Yevamot 17b — the Talmud in English

Whoever teaches ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact folio location")

“the first”

leaves because of the wife of his brother who was not in his world,

has not erred.

For

what is “the first”

that the tanna said? This is the one who is

“first in the falling,”

who fell first, from the first brother, while her co-wife fell only in the second falling, from the second brother.

And whoever teaches “the second”

leaves because of the wife of his brother who was not in his world likewise

has not erred.

For

what is “the second”

that the tanna said? The woman who was

second in marriage

to the second brother, who had already been married to one woman, and afterward performed yibbum with his yevama, the wife of his first brother.

And the Gemara rejects: Is it necessarily the case that the Mishna is speaking of a situation in which the second brother first married his wife and only afterward performed yibbum with his yevama, and therefore she is called “the second”?

What,

is it possible that

we are not dealing

in our Mishna

with a case in which

he first

performed yibbum

the second brother with his yevama who had fallen to him from his first brother,

and

only

afterward married

his wife? And then it is impossible to call the wife of the first “second in marriage”!?

Rather,

this is how the second version must be explained:

What is “the second

leaves because of the wife of his brother who was not in his world”? This is the one who was

second in marriage,

who had been married twice: once to the first brother, and a second time to the second brother.

And now the Gemara explains the basis of the law of the wife of his brother who was not in his world:

“The wife of his brother who was not in his world” —

where is it written

that she is forbidden for yibbum?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The verse says

at the beginning of the passage of yibbum [Deuteronomy 25]:

“For brothers dwell —

together.”

And this is how the verse is expounded: “

For brothers dwell” — it speaks of brothers

who had one dwelling in the world

—

excluding the wife of his brother who was not in his world,

for the two brothers did not have “one dwelling” in the world.

“Together” —

the mitzva of yibbum applies only to brothers who are

“united” in inheritance,

who are called “together” in that they are fit to inherit one another. [And see below, later on the folio, in this same exposition, in Rashi’s words.]

Excluding his maternal brother,

who does not inherit them, and whose maternal brothers do not inherit him; therefore, the law of yibbum does not apply to them.

Rabba said:

That the mitzva of yibbum applies only to

paternal brothers

is derived

by a gzera shava,

“brotherhood, brotherhood,” from the sons of Jacob [Genesis 42].

Just as there,

Just as there,

the sons of Jacob said to their father, when they returned from Egypt the first time and told him what they had said to “the lord of the land” [Joseph]: “

We are twelve brothers, sons of our father.”

And the sons of Jacob were brothers

from the father, and not from the mother.

So too here,

with regard to yibbum, “For brothers dwell” speaks of brothers

from the father, and not

of

brothers from the mother.

And we raise an objection: Why do we have to learn from the sons of Jacob that the brotherhood mentioned in yibbum is only brotherhood from the father, and not learn from the passage of forbidden relationships, where the brotherhood mentioned there applies even to brotherhood that is only from the mother:

And let us derive

by a gzera shava

“brotherhood, brotherhood,” from forbidden relationships,

where we find that “the nakedness of your brother’s wife” means both your paternal brother and your maternal brother!

And we answer:

They derive the gzera shava “For brothers dwell”

from

“brothers”

[in yibbum]

from

“twelve”

“brothers”

the sons of our father.

And they do not derive “For they dwell”

“

brothers,”

from “

the nakedness of”

your brother

you shall not uncover.

And we challenge:

What difference does it make,

what difference does it make, for the purpose of learning a gzera shava, whether “brothers” or “your brother” was written? For a gzera shava is learned from the equal matter in the two places, in the content of the subject, and not from the identical equality between the words:

But the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught

with regard to a gzera shava in the afflictions of houses, that one learns a gzera shava even without identity between the words: It is stated [Leviticus 14],

“And the koen shall return,”

and it is stated

“And the koen shall come” —

“This is returning; this is coming.”

