Yevamot 13b — the Talmud in English

3. And if

they performed halitza

on the co-wives of the forbidden relations from the brothers—

Beit Shammai,

who hold that the co-wives of a forbidden relation undergo yibbum and halitza—

disqualify

the co-wives of the forbidden relation who undergo halitza

from the priesthood,

since their halitza is halitza. And a woman who underwent halitza is forbidden to a kohen, by rabbinic decree.

And Beit Hillel deem them fit

for the priesthood, since they are exempt from halitza, and their halitza is not considered halitza to disqualify them from the priesthood.

4. And if

they underwent yibbum

with the co-wives of the forbidden relation—

Beit Shammai deem them fit

to marry kohanim if they were widowed.

And Beit Hillel disqualify

them from marrying into the priesthood [immediately!], since they are a forbidden relation to their yevamin, and if the yevamin had intercourse with them, they did not acquire them; rather, they disqualified them from the priesthood, as is the law concerning all those liable for karet, who disqualify an Israelite woman from marrying into the priesthood if one had intercourse with her.

5.

Although these,

Beit Hillel,

forbid

the co-wives of the forbidden relation to undergo yibbum,

and

these,

these,

Beit Shammai,

permit

them to undergo yibbum.

And although

these,

Beit Hillel,

disqualify

the co-wives of the forbidden relation from the priesthood if the yavam had intercourse with them,

and

these,

these,

Beit Shammai,

deem

them fit for the priesthood.

Nevertheless,

Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel.

And not

did

Beit Hillel

refrain from marrying women

from Beit Shammai.

This was so despite the fact that the sons of the co-wives of the forbidden relation who underwent yibbum according to Beit Shammai are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel.

Since they would inform one another who those mamzerim were, according to their position.

And likewise, in

all

those

pure things and impure things concerning which these declared pure and those declared impure—

they did not refrain

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel from

preparing pure things, these upon the basis of those.

That is, they would lend their utensils to one another, and they would inform one another if the utensil was impure according to the position of the one to whom they lent the utensil.

Gemara:

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said: What is the reason of Beit Shammai

that they do not forbid the co-wives, and do not expound “to afflict”?

For it is written:

[Deuteronomy 25]

“The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man.”

And Beit Shammai analyze the wording of the verse:

Since the verse stated, “The wife of the dead shall not be

outside,”

it indicates that the verse speaks of a woman who is “outside,” that is, she is unrelated to him, and therefore she is not a forbidden relation to him; and concerning her the verse said that she shall not be to a strange man, but shall undergo yibbum with him.

And it is to be learned

from the general implication

of this, that the verse called her “outside,” in the sense of “external” [unrelated],

that there is

another yevama who falls with her for yibbum, the wife of the dead, who is

“internal,”

close to the yavam, and she is a forbidden relation to him!

And the Merciful One said,

that this “external” woman, who is the co-wife of the “internal” forbidden relation—

“shall not be”

to a strange man, but shall undergo yibbum with the yavam!

And Beit Hillel—

require it,

they need this verse

for that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: From where

is it established that betrothal does not take effect for

a strange man in the case of a yevama?

Since

it is stated, “The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man.”

There shall be no legal bond in her for a strange man!

And the verse teaches that although the prohibition of a yevama to the marketplace is only a prohibition of a negative commandment, and betrothal takes effect with those liable for negative commandments, here betrothal does not take effect, by the scriptural decree “shall not be.”

And Beit Shammai

hold:

Is it written “

shall not be

outside?”

“Outside” is written!

And its meaning is that there is an external woman and an internal woman, and the verse said that the external woman shall not be to a strange man, but shall undergo yibbum with the yavam.

And Beit Hillel

hold:

Since “outside” is written,

it is as though “to outside” were written.

As it was taught in a beraita, Rabbi Nehemiah says: Every word that requires

the letter

lamed at its beginning—

the verse placed

the letter

he at its end.

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael’s tanna taught: For example, “Elim”

[Exodus 15]—

“Elimah.”

“Mahanaim”

[II Samuel 17]—

“Mahanaimah.”

“Egypt”

[Genesis 12]—

“Egyptward.”

And likewise:

“Diblatayimah”

[Numbers 33].

“Jerusalemward”

[Ezekiel 8].

“Wildernessward”

[I Chronicles 5].

And we raised it:

And Beit Shammai,

this

that

Rav

Yehuda said in the name of Rav,

that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama to the marketplace—

from where do they derive it?

It follows from “to a strange man.”

The verse teaches that every person who is “strange” is so in relation to her, and cannot be her husband; rather, only her yavam can take her as a wife.

And we raised it:

And Beit Hillel as well, let it follow for them,

that they should learn the law that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama to the marketplace

from “to a strange man”!

And we answer:

Indeed,

Beit Hillel also derive this from “to a strange man.”

But according to this, “

outside”

for Beit Hillel—

why do I need it?

And we answer:

To include

the yevama

betrothed

for yibbum, despite the fact that she had not yet married his deceased brother and was still in the category of “external” with regard to him, since he had not yet married her.

And the other,

Beit Shammai, learned this

from

the superfluous letter he:

“outside”—

“the outside.”

And the other,

Beit Hillel, the exposition

“outside”—

“the outside,”

do not understand it

to expound concerning a betrothed yevama!

Rava said: The reason of Beit Shammai

is that they hold that the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not take effect upon the prohibition of one’s daughter or upon the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister, and it follows that the forbidden relation does not stand at all in place of yibbum. Consequently, her co-wife is not the co-wife of a forbidden relation in a case of yibbum.

And Beit Shammai assume [by reasoning!], that his daughter who married his brother, since the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect upon her with regard to her father, because according to their position “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition,” is not included in the section of yibbum.

For according to Beit Shammai, the mitzva of yibbum was stated only where there is the prohibition of a brother’s wife, which the Torah permitted for the purpose of yibbum.

But where this permission has no significance, such as when his daughter married his brother, and the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect at all upon his daughter—the Torah did not state the section of yibbum, despite the fact that in every respect she is his brother’s wife; therefore, her co-wife is not considered the co-wife of a forbidden relation in the place of the mitzva of yibbum.

And where there is no mitzva of yibbum, we have no source that a forbidden relation forbids her co-wife.

This is the explanation of the position of Beit Shammai according to Rava, in conclusion.

But at first, the Gemara assumed that Rava explained their reason differently:

Now the Gemara assumed that Rava came to explain their reason concerning a wife’s sister: that the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and therefore, according to their position, there is no possibility at all of a “co-wife of a forbidden relation.”

And according to them, it is impossible to interpret the verse “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to afflict” as a prohibition of the co-wife of a forbidden relation, since they hold

that “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition,”

and the prohibition of a wife’s sister did not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And therefore, her co-wife is not considered the co-wife of a forbidden relation of a wife’s sister.

And it concerns a case where at first his deceased brother married one of the sisters, and she then became forbidden to the living brother through the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And afterward the living brother married her sister. And then his brother’s wife is not forbidden to him on account of “a wife’s sister,” since she had already been forbidden to him previously, through the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.

And since his wife’s sister is not forbidden to him on account of the forbidden relation of a wife’s sister, but continues to be forbidden to him only on account of the prohibition of a brother’s wife, when his brother dies and she and her co-wife fall before him for yibbum, his co-wife is not forbidden as the co-wife of a wife’s sister, since his wife’s sister is not forbidden to him through the forbidden-relation prohibition of a wife’s sister, as stated, for Beit Shammai hold that the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And should you say: Let her co-wife be exempt as the co-wife of the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife, which has not been permitted here for yibbum—

Your answer is: Since the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife is not the reason causing the prevention of yibbum, but only the prohibition of a wife’s sister [which stands ready to take effect upon her if we permit the prohibition of a brother’s wife for yibbum], the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife does not exempt her co-wife.

And Beit Hillel hold that it is not necessary for the prohibition to take effect in practice upon the forbidden relation for her to be considered the co-wife of a forbidden relation; rather, it is sufficient that the wife of the deceased is his wife’s sister in order to prohibit her co-wife by the law of the co-wife of a forbidden relation.

But we challenge:

Granted,

this explanation of Rava’s position according to Beit Shammai is sound, only

where,

if it occurred

that the

deceased

brother married

the sister first, and she became forbidden to the living brother through the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and afterward married

the

living

brother her second sister.

For in such a case we properly say:

The prohibition of a wife’s

sister does not come and take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife, since the prohibition of a brother’s wife preceded it.

But

rather, if it occurred that

if it happened that

the

living

brother married

first one of the two sisters, in which case her sister becomes forbidden to him by the law of a wife’s sister,

and

only

afterward married

the

deceased

brother the second sister—

Then in such a situation, the prohibition of

a wife’s sister preceded,

and it can take effect upon her.

And therefore, when afterward her brother married her sister, and died, and the forbidden relation of his wife’s sister and her co-wife fall before him for yibbum, why should her co-wife not be considered the co-wife of a forbidden relation!?

And we answer: If the prohibition of a wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of a brother’s wife, then

since the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not come and take effect upon the prohibition of a wife’s sister,

since one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition—

the co-wife becomes

the

“co-wife of a forbidden relation not in the place of a mitzva,”

and she is permitted.

That is, according to Beit Shammai, the section of the mitzva of yibbum was stated only concerning a brother’s wife who is forbidden to him through the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

But a brother’s wife upon whom the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect, since the prohibition of a wife’s sister took effect upon her beforehand, is not included at all in the section of yibbum.

Consequently, her co-wife is not considered the co-wife of a forbidden relation in the place of the mitzva; rather, she is like any co-wife of a forbidden relation not in the place of the mitzva, concerning whom all agree that she is permitted.

And Beit Hillel disagree on this point and hold: Since in reality she is a brother’s wife, we do not care that the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect upon her.

And since a forbidden-relation prohibition applies to her, her co-wife is properly considered the “co-wife of a forbidden relation in the place of a mitzva.”

We learned in the Mishna:

They performed halitza

with the co-wives of the forbidden relation—

Beit Shammai disqualify

them from the priesthood, and Beit Hillel deem them fit.

And we challenge: Since according to Beit Shammai the co-wives of the forbidden relation require halitza, while according to Beit Hillel they do not require halitza, why was it necessary for the Mishna to state this dispute between them?

For

it is obvious

that according to Beit Shammai they are disqualified from the priesthood, as is the law of every woman who underwent halitza, who is disqualified to a kohen, while according to Beit Hillel they are fit for the priesthood, since the law of halitza does not apply to them at all!

And we answer: The Mishna comes to teach us this dispute in order

to exclude

the position of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri

below.

For he said: Come, let us enact for them, for the co-wives

of forbidden relations,

that they should undergo halitza and not undergo yibbum,

so that they would not come to a mishap, if they were to marry the sons born from them, since according to Beit Shammai they are fit, while according to Beit Hillel they are mamzerim.

And according to him, since they undergo halitza by force of the enactment, they are disqualified from the priesthood.

It teaches us that Beit Hillel deem them fit,

since according to their view there is no need at all for the enactment of halitza.

We learned in the Mishna:

They underwent yibbum

the co-wives of the forbidden relation—Beit Shammai deem them fit for the priesthood, and

Beit Hillel disqualify them.

And we raised it:

This too—

why do I need it?

Why do I need it to repeat their dispute concerning the co-wife of a forbidden relation both with regard to halitza and with regard to yibbum? It is one dispute: whether the co-wife of a forbidden relation undergoes yibbum or is exempt.

And we answer:

Since it taught “they performed halitza”

the co-wives of the forbidden relation,

it also taught “they underwent yibbum.”

The Gemara now explains how some people conducted themselves according to Beit Shammai and some according to Beit Hillel, although there is a prohibition of “you shall not cut yourselves,” not to divide into separate factions in the conduct of laws and prohibitions!

We learned there

in tractate Megilla [2a]:

The Megilla is read on the eleventh

of the month of Adar,

and on the twelfth, and on the thirteenth, and on the fourteenth, and on the fifteenth—

not less

than the eleventh day,

and not more

than the fifteenth day.

He said to him,

Rish Lakish asked

Rabbi Yohanan,

how is it that they conduct themselves by reading the Megilla at different times, when

here applies

the negative commandment [Deuteronomy 14]

“You shall not cut yourselves,”

whose meaning is:

“You shall not make separate factions,”

conducting one part of the public in this manner and another part of the public in a different manner, as though you had two different Torahs.

For example, reading the Megilla at different times, with these reading the Megilla on one day and those on another day!

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rish Lakish:

This “you shall not cut yourselves”—

is needed for its own matter, for the Merciful One said: You shall not make a wound upon the dead!

And the wording “you shall not cut yourselves” means a prohibition against making cuts and wounds in the body as a sign of sorrow and mourning over the dead; the meaning of the verse is not to prohibit conducting oneself as separate factions.

Rish Lakish said to him:

If so,

that the verse came to prohibit cutting oneself over the dead alone,

let the verse say, “You shall not cut”

“over the dead,” whose meaning would be cutting and making a wound.

What

is the reason that the verse stated the wording

“you shall cut yourselves”?

Conclude from it that this is what it came for,

to prohibit conduct as separate factions.

The Gemara now discusses Rish Lakish’s statement:

And say: The entire “

You shall not cut yourselves” came only

for this,

to prohibit separate factions; and from where do we know the prohibition of cutting oneself over the dead?!

And we answer:

If so, let the verse say, “You shall not form a faction!”

whose meaning is a faction.

What is “you shall not cut yourselves”?

Conclude from it: two things,

both the prohibition of cutting oneself over the dead and the prohibition of separate factions.

And Rabbi Yohanan did not answer Rish Lakish’s question why there is no prohibition of “you shall not cut yourselves” concerning reading the Megilla in different places. [And for the reason, see the Ritva.]

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rish Lakish: Why do you ask about separate factions at the times of reading the Megilla, and do not ask about separate factions at the differing times on the eve of Passover for performing labor?

And is it that

you have not learned this far

the Mishna in tractate Pesahim [50a]:

A place where they were accustomed to perform labor on the eves of Passover until midday—

they perform it.

A place where they were accustomed not to perform labor—

they do not perform it!

And from here you should have asked me how they make separate factions.

He said to him,

Rish Lakish:

I am telling you,

I asked you about a matter of

prohibition,

that the Sages prohibited changing the times of reading that they established, and one is obligated everywhere to read specifically according to the time that the Sages established for it; thereby the matter appears as separate factions, for each place is obligated in this change and is forbidden to conduct itself as another place.

For Rav Shemen bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

What is the meaning of that which is written [Esther 9],

“To establish these days of Purim in their appointed times”?

The verse teaches that

the Sages established many times for them

for reading the Megilla, and it is forbidden to change them.

And

if

you had said to me,

that I should ask you about

a custom,

that they practiced not performing labor on the eve of Passover before midday, how is this conducting oneself as separate factions?!

For the question concerning something that the Sages prohibited being practiced equally, and required reading at different times, is preferable to the question of how they conducted themselves with a differing custom?!

And the Gemara wonders about Rish Lakish’s statement:

And

for

there,

on the eve of Passover,

is it not a prohibition

to perform labor even before midday? Is this merely a custom?

And did we not learn: the night,

of the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the night of searching for leaven —

Beit Shammai prohibit

it with regard to labor,

and Beit Hillel permit!

And they practice in it in separate factions, some like Beit Shammai and some like Beit Hillel.

And those who practice not to perform labor in it, in accordance with Beit Shammai, do so not as a custom, but as a prohibition!

He said to him

Resh Lakish to Rabbi Yohanan:

There,

with regard to the prohibition of labor, there is no concern of separate factions, because

one who sees

him abstaining from labor,

says: It is labor that he does not have.

And the entire prohibition of “You shall not cut yourselves into factions” is that our Torah should not appear as two Torahs; and here it does not appear as two Torahs. Therefore I asked you from the reading of the Megillah, where everyone sees the divided practice.

And as stated, Rabbi Yohanan did not answer him concerning his question from the Megillah.

And now the Gemara discusses the matter of a yevama who is the co-wife of an erva: how Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel practiced, each side according to its words; and behold, there is here the prohibition of separate factions:

But

we learned in our Mishna that

Beit Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,

and Beit Hillel prohibit!

And Beit Shammai practiced in accordance with their words, and Beit Hillel in accordance with their words. And it is difficult: why is there here no prohibition of separate factions!?