Yevamot 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

3. And if

the rival wives removed the shoes

of the forbidden relatives from the brothers—

Beit Shammai,

who maintain that the rival wives of a forbidden relative undergo yibbum and halitza,

disqualify

the rival wives of the forbidden relative who perform halitza

from the priesthood,

because their halitza is valid. And a woman who has performed halitza is prohibited to a priest by rabbinic ordinance.

And Beit Hillel deem

them fit to marry into the priesthood, because they are exempt from halitza, and their halitza is not considered halitza that disqualifies them from the priesthood.

4. And if

the rival wives underwent yibbum,

the rival wives of the forbidden relative with the brothers—

Beit Shammai deem

them fit, if they are widowed, to marry priests.

And Beit Hillel disqualify

them from marrying into the priesthood immediately, because they are forbidden relatives to their yevamim, and if the yevamim had intercourse with them, they did not acquire them as wives; rather, they disqualified them from the priesthood, according to the law governing all those liable for karet, who disqualify a daughter of Israel from marrying into the priesthood if one has intercourse with her.

5.

Although these,

Beit Hillel,

prohibit

the rival wives of the forbidden relative from undergoing yibbum,

and

these,

these

Beit Shammai,

permit

them to undergo yibbum,

and although

these,

Beit Hillel,

disqualify

the rival wives of the forbidden relative from the priesthood if the yavam had intercourse with them,

and

these,

these

Beit Shammai,

deem

them fit for the priesthood,

nevertheless,

Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel.

Nor

did

Beit Hillel

refrain from marrying women

from Beit Shammai.

This was so despite the fact that the children of the rival wives of the forbidden relative who underwent yibbum according to Beit Shammai were mamzerim according to Beit Hillel.

Because each group would inform the other which children were mamzerim according to its view.

Likewise, with

all

those

pure and impure matters concerning which these declared pure and those declared impure,

they did not refrain

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel from

preparing pure items, each on the basis of the other.

That is, they would lend their utensils to one another, and would inform one another if the utensil was impure according to the view of the person to whom they were lending it.

Gemara:

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said: What is the reason of Beit Shammai,

who do not prohibit the rival wives and do not expound the phrase “for rivalry”?

As it is written: [Deuteronomy 25]

[Deuteronomy 25]

“The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man.”

And Beit Shammai analyze the wording of the verse:

Since the verse says, “The wife of the dead shall not be

outside,”

it indicates that the verse is speaking of a woman who is “outside,” meaning that she is unrelated to him and therefore is not a forbidden relative to him. Concerning her the verse says that she shall not be with a strange man; rather, she shall undergo yibbum with him.

And one may learn

by inference

from the fact that the verse called her “outside,” in the sense of “external” [unrelated],

that there is

another yevama who falls with her for yibbum—the wife of the dead, who is

“internal,”

close to the yavam and therefore a forbidden relative to him.

And the Merciful One said that this “external” woman, who is the rival wife of the “internal” one,

that this “external” woman, who is the co-wife of the “internal” forbidden relation—

“shall not be”

with a strange man; rather, she shall undergo yibbum with the yavam.

And Beit Hillel—

they require it;

they need this verse

for that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that betrothal does not take effect

with a strange man

in the case of a yevama?

Because

it is stated: “The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man.”

There shall be no legal bond with her for a stranger!

And the verse teaches that although the prohibition of a yevama to the outside world is only a prohibition of a negative commandment, and betrothal takes effect with those liable for a negative commandment, in this case betrothal does not take effect, by virtue of the biblical decree, “There shall not be.”

And Beit Shammai

maintain:

Is it written “There shall not be

shall not be

outside?”

“Outside” is written!

Its meaning is that there is an external woman and an internal woman, and the verse says that the external woman shall not be with a strange man; rather, she shall undergo yibbum with the yavam.

And Beit Hillel

maintain:

Since “outside” is written,

it is as though “to the outside” were written.

As it is taught in a beraita, Rabbi Neḥemya says: Every word that requires

the letter

lamed at its beginning—

the verse placed

the letter

heh at its end.

And the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For example: elim [Exodus 15]—

[Exodus 15]—

elima.

Mahanaim [II Samuel 17]—

[II Samuel 17]—

maḥanima.

Egypt [Genesis 12]—

[Genesis 12]—

Mitzraima.