Since the intended meaning in both is the same matter, we may learn one from the other by a gzera shava.

And we answer:

These words

that one learns a gzera shava even when there is no identity between the words apply

where there is no matter

when there is no identical word

that resembles it.

But where there is a matter that resembles it,

as here, where there is the possibility of learning a gzera shava from identical words, “brothers, brothers,”

we learn the gzera shava from that which resembles it,

and we do not learn the gzera shava “brothers” from “your brother.”

And we still raise an objection:

And let us derive “brotherhood, brotherhood” from Lot, for it is written

[Genesis 13], that Abraham our father said to Lot:

“For we are brothers.”

And since Lot was the son of Haran, Abraham’s brother, and Abraham referred to them as “brothers,” we should learn by a gzera shava, “brothers, brothers,” that yibbum should also apply to the son of a brother, who performs yibbum with the wife of his deceased paternal uncle!

And we answer:

It is logical that he should have learned from the sons of Jacob,

that it is preferable to learn from them by a gzera shava and say that the brotherhood in yibbum applies only to paternal brothers, rather than learn from Abraham and Lot that yibbum applies also to the sons of brothers.

Because

the word “brothers” written concerning the sons of Jacob is

“available.”

It is superfluous, in order to be free for learning from it a gzera shava concerning the brotherhood of yibbum.

Since he could have written, “Twelve servants of yours, sons of our father.”

And it is written,

and Scripture added the word

“brothers” —

infer from this: it is free,

Scripture added it, the word “brothers,” so that it would be free for a gzera shava to yibbum.

But in Abraham our father’s statement to Lot, the word “brothers” is not superfluous, to be free for a gzera shava!

And the Gemara adds to explain the verse “For two brothers dwell together”:

And it was necessary for the Merciful One to write “

For they dwell

brothers,”

and it was necessary

also to add and

to write “together.”

For if the Merciful One had written

only

“brothers,”

I would have said to derive “brotherhood, brotherhood” from Lot,

so that even the son of a brother could perform yibbum.

And if you would say,

as we wished to say, that it is impossible to learn from Lot by a gzera shava, since

it is not available,

for there is no superfluous word there that would be free to compel the learning of the gzera shava, whereas among the sons of Jacob there is the free word “brothers” from which to teach by a gzera shava for yibbum.

Indeed!

You cannot say that there is nothing “free” by Abraham and Lot, from which they could compel the learning of a gzera shava from Lot.

Rather, indeed,

it is free because of it!

Since he could have written,

that Abraham should say to Lot, “We are

bad

men,”

and he wrote “brothers” —

infer from this: it is free!

And there would be room to learn by a gzera shava from Lot that yibbum by the son of a brother applies to the wife of the father’s brother.

Therefore the Merciful One added and

wrote “together,”

to teach that the mitzva of yibbum applies only to brothers

united in inheritance,

who share one inheritance among themselves.

And if the Merciful One had written

only

“together”

and not “brothers,”

I would have said

that the mitzva of yibbum applies only until

they are united

the brothers

through father and mother,

so that the brotherhood between them would be both from the father and from the mother [and I would say that this is the meaning of “together”].

Therefore it

is necessary

to write also “brothers,” and to learn by a gzera shava from the sons of Jacob that the brotherhood is from the father alone.

And the Gemara challenges the need to write “brothers,” so that we should not learn from “together” that the brotherhood must be both from the father and from the mother:

But,

the supposition that there is yibbum only with brothers whose brotherhood is both from the father and from the mother —

from where would it come?

From where would we come to say this!?

For the mitzva of

yibbum —

the Merciful One made it dependent on inheritance,

as it is written concerning the yavam: “He shall establish the name of his deceased brother,” and “establishing the name” of the deceased means that the brother performing yibbum acquires all the property of the deceased, and not the other brothers.

And inheritance —

only

from the father, and not from the mother, is it!

