Yevamot 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Do you maintain that

you indeed maintain that

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion!?

Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion!

But

if

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

indeed

they did, and they did

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion.

But

this question is

the subject of a dispute between Rav and Shmuel.

For Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion.

But

if

Shmuel said: They did, and they did!

And we inquire about this:

When?

For which period did Rav and Shmuel disagree as to whether Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion?

If we say: Before

the

heavenly voice

went forth from Heaven and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel—

this would be difficult:

What is the reason of the one who says, “Beit Shammai did not act

in accordance with their opinion,” when they maintained that the halakha was in accordance with them?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that they disagreed concerning the period

after

the

heavenly voice

went forth—

if so, the opposite difficulty arises:

What is the reason of the one who says, “Beit Shammai acted

in accordance with their opinion”?

And we answer:

If you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning the period

before the heavenly voice; and if you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning the period

after the heavenly voice.

And the Gemara explains both possibilities:

If you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning the period

before the heavenly voice—

and this is a case where Beit Hillel

were

the majority,

and Beit Shammai were the minority.

According to the one who says, “They did not act”

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, even though they believed that they were correct,

for Beit Hillel

were

the majority,

and in deciding a dispute one must follow the majority.

Even the minority, which disputes the opinion of the majority, must act in practice in accordance with the opinion of the majority, despite believing that the majority is mistaken!

And according to the one who says, “They did act,”

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion and did not act in practice in accordance with the opinion of the majority, because

when

we follow the majority—

it is where

the disputants

are equal to one another,

that is, equal in their understanding.

But in a dispute between the minority and the majority,

here—

Beit Shammai

were

sharper.

They were more acute and incisive in their understanding than Beit Hillel; therefore, the majority does not determine the practical halakha.

And if you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning the period

after

the

heavenly voice

went forth and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel.

The one who says, “They did not act”

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion—

for the heavenly voice went forth

and decided against them.

And the one who says, “They did act,”

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion despite the proclamation of the heavenly voice—the opinion of

Rabbi Yehoshua is.

For he said: We pay no attention to a heavenly voice.

The Gemara now discusses the question of the prohibition of forming factions:

And according to the one who says, “They did act,”

Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, and likewise Beit Hillel acted in accordance with their opinion—how could they act in this manner?

But

we read here: [Deuteronomy 14]

“Deuteronomy 14”

“You shall not cut yourselves” —

you shall not form factions!

Abaye said: When we say, “You shall not cut yourselves,”

it is, for example, when there are two courts in one city,

such that

these rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, and those rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

But two courts

that issue divergent rulings

in two towns—

there is no difficulty.

We are not concerned, since this does not constitute the prohibition of forming factions.

Rava said to him: But

the ruling of

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

was directed to all Israel, and

it is

like divergent rulings of

two courts in one city!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how it should be answered:

When we say, “You shall not cut yourselves,”

it is, for example, when there is one court in one city,

and

part

of the judges of the court

rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, while part rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

But two courts

that issue divergent rulings

in one city—

there is no difficulty.

And the Gemara cites proof that they would follow divergent rulings and were not concerned about “You shall not cut yourselves.”

Come and hear: In the place of Rabbi Eliezer,

who maintained that even the “requirements of circumcision”—the labors necessary in order to make it possible to fulfill the mitzva of circumcision—override Shabbat, and not only circumcision itself—

they would chop wood

on Shabbat in order

to make charcoal on Shabbat,

in order

to make iron

for the circumcision knife.

In the place of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who permitted cooking fowl with milk and eating it—

they would eat fowl cooked with milk.

And the Gemara infers: only

in the place of Rabbi Eliezer, they did

act in accordance with his opinion; but

in the place of Rabbi Akiva,

who disagreed with him,

they did not

act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Akiva stated a general principle: Any labor that can be performed

for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of circumcision

on the eve of Shabbat—

does not override Shabbat!

How could they act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in his place and in accordance with Rabbi Akiva in Rabbi Akiva’s place, without being concerned about “You shall not cut yourselves”!? The Gemara is astonished at the one who raised this question:

And this—what refutation is it

that not everyone acted according to the same opinion?

For

different places are different.

As we already distinguished above, there is no prohibition of forming factions when the practices are followed in two different places.

The Gemara now explains:

And as for the one who raised it—

what led him to raise it?

What entered his mind that led him to raise this objection!?

You might have thought: Because of the stringency of

the laws of

Shabbat,

for violating which one is liable to stoning, all the places

are considered like one place.

It teaches us

that even with regard to the laws of Shabbat, all places are not considered one place, and there is no need to be concerned about divergent rulings in different places.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Come and hear

from the practice of Rabbi Abbahu:

For when Rabbi Abbahu happened to come to the place

of

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—

he would carry

on Shabbat

a lamp,

that is, a utensil containing oil and a wick.

The lamp itself is a useful utensil in which one can hold oil; however, since a fire was lit in the wick, it was a utensil designated by a person for a labor that is prohibited on Shabbat.

Rabbi Abbahu would carry the lamp on Shabbat after the fire had gone out, and he was not concerned about the prohibition against moving muktzeh, because Rabbi Yehoshua held in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who does not recognize the category of muktzeh.

That is, a person’s setting aside of a utensil from use on Shabbat does not prohibit the utensil as muktzeh, since according to Rabbi Shimon, muktzeh applies only to something that is inherently set aside, such as a stone or a corpse.

But a utensil that is inherently fit for permitted use on Shabbat, and that a person has consciously set aside because he uses it for a labor prohibited on Shabbat, does not become muktzeh.

But

if

Rabbi Abbahu happened to come

Rabbi Abbahu

to the place

of

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who recognizes the category of muktzeh—that is, a person’s setting aside a utensil from use on Shabbat because he designated it for a labor prohibited on Shabbat renders it prohibited as muktzeh—

he would not carry the lamp,

because it was muktzeh!

It is thus evident from Rabbi Abbahu’s practice that they acted differently in practical halakha. Why, then, is this not a violation of “You shall not cut yourselves”?

The Gemara is astonished at the one who raised the objection:

And this—

what difficulty is this!?

And

if

we do not say

that “

places,”

are different!?

The Gemara explains the objection:

This is what we meant: Rabbi Abbahu—

how did he act this way here and that way there?

How did he act differently from one place to another!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Abbahu—

held in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi

as his position,

who ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, that the lamp is not muktzeh.

Rather,

when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

he was stringent upon himself, and

would not carry

the lamp

out of respect for Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda and prohibited carrying the lamp.

The Gemara discusses this:

But there was the attendant!

Rabbi Abbahu had an attendant who served him, and the attendant saw Rabbi Abbahu carrying the lamp. If so, he would also carry it before Rabbi Yoḥanan, since he would not know that Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled differently, and this would constitute an affront to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s honor.

The Gemara explains:

He informed the attendant,

as Rabbi Abbahu informed his attendant that he should be stringent and not carry the lamp in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s place, out of respect for him.

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

Although these prohibit

the rival wife of the erva,

and those permit

her—

Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the families of Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from the families of Beit Shammai.

Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act

in accordance with their opinion,

it is for this reason that Beit Hillel did not refrain

from marrying women from Beit Shammai.

But if you say that Beit Shammai did act

in accordance with their opinion, it follows that there were mamzerim among the rival wives of the erva—

why did Beit Hillel not refrain

from marrying women from Beit Shammai?

The Gemara continues and explains:

Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel,

despite the fact that according to Beit Hillel the rival wives of the erva leave without either yibbum or ḥalitza, whereas according to Beit Shammai they may not leave without ḥalitza, with the result that their sons were born through a prohibited union,

because

they are the sons of those liable for lashes,

and they are not mamzerim.

But Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai—

why did they not refrain

from marrying women from them?

After all, the sons of the rival wives of the erva who underwent yibbum are the sons of those liable for karet, since the rival wife of the erva is the wife of a brother whose marriage was not permitted through yibbum, and the punishment for this prohibition is karet.

And

the sons of those liable for karet—

are they not mamzerim!

And if you would say

as an answer that

Beit Hillel maintain that there is no mamzer from those liable for karet,

but only from those liable to a court-imposed death penalty, whereas the prohibition against the wife of a brother in the case of the rival wife of an erva carries only karet—

but Rabbi Elazar said: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they agree

that

there is a mamzer only from one whose prohibition is a prohibition of erva, and who is punished by karet!

Rather, is it not that one can conclude from here

that

Beit Shammai did not act

in accordance with their opinion!

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Actually, Beit Shammai did act

in accordance with their opinion.

Rather,

they informed them,

they informed Beit Hillel which men were the sons of rival wives of an erva who had undergone yibbum,

and they separated,

and Beit Hillel refrained from marrying them as wives.

And this too is evidently so,

that this is the explanation of the Mishna.

For the latter clause teaches: With regard to all the pure and impure objects concerning which these declare pure and those declare impure, they did not refrain

from

preparing these pure objects on top of

the borrowed utensils of

those.

This was despite the fact that Beit Hillel were more stringent regarding purity than Beit Shammai.

It must be that Beit Shammai informed Beit Hillel which utensils were considered impure according to Beit Hillel; and likewise, they informed them which men were considered mamzerim according to Beit Hillel.

The Gemara explains the proof: