Yevamot 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: It teaches

that he divorces her

the yavam

with a bill of divorce, and takes her back

after her divorce; and she is no longer forbidden to him as a brother’s wife, even though the new marital relationship that he establishes after the divorce does not involve the mitzva of yibbum.

According to your statement,

there too, let us say: “And he takes her in yibbum” —

the first yibbum remains upon her,

even after the yavam took her in yibbum to be his wife,

and let her require ḥalitza

in addition to the bill of divorce, so that she would be permitted to marry anyone!

Likewise, if he himself came to take her back after divorcing her, he could not do so, since the status of a brother’s wife would still apply to her. He was permitted to marry a brother’s wife only for the purpose of the marital relationship of yibbum, and not for a marital relationship that does not fulfill the mitzva of “and he takes her to be his wife.”

And we answer:

There it is different—the law there, concerning permitting a woman after she has undergone yibbum to leave the yavam by means of a bill of divorce alone, without requiring ḥalitza, or to return and remarry her own yavam, is different.

for with regard to the permission of a woman who has undergone levirate marriage to leave the yevama's brother-in-law with a bill of divorce alone, without requiring release from the levirate bond, or to marry her yevama's brother-in-law again,

Because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 25]:

[Deuteronomy 25]

“And he takes her to be his wife,”

the verse teaches:

once he has taken her—

she becomes like his wife in every respect.

And once she becomes like his wife in every respect, she leaves him by means of a bill of divorce alone, like any wife, and she is permitted to return to him after her divorce, like any wife.

Nevertheless, she retains the status of “a brother’s wife” of his brother who was not in his world, with regard to the third brother, who was born after the death of the first brother.

And we challenge this:

If so, since she becomes like the yavam’s wife in every respect, and the prohibition of a brother’s wife of the first brother is removed from her—

since she becomes like the yevama's brother-in-law's wife in every respect, and the prohibition against the wife of the first brother is removed from her—

here too,

with regard to the brother who was not in his world, let us say the same thing: Since the prohibition of a brother’s wife was removed from her with regard to the brother who performed yibbum, and she is like his wife in every respect, even when the relationship does not fulfill the mitzva of yibbum, she should no longer be forbidden as the first brother’s wife; consequently, her prohibition should also be removed with regard to the brother who was not in his world!

And we answer:

The Merciful One writes: “And he takes her in yibbum,”

indicating that the first yibbum remains upon her, and she retains the status of the first brother’s wife.

We raise a difficulty: Since we have one exposition that prohibits and another exposition that permits—

what have you seen

that led you to interpret “and he takes her to be his wife” as permitting the yavam to divorce her with a bill of divorce and take her back, while interpreting “and he takes her in yibbum” as prohibiting her to the brother who was not in his world?

And why not say the reverse: She should be permitted to the brother who was not in his world, since when he was born he found her as the wife of the second brother, and I apply to her “and he takes her to be his wife,” for with regard to him she is the second brother’s wife and not the first brother’s wife; therefore, if the second brother dies, he should be permitted to take her in yibbum.

Whereas from “and he takes her in yibbum” we should learn that the first yibbum still remains upon her if he comes to divorce her, so that she would also require ḥalitza and would be forbidden to return to him after her divorce!?

And we answer:

It is reasonable

to say as we have said, because:

Apply

the

permissive interpretation of “and he takes her to be his wife”

to

to the permissive case,

to the yavam to whom she was initially permitted.

And apply

the

prohibitive interpretation of “and he takes her in yibbum”

to

to the prohibited case,

to the brother who was not in his world, to whom she is forbidden because she fell before him from a brother who was not in his world.

The Gemara now clarifies Rabbi Shimon’s position: How can the prohibition of the wife of a brother who was not in his world be removed through the yibbum of the second brother before the birth of the third brother, whereas other prohibitions are not removed in such a manner?

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says:

“If he performed yibbum and the brother was subsequently born,” she is permitted,

since:

a.

The third brother came,

the brother who was not in the world of the first brother,

and “found her in a permitted state,”

when she had undergone yibbum with his brother who was in his world, and she was permitted to him.

And the permission that applied to the second brother now passes to the third brother when he comes to perform yibbum with her after she falls before him from the second brother, since through yibbum the deceased second brother’s marital relationship passes to the third brother with all its permissions.

b.

And she was never subject to the prohibition for even one moment

because she had fallen before the brother who was not in his world.

