Yevamot 20a — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: It teaches ![](pamud.bmp "

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that he divorces her

the yavam

with a bill of divorce, and takes her back

after her divorce; and she is no longer forbidden to him under the prohibition of a brother’s wife, even though the new marriage that he establishes after the divorce does not involve the mitzva of yibbum.

According to your words,

there too, let us also say: “And he takes her in yibbum” —

the first yibbum remains upon her,

even after the yavam took her in yibbum to be his wife,

and she should require ḥalitza

in addition to a bill of divorce in order that she be permitted to marry any person!

And likewise, if he himself comes to take her back after divorcing her, he cannot do so, since the designation “a brother’s wife” still applies to her; and a brother’s wife was permitted to him only for the purpose of a yibbum marriage, and not for the purpose of a marriage that does not fulfill the mitzva of “and he shall take her to himself as a wife.”

And we answer:

There it is different,

the law there, concerning the permission of a woman after she was taken in yibbum, to leave the yavam by a bill of divorce alone, so that she need not perform ḥalitza, or to return and marry her own yavam anew.

Because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 25]

“

and he shall take her to himself as a wife,”

the verse teaches:

once he has taken her —

she becomes like his wife in every respect.

And once she becomes like his wife in every respect, she leaves through a bill of divorce alone, like every wife, and she is permitted to return to him after her divorce, like every wife.

But she still bears the designation “a brother’s wife” of his brother who was not in his world, with regard to the third brother who was born after the death of the first brother.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that she becomes like the yavam’s wife in every respect, and the prohibition of the first brother’s wife is removed from her —

here too,

with regard to his brother who was not in his world, let us say the same thing: since the prohibition of a brother’s wife was removed from her [with regard to the brother performing yibbum], and she is like his wife in every respect, even not for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of yibbum, she is no longer forbidden because of the first brother’s wife; therefore her prohibition should also be removed with regard to the brother who was not in his world!

And we answer:

But the Merciful One wrote: “And he takes her in yibbum,”

teaching that the first yibbum remains upon her, and the designation “the first brother’s wife” remains upon her.

And we inquire: Since we have one exposition to prohibit and another exposition to permit —

what did you see

to expound “and he shall take her to himself as a wife” in order to permit the yavam to divorce her with a bill of divorce and take her back, while, on the other hand, to expound “and he takes her in yibbum” in order to prohibit her to his brother who was not in his world?

And why should we not say the opposite: that she is permitted to the brother who was not in his world, since when he was born he found her as the second brother’s wife, and I apply to her “and he shall take her to himself as a wife,” since with regard to him she is the wife of the second brother and not of the first; and if the second brother dies, it will be permitted for him to take her in yibbum,

whereas from “and he takes her in yibbum” it is learned that the first yibbum still remains upon her if he comes to divorce her, and she will also require ḥalitza, and she will be forbidden to return to him after her divorce!?

And we answer:

It is reasonable

to say as we said, because:

Apply

the

permission

of “and he shall take her to himself as a wife”

to the permission,

to the yavam to whom she was initially permitted.

And apply

the

prohibition

of “and he takes her in yibbum”

to the prohibition,

to his brother who was not in his world, to whom she is forbidden because of her falling from his brother who was not in his world.

And the Gemara clarifies Rabbi Shimon’s position: How does the prohibition of the wife of his brother who was not in his world disappear through the yibbum of the second brother before the birth of the third brother, whereas other prohibitions do not disappear in such a manner?

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says “he performed yibbum and afterward [the third brother] was born,” she is permitted,

“If he performed yibbum and the brother was subsequently born,” she is permitted,

since:

1.

The third brother came,

the brother who was not in the world of the first brother,

and “found her in a permitted state,”

when she had been taken in yibbum by his brother who was in his world, and she was permitted to him.

And the permission of the second brother now passes to the third brother, when he comes to take her in yibbum because of her falling from the second brother, since through yibbum the deceased’s marriage relationship with the second brother passes to the third brother with all its permissions.

2.

And she did not stand before him for even one moment in a prohibited state

because of the falling of the brother who was not in his world.

For had she fallen before him [if she had not been taken in yibbum at the time of his birth] and had then become forbidden to him on account of “the wife of his brother who was not in his world,” the second brother’s yibbum would no longer have been effective for him to permit her from this prohibition. Since any yevama concerning whom I cannot apply, at the time of her falling, “his yevama, he shall come upon her,” she is thereby forbidden to him forever, like the wife of a brother who has children; and yibbum by virtue of the second brother cannot remove the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children.