And likewise:

Diblataima [Numbers 33].

[Numbers 33].

Jerusalema [Ezekiel 8].

[Ezekiel 8].

Midbara [I Chronicles 5].

[I Chronicles 5].

And we raised an objection:

And as for Beit Shammai,

this

that

Rav

Yehuda said in the name of Rav, that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama who is available to the outside world—

from where do they derive it?

It follows from “to a strange man.”

The verse teaches that every man who is “strange” is so with regard to her and cannot be her husband; only her yavam can take her as a wife.

And we raised an objection:

And Beit Hillel too, let it follow for them

that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama who is available to the outside world

from “to a strange man”!

And we answer:

Indeed,

Beit Hillel too derive this from “to a strange man.”

But if so,

“outside”

according to Beit Hillel—

why do I need it?

And we answer: It serves

to include

the yevama who is

betrothed

for yibbum, even though she had not yet married the deceased brother and was still considered “external” with respect to him, since he had not yet married her.

And the other one,

Beit Shammai, learned this

from

the superfluous letter heh:

“outside”—

“the outside.”

And the other one,

Beit Hillel, the derivation

“outside”—

“the outside,”

do not understand it

as a basis for deriving the law of a betrothed yevama.

Rava said: The reason of Beit Shammai

is that they maintain that the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not take effect upon the prohibition of one’s daughter or upon the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister; consequently, the forbidden relative does not stand at all in the place of yibbum. Therefore, her rival wife is not the rival wife of a forbidden relative in the context of yibbum.

And Beit Shammai assume, by logical reasoning, that when one’s daughter marries his brother, since the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not take effect with regard to her vis-à-vis her father, in accordance with their view that one prohibition does not take effect upon another, she is not included in the passage concerning yibbum.

For according to Beit Shammai, the mitzva of yibbum was stated only in a case in which there is the prohibition of a brother’s wife, which the Torah permitted for the purpose of yibbum.

But where this permission has no practical significance—for example, when his daughter married his brother, and the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect upon his daughter—the Torah did not state the passage concerning yibbum, although she is his brother’s wife in every respect. Therefore, her rival wife is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative in the context of the mitzva of yibbum.

And outside the context of the mitzva of yibbum, we have no source that a forbidden relative prohibits her rival wife.

This is the explanation of Beit Shammai’s method according to Rava, in conclusion.

Initially, however, the Gemara assumed that Rava explained their reason differently:

The Gemara now assumed that Rava came to explain their position concerning a wife’s sister: The prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and therefore, according to their view, there is no possibility at all of a “rival wife of a forbidden relative.”

And according to them, it is impossible to interpret the verse, “And a woman and her sister you shall not take, to make them rivals,” as prohibiting the rival wife of a forbidden relative, since they maintain

that one prohibition does not take effect upon another,

and the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

Accordingly, her rival wife is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative who is a wife’s sister.

This is referring to a case in which the deceased brother first married one of the sisters, at which point she became prohibited to the surviving brother by the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

Afterward, the surviving brother married her sister. In that case, the wife of his brother is not prohibited to him on account of the prohibition of a wife’s sister, since she had already been prohibited to him by the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and one prohibition does not take effect upon another.

And since his wife’s sister is not prohibited to him as a forbidden relative on account of the prohibition of a wife’s sister, but remains prohibited to him only because of the prohibition of a brother’s wife, when his brother dies and she and her rival wife fall before him for yibbum, her rival wife is not prohibited as the rival wife of a wife’s sister, since the wife’s sister is not prohibited to him by the prohibition of a wife’s sister, as stated above: Beit Shammai maintain that the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And should you say: Let her rival wife be exempt because she is the rival wife of a brother’s wife, for whom yibbum is not permitted here,

the answer is: Since the forbidden status of a brother’s wife is not the factor preventing yibbum, but only the prohibition of a wife’s sister—which is poised to take effect upon her if the prohibition of a brother’s wife is permitted for yibbum—therefore the forbidden status of a brother’s wife does not exempt her rival wife.

And Beit Hillel maintain that it is unnecessary for the prohibition to take effect in practice upon the forbidden relative in order for her rival wife to be considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative. It is sufficient that the wife of the dead is his wife’s sister for her rival wife to be prohibited by the law of the rival wife of a forbidden relative.