For had she fallen before him [if she had not undergone yibbum at the time of his birth] and had then become forbidden to him as “the wife of his brother who was not in his world,” the second brother’s yibbum would no longer have been effective in permitting her from this prohibition. Since any yevama with regard to whom, at the time she falls before the yavam, I cannot apply the phrase “he may take her in yibbum,” she is permanently forbidden to him, like the wife of a brother who has children; and yibbum deriving from the second brother cannot remove the prohibition of the wife of a brother who has children.

Thus, if we explain according to Rabbi Shimon that the mitzva of yibbum transfers the deceased’s marital relationship to the yavam together with all its permissions—

Then from now on, his maternal sister, whom

before his birth

his paternal brother married, and

only

afterward this

this

brother

was born and was in the world together with him,

and

the brother who had been married to his maternal sister

died, she should undergo yibbum

with him, despite the fact that she is forbidden to him as his maternal sister,

since he came and found her in a permitted state

with regard to his deceased brother.

For one could say that all the permissions that applied to his brother now pass to him through yibbum, since the meaning of yibbum is the transfer of the deceased’s marital relationship to the yavam, with all its permissions!

The Gemara rejects this: How can this be said?

But

the prohibition of a sister—

where has it gone

?

The Gemara responds rhetorically:

Here too,

in the case where the second brother performed yibbum and the third brother was subsequently born, why should we not raise the same question:

The prohibition of

“the

wife of his brother who was not in the world,”

which applies to the third brother—

where has it gone!?

And the Gemara distinguishes between them:

This,

the prohibition of his maternal sister, is

a prohibition that has no possibility of permission,

as this prohibition was never permitted to anyone.

For the prohibition of his maternal sister was not permitted to his deceased brother, since she was not his sister.

Therefore, it is impossible to permit the prohibition of a sister to the yavam by virtue of the deceased’s marital relationship being transferred to him, since, as stated, the deceased brother had no “permission” with regard to the prohibition of a maternal sister.

But

this,

the prohibition of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, is

a prohibition that does have a possibility of permission.

For the prohibition of the first brother’s wife was permitted to his second brother, who was in his world; what prevented its being permitted to the third brother was only that he was not in the world at the relevant time.

But since, at the time the third brother was born, he found her having undergone yibbum with the second brother, and she was already designated for him for yibbum after the second brother’s death, and through yibbum he receives the deceased’s marital relationship, the permission with regard to the first brother’s wife that the second brother possessed passes to the third brother, since the third brother comes by virtue of the second brother! [The wording of Rashi].

Mishna:

Until now, we learned in the Mishna the law of those women who are forbidden by a prohibition punishable by karet and thereby exempt their rival wives from ḥalitza and yibbum. The Mishna now explains the law of a yevama who is forbidden to the yavam by a prohibition of a negative or positive mitzva alone, or who is forbidden to him by a rabbinic prohibition:

They stated a general principle with regard to a yevama:

a.

Any

yevama

whose prohibition

to the yavam is

“a prohibition of forbidden relations,”

which is punishable by karet—

the rival wife of the forbidden woman

does not perform ḥalitza and does not undergo yibbum.

And certainly the forbidden woman herself is exempt from ḥalitza and yibbum.

b. If the yevama was forbidden to the yavam by

“a prohibition of mitzva,”

which is a rabbinic prohibition of “secondary relatives,” as the Sages also prohibited the relatives of those forbidden relations, as the Mishna will explain shortly;

and

likewise, if she was forbidden by

“a prohibition of sanctity,”

which is a priestly prohibition, such as a divorcee to a koen, as the Mishna will explain shortly—

she herself

performs ḥalitza but does not undergo yibbum.

c. The Sages likewise prohibited the relatives of the yevama who falls before him and is “bound” to him for yibbum.

Therefore, if two sisters, from two of his brothers, fall before the yavam, he may not perform yibbum with either of them, since each is forbidden to him as the “sister of one bound to him.”

But if it happened that one of the two sisters who fell before him was forbidden to him as a forbidden relation, the forbidden woman is not considered “bound to him,” and her sister, who is permitted to him, is not considered the “sister of one bound to him.” Therefore:

Her sister

of the forbidden woman,

who,

when she is

“her yevama,”

falls with her for yibbum,

performs ḥalitza or undergoes yibbum.

For, as stated, there is no bond between the sister who is a forbidden relation and the yavam, and consequently the permitted sister is not considered the “sister of one bound to him.”

The Mishna now explains what is meant by a prohibition of mitzva and what is meant by a prohibition of sanctity:

“A prohibition of mitzva”—

“secondary relatives

to forbidden relations,” whose prohibition is

by rabbinic ordinance;

their parameters will be explained in the Gemara.