And we answer: Nevertheless, it

was necessary

to write “brothers.”

For

it might enter your mind that, since

the very matter of yibbum

is a novelty, for an erva is permitted,

the erva of the wife of his brother being permitted

with regard to him,

toward him.

And if so,

say

that “the wife of a brother” is not permitted

until they are united

the two brothers also

through the father and

also

through the mother.

Therefore it

is necessary

to write “brothers,” in addition to “together,” to teach that brotherhood from the father and not from the mother is also called brotherhood for yibbum.

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If a woman awaiting yibbum dies —

it is permitted

for the yavam

to marry her mother.

But as long as she is alive, it is forbidden to take her mother or one of her relatives, because through this the yevama would become an erva to him, and he would be unable to perform yibbum with her, and the mitzva of yibbum would thereby be nullified. And it is forbidden for him to perform yibbum in order “to nullify the mitzva of yavamim.”

And the Gemara infers:

Apparently,

it is evident from his words that he permitted taking her mother after the death of the yevama —

he holds

Rav Huna in the name of Rav,

“there is no zekika.”

That is, the zekika of the yevama to him does not have the power to cause her to be considered by rabbinic law as though she were his betrothed, so that her mother would be forbidden to him as his “mother-in-law,” by rabbinic law.

And the Gemara challenges: If so,

let Rav Huna say

in the name of Rav:

The halakha is according to the one who says, “There is no zekika”!

For the tannaim disputed this, whether the relatives of the yevama who is awaiting yibbum are forbidden to the yavam.

And we find this dispute of the tannaim below [41a], when the yavam transgressed and betrothed the sister of his yevama, thereby nullifying the mitzva of yavamim, since his yevama had now become an erva to him as the sister of his wife, and she was no longer required by Torah law for either chalitza or yibbum: Is the sister of his yevama whom he betrothed as a wife forbidden to him by the rabbinic prohibition of “the sister of one’s zekuka”?

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: “There is zekika,” and the prohibition of “the sister of one’s zekuka” remains upon her even after his yevama became an erva to him!

Since the Sages said that his betrothal of the sister of his yevama [even though it takes effect by Torah law!] cannot remove the prohibition of “the sister of one’s zekuka” by rabbinic law.

Therefore, he must wait with his betrothal and refrain from marrying the sister of his wife [who is betrothed to him by Torah law] until one of his brothers performs chalitza with the yevama or performs yibbum with her; then the zekika departs from her, and he is permitted to her relatives.

And the Sages hold that “there is no zekika.” Although initially he may not betroth the sister of his yevama, because it is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of yavamim, if he transgressed and betrothed her, he is permitted to marry her, because there is no prohibition involving the relatives of his yevama.

And since the tannaim disputed the matter, Rav Huna in the name of Rav should have said that the halakha is according to the one who says that there is no zekika, and we would know that a person is permitted to the relatives of his yevama where there is no nullification of the mitzva of yavamim, such as after the death of his yevama.

And we answer:

If Rav Huna had said

Rav

this,

that the halakha is according to the one who says that there is no zekika, and he had not explained his words that it is permitted to take the relatives of his yevama after her death,

I would have said, these words

that the zekika of the yevama to the yavam is not considered as though she were betrothed to him, so that her relatives would be forbidden to him, apply when the zekika was

with two

yevamin, when she cannot be considered the betrothed of both yevamin at once, and we do not know before whom she is destined to fall for yibbum, so that we should say that she is already like his betrothed.

But with one

yavam, when she is designated exclusively for him, I would say that

“there is zekika

toward him, as though she were his betrothed, and the yavam would be forbidden by rabbinic law to the relatives of his yevama, as though he had already married her and made her his betrothed.

And I would say that this prohibition applies to the relatives of his yevama even after her death, despite the fact that he did not perform yibbum with her!

Therefore Rav Huna in the name of Rav preferred to inform us that in every case, even when she fell before one yavam, he is not forbidden to her relatives.