But we challenge this:

Granted,

this explanation of Rava’s position according to Beit Shammai is sound only

where,

if it happened that

the deceased

brother

first married

the sister, and she became prohibited to the surviving brother by the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and afterward married

the

surviving

brother her second sister.

For in such a case we can properly say:

The prohibition of a wife’s sister does not come and take effect

upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife, because the prohibition of a brother’s wife came first.

But

But,

if it happened that

the

surviving

brother first married one of the two sisters, in which case her sister became prohibited to him by the law of a wife’s sister,

and

only

afterward married

the

deceased

brother the second sister—

then in such a case, the prohibition of

a wife’s sister preceded,

and it could take effect upon her.

And if so, when her brother-in-law subsequently married her sister, then died, and the forbidden relative who is his wife’s sister and her rival wife fall before him for yibbum, why should her rival wife not be considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative?

And we answer: If the prohibition of a wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of a brother’s wife, then

since the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not come and take effect upon the prohibition of a wife’s sister,

because one prohibition does not take effect upon another,

the rival wife becomes

the

“rival wife of a forbidden relative outside the context of the mitzva,”

and is permitted.

That is, according to Beit Shammai, the passage concerning the mitzva of yibbum was stated only with regard to a brother’s wife who is prohibited to him by the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

But a brother’s wife upon whom the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect, because the prohibition of a wife’s sister had taken effect upon her earlier, is not included at all in the passage concerning yibbum.

Consequently, her rival wife is not considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative within the context of the mitzva; rather, she is like any rival wife of a forbidden relative outside the context of the mitzva, concerning whom all agree that she is permitted.

And Beit Hillel disagree on this point and maintain: Since she is in fact a brother’s wife, it makes no difference to us that the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not take effect upon her.

And since a prohibition of a forbidden relative applies to her, her rival wife is properly considered the “rival wife of a forbidden relative within the context of the mitzva.”

We learned in the Mishna:

The rival wives of a forbidden relative removed the shoes

—

Beit Shammai disqualify

them from the priesthood, while Beit Hillel deem them fit.

And we challenge this: Since according to Beit Shammai the rival wives of a forbidden relative require halitza, while according to Beit Hillel they do not require halitza, why did the Mishna need to state this dispute between them?

After all,

it is obvious

that according to Beit Shammai they are disqualified from the priesthood, like any woman who has performed halitza and is disqualified to a priest, while according to Beit Hillel they are fit for the priesthood, since the law of halitza does not apply to them at all!

And we answer: The Mishna comes to teach this dispute in order

to exclude

the opinion

of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri

below.

For he said: Come, let us institute for the rival wives

of forbidden relatives

that they perform halitza but not yibbum,

so that people would not come to stumble, if they married the sons born to them, since according to Beit Shammai those sons are fit, whereas according to Beit Hillel they are mamzerim.

And according to him, since halitza is performed with them by virtue of the ordinance, they are disqualified from the priesthood.

It teaches us that Beit Hillel deem them fit,

since according to their view there is no need whatsoever for the ordinance requiring halitza.

We learned in the Mishna:

The rival wives underwent yibbum

of the forbidden relative—Beit Shammai deem them fit for the priesthood,

and Beit Hillel disqualify them.

And we raised an objection:

This further statement—

why do I need it?

Why did the Mishna need to repeat their dispute concerning the rival wife of a forbidden relative both with regard to halitza and with regard to yibbum? It is a single dispute: whether the rival wife of a forbidden relative undergoes yibbum or is exempt.

And we answer:

Since it taught “they removed the shoes”

the rival wives of the forbidden relative,

it also taught “they underwent yibbum.”

The Gemara now explains how some people followed Beit Shammai and some followed Beit Hillel, despite the prohibition of “You shall not cut yourselves,” meaning that one must not divide into separate factions in matters of conduct and prohibitions.

We learned there,

in tractate Megilla [2a]:

The Megilla is read on the eleventh

of the month of Adar,

and on the twelfth, and on the thirteenth, and on the fourteenth, and on the fifteenth—

not earlier

than the eleventh day,

and not later

than the fifteenth day.

He said to him,

Rish Lakish asked

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

how can the Megilla be read at different times, when

the prohibition applies here

of [Deuteronomy 14]

“You shall not cut yourselves,”

whose meaning is:

You shall not form separate factions,

with part of the public acting one way and part of the public acting differently, as though you had two different Torahs.