“A prohibition of sanctity”—

a widow to a High Priest; a divorcee or a woman who performed ḥalitza to an ordinary koen; a mamzeret or a netina to an Israelite; and an Israelite woman to a netin or a mamzer.

For example, his brother married them in violation of the prohibition, and betrothal takes effect with women who are forbidden to the man who betroths them when they are not forbidden to him as forbidden relations punishable by karet.

These women do not undergo yibbum, since they are forbidden to the yavam, but they require ḥalitza, because they are not comparable to a wife’s sister, from whom the exemption of a forbidden relation from yibbum and ḥalitza is derived.

Gemara:

The wording “They stated a general principle with regard to a yevama” indicates that there are additional cases beyond those detailed by the Mishna, which the Mishna did not specify but included within this “general principle.”

We raise a difficulty:

“A general principle,”

as stated by our Mishna—

what does it come to include?

What does it come to add?

Rafram bar Pappa said: It comes to include the rival wife of an aylonit.

That is, an aylonit, who is incapable of bearing children and is therefore exempt from yibbum, also exempts her rival wife from ḥalitza and yibbum.

And this is in accordance with Rav Asi,

who holds that the rival wife of an aylonit is exempt from ḥalitza and yibbum.

And there are those who say

that this is how the difficulty was raised:

We learned in our Mishna this general principle: Any woman who is a forbidden relation—[her rival wife, and all the more so she herself] does not perform ḥalitza and does not undergo yibbum.

We should infer from this general principle that

“anyone whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations”—

it is she whose rival wife is forbidden.

But

if

not

was her

prohibition a prohibition of forbidden relations—

her rival wife is not forbidden.

If so, the word “any” [anyone whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations]—

what does it exclude?

Which rival wife does it come to exclude?

After all, even without the word “any,” we know that any yevama whose prohibition is not a prohibition of forbidden relations does not render her rival wife forbidden!

Rafram said: It comes to exclude the rival wife of an aylonit,

who is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation and may therefore undergo yibbum, despite the fact that the aylonit herself is the forbidden relation of the wife of a brother for whom yibbum is not possible; consequently, her rival wife is the rival wife of a forbidden relation for whom yibbum is not possible.

The reason that her rival wife is not exempt because she is the rival wife of the forbidden relation of the wife of a brother is that the forbidden relation of the aylonit does not prevent yibbum. Rather, it is her status as an aylonit, who cannot give birth, that prevents her yibbum.

Therefore, the fact that the aylonit is the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife does not exempt her rival wife from yibbum.

And this is not in accordance with Rav Asi,

who holds that an aylonit indeed exempts her rival wife from yibbum and ḥalitza.

The Gemara now explains what we learned in our Mishna:

Her sister, who is her yevama,

performs ḥalitza or undergoes yibbum.

Her sister,

who is her yevama—

whose sister?

Which sister is being discussed?

If you say

the sister

of a prohibition of mitzva [a sister of a secondary relative prohibited by rabbinic law],

[the sister of a woman forbidden as a secondary relative by rabbinic enactment],

it is impossible for her to be permitted to undergo yibbum.

Since by Torah law she is before him,

since by Torah law her sister, who is subject to a prohibition of mitzva, falls before him for yibbum, the sister who is not subject to the prohibition of mitzva is considered the sister of one bound to him; and if he has intercourse with her—

he has violated the prohibition against the sister of one bound to him!

Rather,

the Mishna must necessarily be speaking of

her sister who is a forbidden relation.

Since her sister is a forbidden relation to the yavam, she is not bound to him; therefore, she is not considered the sister of one bound to him, and the sister performs ḥalitza or undergoes yibbum.

We learned in the Mishna:

A prohibition of mitzva—

“secondary relatives.”

We raise a difficulty:

Why did the tanna call

the “secondary relatives”—

“a prohibition of mitzva”?

Abaye said:

It is named so because

“it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“A prohibition of sanctity: a widow to a High Priest; a divorcee or a woman who performed ḥalitza to an ordinary koen.”

We raise a difficulty:

And why did it call them

the prohibitions governing marriage to a koen

“a prohibition of sanctity”?

And we answer:

As it is written concerning kohanim [Leviticus 21]:

“They shall be holy to their God,”

“They shall be holy to their God,”

which precedes the verse prohibiting them from taking a divorcee or a woman rendered profaned.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda interchanges

the definitions of a prohibition of mitzva and a prohibition of sanctity that we learned in our Mishna.

A prohibition of mitzva—

a widow to a High Priest; a divorcee or a woman who performed ḥalitza to an ordinary koen.

The Gemara explains:

And why did he call it a prohibition of mitzva?

As it is written at the end of Leviticus, called “the Torah of the Kohanim” [27:34]:

“These are the mitzvot.”

“These are the mitzvot.”

The beraita continues with Rabbi Yehuda’s interchange:

“A prohibition of sanctity”—

secondary relatives by rabbinic ordinance.

The Gemara explains:

And why did he call it “a prohibition of sanctity”?

Abaye said: Anyone who fulfills the words of the Sages is called “holy.”

Rava said to him: But

is it true that

anyone who does not fulfill the words of the Sages

“holy,”

is merely not called “holy,”

whereas he

is not also called “wicked”—

he is not called that!?

Rather, Rava said: “A prohibition of sanctity” is an expression derived from

We learned in the Mishna: A prohibition associated with holiness:

“sanctify yourself through what is permitted to you.”

We learned in the Mishna: A prohibition of sanctity:

a widow to a High Priest,

she performs ḥalitza but does not undergo yibbum.

We raise a difficulty:

The tanna states categorically

the matter as definitive,

and teaches: “A widow to a High Priest”—

from marriage, and it makes no difference

it makes no difference

whether she is a widow

from marriage, and it makes no difference

whether she is a widow

from betrothal;

she does not undergo yibbum, but performs ḥalitza.

Granted,

a widow

from marriage

properly does not undergo yibbum with a High Priest, since she is forbidden to him by both the prohibition of

a positive mitzva, “He shall take a woman in her virginity,”

positive commandment of levirate marriage

and

also by

a negative mitzva, “He shall not take a widow.”

Rather,

And the

mitzva of

yibbum

does not

override the

prohibitions of

a negative and a positive mitzva that apply to a High Priest with regard to a widow.

should come and

But a widow

the

from betrothal, whose prohibition to a High Priest is merely a

prohibiting a widow from betrothal to a High Priest, and it should be permitted for him to perform levirate marriage with her!?

“negative mitzva” alone,

since the positive prohibition concerning a non-virgin does not apply to her, as she is a virgin—

if so,

the positive mitzva

of yibbum

should override

the

negative mitzva

prohibiting a widow from betrothal to a High Priest, and it should be permitted for him to perform yibbum with her!?

Rav Giddel said that Rav said: A widow from betrothal to a High Priest was excluded by a special derivation, establishing that she does not undergo yibbum but performs ḥalitza:

For the verse begins by saying: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama,” and it could have continued by saying, “then she shall go up to the gate,” without needing to say, “then his yevama shall go up to the gate.”

The verse says in the passage concerning yibbum [Deuteronomy 25:7]:

And it shall be, if the man does not desire to take his yevama” —

“And it shall be, if the man does not wish to take his yevama”—

“then his yevama shall go up to the gate …

and remove his shoe.”

The word “his yevama” appears twice in this verse, and the second occurrence is superfluous!

There is no need

to

say,

to write it a second time,

“his yevama.”

For the verse begins by saying, “And it shall be, if the man does not wish to take his yevama,” and it could have continued, “then she shall go up to the gate”; it need not have said, “then his yevama shall go up to the gate.”

For it is clear that the “yevama” mentioned at the outset—whom the yavam does not wish to take—is the one who goes up to the gate for chalitza.

And if so,

what does “his yevama"

teach? What does the superfluous word teach?

It comes to include a yevama who had not previously been included in the verse, and to say that she, too, undergoes chalitza, despite the fact that she does not undergo yibbum:

There is another yevama who goes

up to the gate

for chalitza, but does not go up for yibbum.

And which one

is she?

This

is the yevama who is forbidden to the yavam because she is

“one of those liable for violating prohibitions”

.

The superfluous wording of the verse, the word “his yevama,” teaches that even a yevama who is among those liable for violating prohibitions, and who is not eligible for yibbum, must nevertheless undergo chalitza.

And it is evident that without this superfluous wording, not only would the mitzva of yibbum not have the power to override the prohibition of priesthood, so that she could not undergo yibbum; she would not even require chalitza!

And this is the derivation from the verse [according to Rashi; see Tosafot]:

Had the verse said only, “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama—she shall go up to the gate, and she shall remove his shoe,” the meaning of this verse would have been that a yevama forbidden by a prohibition does not even require chalitza!

For this would have been its meaning:

Only with regard to one of whom we can read, “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama”—meaning that he could “take” his yevama if he so wished, and that he could choose not to wish to do so—only with regard to her do I read the continuation of the verse: “she shall go up to the gate, and she shall remove his shoe.”