Thus, if we explain according to Rabbi Shimon that the mitzva of yibbum transfers the deceased’s marriage relationship to the yavam together with all its permissions —

From now, his maternal sister, who

before his birth

was married by his paternal brother, and

only

afterward the

this

brother

was born, and he was in his world,

and the

brother who was married to his maternal sister died, she too

should be taken in yibbum

by him, despite the fact that she is forbidden to him as his maternal sister,

since he came and found her in a permitted state

to his deceased brother.

For it would be said that all the permissions that his brother had now pass to him through yibbum, since the meaning of yibbum is the transfer of the deceased’s marriage relationship to the one performing yibbum, with all its permissions!

The Gemara rejects this: How can this be said?

But

the prohibition of a sister —

where did it go,

did it go!?

And the Gemara answers by way of a rhetorical question:

Here too,

in the case where the second brother performed yibbum and afterward the third brother was born, why should we not ask the same question:

The prohibition of “

the

brother’s wife who was not in the world,”

which applies to the third brother —

where did it go!?

And the Gemara distinguishes between them:

This

, the prohibition of his mother’s daughter, is

a prohibition that has no permission,

as this prohibition was not permitted to anyone.

For the prohibition of a maternal sister was not permitted to the brother who died, since she was not his sister.

Therefore it is impossible to permit the prohibition of a sister to the yavam by virtue of the deceased’s marriage relationship transferred to him, because, as stated, the deceased brother had no “permission” with regard to the prohibition of his maternal sister.

But

this,

the prohibition of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, is

a prohibition that has a permission.

For the second brother, who was in his world, was permitted the prohibition of the first brother’s wife; and what was not permitted to the third brother was only because he was not in his world.

But since, at the time the third brother was born, he found her taken in yibbum by the second brother, and she was already now designated for him for yibbum after the death of the second brother, and through yibbum he receives the deceased’s marriage relationship, the permission concerning the first brother’s wife that the second brother had passes to the third brother, since the third brother comes by virtue of the second brother! [The wording of Rashi].

Mishna:

Until now we learned in the Mishna the law of the forbidden relations that are forbidden by a prohibition punishable by karet and exempt their rival wives from ḥalitza and from yibbum. Now the Mishna explains the law of the yevama who is forbidden to the yavam by a prohibition of a negative commandment or a positive commandment alone, or who is forbidden to him by a rabbinic prohibition:

They stated a general rule concerning a yevama:

1.

Every

yevama

whose prohibition

to her yavam is

“the prohibition of a forbidden relation,”

which involves karet —

the rival wife of the forbidden relation

does not perform ḥalitza and is not taken in yibbum.

And all the more so, the forbidden relation herself is exempt from ḥalitza and from yibbum.

2. If the yevama was forbidden to the yavam by

“the prohibition of a mitzva,”

which is the rabbinic prohibition of “secondary forbidden relations,” by which the Sages also prohibited the relatives of the forbidden relations, as the Mishna will explain shortly,

and

likewise if she was forbidden by

“the prohibition of sanctity,”

which is a priesthood prohibition, such as a divorcee to a koen, as the Mishna will explain shortly —

then she herself

performs ḥalitza but is not taken in yibbum.

3. Likewise, the Sages prohibited the relatives of the yevama who falls before him and is “bound” to him for yibbum.

Therefore, if two sisters, from two of his brothers, fell before the yavam, he is forbidden to take either of them in yibbum, since each one is forbidden to him by the prohibition of “the sister of one bound to him.”

But if it happened that one of the two sisters who fell before him was forbidden to him by the prohibition of a forbidden relation, then the forbidden relation is not considered “one bound to him,” and her sister who is permitted to him is not considered “the sister of one bound to him”; therefore:

Her sister

of the forbidden relation,

who,

when she

“is her fellow yevama,”

falls for yibbum together with her,

performs ḥalitza or is taken in yibbum.

Since, as stated, there is no bond between the sister who is a forbidden relation and the yavam, it follows that the permitted sister is not considered “the sister of one bound to him.”

And now the Mishna explains what is the prohibition of a mitzva and what is the prohibition of sanctity:

“The prohibition of a mitzva” —

“secondary relations

to forbidden relations,” whose prohibition is

from the words of the Scribes,

and their definition will be explained in the Gemara.

