Yevamot 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

Come, let us rectify the situation for their co-wives

so that they must perform ḥalitza and may not undergo yibbum,

but may marry after ḥalitza outside, and they themselves will be fit and their children fit, according to everyone.

They did not manage to complete the matter before the hour was disrupted.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said

to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri:

What shall we do with the

co-wives of the forbidden relative

from before,

who had already undergone yibbum before the enactment, in accordance with Beit Shammai,

from now on,

after it was enacted that they may not undergo yibbum?

That is, we can enact a measure only from this point onward. But what measure can be taken for the mamzer children of those co-wives of a forbidden relative, after they have already undergone yibbum in accordance with Beit Shammai? And the Gemara proves this:

Granted, if you say that

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion,

this is why he said: What shall we do

to rectify the status of the mamzer children?

But if you say that they did not act

in accordance with their opinion—

what

was Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel’s question,

“What shall we do?”

After all, there are no mamzerim whose status requires rectification!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was necessary

to say this; the matter here does not concern the rectification of the mamzerim,

but with regard to the

rectification of the

co-wife herself,

according to Beit Shammai.

And

his question,

“What shall we do?”—

this is what he meant:

These co-wives

of a forbidden relative

according to Beit Hillel,

for according to Beit Hillel they need not perform ḥalitza, and if they went and married without ḥalitza—

According to Beit Shammai—

how should we make a remedy for them

so that they will be permitted to their husbands? After all, according to Beit Shammai they were not permitted to marry outside without ḥalitza, and they remain subject to the prohibition, “The wife of the dead shall not go outside,” with regard to their husbands.

Lest you say:

Let them perform ḥalitza

now,

that would not be a remedy, because by requiring them to perform ḥalitza—

their husbands will despise them!

They will thereby become repugnant to their husbands.

And if you would say

what difference does that make?—

Let them be despised!

What of it if they become repugnant to their husbands? After all, they are forbidden to them according to Beit Shammai.

The answer is: The verse says [Proverbs 3]:

“Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.”

And this is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do with the co-wives from before, who married without ḥalitza and are forbidden to their husbands according to Beit Shammai, for which we have no remedy?!

Come and hear,

from that

which Rabbi Tarfon said,

who was among the students of Beit Shammai:

I long

[literally: I am longing]

for the day when the co-wife of a daughter will come into my hands,

when she falls before me through the marriage of my brother—

and I will marry her,

by performing yibbum with her!

This proves that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion!

And we answer:

Say

that Rabbi Tarfon said as follows: When will the co-wife of a daughter come into my hands,

so that I may marry her off

outside without ḥalitza, in accordance with Beit Hillel?

And we challenge this:

But

Rabbi Tarfon

said, “I long”

[I am longing]

!

His words indicate that he yearned for something novel, something not currently practiced. But if he holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, there would be nothing novel in this, since everyone acts in accordance with Beit Hillel!

And we answer: Rabbi Tarfon said that he longed

to reject the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,

who enacted that she must perform ḥalitza.

Rabbi Tarfon yearned to abolish this enactment and marry her off outside without having her perform ḥalitza, in accordance with Beit Hillel.

Come and hear: There was an incident involving the daughter of Rabban Gamliel, who was married to Abba, his brother,

of Rabban Gamliel.

And Abba died

—Abba, the brother of Rabban Gamliel, who had been married to his daughter—

without sons, and Rabban Gamliel performed yibbum with his co-wife,

who was the co-wife of his daughter!

This proves that Rabban Gamliel performed yibbum with the co-wife of his daughter, demonstrating that in practice Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion; for otherwise Rabban Gamliel would not have performed yibbum with her.

The Gemara rejects this:

Can you understand it

in this way?

But was

Rabban Gamliel among the students of Beit Shammai?

He was, after all, a descendant of Hillel!

Rather, the daughter of Rabban Gamliel was an aylonit.

Therefore, her co-wife was not considered the co-wife of a forbidden relative. And so we learned in the first Mishna: If any of them were found to be an aylonit, their co-wives are permitted. Since it becomes clear that her betrothal was a mistaken transaction, her co-wife is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative.

And we ask:

But from what is taught in the latter clause

of that beraita:

Others say: The daughter of Rabban Gamliel was an aylonit.

Therefore Rabban Gamliel performed yibbum with her co-wife.

By inference

we must prove from this

that the first tanna holds

that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter

was not an aylonit,

and nevertheless Rabban Gamliel performed yibbum with her co-wife!

And we answer: In fact, according to both the first tanna and Others, Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was an aylonit.

And the issue of whether

he knew about her

—whether Rabban Gamliel’s brother knew at the time of her betrothal that she was an aylonit—

and

whether he

did not know about her

at the time of the betrothal—

is the difference between them,

the first tanna and Others.

And this is the dispute between the first tanna and Others:

Is the co-wife of an aylonit daughter permitted for yibbum only when he did not know at the time of her betrothal that she was an aylonit, and her marriage was therefore a mistaken transaction, so that her co-wife is not a co-wife of a forbidden relative at all, since it is retroactively revealed that the aylonit daughter was never married to the deceased brother? But if he knew that she was an aylonit and betrothed her, and the aylonit was the daughter of the yavam, then she renders her co-wife forbidden?

This is the opinion of the first tanna.

Or perhaps even if he knew at the time of her betrothal that she was an aylonit, and her marriage was not a mistaken transaction, her co-wife is not rendered forbidden.

The reason is that an aylonit, since she is incapable of bearing children, is not included at all in the passage concerning yibbum. And her co-wife is considered “the co-wife of a forbidden relative where there is no mitzva.”

And where there is no mitzva, the co-wife of a forbidden relative is not rendered forbidden.

This is the opinion of Others. For they said, “The daughter of Rabban Gamliel was an aylonit,” and the implication of the phrase “was”

is that he knew at the time of her marriage that she was an aylonit.

For if this had been a mistaken transaction, it would have been appropriate to say that “she was found to be an aylonit.”

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

If

he took her in marriage,

the deceased brother married Rabban Gamliel’s daughter, and she was together with her co-wife in his household.

And ultimately,

before his death,

he divorced

her—the deceased brother divorced his daughter, and only afterward did the brother die, so that his co-wife now fell before him for yibbum, having been her co-wife only during his lifetime and not at the time of the fall for yibbum—

this is the difference between them,

between the first tanna and Others: whether she has the exemption of the co-wife of a forbidden relative.

According to Others, she too is considered the co-wife of a forbidden relative. Therefore Others said that Rabban Gamliel performed yibbum with her because his daughter was an aylonit, and an aylonit does not render her co-wife forbidden.

But according to the first tanna, there is no need to say that she was an aylonit. Rather, she is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative, since at the time his brother died she was not the co-wife of a forbidden relative [as his brother had divorced the forbidden relative]. The prohibition of the co-wife of a forbidden relative applies only if she was the co-wife of the forbidden relative at the time of death, which is the time of the fall for yibbum.

Alternatively, if you wish, say: There was a condition regarding the intercourse—

this is the difference between them.

Rabban Gamliel’s brother made a condition with Rabban Gamliel’s daughter when he took her as a wife, stipulating that she have no blemishes.

The first tanna and Others disagreed over whether we say, “A person does not make his intercourse an act of promiscuity,” and therefore he waived his condition so that his intercourse would not be intercourse with an unmarried woman; or whether he does not waive it, and if she has a blemish, she is not his wife.

According to the first tanna, his condition remains in force and he does not waive it for her. Therefore, she is not his wife, since being an aylonit is a blemish, and consequently her co-wife is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative, since she is not her co-wife.

But according to Others, he waives his condition, and she is his wife, so that her co-wife is the co-wife of a forbidden relative. However, the co-wife of an aylonit is permitted, since an aylonit is not considered to have fallen where there is a mitzva, and the prohibition of the co-wife of a forbidden relative applies only where there is a mitzva.

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who picked an etrog on the first of Shevat.

That is, at the end of the tree’s second year of the Sabbatical cycle and at the beginning of the third year.

And he treated it,

as a matter of uncertainty,

as subject to two tithes

[the second tithe and the poor tithe]:

One

tithe,

the poor tithe, he tithed in accordance with the law of the tithe that must be separated in the new year of the tree,

in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai,

who say that the New Year for trees is on the first of Shevat.

And

another

tithe,

the second tithe, he tithed in accordance with the tithe practiced in the preceding year,

in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel,

who hold that the New Year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat.

Conclude from this: They acted

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, and therefore Rabbi Akiva, because of the uncertainty, acted in accordance with their view!

And we reject this: In fact, Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion.

And

Rabbi Akiva,

who separated two tithes because of the uncertainty, did so according to Beit Hillel, because

his learning

—the teaching he had learned concerning when the New Year for trees is—

was uncertain to him.

And Rabbi Akiva did not know

with certainty

whether Beit Hillel said that the first of Shevat

is the New Year for trees,

or whether they said the fifteenth of Shevat.

Mar Zutra raised an objection: There was an incident in which the daughter-in-law of the elder Shammai gave birth, and Shammai removed

Shammai

the plaster,

breaking the ceiling plaster and making an opening in it,

and he covered over

the

bed, for the sake of

the

infant,

so that he would eat in the sukka.

Conclude from this: They acted

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion. For according to Beit Hillel, an infant who still requires his mother is exempt from the sukka.

And we answer:

There,

they acted in accordance with their opinion but were not concerned about the prohibition of “You shall not cut yourselves,” because one who sees the opening in the ceiling does not know that it was made in order to fulfill the mitzva of sukka for an infant who still requires his mother.

Rather, the one who

sees

this

says:

He did it to increase the air.

They removed the plaster in order to increase the air in the sukka.

Mar Zutra raised an objection: There was an incident involving the aqueduct of Jehu, which was in Jerusalem,

and the aqueduct was carved into the rock, but it did not contain forty se’a of water, which is the measure required for a mikve.

And that

aqueduct

was “pierced” to a mikve

that was beside it.

There was an opening between the aqueduct and the mikve, and through the opening the water of the aqueduct became connected to the water of the mikve.

Through this, the water of the aqueduct became connected to the water of the mikve and was considered one mikve containing forty se’a.

And all ritually pure items that were in Jerusalem—

were prepared on its basis,

relying on immersion in this aqueduct.

And Beit Shammai sent word and widened it,

the opening between the aqueduct and the mikve, so that the water of the aqueduct would be connected to the water of the mikve through a wider connection.

Because

Beit Shammai say:

the water of the aqueduct is not considered connected to the water of the mikve

until

the wall of the aqueduct on the side of the mikve is breached

through most of it,

so that the water mixes across most of the width between the aqueduct and the water of the mikve.

It is not sufficient for water to mix through an opening whose width is that of the tube of a skin flask [the diameter of two fingers].

And we learned in a Mishna: The joining,

the connection between two

mikvaot,

is effected by means of an opening between the two mikvaot, provided that the width of the opening is

that of the tube

that can be placed in the mouth of

a skin flask.

And this width of the tube is measured both

in its thickness,

the wall of the round tube,

and

also

in its hollow,

the interior of the tube.

In total, it is a diameter of

approximately two fingers,

which rotate around themselves and

return to their place.

That is, a round opening [it need not be square] whose diameter is like the diameter of the circle formed by two fingers rotating one complete revolution around themselves.

Conclude from this:

From the fact that Beit Shammai widened the connection between the aqueduct and the water,

they acted

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion.

And we answer:

There,

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion because there was no concern there regarding the prohibition of “You shall not cut yourselves.”