But with regard to any yevama of whom I cannot read the beginning of the verse, “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama”—including a yevama forbidden by a prohibition, whom he cannot “take” because of the prohibition [were it not for the possibility that the positive mitzva overrides the prohibition]—I cannot read with regard to her either the continuation of the verse: “she shall go up to the gate, and she shall remove his shoe.”

Therefore, the verse added the word “his yevama,” stating: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate ... and she shall remove his shoe,” to teach you that even a yevama of whom I cannot read the beginning of the verse, “if he does not wish to take her”—for even if he wishes to take her, he cannot do so—is nevertheless called “his yevama,” and she, too, must go up to the gate for chalitza.

And it is evident from here that the positive mitzva of yibbum does not override a prohibition in the case of those liable for violating prohibitions; rather, it is solely by virtue of the superfluous wording “his yevama” that she is eligible for chalitza.

And the reason is that even with regard to those liable for violating prohibitions, I cannot read, “But if the man does not wish to take her.”

For if the positive mitzva did override the prohibition, and we could read with regard to her “to take,” so that she would indeed undergo yibbum, there would be no need at all for the superfluous word “his yevama” to teach that she requires chalitza, since if the positive mitzva overrides the prohibition here, she would even undergo yibbum!

We challenge this: According to your explanation, that the superfluous word “his yevama” comes to teach that even when I cannot read with regard to the yevama the beginning of the verse, “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama” [because the matter does not depend on his desire, but he is forbidden to take her], she is nevertheless eligible for chalitza, based on the exposition of “then his yevama shall go up to the gate, and she shall remove his shoe”

—say

that the superfluous word “his yevama” comes to include even

those liable to karet,

so that they would require chalitza, despite the fact that I cannot read with regard to them the beginning of the verse, “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama”

!

The superfluous word “his yevama” would thus teach the novel ruling that every yevama—even if she is a forbidden relation liable to karet, who cannot undergo yibbum, and of whom I cannot read “to take”—must nevertheless go up to the gate for chalitza.

We answer: It is impossible to say that the verse innovated, through the superfluous word “his yevama,” that even those liable to karet require chalitza.

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 25]: “

And if the man does not wish to take

his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate ... and she shall remove his shoe.”

And this is what we infer from the meaning of the verse:

If he does not wish to perform yibbum, then he performs chalitza.

Indeed,

if he

wishes

to perform yibbum—

he performs yibbum!

And from here we learn a principle:

Every

yevama [only a yevama]

who is eligible for yibbum [with regard to whom I can read, “But if the man does not wish to take her”—indeed, if he wishes to perform yibbum, he performs yibbum]—

goes up for halitza.

is eligible for chalitza.

And only with regard to her do I read the continuation of the verse, “Then his yevama shall go up to the gate, and she shall remove his shoe.”

But

nevertheless,

every

yevama

who is not eligible for yibbum [with regard to whom I cannot read, “If he does not wish to perform yibbum, she shall remove his shoe”—indeed, if he wishes to perform yibbum, he performs yibbum]—

does not

is not

[she is not]

eligible for chalitza.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that the superfluous wording “his yevama” comes to include even a forbidden relation among those liable to karet for chalitza.

We challenge this:

If so,

if we are to derive a meaning from the verse that, as a general rule, anyone who is not eligible for yibbum is not eligible for chalitza—then yevamot who are

also those liable for violating prohibitions

should likewise be exempt from chalitza according to this principle, since they are not eligible for yibbum! We answer:

Indeed,

there is, on the other hand,

a verse that includes

[we have the inclusion of]

“his yevama,”

which states that there is a yevama who is not eligible for yibbum and nevertheless is obligated to undergo chalitza!

And since we have two contradictory derivations, we must say that the principle, “Anyone who is not eligible for yibbum is not eligible for chalitza,” comes to exclude those liable to karet from chalitza.

Whereas the inclusion derived from “his yevama” teaches that those liable for violating prohibitions are obligated to undergo chalitza!

We refute this:

What did you see?

That is, from where do you know that we should distinguish between those liable for violating prohibitions and those liable to karet?

After all, in both cases I cannot read “to take” with regard to them initially.

And if so, why does the inclusion derived from “his yevama” teach specifically about those liable for violating prohibitions, that they undergo chalitza despite the fact that we cannot read “to take” with regard to them, and not about those liable to karet, who should likewise be obligated to undergo chalitza despite the fact that we cannot read “to take” with regard to them?

And the fact that we have a contrary derivation, that “anyone who is not eligible for yibbum is not eligible for chalitza,” still does not establish or explain the distinction between those liable to karet and those liable for violating prohibitions.