“The prohibition of sanctity” —

a widow to a High Priest, a divorcee and a woman released by ḥalitza to an ordinary priest, a mamzeret and a netina to an Israelite, and an Israelite woman to a netin and a mamzer.

And this is, for example, when his brother married them in violation, and betrothal takes effect with women forbidden to the one who betroths them when they are not forbidden to him as forbidden relations involving karet.

And these women are not taken in yibbum, since they are forbidden to the yavam, but they require ḥalitza, because they are not comparable to a wife’s sister, from whom the exemption of a forbidden relation from yibbum and from ḥalitza is derived.

Gemara:

The wording “They stated a general rule concerning a yevama” means that there are additional matters beyond what the Mishna specifies, which the Mishna did not specify but assigns to this “general rule.”

And we inquire:

“A general rule,”

which our Mishna stated —

what does it come to include,

what does it come to add?

Rafram bar Pappa said: It comes to include the rival wife of an aylonit.

That is, an aylonit, who is not fit to bear children and is therefore exempt from yibbum, exempts her rival wife from ḥalitza and from yibbum as well.

And this is in accordance with Rav Asi,

who holds that the rival wife of an aylonit is exempt from ḥalitza and yibbum.

There are those who say

that this is how we inquired:

This that we learned in our Mishna as a general rule: Any one whose prohibition is the prohibition of a forbidden relation [her rival wife, and all the more so she herself] does not perform ḥalitza and is not taken in yibbum.

We must infer from this general rule that

“any one whose prohibition is the prohibition of a forbidden relation” —

it is she whose rival wife is forbidden.

But,

if

not

was her

prohibition the prohibition of a forbidden relation —

her rival wife is not forbidden.

If so, the word “any” [any one whose prohibition is the prohibition of a forbidden relation] —

what does it exclude,

which rival wife does it come to exclude?

But even without the word “any,” we know that every yevama whose prohibition is not the prohibition of a forbidden relation has a rival wife who is not forbidden!

Rafram said: To exclude the rival wife of an aylonit,

who is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation, and she is taken in yibbum, despite the fact that the aylonit herself is the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife for whom there is no permission of yibbum; it follows that her rival wife is the rival wife of a forbidden relation for whom there is no permission of yibbum.

And the reason that her rival wife is not exempt because she is the rival wife of the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife is that the forbidden relation of the aylonit as a brother’s wife does not prevent yibbum. Rather, it is her being an aylonit, who does not give birth, that prevents her yibbum.

Therefore, the fact that the aylonit is the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife does not exempt her rival wife from yibbum.

And this is not in accordance with Rav Asi,

who holds that an aylonit does indeed exempt her rival wife from yibbum and from ḥalitza.

And now the Gemara explains what we learned in our Mishna:

“Her sister who is her fellow yevama”

performs ḥalitza or is taken in yibbum.

Her sister

who is her fellow yevama —

whose?

Which sister is under discussion?

If you say

the sister

of the prohibition of a mitzva [the sister of a secondary relation prohibited by rabbinic law].

It cannot be that she is permitted to be taken in yibbum.

She cannot be permitted to be taken in yibbum.

Since by Torah law she is cast before him,

since by Torah law her sister, who is a prohibition of a mitzva, falls for yibbum, the sister who does not involve the prohibition of a mitzva is considered the sister of one bound to him; and if he comes upon her —

he has encountered the sister of one bound to him!

Rather,

necessarily, the Mishna is speaking of

the sister of a forbidden relation.

Since her sister is a forbidden relation to the yavam, she is not bound to him; therefore she is not considered the sister of one bound to him, and she performs ḥalitza or is taken in yibbum.

We learned in the Mishna:

The prohibition of a mitzva —

“secondary relations.”

And we inquire:

Why did he call it

the tannai “secondary relations” —

“the prohibition of a mitzva”?

Abaye said:

because of

“it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages.”

We learned in the Mishna:

The prohibition of sanctity: a widow to a High Priest, a divorcee and a woman released by ḥalitza to an ordinary priest.

And we inquire:

And why did he call them

the prohibitions of marriage to the priesthood

“the prohibition of sanctity”?

And we answer:

As it is written concerning priests [Leviticus 21]

[before the verse prohibiting them from taking a divorcee and a woman profaned,]

“They shall be holy to their God,”

before the verse that prohibits them from taking a divorcee and a woman profaned.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda exchanges

the definitions that we learned in our Mishna for the prohibition of a mitzva and the prohibition of sanctity.

