Yevamot 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught:

The wife awaiting levirate marriage, whose brother-in-law betrothed [

that is, one of the brothers]

her sister

the sister of the woman awaiting levirate marriage. From that point onward, his yevama becomes forbidden to him as his wife's sister, and she is no longer bound to him for levirate marriage, since there is no zikah with regard to a forbidden relation.

It follows that from this point onward, the sister of the woman whom he betrothed as a wife is no longer “the sister of his bound yevama”:

They said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira:

Nevertheless, since she appeared to be the sister of his bound yevama,

they say to him

to the brother-in-law who betrothed his yevama’s sister:

Wait

to marry her

until your brother

with regard to her

takes action,

meaning that he performs halitza with her. Then her zikah is dissolved with regard to all the brothers, and she will no longer appear to be the sister of your bound yevama. For once he performs halitza with her, her zikah is dissolved with regard to all the brothers.

That is, Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira holds that “there is zikah,” and therefore the brother-in-law was forbidden to betroth his yevama’s sister, since she was forbidden to him as the sister of his bound yevama.

However, once he betrothed her, the zikah of the yevama to him should have been dissolved, since she thereby became forbidden to him by Torah law as a forbidden relation.

Rather, the Sages instituted that, since he appears to be taking the sister of his bound yevama, and since she is still only his betrothed and he has not yet married her, she should remain forbidden to him as though the zikah still existed with regard to him, until his brother performs halitza with her.

For the Sages gave the zikah the force of betrothal, as though she were betrothed to him, and the betrothal of one does not dissolve the betrothal of the other.

But if the brother had already married her, the Sages did not institute that the yevama should still be considered bound. For marriage is superior to betrothal; therefore it is as though the sister’s marriage “dissolves” the yevama’s zikah, and her sister is no longer forbidden as the sister of a bound yevama.

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

It is evident that Shmuel held that there is zikah. And necessarily, Rav Yehuda received the ruling that there is zikah from Shmuel, his teacher.

Rav Yosef said to him

to Abaye: Why did you establish that Rav Yehuda received it from Shmuel, rather than from Rav?

For if

the matter is

that he

received it from

Rav

that there is zikah,

what

difficulty would this cause you?

Let there be

a contradiction between Rav and Rav,

meaning, there would be a contradiction in Rav’s statements: On the one hand, Rav Huna said in his name that there is no zikah, while on the other hand, Rav Yehuda said in his name that there is zikah.

This is not a contradiction in Rav’s statements.

For

perhaps they are amoraim,

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda, who were Rav’s students, disagreed with one another

and

disagreed

according to Rav’s position,

as to what his position was.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef:

Since it was stated explicitly in the name of Shmuel,

that we have an explicit tradition in Shmuel’s name that he holds there is zikah,

and

if it had been

in the name of Rav,

it would not be clear what his position was, since it was stated

as an amoraic dispute,

that Rav’s students disagreed as to whether there is zikah or no zikah.

Therefore,

we do not abandon

we do not set aside what we stated

explicitly in the name of Shmuel. Thus, we must say that Rav Yehuda, who said that there is zikah, said so according to the position of Shmuel, his teacher.

Thus we must say that Rav Yehuda, who said that there is a levirate bond, said so in accordance with the position of his teacher, Shmuel.

And

not

do we establish

Rav Yehuda’s statement as having been said in Rav’s name,

as an amoraic dispute,

with an amoraic disagreement among Rav’s students,

and according to Rav’s position.

Rather, we establish Rav Yehuda’s statement that there is zikah as having been said in the name of Shmuel, his teacher.

Rav Kahana said: I stated this teaching

this

before Rav Zevid of Nehardea.

And he

said

to me:

You

you

teach it this way,

that is how you transmit Rav Yehuda’s statement, without explicitly transmitting it in the name of Shmuel, his teacher; therefore you debate among yourselves whether Rav Yehuda said his statement according to Shmuel or according to Rav.

But

we

teach explicitly

Rav Yehuda’s statement in the name of Shmuel, his teacher, and this is how we transmit it:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: If the woman awaiting levirate marriage dies—

he is forbidden to her mother.

Apparently, he holds

Shmuel:

There is zikah.

And Shmuel followed his own reasoning.

