Yevamot 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

The initial assumption was that she is forbidden only

if the yevama is

alive

—

but after the yevama’s death

—

the bond would lapse,

and her mother would be permitted.

It teaches us that a bond, by itself,

without yibbum or halitza by her rival wife,

does not lapse.

Shall we say that this supports

Rav Yehuda from the Mishna below [49a]:

If his yevama died—he is

permitted to her sister.

This implies that only

to her sister, yes,

is he permitted, just as in the case of his wife who died, when he is permitted to her sister.

But

to her mother—

no!

Because there is a bond.

And we reject this:

The same הדין applies even to her mother:

he is forbidden to her.

And since the first clause taught: “His wife who died”—

he is permitted to her sister,

which teaches

specifically to her sister

is he permitted,

but to her mother, no,

as she becomes

his mother-in-law even after his wife’s death,

a prohibition by Torah law.

The tanna therefore also taught in the latter clause: “He is permitted to her sister,”

but the same הדין applies to her mother.

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya raised an objection

from our Mishna, in which we learned:

If he performed

the second brother

a maamar

with the yevama who had fallen before him from the first brother, who had not been alive during the lifetime of the third brother,

and he died,

the first brother’s wife, who was “the wife of a brother who had not been alive during his lifetime,” and the second brother’s wife, who became her rival wife through the maamar performed by the second brother, now fall before the third brother.

The

second yevama,

the second brother’s wife,

performs halitza,

because by Torah law she is not the rival wife of “the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime,”

but she may not undergo yibbum

because she is her rival wife, by rabbinic enactment.

And Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya infers:

The reason is that he performed

the second brother

a maamar

with the first brother’s wife; therefore the second brother’s wife may not undergo yibbum, since she is the rival wife of “the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime,” by rabbinic enactment.

Had the second brother not performed

with her

a maamar

with the first brother’s wife, and then died, the second brother’s wife, who is called

“the second”—

would likewise undergo yibbum!

Since she is not the rival wife of “the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime.”

And if you say, “There is a bond”

that prohibits the relatives of the yevama, how can she undergo yibbum when the second brother did not perform a maamar with her?

For

she would then be

the second brother’s wife,

“the rival wife of the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime”—

through the bond!

For the first brother’s wife, who is “the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime” with respect to the third brother, was bound to the second brother, the husband of the second wife. Thus, according to the one who says “there is a bond,” they became rival wives by rabbinic law, treating the yevama as though she were betrothed to the yavam.

Rabba said: The same הדין applies even though he did not perform

the second brother

a maamar—

the second woman performs halitza, but she may not undergo yibbum.

For indeed, by virtue of the bond of “the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime” to the second brother, the second brother’s wife becomes her “rival wife of a forbidden relative,” and she is forbidden to undergo yibbum with the third brother.

And the reason that it teaches

in our Mishna, “the second brother performed

a maamar,”

is in order

to exclude

and negate

the

method of

Beit Shammai.

For Beit Shammai say:

a

maamar,

through which the yavam effects monetary betrothal with his yevama,

acquires

the yevama

with a complete acquisition,

by Torah law. According to them, the second brother’s wife becomes, by Torah law, the rival wife of the “wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime,” and is exempt even from halitza.

Therefore,

it teaches us

our Mishna that a maamar does not effect a complete acquisition of a yevama, but only a rabbinic acquisition. Therefore, even if the second brother performed a maamar with her, his wife requires halitza.

But the same הדין applies if he did not perform a maamar with her: the second brother’s wife performs halitza but may not undergo yibbum, because she is “the rival wife of the forbidden wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime, through the bond”—according to the one who says there is a bond!

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba

from the beraita [below, 19a]:

As it was taught:

Two brothers

who were

alive at the same time.

One of them died without children.

And this second brother proceeded to perform a maamar with his yevama.

But the second brother did not have time

to

perform a maamar with her before another brother was born to him

—a third brother, who had not been alive during the lifetime of the first brother—

and he died,

the second brother, without performing a maamar with her—

The first

woman, who had fallen from his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime,

leaves

without halitza

because of the forbidden relationship of

the

wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime.

And the second,

the second brother’s wife,

either performs halitza or undergoes yibbum!

And if you say there is a bond,

how can the second woman undergo yibbum?

For

she would then be

the second woman

“the rival wife of the wife of his brother who had not been alive during his lifetime, through the bond”!

And how can she undergo yibbum!?

Rabba said to Abaye:

This

beraita,

whose view is it? It is the view of

—

Rabbi Meir, who says: There is no bond.

But according to the one who says there is a bond, she indeed performs halitza but may not undergo yibbum.

Below, Rav Pappa and Rabbi Oshaya disagree as to whether “a bond is like a consummated marriage.” The Gemara there brings this beraita as proof for Rav Pappa, who holds that a bond is not like a consummated marriage, since its conclusion states: “These are the words of Rabbi Meir.”

The Gemara now assumes that Rabbi Meir holds that there is no bond at all that prohibits the relatives of the yevama.

Accordingly, Abaye wonders at Rabba’s resolution:

And does Rabbi Meir really hold

that

“there is no bond”?

But didn’t we learn

below [26a], in an unattributed Mishna, which is the view of Rabbi Meir:

Four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and they died,

the two brothers

who were married to the sisters—

these

two sisters

perform halitza but may not undergo yibbum,

since each one is “the sister of a woman bound to him”?

And if it enters your mind

that

Rabbi Meir holds: “There is no

bond”—

why, according to him, may the two women not both undergo yibbum!?