But it is still difficult:

Let

Rav Huna in the name of Rav state explicitly:

The halakha is according to the one who says that there is no zekika, even in

a falling before one

yavam!

And he is Rabbi Akiva, who holds below [29b] that the power of the zekika, even to one yavam, is not sufficient to make her his wife with regard to annulling vows [while Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree and hold that the yavam can annul the vows of his yevama by virtue of the marital zekika between them].

And we answer:

If he had said this,

that the halakha is according to the one who says that there is no zekika even when she falls before one yavam,

I would have said that

he has no zekika

even during her lifetime,

during the life of the yevama, and not only after her death!

That is, it would be permitted for him, the yavam, to marry the mother of his yevama, even before he performs chalitza with her, and then the yevama would leave without chalitza, like an erva, for from that point she is forbidden to him because of “his wife’s daughter.”

He teaches us

Rav Huna in the name of Rav that only

after the death

of his yevama,

there is no

only then is it permitted for him, the yavam, to take the mother of his yevama.

But

during the lifetime

of his yevama,

no,

he may not take her,

because it is forbidden

for him, the yavam,

to nullify the mitzva of yavamim.

And if he takes the mother of his yevama as a wife, his yevama will leave without yibbum and without chalitza, like an erva, and he will thereby nullify his mitzva to perform yibbum or chalitza.

And the Gemara brings a proof against Rav’s position from a Mishna, the early rabbinic legal compendium, which demonstrates that there is a legal bond of levirate obligation.

We learned in the Mishna [49a]:

below, folio 49a

“if his levirate widow dies”—

“he is permitted to her sister,”

just as any other man is permitted to his wife’s sister, when it is not a case of levirate marriage, after his wife’s death.

This implies that only

with regard to her sister, yes,

he is permitted, just as he is permitted to his wife’s sister after her death.

But

with regard to her mother—

no!

Because there is a legal bond of levirate obligation, and she is forbidden to him.

And we answer:

The same law applies even with regard to her mother:

he is permitted to her after the death of his levirate widow.

And since the first clause of

that Mishna teaches:

“if his wife dies”—

“he is permitted to her sister,”

for with regard to his wife, after she dies,

“with regard to her sister, yes,”

he is permitted.

But with regard to her mother,

after his wife dies,

“no,”

she does not become permitted to him.

For she is

his mother-in-law, even after his wife’s death, and this is

a prohibition from Torah law.

The tanna also taught the final clause:

“if his wife dies,”

“he is permitted to her sister,”

but the same law applies with regard to her mother.

And Rav Yehuda

disagrees with Rav Huna’s report in the name of Rav, and

said: “If a levirate widow dies,”—

“he is forbidden to her mother.”

Evidently, Rav Yehuda holds

that

there is a legal bond of levirate obligation,

meaning that the levirate widow is considered as though she has been taken in marriage by the levir, and therefore he is forbidden to her relatives. And they challenge this:

Let

Rav Yehuda

say: “The halakha follows the one who says, ‘There is a legal bond of levirate obligation’”!

And we answer:

Had

Rav Yehuda

said this, I would have said that this applies only

when there is a legal bond of levirate obligation

with

one

levir,

as the bond exists only with regard to him.

But with two

levirs,

there is no legal bond of levirate obligation,

and therefore Rav Yehuda teaches us that even when there are two levirs, there is such a bond.

And they challenge this:

But when

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Sages dispute whether there is or is not a legal bond of levirate obligation,

with two

levirs

is where they dispute!

Rav Yehuda should have said that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who holds that there is a legal bond of levirate obligation, and we would then know that this refers even to a bond involving two levirs! Because of this difficulty, the Gemara brings another answer.

Rather, if

Rav Yehuda

had said this,

that there is a legal bond of levirate obligation, and he had not said, “A levirate widow who dies is forbidden to her mother,”