Shmuel, who holds that there is zikah, follows his own position:

For Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

And the Gemara explains:

And both statements are necessary,

for Shmuel needed to state both teachings: both the teaching “If the woman awaiting levirate marriage dies, he is forbidden to her mother,” and the teaching “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.”

For had he taught us

only the teaching

“There is zikah,”

I would have said: This applies

that there is zikah only

to

a yevama who falls before

one

yevama, whose zikah is clearly directed solely toward him.

But with two

levirate brothers, when it is unknown which of them will perform levirate marriage with her,

not

would we say that there is zikah toward both of them.

He teaches us

through his statement “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,” which discusses zikah toward several brothers, that nevertheless there is zikah.

And had he taught us

only the statement that

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,” I would have said: This applies

that there is zikah only

during her lifetime,

while the yevama is alive, when she has zikah, and even after she becomes forbidden to him she continues to appear as the sister of his bound yevama.

But after the death

of the yevama,

her zikah is dissolved,

and the brother-in-law is then permitted to her relatives.

Therefore,

he teaches us

that Shmuel holds “There is zikah,”

for zikah by itself,

without halitza,

is not dissolved.

He remains forbidden to her relatives, just as one whose betrothed wife died remains forbidden to her relatives even after her death.

Mishna:

The previous Mishna explained the law of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, in the case where the third brother was born

before

the second brother performed levirate marriage with the wife of the first brother.

Now the Mishna explains the law of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, when the third brother was born

after

the second brother performed levirate marriage with the wife of the first brother:

If there were

two brothers

alive,

and one of them died.

And

the

second brother performed levirate marriage with the wife of his brother

who had been alive together with him.

And afterward a brother was born to them,

who had not been alive in the world of the first brother.

And

the second brother died, the one who had performed levirate marriage with the wife of the first brother.

The wife of the brother who was not alive in his world and her rival thereby fall before the third brother:

Behold,

the first,

the wife of the first brother, with whom the second brother performed levirate marriage,

leaves because of

the forbidden relation of

“the wife of his brother who was not alive in his world.”

She is exempt from both levirate marriage and halitza.

And the second,

her rival, the wife of the second brother, likewise leaves without halitza or levirate marriage,

because she is the rival

of a forbidden relation.

But if the second brother did not perform levirate marriage with the wife of the first brother, but only

performed

the second brother

a maamar

with her—a monetary betrothal, which the Sages instituted so that the levir would betroth his yevama before engaging in intercourse—and

he died—

the first nevertheless leaves because she is the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

Whereas

the second,

who is a rival of a forbidden relation by rabbinic law, because of the maamar that her husband performed with the first,

must perform halitza, but may not undergo levirate marriage.

Rabbi Shimon

disagrees with what was stated in the first clause of the Mishna, and

says:

The wife of a brother who was not alive in his world becomes forbidden to him only if the third brother was born and encountered the wife of his brother who was not alive in his world while she was still in “the zikah of the marriage of his first brother.”

That is, she had not undergone halitza or levirate marriage and was still bound for levirate marriage by virtue of the marriage of his brother who was not alive in his world.

In that case, since he cannot perform levirate marriage with her or halitza for her, she becomes forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world. And since she became forbidden to him at the time of falling for levirate marriage, she remains forbidden to him forever.

But if the third brother was born after the second had performed levirate marriage with the wife of the first, so that the first brother’s wife did not fall before the third brother, and she did not become forbidden to him at the time of falling as a brother’s wife with no possibility of permission, but rather the third brother encountered her at the time of his birth as the wife of his second brother, she does not become forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

Therefore, when the second brother dies, he

may perform levirate marriage with whichever of them he wishes, or perform halitza with whichever of them he wishes.

The reasoning of Rabbi Shimon will be clarified in the Gemara, according to the approaches of the Rishonim, on folio 20a.

Gemara:

It was explained in our Mishna that Rabbi Shimon permits the third brother to perform levirate marriage with the wife of his first brother [who had performed levirate marriage with his second brother, and the second brother died], when the third brother was born

after

the second brother performed levirate marriage with her.

It follows from here that only in such a case—when the third brother was born and encountered her after she had become the second brother’s yevama—did Rabbi Shimon permit the third brother to marry her by levirate marriage.

But in the prohibition concerning the wife of his brother discussed in the previous Mishna, when the third brother was born

before

the second brother performed levirate marriage with her, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the Sages that she remains forbidden to him forever as the wife of a brother who has children, and there is no longer any way for him to perform levirate marriage with her, even if his second brother performed levirate marriage with her and then died, leaving her to fall from him.

