Yevamot 14a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Do you maintain that

you think that indeed

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their position!?

Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their position!

And

if

Rabbi Yohanan said:

indeed

they acted, and they acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position.

And

this question is

subject to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel.

For Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their position.

And

if

Shmuel said: They acted, and they acted!

And we examine it:

When?

During which period did Rav and Shmuel dispute whether Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their position or not?

If you say: Before

there emerged a

heavenly voice

from Heaven and proclaimed that the halakha follows Beit Hillel—

it is difficult:

What is the reason of the one who says, “They did not act

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position,” when they held that the halakha follows them?

Rather

perhaps you will say that they disputed concerning the period

after

there emerged the

heavenly voice—

went forth—

if so, it is difficult in the opposite way:

What is the reason of the one who says, “They acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position”?

And we answer:

If you wish, say

that they disputed concerning the period

before the heavenly voice, and if you wish, say

that they disputed concerning the period

after the heavenly voice.

And the Gemara explains the two possibilities:

If you wish, say

that they disputed concerning the period

before the heavenly voice—

and this is referring to a case in which Beit Hillel

were

the majority,

and Beit Shammai were the minority.

According to the one who says, “They did not act

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position,” despite their thinking that they were correct,

for Beit Hillel

were

the majority,

and in deciding a dispute one must follow the majority.

And even the minority, which disputes the opinion of the majority, is obligated to conduct itself in practice according to the opinion of the majority, even though it holds that the majority is mistaken!

And the one who says, “They acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position, and they did not conduct themselves in practice according to the opinion of the majority, since

when

we follow the majority—

where

the disputants

are equal to one another,

that they are equal in their understanding.

But in the dispute of the minority and the majority

here—

Beit Shammai

are

more incisive.

For they were sharper and more incisive in their understanding than Beit Hillel, and therefore the majority does not determine the halakha in practice.

And if you wish, say

that they disputed concerning the period

after

there emerged the

heavenly voice

and proclaimed that the halakha follows Beit Hillel.

The one who says, “They did not act

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position”—

for a heavenly voice emerged

and decided against them.

And the one who says, “They acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position despite the proclamation of the heavenly voice—this is the position of

Rabbi Yehoshua.

For he said: We do not take notice of a heavenly voice.

And now the Gemara discusses the question of “You shall not make factions”:

And the one who says, “They acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position, and likewise Beit Hillel acted in accordance with their position—how did they conduct themselves in this manner?

And after all,

we read here:

Deuteronomy 14]

“You shall not cut yourselves”— —

You shall not make factions!

Abaye said: When we say, “You shall not cut yourselves”—

for example, two courts of law in one city,

such that

these instruct in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai, and these instruct in accordance with the words of Beit Hillel.

But two courts of law

that issue differing rulings

in two towns—

there is no matter.

It does not concern us, for this does not involve “You shall not make factions.”

Rava said to him: But

the ruling of

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

is for all Israel, and

like

differing rulings of

two courts of law in one city, it is comparable!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how it should be answered:

When we say, “You shall not cut yourselves”—

for example, one court of law in one city,

in which

half

of the judges of the court

instruct in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai, and half instruct in accordance with the words of Beit Hillel.

But two courts of law

that issue differing rulings

in one city—

there is no matter.

And the Gemara brings proof that they would conduct themselves according to differing rulings and were not concerned about “You shall not make factions.”

Come and hear: In the place of Rabbi Eliezer,

who held that even “requirements of circumcision,” which are labors that must be performed in order to make it possible to fulfill the mitzva of circumcision, override Shabbat, and not only the mitzva of circumcision itself—

they would cut wood

on Shabbat in order

to make charcoal on Shabbat,

in order

to make iron

for the circumcision knife.

In the place of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean,

who permitted cooking poultry with milk and eating it—

they would eat poultry meat with milk.

And the Gemara infers: only

in the place of Rabbi Eliezer, no,

they would conduct themselves like him, but

in the place of Rabbi Akiva,

who disagreed with him,

not

would they conduct themselves like Rabbi Eliezer!

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any labor that it is possible to perform

for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of circumcision

from the eve of Shabbat—

does not override Shabbat!

And how did they conduct themselves in the place of Rabbi Eliezer like him, and in the place of Rabbi Akiva like Rabbi Akiva, and were not concerned about “You shall not make factions”!? The Gemara expresses astonishment at the one who raised this difficulty:

And this—what refutation is it

from the fact that they did not all conduct themselves according to one position?

And after all,

different places—that is different.

For we already distinguished above that there is no prohibition of “You shall not make factions” in two places.

And now the Gemara explains:

And the one who raises it—

what caused him to raise it?

What entered his mind that he should raise this difficulty in this manner!?

It might enter your mind to say: Because of the stringency of

the laws of

Shabbat,

for one who violates them is liable to stoning—therefore all the places

are considered like one place.

It teaches us

that even with regard to the laws of Shabbat, all the places are not considered one place, and there is no need to be concerned about a variation in the ruling in different places.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Come and hear

from the conduct of Rabbi Abbahu:

For Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened upon the place

when he would arrive at the place

of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—

would carry

on Shabbat

a lamp, “a lamp,” which is a utensil containing oil and a wick.

