Yevamot 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says:

If the second brother performed ma’amar with the wife of the first brother, it is uncertain whether ma’amar effects acquisition [as the Gemara brought earlier, at the beginning of the first side, that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether ma’amar effects acquisition or not].

Therefore,

the intercourse or halitza of either of them—

frees her rival wife.

The Gemara will explain below that Rabbi Shimon is speaking of a case in which the second brother performed ma’amar with her, and afterward a brother was born.

However, Rabbi Shimon added that this statement does not apply to the intercourse or halitza of either of the two women.

Rather, if

he performed halitza with the woman with whom ma’amar had been performed

[the wife of the first brother]—

the rival wife is not freed,

the wife of the second brother. For Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether ma’amar effects acquisition. If it does not effect acquisition, the woman with whom ma’amar was performed, who is the wife of the first brother, is forbidden to him by the law of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, and her halitza is of no consequence.

Only if he had intercourse with the second woman or performed halitza with her would the first woman also be freed.

For either way, it follows: If ma’amar effects acquisition, the first woman is not forbidden by the law of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, since the third brother was born after the second had performed ma’amar with her, and the third brother encountered her as the wife of the second. Therefore, the second woman is not the rival wife of a forbidden relation; rather, both women fell before the second brother alone, and the halitza of the second woman frees the first woman as well.

And if ma’amar does not effect acquisition, then the first woman is the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, and she leaves the third brother without halitza, as is the law with regard to a forbidden relation. The second woman is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation, since ma’amar does not effect acquisition.

This concludes the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

The beraita continues, according to the opinion of the Rabbis:

If

the second brother married

the wife of the first brother,

and the second brother died,

after which

a brother was born to him,

and the brother who was born encountered her as the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

Or a brother was born to him, and afterward he married

the second brother,

and he died—

that is, he was born and afterward performed yibbum.

Both women are exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

The first by virtue of the prohibition of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, and the second by virtue of being the rival wife of a forbidden relation.

This law is accepted by everyone. It is in accordance with Rav Pappa, and not in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya.

And if

the second brother married

her,

and

afterward

a brother was born to him, and afterward he died,

the second brother—

both women are exempt from halitza and from yibbum,

as in the case where the brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum,

according to Rabbi Meir.

And Rabbi Shimon says: Since he came

the third brother, who had now been born,

and encountered her in a permitted state,

since by virtue of her marriage to the second brother she would ultimately be permitted to him for yibbum,

and she was not subject to him for even one moment in a forbidden state,

as the wife of his first brother, who had not been alive together with him in his world—

he may perform yibbum with whichever of them he wishes, or perform halitza with whichever of them he wishes.

The Gemara raises the matter:

As for the latter clause,

which states that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the case where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born [but no disagreement is mentioned in the case where the brother was born and finally he performed yibbum]—

For which tanna is it taught?

That is, for which tanna did the beraita need to state that he holds this opinion?

If you say that it was taught for Rabbi Meir,

this is impossible!

After all,

it is clear that

Rabbi Meir makes no distinction between the case where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born and the case where a brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum,

and if so, the following difficulty arises:

Let them be combined and taught together, since whether the brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum, or he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born, both women are exempt from halitza and from yibbum, since the wife of the first brother is the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

[This segment is included in the preceding translation.]

Rather, is it not that this latter clause,

which contains the novelty of

Rabbi Shimon,

is the reason it was taught?

And

it comes to teach us that only

in the case where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born—

does Rabbi Shimon disagree,

as he explains his reasoning: Since the third brother came and encountered her married to the second brother, so that she was destined to be permitted for yibbum, having fallen before him from the second brother.

But

in the case where a brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum—

Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the Rabbis. This is in accordance with Rav Pappa and not in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya!

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

it may be inferred that this is so;

infer from it.

The Gemara now explains the wording of the beraita above:

The master said: The second brother intended to perform ma’amar with his yevama, but he did not manage to perform ma’amar with his yevama before a brother was born to him, and he died—

The first woman leaves because she is the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, while the second—

either performs halitza or undergoes yibbum.

The Gemara raises the matter:

What is the meaning of “intended”? And what is the meaning of “did not manage”?

and what is meant by “did not manage”?

After all, either way:

If he did it,

if he performed ma’amar with her—

he did it.

And if he did not do it—

he did not do it!

Rather,

this is the explanation:

“Intended”

to perform ma’amar with her—

with her consent,

with her agreement.

And “did not manage”

to perform ma’amar with her, meaning that he was unable to perform the ma’amar

with her consent, but

he performed it

against her will,

giving her the money and betrothing her without her consent.

The beraita teaches us that since he did not betroth her with her consent, he acquired nothing at all, not even partially; therefore, the second woman may even undergo yibbum.

And this is not in accordance with Rabbi,

who holds that ma’amar with a yevama is effective in acquiring her even against her will.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who performs ma’amar with his yevama,

betrothing her with money,

without her consent—

Rabbi says: He acquires

her through the acquisition of ma’amar.

And the Rabbis say: He acquires nothing

at all.

The Gemara explains the reason for their dispute:

What is Rabbi’s reason?

He derives it from intercourse with a yevama,

which acquires her by Torah law.

Just as intercourse with a yevama,

acquires her even if he had intercourse with her

against her will—

so too, betrothal,

the ma’amar betrothal instituted by the Sages,

with a yevama,

can be performed even

against her will.

But the Rabbis derive it from ordinary betrothal,

of a woman who is not a yevama.

Just as ordinary betrothal

is only

with her consent, so too, betrothal with a yevama

is only

with her consent.