Rather, the amoraim disagreed about this:

Rabbi Oshaya said: Rabbi Shimon disagreed

with the Sages

even in

the previous

Mishna,

and held that even if the third brother was born before the second brother performed levirate marriage with her, and the second brother then performed levirate marriage with her and died, she may undergo levirate marriage!

According to Rabbi Oshaya, Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is not as we explained it in the Mishna; rather, it is based on a different rationale, as will be explained below.

Rabbi Oshaya proves his statement:

From where

do I derive this?

From the fact that an unnecessary Mishna was taught—

the first clause.

For the previous Mishna is entirely superfluous if we do not accept my interpretation, and it was included to teach that Rabbi Shimon also disagrees with it.

For

for whom was it taught?

For whose purpose was the previous Mishna taught, to inform us of his position?

If you say, for the Sages,

if it was intended to teach the position of the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, while Rabbi Shimon is not mentioned there because he agrees with the Sages in that law, this cannot be so.

For

now,

it is already stated in our Mishna that even if

the second brother performed levirate marriage

the second brother

and ultimately the third was born, so that he did not encounter her at the time she fell for levirate marriage from the first brother, but encountered her as the second brother’s wife,

so that he did not find her at the time she fell for levirate marriage from the first brother, but found her as the second brother’s wife,

when he encountered her

when he encountered her at the time of his birth,

in a permitted state

for levirate marriage by virtue of the second brother,

he encountered her—nevertheless

the Sages forbade

her to him by levirate marriage, as explained in our Mishna—

the third was born

before the second brother performed levirate marriage, and became forbidden to him by virtue of the first brother’s falling as the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world,

and

only

afterward the second brother performed levirate marriage

the second brother—

is it necessary to say so?!

Is it necessary to say that she is forbidden to him?

Rather, is it not

that this Mishna, which precedes our Mishna,

was necessary for Rabbi Shimon, to teach us that he also disagrees in that case?

to teach us that he also disagrees in that case.

And the first clause was taught

the previous Mishna

to inform you of the force of Rabbi Shimon,

that even when the third brother was born and the second brother then performed levirate marriage, Rabbi Shimon permitted it.

And the final clause was taught,

our Mishna,

to inform you of the force of the Sages,

that even when the second brother performed levirate marriage and the third was born afterward, the Sages forbade her.

And in fact,

it would have been appropriate

for him to disagree,

to disagree

Rabbi Shimon

with the Sages immediately and permit her immediately

in the first clause.

Rather, he waited for them,

Rabbi Shimon restrained himself and waited

for the Sages until they completed their statement, and afterward,

afterward—

he disagreed with them.

The Gemara now clarifies: If Rabbi Shimon also permitted her when the third brother was born and the second brother ultimately performed levirate marriage, then:

Rather, the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, according to Rabbi Shimon—

how can you find such a case?

In what circumstance can it occur?

With one brother,

where there was one brother who had not been alive in the world of the second brother,

and he died.

And a brother was born to him,

after his death, who cannot perform levirate marriage with his brother’s wife because he was not alive together with him.

Alternatively, with two,

with two brothers, and a third brother was born,

and the second brother did not perform levirate marriage

with his brother’s wife,

and he did not die,

the second brother was still alive.

The third brother is forbidden to perform levirate marriage with her because she fell from his deceased brother, since he had not been alive together with him.

But if the first brother’s zikah was dissolved when the second brother performed levirate marriage, and from then on she was considered the second brother’s wife, the third brother is permitted to perform levirate marriage with her when the second brother dies. For the second brother had been alive together with him, and she now falls before him as the second brother’s wife, not as the first brother’s wife.

The Gemara added “and he did not die” because it will be explained below that according to Rabbi Oshaya, if the second brother dies, she will then become permitted to the third brother—for the reason that will be explained below.

The Gemara now explains the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon according to Rabbi Oshaya: Why is the third brother permitted to perform levirate marriage even when the third was born and the second ultimately performed levirate marriage and then died?

Granted,

if

the second brother performed levirate marriage

the second brother

and afterward the third brother was born, and the second brother died, the third brother is permitted to perform levirate marriage with her, since

and the second brother died, the third brother may perform levirate marriage with her, since

when he encountered her

the third brother—

he encountered her in a “permitted state”!

