Yevamot 14b — the Talmud in English

If you say that they informed them

which vessels were impure according to Beit Shammai, to Beit Hillel.

For that reason they did not refrain

from asking vessels from Beit Shammai in order to perform their pure acts with them.

But if you say that they did not inform them—

Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from Beit Hillel

from asking vessels, and they were not concerned lest Beit Hillel be lenient in a matter in which they were stringent, since

the impurities of Beit Hillel—

are pure things for Beit Shammai!

That is to say, Beit Hillel were stringent in their dispute with Beit Shammai concerning matters of purity.

But Beit Hillel, from Beit Shammai—

why did they not refrain

from asking their vessels?

And yet

the pure things of Beit Shammai—

are impure for Beit Hillel!

Rather, is it not that they informed them

which vessels were impure according to Beit Hillel.

And we conclude:

learn from it

that they informed them.

And we raise an objection:

And what is its strength,

what is the superiority

of this

proof that we have now brought, from the impurities of Beit Shammai to Beit Hillel, which necessarily means that they informed them,

over that

proof that we brought from the mamzerim of Beit Shammai, the sons of the rival wives of forbidden relations, which necessarily means that they informed them? For we said, “Here too it is reasonable,” and this is the language of bringing a proof superior to the previous one!?

And we answer:

You might have said,

there was room to say that

a rival wife

of a forbidden relation

has a public reputation,

and her sons are known as mamzerim, and Beit Shammai did not see a need to inform Beit Hillel of this. If so, there is no proof that in other cases they indeed informed them.

Therefore,

it teaches us

the proof from the impurities, that Beit Shammai were accustomed to inform them.

The principal matter: Rabbi Elazar said: Even though Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed concerning rival wives, they agree that there is no mamzer—

except from one whose prohibition is the prohibition of a forbidden relation, and for which one is liable to excision.

And we raise an objection:

Who,

who are the

“agree”

with whom?

If you say

that Beit Shammai

agree with Beit Hillel

that the sons of rival wives of forbidden relations, who went out to the marketplace without halitza [according to the view of Beit Hillel], are not mamzerim—

It is obvious!

For

the sons of those liable for prohibitions

[the sons of a yevama who went out to the marketplace without halitza, according to Beit Shammai]—

are fit!

For there is no mamzer except from those liable for excision.

Rather,

lest you say that Beit

Hillel agree with Beit Shammai,

that the sons of rival wives of forbidden relations who undergo levirate marriage are not mamzerim, since there is no mamzer except from those liable for excision.

It is impossible to say so! For

itself,

the rival wife of a forbidden relation—

is one liable for excision

to the levir; for she stands before him under the prohibition of the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife, which was not permitted for levirate marriage, and her son is a mamzer.

And we answer:

Always,

Beit

Shammai agree with Beit Hillel,

that the sons born from a rival wife of a forbidden relation who went out to the marketplace without halitza [according to the words of Beit Hillel] are not mamzerim.

And regarding what we objected, “It is obvious,” for they are the sons of those liable for prohibitions—

your answer is:

And to exclude

—to exclude

Rabbi Akiva, who said that there is a mamzer

even

from those liable for prohibitions.

It teaches us that there is no mamzer from those liable for prohibitions,

but only from those liable for excision!

And now the Gemara brings a proof from a beraita in the Tosefta:

Ta shma

from that which was taught:

Even though Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed:

a.

concerning rival wives

of a forbidden relation, whether they are permitted to undergo levirate marriage or forbidden.

b.

And concerning

two yevamot who are

sisters,

and who fell before two brothers, and each one is forbidden for levirate marriage because of “the sister of one bound to him,” what is the law if the levirs preceded and married them—must they send them out [below, 26a].

c.

Concerning an “old get”,

when a man wrote a get for his wife but had not yet given it to her, and was secluded with her after writing the get, whether it is possible to divorce with it.

d.

And concerning a doubtful married woman [see the two explanations in Rashi].

e.

And concerning one who divorces his wife and she spends the night with him at an inn,

whether one must be concerned that he had intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal.

f. Concerning the betrothal of a woman:

For Beit Shammai, he must betroth her

with money

which is one dinar,

and with an object worth money,

of the value of one dinar.

And for Beit Hillel, it is possible to betroth her even

with a peruta

of copper,

and with something worth a peruta

of copper.

Nevertheless,

Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel.

And

they did not refrain

from

Beit Hillel

from marrying women

from Beit Shammai.

To teach you that affection and friendship prevail between them.

To fulfill that which is said:

[Zechariah 8]

“Love truth and peace.”

Rabbi Shimon says: They refrained from the certain.

But they did not refrain from the doubtful.

And the Gemara now assumed that they refrained in a case of doubtful prohibition, such as one who divorces his wife and she spends the night with him at an inn, where it is doubtful whether he betrothed her through intercourse.

And therefore the Gemara asks:

Granted, if you say that they acted

according to their words,

for that reason,

according to Rabbi Shimon,

they refrained

from the certain [and what is meant by their not refraining from the doubtful will be explained below].

But if you say that they did not act

according to their words—

why did they refrain?

And the Gemara raises an objection to the proof from there:

But can you understand it,

do you think it is possible to learn in this way?

Even if it is so that they acted

according to their words, it is still difficult—what is the meaning of the “granted” that you said!?

For

granted, Beit Hillel refrained from Beit Shammai,

since

the

rival wives of a forbidden relation

are those liable for excision, and

their sons—

are mamzerim, according to Beit Hillel.

But Beit Shammai—

why did they refrain

from marrying women

from Beit Hillel?

For yevamot going out to the marketplace without halitza—

are the sons of those liable for prohibitions, and

their sons

are fit!

And we answer:

As Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

below:

It was necessary only with regard to the rival wife herself.

Here too, it was necessary only with regard to the rival wife herself.

For Beit Shammai too refrained from taking from Beit Hillel a rival wife of a forbidden relation without halitza, and she is forbidden to them by the prohibition of a yevama going out to the marketplace, since according to Beit Hillel she does not undergo halitza. The concern is not regarding the sons of the rival wife of a forbidden relation.

And now the Gemara comes to clarify what was stated in the beraita: they refrained from the certain but did not refrain from the doubtful.

And we raise an objection:

And what is different about the certain,

from which they refrained from marrying, since

it is a prohibition?

And yet

the doubtful, too—

is a prohibition!?

And we answer:

Do not say, “They did not refrain from marrying

from the doubtful.”

Rather, say

this: They did not refrain from marrying

presumptively,

as long as they had not informed them that they were forbidden to them, since

they informed them

of what was forbidden according to their view,

and they withdrew

from them.

But it is still difficult:

And what does it teach us

by this?—

that love and friendship prevail between them.

If so,

this is the first part!?

And we answer:

This teaches us—

that the entire

beraita is according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon.

Ta shma,

from that

which

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said:

How is this halakha

of the rival wife of a forbidden relation

widespread,

practiced,

in Israel?

If

we act according to the words of Beit Shammai—

the child is a mamzer according to the words of Beit Hillel!

And if

we act according to the words of Beit Hillel—

the child is blemished

for the priesthood, by the law of a ḥalal,

according to the words of Beit Shammai!

And as will be clarified below, they learn this by means of a kal va-chomer from a widow to a High Priest, whose son is a ḥalal.