Yevamot 19b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says:

if the second performed maamar with the wife of the first, it is uncertain whether maamar acquires her [and as the Gemara brought earlier, at the beginning of the page, that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether maamar acquires or does not acquire her].

Therefore,

the intercourse or the halitza of one of them—

exempts her rival-wife.

And later the Gemara will explain that Rabbi Shimon is speaking of a case in which he performed maamar with her and afterward a brother was born.

But Rabbi Shimon added that the matter is not stated concerning the intercourse or the halitza of each of the two.

Rather, if

he performed halitza with the possessor of maamar

the wife of the first brother—

the rival-wife is not exempt,

the wife of the second brother. For Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether maamar acquires her; and if it does not acquire her, then the possessor of maamar, who is the wife of the first, is forbidden to him by the law of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and her halitza is nothing.

Only if he had intercourse with the second or performed halitza for her is the first also exempt.

For whichever way you consider it: if maamar acquires her, then the first is not forbidden by the law of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, since the third brother was born after the second had performed maamar with her, and the third found her as the wife of the second. Therefore, the second is not the rival-wife of a forbidden relation; rather, both of them fall before the second alone, and the halitza of the second exempts the first as well.

And if maamar does not acquire her, then the first is the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and she leaves the third without halitza, as the law of a forbidden relation. And the second is not considered the rival-wife of a forbidden relation, since maamar does not acquire her.

Thus far are the words of Rabbi Shimon.

And the baraita continues, according to the words of the Sages:

If

he brought her into his house

the second bringing in the wife of the first,

and the second died,

and afterward a brother was born to him,

and afterward a brother was born to him,

and the brother who was born found her as the wife of his brother who was not in his world.

Or a brother was born to him, and afterward he brought her into his house

the second,

and he died—

that is, he was born and afterward performed yibbum.

Both of them are exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

The first by virtue of the forbidden relation of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and the second by virtue of the rival-wife of a forbidden relation.

And this law is according to everyone. And it is like the words of Rav Pappa, and not like the words of Rabbi Oshaya.

And if

he brought her into his house

the second,

and

afterward

a brother was born to him, and afterward he died

the second—

both of them are exempt from halitza and from yibbum,

as in the case of being born and afterward performing yibbum,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And Rabbi Shimon says: since he came

the third brother, who was now born,

and found her permitted,

for by virtue of the marriage of the second she was destined to be permitted to him for yibbum,

and she did not stand before him for even one moment in prohibition

as the wife of the brother of his first brother, who was not with him in his world—

he performs yibbum with whichever of them he wishes, or performs halitza for whichever of them he wishes.

And we raised a difficulty against it:

this clause at the end,

which says that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagreed in the case of performing yibbum and afterward being born [but in the case of being born and afterward performing yibbum, no disagreement was mentioned]—

for which one does it teach it?

That is, for which tanna was it necessary for the baraita to say that he holds this way?

If you say that it teaches it for Rabbi Meir,

this is impossible!

Since,

after all,

Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between performing yibbum and afterward being born, and being born and afterward performing yibbum,

then the difficulty arises:

let them combine them and teach them,

that both in the case of being born and afterward performing yibbum, and in the case of performing yibbum and afterward being born, both are exempt from halitza and yibbum, since the wife of the first is the wife of his brother who was not in his world.

Rather, is it not

this clause at the end, the novelty of

Rabbi Shimon,

is it?

And

to inform us that only

in the case of performing yibbum and afterward being born—

he disagrees,

Rabbi Shimon, and as he gives the reason for his view: since the third came and found her married to the second, and she is destined to be permitted for yibbum, through the falling before the second.

But

in the case of being born and afterward performing yibbum—

he does not disagree,

Rabbi Shimon. And it is like Rav Pappa, and not like Rabbi Oshaya!

And we conclude: indeed

infer from it.

And now the Gemara explains the wording of the baraita above:

The Master said: The second intended to perform maamar with his yevama, but he did not manage to perform maamar with his yevama before a brother was born to him, and he died—

the first leaves because of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and the second—

either performs halitza or performs yibbum.

And we raised a difficulty against it:

what is “intended”

? And what is “did not manage”?

But whichever way you consider it:

if he did it,

if he performed maamar with her—

he did it.

And if he did not do it—

he did not do it!

Rather,

this is the explanation of the matter:

“Intended”

to perform maamar with her—

with her consent,

with her agreement.

And “did not manage”

to perform maamar with her, for he did not have the opportunity to perform the maamar

with her consent, but

he performed it

against her will,

for he gave her the money and betrothed her without her consent.

And the baraita informs us that since he did not betroth her willingly, he did not acquire her at all, even partially, and therefore the second may even be taken in yibbum.

And not like Rabbi,

who holds that maamar with a yevama is effective to acquire her even against her will.

As it was taught: One who performs maamar with his yevama,

who betroths her with money,

without her consent—

Rabbi says: he acquired

her through the acquisition of maamar.

And the Sages say: he acquired nothing.

The Gemara explains the reason for their disagreement:

And the Gemara explains the reason for their disagreement:

What is Rabbi’s reason?

He derives it from the intercourse of a yevama,

which acquires her by Torah law.

Just as the intercourse of a yevama,

acquires her even if he had intercourse with her

against her will—

so too, betrothal

of maamar, which is rabbinic,

of a yevama,

can be performed even

against her will.

And the Rabbis derive it from ordinary betrothal,

of a woman who is not a yevama.

Just as ordinary betrothal

is only

with her consent, so too the betrothal of a yevama

is only

with her consent.