The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

With regard to what do they disagree?

One master,

Rabbi,

holds: Matters

concerning

a yevama—

he should have learned from matters concerning a yevama. After all, a yevama is acquired against her will through intercourse, and the same applies to the betrothal of ma’amar that the Sages instituted for her.

And the other master,

the Rabbis,

holds: Matters of betrothal should be learned from matters of betrothal.

After all, ma’amar is an act of betrothal, and “betrothal” is an act of acquisition through which the woman herself is transferred to the husband who acquires her; an act of acquisition cannot be performed without the consent of the one transferring ownership. Furthermore, with regard to betrothal it is stated: “And she shall go and become another man’s,” indicating that she goes and makes herself available of her own consent.

The Gemara now explains what they said:

The second brother

performed

with her

a ma’amar, and afterward a brother was born to him,

a third brother.

Or a brother was born to him,

a third brother,

and afterward he performed

the second brother

a ma’amar with her.

And he died,

the second brother who had performed ma’amar with the wife of the first brother.

The wife of the first brother, with whom ma’amar had been performed, now falls together with the wife of the second brother before the third brother for yibbum—

The first,

the wife of the first brother,

leaves because she is the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, while the second,

the wife of the second brother,

performs halitza but does not undergo yibbum.

Rabbi Shimon says: The intercourse or halitza of either of them—

frees her rival wife.

Rabbi Shimon—

to what does he refer?

What is he coming to dispute?

If you say

that he is coming to dispute

the case where a brother was born to him

the third brother before the ma’amar,

and afterward he performed with her

the second brother

a ma’amar—

and Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted for the third brother, who was not alive in the world of the first brother, to have intercourse with whichever of them he wishes, and that the intercourse or halitza of one frees the other.

This cannot be said. For:

You have said

that

in the case where “a brother was born and ultimately he performed yibbum,” Rabbi Shimon does not disagree

with the Rabbis; rather, the first woman is forbidden to the third brother by virtue of being the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

But it is possible that ma’amar effects acquisition, in which case the wife of the second brother is the rival wife of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world; how, then, could she undergo yibbum? Moreover, what relevance is there to saying that the intercourse or halitza of one of them frees her rival wife? The wife of the first brother is a forbidden relation, by virtue of being the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, and she is exempt because she is a forbidden relation!

Rather,

Rabbi Shimon must necessarily be coming to dispute

the case where he performed ma’amar with her and afterward a brother was born to him.

For if ma’amar effects acquisition, this case is equivalent to one where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born, which according to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion does not render her forbidden.

However, Rabbi Shimon was uncertain whether ma’amar effects acquisition or does not effect acquisition.

At first, the beraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon’s uncertainty is whether ma’amar effects acquisition completely or does not effect acquisition at all.

Therefore, if the second brother performed ma’amar with the wife of the first brother and afterward the third brother was born, the wife of the second brother either performs halitza or undergoes yibbum, either way:

If ma’amar effects acquisition completely, this case is one where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born, in which case, according to Rabbi Shimon, she is permitted to the third brother.

And if ma’amar does not effect acquisition, and does not effect acquisition entirely, even partially, then the wife of the second brother is not considered the rival wife of the wife of the first brother at all; therefore, she is permitted even to undergo yibbum with the third brother.

In the latter clause, the beraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between the case where a brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum, and the case where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born, so that we should not err and say that what Rabbi Shimon stated initially—“the intercourse or halitza of either of them [of the second woman] frees her rival wife”—also applies in the case where a brother was born and afterward he performed yibbum.

The Gemara now presents the basis of the law that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether ma’amar effects acquisition, on the basis of which we have explained the entire discussion until now:

The Gemara raises the matter: With regard to Rabbi Shimon’s statement that if

he performed halitza with the woman with whom ma’amar had been performed,

the wife of the first brother,

the rival wife is not freed

by this, the

rival wife,

the wife of the second brother—

what is the reason?

Because she was certainly a rival wife

[the wife of the second brother]

and certainly

requires halitza,

while

if

the woman with whom ma’amar was performed

is

possibly

required to undergo halitza.

It is uncertain whether she is the wife of the second brother, such that her halitza could free the second woman by virtue of the principle of “one household.”

For only if ma’amar effects acquisition is she permitted to the second brother, as in the case where he performed yibbum and afterward a brother was born according to Rabbi Shimon; then her halitza frees the second woman, who fell together with her as part of the same household.

But if ma’amar does not effect acquisition, she is forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who was not alive together with him in his world, and she is not considered to be part of the same household as the second woman.

And an uncertainty cannot override a certainty!

That is, the halitza of the woman with whom ma’amar was performed, which is a “doubtful” halitza, cannot permit the wife of the second brother, who certainly requires halitza.

Rav Menashe bar Zevid sat before Rav Huna and sat saying: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

The Gemara is astonished: Is there really room to analyze

what is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

After all, this is

as he explicitly stated the reason: Since he came and encountered her

the brother who had been born

in a permitted state, and she was not subject to him for even one moment in a forbidden state,

as the wife of the first brother!

Rather,

this is what he was asking:

What is the reason of the Rabbis,

who dispute Rabbi Shimon?

And he explained: For

the verse says: “And he shall take her for himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her.”

This teaches that even after the yevama has been taken by the brother as his wife—

the initial obligations of yibbum still remain upon her.

That is, the status of the first brother still remains upon her, and she is forbidden to the brother who was born because he was not alive together with him in his world.

And we challenge this:

But as for that which we learned in the Mishna: A yevama whom he

has

married—

she is like his wife in every respect!