The prohibition of a mitzva —

a widow to a High Priest, a divorcee and a woman released by ḥalitza to an ordinary priest.

And the Gemara explains:

And why did he call it the prohibition of a mitzva?

As it is written at the end of the book of Leviticus, called “Torat Kohanim” [27:34],

“These are the mitzvot.”

“These are the mitzvot.”

And the beraita continues Rabbi Yehuda’s exchange:

“The prohibition of sanctity” —

secondary relations from the words of the Scribes.

And the Gemara explains:

And why did he call it “the prohibition of sanctity”?

Abaye said: Anyone who fulfills the words of the Sages is called “holy.”

Rava said to him: And

is it so that

anyone who does not fulfill the words of the Sages

is merely

not called “holy,”

whereas

“wicked” also —

is he not called!?

Rather, Rava said: “The prohibition of sanctity” is an expression of

“sanctify yourself through what is permitted to you.”

“Sanctify yourself through what is permitted to you.”

We learned in the Mishna: The prohibition of sanctity:

a widow to a High Priest,

she performs ḥalitza but is not taken in yibbum.

And we inquire:

The tannai stated categorically

an absolute and decisive matter,

and taught “

a widow to a High Priest” —

it is no different

a widow

from marriage, and it is no different

a widow

from betrothal,

she is not taken in yibbum, but performs ḥalitza.

Granted,

a widow

from marriage,

it is properly stated that she is not taken in yibbum by a High Priest, since she is forbidden to him both by the prohibition of

a positive commandment, “He shall take a woman in her virginity,”

and

by

also a

negative commandment, “He shall not take a widow.”

And

the

mitzva of

the positive commandment

of yibbum

does not override

the prohibitions of

a negative commandment and a positive commandment

of a High Priest with regard to a widow.

But

a widow

from betrothal, whose prohibition to a High Priest is solely a

prohibition of

“a negative commandment,”

since she does not involve the positive-commandment prohibition of a woman who has had intercourse, as she is a virgin.

If so,

the positive commandment

of yibbum

should override

the

negative commandment

of a widow from betrothal to a High Priest, and it should be permitted for him to take her in yibbum!?

Rav Giddel said that Rav said: A widow from betrothal to a High Priest was excluded by a special derivation, that she is not taken in yibbum but performs ḥalitza:

For the verse begins by saying: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama,” and it could have continued by saying, “then she shall go up to the gate,” without needing to say, “then his yevama shall go up to the gate.”

the verse says in the passage concerning yibbum: [Deuteronomy 25:7] “

And it shall be, if the man does not desire to take his yevama” —

then his yevama shall go up to the gate ...

“then his yevama shall go up to the gate …

and she shall remove his shoe.”

The word “his yevama” is written twice in this verse, and the second occurrence is superfluous!

There is no need

there is no need

to say,

to write it a second time,

“his yevama.”

For the verse begins and says: “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama,” and it could have continued by saying “then she shall go up to the gate,” and it would not have needed to say “then his yevama shall go up to the gate.”

For it is clear that the “his yevama” mentioned at the beginning, whom the yavam did not wish to take, is the one who goes up to the gateway for halitza.

And if so,

what is the purpose of saying “his yevama”

? What does the extra word come to teach?

To include a yevama who had not until now been included in the verse, and to say that she too performs halitza, even though she does not undergo yibbum:

There is another yevama who goes up

to the gateway

for halitza, but does not go up for yibbum.

And which

one

is this?

It is the yevama who is forbidden to the yavam because she is

“subject to a negative commandment.”

And the extra wording of the verse, the word “his yevama,” teaches that even a yevama who is subject to a negative commandment, and does not go up for yibbum, nevertheless needs to perform halitza.

And it is proven that without this extra wording, not only would the mitzva of yibbum not have the power to override the prohibition of priesthood, and she would not undergo yibbum, but she would not even need halitza!

And this is the derivation from the verse [according to Rashi! And see Tosafot]:

Had the verse said only, “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama—then she shall go up to the gateway, and she shall remove,” the meaning of this verse would have been that a yevama forbidden by a negative commandment does not even need halitza!

For this would have been its meaning:

Only with regard to one about whom we read, “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama,” meaning that it is possible for him to “take” his yevama if he so desires, and he can not desire this, only with regard to her do I read the continuation of the verse: “and she shall go up to the gateway, and she shall remove.”

But with regard to every yevama about whom I do not read the beginning of the verse, “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama,” including a yevama forbidden by a prohibition, whom he cannot “take” because of the prohibition [were it not for the overriding of the positive commandment over the prohibition!], with regard to them I do not read the continuation of the verse either: “and she shall go up to the gateway, and she shall remove.”

Therefore, the verse added the word “his yevama,” and wrote: “And it shall be, if the man does not desire to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gateway ... and she shall remove,” to teach you that even with regard to a yevama about whom I do not read the beginning of the verse, “and if he does not desire to take”—for even if he desires her, he cannot take her—nevertheless she is called “his yevama,” and she too needs to go up to the gateway, for halitza.

And it is proven from here that the positive commandment of yibbum does not override a negative commandment in the case of women subject to negative commandments, and it is only by virtue of the extra wording “his yevama” that she goes up for halitza.

And the reason for this is that even with regard to women subject to negative commandments, I do not read in their case, “And if the man does not desire to take.”

For if a positive commandment did override a negative commandment, and we would read with regard to her “to take,” and she would also undergo yibbum, there would be no need at all for the extra word “his yevama” to teach that she needs halitza, since if a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment here, she would also undergo yibbum!

And we object: According to your words, that the extra word “his yevama” came to introduce the novelty that even if I do not read in the yevama the beginning of the verse, “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama” [for the matter does not depend on his desire, but it is forbidden for him to take her], nevertheless she goes up for halitza, from the inclusion of “and his yevama shall go up to the gateway, and she shall remove”—

raise an objection:

And say

that the extra word “his yevama” came to include even

women liable to karet

who would need halitza, even though I do not read in their case the beginning of the verse, “And if the man does not desire to take his yevama”!

And the extra wording “his yevama” comes to say the novel point that every yevama, even if she is a forbidden relation liable to karet, who cannot undergo yibbum, and with regard to whom I do not read “to take,” is nevertheless obligated to go up to the gateway to perform halitza.

And we answer: It is impossible to say that the verse introduced the novelty, through the extra wording “his yevama,” that even women liable to karet need halitza.

For, in contrast, we have a derivation from the wording of the verse that a yevama who does not undergo yibbum is exempt even from halitza:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 25], “And

if the man does not desire to take

his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gateway ... and he shall remove his shoe.”

And this is what we can infer from the meaning of the verse:

If he does not desire to perform yibbum—then he performs halitza.

Indeed,

if he

desires

to perform yibbum—

he performs yibbum!

And from here we have learned a principle:

Every

[only] yevama who

goes up for yibbum [with regard to whom I read, “And if the man does not desire to take,” indeed, if he desires to perform yibbum, he performs yibbum]—

goes up for halitza.

And only with regard to her do I read the continuation of the verse, “And his yevama shall go up to the gateway, and she shall remove his shoe.”

But

and

nevertheless,

every

yevama

who does not go up for yibbum [with regard to whom I do not read, “If he does not desire, then he shall remove his shoe”—indeed, if he desires to perform yibbum, he performs yibbum]—

does not

[she does not]

go up for halitza.

And therefore, it is impossible to say that the extra wording “his yevama” came to include even a forbidden relation among women liable to karet for halitza.

And we object:

If so,

if that is so,

that we must derive a meaning from the verse in general, that anyone who does not go up for yibbum does not go up for halitza—yevamot who are

subject to negative commandments, too,

should be exempt from halitza, according to this principle. For they do not go up for yibbum! And we answer:

Indeed,

in contrast

the Merciful One included

[we have the inclusion of]

“his yevama,”

which says that there is a yevama who does not go up for yibbum and nevertheless is obligated in halitza!

And since we have two opposing derivations, we must say that the principle, “Anyone who does not go up for yibbum does not go up for halitza,” comes to exclude women liable to karet from halitza.

Whereas the inclusion of “his yevama” teaches that women subject to negative commandments are obligated in halitza!

And we refute this:

And what have you seen?

That is, from where do you have [the basis] to distinguish between women subject to negative commandments and women liable to karet!?

After all, in both cases I do not read “to take” initially.

And if so, why does the inclusion of “his yevama” teach specifically with regard to women subject to negative commandments, that they perform halitza even though we do not read “to take” with regard to them, and not with regard to women liable to karet, that they should be obligated in halitza even though we do not read “to take” with regard to them?

And the fact that we have an opposing derivation, that “anyone who does not go up for yibbum does not go up for halitza,” still neither necessitates nor explains the distinction between women liable to karet and women subject to negative commandments.