And the Gemara explains the reason for their disagreement:

over what do they disagree?

One Master,

Rabbi,

holds: matters

matters

of a yevama—

he should have learned it from matters of a yevama. For a yevama is acquired against her will through intercourse, and the same law applies to the betrothal of maamar that the Sages instituted for her.

After all, a yevama is acquired against her will through intercourse, and the same should apply to the betrothal of maamar instituted for her by the Sages.

And one Master,

the Rabbis,

holds: matters of betrothal should be learned from matters of betrothal.

For the maamar is an act of betrothal, and “betrothal” is an act of acquisition by which the woman herself transfers herself to the husband who acquires her, and it is impossible to perform an act of acquisition without the consent of the one who transfers ownership. Furthermore, it is stated concerning betrothal, “and she shall go and become another man’s,” implying that she goes and makes herself [another man’s] with her consent.

And now the Gemara explains what they said:

the second brother performed

with her

a maamar, and afterward a brother was born to him

the third.

Or a brother was born to him

the third,

and afterward he performed with her

the second brother

a maamar.

And he died,

the second brother who had performed maamar with the wife of the first.

And the wife of the first brother, with whom maamar had been performed, falls together with the wife of the second brother before the third brother for yibbum—

the first,

the wife of the first,

leaves because of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and the second,

the wife of the second,

performs halitza but may not be taken in yibbum.

Rabbi Shimon says: the intercourse or the halitza of one of them—

exempts her rival-wife.

Rabbi Shimon—

with regard to what does he stand?

With regard to what does he come to disagree?

If you say

that he comes to disagree

about a brother being born to him

the third before the maamar,

and afterward he performed with her

the second brother

a maamar.

And Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted for the third brother, who was not in the world of the first, to have intercourse with whichever of them he wishes, and the intercourse or halitza of one exempts the other.

It is impossible to say so. For:

You have said

that

in the case of “being born and afterward performing yibbum,” Rabbi Shimon does not disagree

with the Sages; rather, the first is forbidden to the third by virtue of the wife of his brother who was not in his world.

And it is possible that maamar acquires her, and the wife of the second is found to be the rival-wife of the wife of his brother who was not in his world; so how can she be taken in yibbum? And furthermore, what relevance is there to saying that the intercourse or halitza of one of them exempts her rival-wife? After all, the wife of the first is a forbidden relation, by virtue of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, and she is exempt because she is a forbidden relation!

Rather,

it is necessarily that Rabbi Shimon comes to disagree

about performing maamar with her and afterward a brother being born to him.

For if maamar acquires her, this is like performing yibbum and afterward a brother being born, according to Rabbi Shimon’s view, in which case she is not forbidden.

But Rabbi Shimon was uncertain whether maamar acquires her or does not acquire her.

At first, the baraita informs us that Rabbi Shimon’s uncertainty is whether maamar acquires her completely, or does not acquire her at all.

Therefore, if the second performed maamar with the wife of the first and afterward the third was born, the wife of the second either performs halitza or is taken in yibbum, whichever way you consider it:

If maamar acquires her completely, this is a case of performing yibbum and afterward being born, in which, according to Rabbi Shimon, she is permitted to the third.

And if maamar does not acquire her, and it does not acquire her completely, even partially, then the wife of the second is not considered the rival-wife of the wife of the first at all, and therefore she is permitted even to be taken in yibbum by the third.

And at the end, the baraita informs us that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between being born and afterward performing yibbum, and performing yibbum and afterward being born, so that we should not mistakenly say that what Rabbi Shimon said at first, “the intercourse or halitza of one of them [of the second] exempts her rival-wife,” also applies in the case of being born and afterward performing yibbum.

And now the Gemara brings the foundation of the law, that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether maamar acquires her, on the basis of which we explained the entire course until now:

And we raised a difficulty against it: concerning what Rabbi Shimon said, that if

he performed halitza with the possessor of maamar,

the wife of the first,

the rival-wife was not exempted

by this, the

rival-wife,

the wife of the second—

what is the reason?

Because she was a rival-wife

the wife of the second

certainly

requires halitza,

and

if

the possessor of maamar

is

uncertainly

requiring halitza.

And it is uncertain whether she is the wife of the second, so that her halitza could exempt the second by virtue of the law of one house.

For only if maamar acquires her is she permitted to the second, according to the law of performing yibbum and afterward being born, according to Rabbi Shimon; and then her halitza exempts the second, who is together with her in the same house.

But if maamar does not acquire her, she is forbidden to him as the wife of his brother who was not with him in his world, and she is not considered to be in one house with the second.

And uncertainty does not remove certainty!

That is, the halitza of the possessor of maamar, which is a “doubtful” halitza, cannot permit the wife of the second, who certainly requires halitza.

Rav Menashe bar Zevid sat before Rav Huna, and sat and said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

And the Gemara expresses astonishment: Is it so that one should discuss

what is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

But this is

as he stated the reason: since he came and found her

the brother who was born

in a permitted state, and she did not stand before him for even one moment in prohibition,

as the wife of the first brother!

Rather,

this is what he is discussing:

what is the reason of the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon?

And he explained: for

the verse says, “And he shall take her for himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her.”

It teaches that even after the yevam-brother has taken her for himself as a wife—

the first yibbum obligations are still upon her.

That is, the status of her first brother still remains upon her, and she is forbidden to the brother who was born, because he was not with him in his world.

And we raise an objection:

but that which we learned: a yevama whom he

married—

brought into his house—

behold, she is like his wife in every respect!