For

these

two sisters

come from two households,

from the households of two brothers; they

come,

and do not come from one household, in which case the two could not both undergo yibbum.

If so,

this

brother should

perform yibbum with one

sister, and

that

brother should

perform yibbum with one

sister.

For according to Rabbi Meir, there is no prohibition against taking the sister of a woman bound to him!

Rather, it must be that Rabbi Meir holds: “There is a bond.”

If so, his statements in the earlier beraita contradict this, since there he holds that there is no bond.

Rabba said to him:

In fact,

Rabbi Meir

holds that there is no bond!

And the reason he requires halitza from both sisters is not the prohibition of the sister of a woman bound to him, but

because he holds

that Rabbi Meir

holds that it is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of yevamin,

and for this reason he prohibited performing yibbum with both of them:

Lest, by the time one performs yibbum,

perhaps by the time one brother

alone

performs yibbum with one sister, a long period will pass before he performs yibbum with her, and after he does so

the other brother dies,

the second brother dying before he has time to perform yibbum with the second sister.

Then the second sister could not undergo yibbum, since she would be his wife’s sister. She would also leave without halitza, as a yevama who is a forbidden relative of the yavam.

And you would thereby have nullified the mitzva of yevamin

with regard to the second sister.

Therefore, they instituted that both perform halitza, and even one brother may perform halitza with both of them. Abaye objected:

And if

Rabbi Meir holds that

there is no bond—

let the mitzva of yevamin be nullified!

Why should he be concerned?

Not that there is a connection between the existence of a bond and the nullification of the mitzva of yevamin.

Rather, since we have heard that Rabban Gamliel holds both of these positions—that there is no bond, and that it is permitted to nullify the mitzva of yevamin—why should Rabbi Meir not hold likewise!?

For Rabban Gamliel said: “There is no bond,” and “it is permitted to nullify the mitzva of yevamin”!

As we learned

below in the Mishna [109a]:

Two brothers were married to two sisters. One was an adult, married to one brother by Torah law, and the other was a minor whom her mother and brothers had married off, whose marriage was only by rabbinic law.

The husband of the adult died, and his adult wife fell before the brother who was married to her younger sister, whose marriage was only by rabbinic law.

That brother is forbidden to perform yibbum with her. Although she is his yevama by Torah law, while his marriage to his minor wife is only by rabbinic law, she is nevertheless his wife’s sister by rabbinic law.

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel disagreed about this matter.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, there is a bond, and the adult sister who falls before him and is bound to him by Torah law thereby renders his minor wife forbidden to him, since she becomes forbidden as “the sister of a woman bound to him.”

From this point onward, he is forbidden both to his wife and to his yevama.

Therefore, the minor wife is instructed to refuse him, thereby uprooting her marriage to him retroactively; he can then perform yibbum with her adult sister.

Rabban Gamliel says:

There is no bond, and his minor wife is not rendered forbidden as the sister of a woman bound to him. Since his minor wife is not forbidden, there is no need to instruct her to refuse him.

Rather,

if she refuses

him—

she has refused,

and he is then permitted to perform yibbum with her adult sister.

And if she does not refuse

him, she herself remains permitted to him, whereas the adult yevama

must wait until the minor comes of age,

so that her marriage will become a marriage by Torah law.

And

then

the latter

yevama

will leave because of

the forbidden relationship of

a wife’s sister,

without yibbum and without halitza!

That is, Rabban Gamliel holds that there is no bond; therefore the yavam is permitted to his minor wife, and it is permitted to nullify the mitzva of yevamin. Consequently, she is not instructed to refuse him; rather, he may marry her by Torah law when she comes of age, and the mitzva of yibbum with regard to her adult sister will be nullified.

If so, why should Rabbi Meir not hold like Rabban Gamliel, that it is possible to nullify the mitzva of yevamin?

He said to him,

Rabba: Do you really compare

Rabban Gamliel with Rabbi Meir?

Do you think that Rabbi Meir, who agrees with Rabban Gamliel that there is no bond, must agree with Rabban Gamliel in every matter, including that it is permitted to nullify the mitzva of yevamin!?

Abaye said to him:

No.

Rather,

this is what we are saying:

Is it possible that the disagreement between them is so extreme that

Rabbi Meir is concerned even about the possibility

of nullifying the mitzva of yevamin, and therefore said, regarding two sisters who fall before two brothers, that both should perform halitza, lest one of the brothers die and the mitzva of yevamin not be fulfilled,

whereas

Rabban Gamliel, even with regard to a certainty

that the mitzva of yevamin will be nullified,

is not concerned!

For he permitted the man to marry his minor wife once she came of age, so that her sister would leave because she was a wife’s sister, and he would actively nullify the mitzva of yevamin.

Rabba rejected this: Their disagreement is not so extreme; rather, it is a fundamental disagreement as to whether it is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of yevamin or whether it is permitted to nullify it.

Therefore,

perhaps one who is not concerned

about nullifying the mitzva of yevamin [Rabban Gamliel],

even with regard to a certainty

of its nullification

is not concerned.

And

if

one who is concerned

about nullifying the mitzva of yevamin [Rabbi Meir]—

is concerned even about a possibility.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This statement of Rav Yehuda,

who said that there is a bond and that the yavam remains forbidden to his wife’s relatives even after her death,

is the view of Shmuel!

Rav Yehuda heard it from his teacher Shmuel, and not from Rav, who was also one of Rav Yehuda’s teachers.