Since she had not become bound to him by virtue of the first brother, but encountered her as the second brother’s yevama, she did not become forbidden to him, and she is permitted to him by virtue of the second brother.

But

if

the third was born, and encountered her in the zikah of the first brother’s marriage, and she then became forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who has children,

and found her bound by the marital bond of the first brother, at which point she became forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who has children,

and

only

afterward the second brother performed levirate marriage

with her—

For what reason was she permitted to the third brother when the second died? She had already become permanently forbidden to him when he was born, since at that time she had fallen under the zikah of the marriage of his first brother, who had not been alive in his world.

does she become permitted to the third brother when the second brother dies? She had already become permanently forbidden to him when she was born, since at that time she had fallen through the marital bond of his first brother, who had not been alive in his world.

And we answer:

He holds,

Rabbi Shimon [according to Rabbi Oshaya]:

a.

There is zikah.

The bond of marital status that a levir has with his yevama is a strong marital bond, and it has several legal aspects [such as forbidding him to her relatives, and others, as will be explained below].

b.

And the zikah

of the yevama to the levir is marital status so strong that

it is comparable to one who has already taken her in marriage.

Even by Torah law, her zikah to the levir is considered as though the levir had already taken her as his wife!

Therefore, when a new brother is born, he does not encounter her in the marital status of his deceased brother, who had not been alive in his world. Rather, it is considered as though the marital status of his deceased brother had been completely dissolved, and the levir’s marital status had begun.

And this marital status is permitted for levirate marriage to the brother who has just been born, since he had been alive together with the second brother.

That is, according to Rabbi Shimon, in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya, she does not become forbidden to the third brother as the wife of a brother who has no children, since the marital status of the first brother is not present to make her permanently forbidden to him; only the marital status of the second brother is present!

Rav Yosef challenged

Rabbi Oshaya:

Now,

behold, with regard to

zikah and maamar, it is uncertain to Rabbi Shimon whether it is comparable to one who has taken her in marriage or whether it is not comparable to one who has taken her in marriage

as the Gemara will explain.

With zikah alone,

without a maamar—

is it necessary

to say that according to Rabbi Shimon it is not comparable to one who has taken her in marriage?

The Gemara explains:

What is this?

Where do we find that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether zikah together with a maamar is comparable to one who has taken her in marriage or not?

As it was taught [

below, 31b]:

Three brothers

who were

married to three unrelated women.

And one of them died.

And he performed

the second brother

a maamar with her, and he died—

behold, these,

the two yevamot, the wife of the first brother and the wife of the second brother,

must perform halitza but may not undergo levirate marriage.

This is because the yevama with whom he performed a maamar is forbidden in levirate marriage, as will be explained, and she also renders her rival forbidden [through the maamar].

As it is stated: [

Deuteronomy 25]

“And one of them dies—

the yevama shall come to him.”

The one upon whom rests the zikah of one levir—

I apply to her, “the yevama shall come to him.”

But not

one

upon whom rests the zikah of two levirs!

This woman, with whom the second brother performed a maamar, has the zikah of two levirs, of the first and of the second: She is bound by virtue of the first brother and also by virtue of the second, because he performed a maamar with her. And her rival, the second brother’s wife, is likewise forbidden in levirate marriage.

Rabbi Shimon

disagrees and reasons: In either case:

If the maamar acquires her as his wife, then she is solely the second brother’s wife, and there is no zikah of the first brother.

And if the maamar does not acquire her as his wife, then there is no zikah of the second brother, since she does not fall from him but from the first brother.

Therefore, Rabbi Shimon does not accept at all the exposition that one upon whom rests the zikah of two levirs may not undergo levirate marriage.

Therefore, Rabbi Shimon

says: He performs levirate marriage with whichever of them he wishes, and performs halitza with the second,

because of the uncertainty!

The Gemara explains:

He may not perform levirate marriage with both,

according to Rabbi Shimon he may not perform levirate marriage with both of them, because Rabbi Shimon is uncertain

perhaps “there is zikah,”

and by virtue of the zikah the first brother’s wife is considered as though she had been taken in marriage by the second brother.

And they become

the first brother’s wife, who is bound to the second, and the second brother’s wife—

two yevamot who come

from one household.

One may perform levirate marriage with only one yevama from the household, because the Torah says, “the house of his brother,” teaching that he builds one house, but does not build two houses.