For example, the reading of the Megilla at different times: These read the Megilla on one day, and those on another day!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rish Lakish:

This “You shall not cut yourselves”—

is needed for its literal meaning, for the Merciful One said: Do not make a wound over the dead!

The expression “You shall not cut yourselves” means that it is prohibited to make cuts and wounds in the body as a sign of grief and mourning for the dead; the verse does not prohibit acting as separate factions.

Rish Lakish said to him:

If so,

if the verse came only to prohibit cutting oneself over the dead,

let the verse say, “Do not cut yourselves

over the dead,” whose meaning would be an expression of cutting and wounding.

What

is the reason the verse uses the expression

“You shall not cut yourselves”?

Conclude from this that it comes for this purpose,

to prohibit the formation of separate factions.

The Gemara now discusses Rish Lakish’s statement:

But perhaps the entire

“You shall not cut yourselves”

comes only for this purpose,

to prohibit separate factions. And from where do we know the prohibition against cutting oneself over the dead?

And we answer:

If so, let the verse say, “Do not form a faction!”

which would indicate a faction.

What is the meaning of “You shall not cut yourselves”?

Conclude from this that it teaches two things:

both the prohibition against cutting oneself over the dead and the prohibition against forming separate factions.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan did not answer Rish Lakish’s question as to why there is no prohibition of “You shall not cut yourselves” with regard to reading the Megilla in different places. [For the reason, see the Ritva].

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rish Lakish: Why do you ask about separate factions with regard to the times of reading the Megilla, but do not ask about separate factions with regard to the different customs on the eve of Pesaḥ concerning performing labor?

And is it not the case that

you have already learned

the Mishna in tractate Pesaḥim [50a]:

A place where the custom is to perform labor on the eve of Pesaḥ until midday—

they perform labor.

A place where the custom is not to perform labor—

they do not perform labor!

And from this you should have asked me how they may form separate factions.

He said to him,

Rish Lakish:

I am telling you,

I asked you about a matter of

prohibition,

for the Sages prohibited changing the times established for the reading, and everywhere one is obligated to read specifically at the time established for that place by the Sages. This appears to constitute separate factions, since each place is required to follow this differing practice and is prohibited from acting like another place.

As Rav Shemen bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

What is the meaning of that which is written [Esther 9],

“To establish these days of Purim at their appointed times”?

The verse teaches that

the Sages established many times

for reading the Megilla, and it is prohibited to change them.

And

if

you had said to me

that I should ask about

a custom,

the custom of refraining from labor on the eve of Pesaḥ before midday, how this constitutes the formation of separate factions,

surely the question concerning something that the Sages prohibited people from doing uniformly, and for which they required reading at different times, is preferable to the question of how people followed divergent customs!

The Gemara is astonished at Rish Lakish’s words:

And

is it not the case that

there,

on the eve of Pesaḥ,

was it not a prohibition

to perform labor even before midday? After all, this is not merely a custom?

And didn’t we learn: The night

of the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the night of searching for leaven—

Beit Shammai prohibit

engaging in labor,

and Beit Hillel permit it!

And people follow divergent practices regarding it, some in accordance with Beit Shammai and others in accordance with Beit Hillel.

And those who refrain from labor on it in accordance with Beit Shammai do so not merely as a custom, but because they consider it prohibited!

Reish Lakish said to

Rebbi Yohanan:

There,

with regard to the prohibition against labor, there is no concern of forming separate groups, because

one who sees

him refraining from labor

says: He simply has no work to do.

And the entire prohibition of lo titgodedu is that our Torah should not appear to be two Torahs. Here, however, it does not appear to be two Torahs, and therefore I asked you about the reading of the Megilla, since everyone sees the divergent practice.

And, as stated, Rebbi Yohanan did not answer him concerning his question from the reading of the Megilla.

And now the Gemara discusses the case of a yevama who is the co-wife of an ervah: How did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel conduct themselves, each in accordance with its own ruling? Yet this entails the prohibition against forming separate groups:

But

we learned in our Mishna that

Beit Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,

and Beit Hillel prohibit them!

And Beit Shammai conducted themselves in accordance with their ruling, and Beit Hillel in accordance with theirs. This is difficult: Why is there no prohibition against forming separate groups here!?