The lamp itself is a useful utensil, in which oil can be held, but since they would light a fire in the wick, it was a utensil designated by a person for a labor that is forbidden to perform on Shabbat.

And Rabbi Abbahu would carry the lamp on Shabbat after the fire had gone out, and he was not concerned about the prohibition of carrying muktze, since Rabbi Yehoshua holds like Rabbi Shimon, who “does not hold of muktze.”

That is, a person’s setting aside of a utensil from use on Shabbat does not prohibit the utensil with the prohibition of muktze. For according to Rabbi Shimon there is no muktze except something that is muktze by its very nature, such as a stone or a corpse.

But a utensil that in itself is fit for permitted use on Shabbat, except that a person set it aside in his mind because he uses it for a labor forbidden on Shabbat, does not become muktze.

And

if

when he happened upon

Rabbi Abbahu

the place

his place

of Rabbi Yohanan,

who held like Rabbi Yehuda, who “holds of muktze,” meaning that a person’s setting aside of a utensil from use on Shabbat because he designated it for a labor forbidden on Shabbat prohibits it with the prohibition of muktze—

he would not carry the lamp,

since it was muktze!

And it is proven from the conduct of Rabbi Abbahu that they conducted themselves differently in practical halakha, and why is there not here “You shall not make factions”?

The Gemara expresses astonishment at the one who raised the difficulty:

And this—

what is the difficulty!?

And

because

we do not say that “

places,

places,”

is different!?

And the Gemara explains the difficulty:

We are saying this: Rabbi Abbahu—

how did he do this here, and how did he do that there?

How did he conduct himself differently from place to place!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu—

like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi

he held,

for he ruled according to Rabbi Shimon, that the lamp is not muktze.

Rather,

when he happened upon the place of Rabbi Yohanan,

he was stringent upon himself, and

he would not carry

the lamp

because of the honor of Rabbi Yohanan,

who ruled like Rabbi Yehuda and prohibited carrying the lamp.

And the Gemara discusses it:

But there was the attendant!

Rabbi Abbahu had an attendant who served him, and he saw that Rabbi Abbahu carried the lamp. If so, he would also carry it before Rabbi Yohanan, for he would not know that Rabbi Yohanan ruled oppositely, and this would involve an affront to the honor of Rabbi Yohanan.

And the Gemara explains:

For he informed the attendant,

as Rabbi Abbahu informed his attendant that one must be stringent and not carry the lamp in the place of Rabbi Yohanan, because of his honor.

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

Even though these prohibit

the co-wife of the forbidden relative,

and these permit

her—

Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai.

If you grant that they did not act

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position,

for this reason they did not refrain

Beit Hillel from marrying women from Beit Shammai.

But if you grant that they acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position, it follows that there were mamzerim from the co-wives of forbidden relatives—

why did they not refrain

Beit Hillel from marrying women from Beit Shammai?

And the Gemara continues and explains:

Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from Beit Hillel

from taking women, despite the fact that according to the words of Beit Hillel the co-wives of the forbidden relatives leave without yibbum and without halitza, whereas according to Beit Shammai they are forbidden to leave without halitza, and it follows that their sons were born in prohibition.

Since

they are the sons of those liable for prohibitions subject to lashes,

and they are not mamzerim.

But Beit Hillel from Beit Shammai—

why did they not refrain

from marrying women from them?

After all, the sons of the co-wives of forbidden relatives who underwent yibbum are the sons of those liable for karet, since the co-wife of the forbidden relative is the wife of a brother who was not permitted for yibbum, and it is punishable by karet.

And

the sons of those liable for karet—

are they mamzerim!

And if you would say

to answer that

Beit Hillel hold that there is no mamzer from those liable for karet, but only from those liable to a court-imposed death penalty, whereas the prohibition of the wife of a brother in the case of the co-wife of a forbidden relative is only karet—

But Rabbi Elazar said: Even though Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed concerning the co-wives, they agree

that

there is no mamzer except from one whose prohibition is the prohibition of a forbidden relative and who is punished by karet!

Rather, is it not, conclude from here

that

they did not act

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position!

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Actually, they acted

Beit Shammai in accordance with their position.

Rather,

they informed them,

they would inform Beit Hillel who were the sons of the co-wives of forbidden relatives who had undergone yibbum,

and they withdrew,

and Beit Hillel would withdraw from them, from marrying them as wives.

And this too is logically evident,

that this is the explanation of the Mishna.

For it teaches in the latter clause: All the pure things and all the impure things concerning which these would declare pure and these would declare impure, they did not refrain

from

making these pure things upon

the borrowed utensils of

these.

Despite the fact that Beit Hillel were stringent concerning pure things more than Beit Shammai.

And necessarily, Beit Shammai would inform Beit Hillel that these were their utensils that were impure according to Beit Hillel, and the same applies: they informed them that these were their mamzerim according to Beit Hillel.

And the Gemara explains the proof: