Yevamot 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

The one who sees says: “To increase the water,”

in order to increase the water in the trough

is what he is doing.

Therefore, he makes a wide opening.

And this is not analogous to two Torahs.

And the Gemara brings proof that Beit Shammai conducted themselves in accordance with their own opinion:

Ta shma,

from this

which Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: When I was studying Torah with Rabbi Yohanan HaḤorani, I saw that he would eat dry bread with salt on two occasions.

I came and told my father.

He said to me: Take him olives. And I took them to him.

He saw them,

the olives,

that they were moist,

and he assumed that the liquid emerging from the olives had come upon them, and that they had thereby been “prepared” to contract ritual impurity.

Food does not contract ritual impurity unless a liquid has been placed upon it, and through this it becomes “prepared”—that is, it becomes “fit” to contract ritual impurity as food.

And he was concerned lest an am ha-aretz had touched the outer wall of the earthenware barrel in which the olives had been placed, and the olives had thereby contracted ritual impurity by rabbinic decree, since the Sages decreed impurity upon contact with an am ha-aretz.

He said to me: I do not eat olives!

I came and told my father.

He said to me: Go and tell him: It was a perforated barrel,

and the liquid was supposed to emerge from it through the opening.

Thus, I do not wish the liquid to be placed upon the olives.

And when one does not desire the placement of the liquid upon the food, the food does not become “prepared” to contract ritual impurity.

But the dregs sealed it,

the place of the opening, and therefore the liquid remained in it.

And we learned in the Mishna: With regard to a barrel of pressed olives,

packed tightly in the barrel, with liquid emerging from them as a result of the pressure—

Beit Shammai say: It does not require a perforation,

so that it will be evident that its owner does not desire the liquid to be placed upon the olives, since the liquid is not considered a liquid but merely “fruit juice,” which does not prepare food to contract ritual impurity.

And Beit Hillel say:

The liquid emerging from the olives is considered a liquid, like oil, and it prepares the olives to contract ritual impurity if the owners desire the liquid to be placed upon the olives.

Therefore, if the owner wishes that the pressed olives in the barrel not be prepared to contract ritual impurity from the liquid,

the barrel must

to be

be perforated,

so that the liquid will emerge through it, making it evident that the owner does not desire the liquid to be placed upon the olives.

And they agree

Beit Hillel with Beit Shammai,

that if it was perforated

the barrel,

and the dregs sealed it—

that it

the olives inside it

is pure.

And even though

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok

was a student of Shammai—

he performed all his actions only in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

And we analyze:

Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted

in accordance with their opinion,

this is the novelty

there is a novelty in the fact that the beraita noted the conduct of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok, who did not conduct himself like Beit Shammai despite having been their student.

But if you say that Beit Shammai did not act

in accordance with their opinion—

what is the novelty

of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok, who conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel!?

And the Gemara brings an additional proof:

Ta shma,

from that which was taught in a beraita:

They asked Rabbi Yehoshua: The rival wife of the daughter—

what

is her status?

He said to them:

It is

a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

.

And they asked him again:

And in accordance with whose opinion is the halakha

?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to them:

Rabbi Yehoshua said:

Why are you placing my head between two great mountains?

Between two great disputes, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel!

I am afraid

to answer you in accordance with whose opinion the halakha is,

lest they crush

and shatter

my head!

However, I testify to you concerning two great families that were in Jerusalem: the family of Beit Tzavo'im, descended from Ben Akhmai, and the family of Beit Kufa'i, descended from Ben Mekoshesh. They are the sons of rival wives

of a forbidden relation, who married and entered the wider community without ḥalitza, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel,

and among them

there are also

High Priests, and they served upon the altar.

And the Gemara infers:

Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted

in accordance with their opinion, that is well;

this is why he said

Rabbi Yehoshua

“I am afraid,”

as he did not wish to rule against them and declare that the sons of the rival wives whom Beit Shammai permitted to marry were mamzerim, because he feared that those mamzerim would attack him, since he would disqualify them from entering the Jewish people.

But if you say that Beit Shammai themselves did not act

in accordance with their opinion—

why did he say, “I am afraid”?

Rather, the Gemara was perplexed by that which we learned in the beraita:

And even if it is so that they acted,

even if we say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, while the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, there is still a difficulty:

What is the meaning of “I am afraid”

that Rabbi Yehoshua said?

And

did Rabbi Yehoshua not say: There is no mamzer except one born from a relationship punishable by a court-imposed death penalty!?

But the sons of the rival wives who entered into levirate marriage according to Beit Shammai are sons of relationships punishable by karet, and they are not mamzerim, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, even according to Beit Hillel.

If so, he has no reason at all to fear mamzerim attacking him if he publicizes that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, since according to his statement they are not mamzerim!?

And we answer:

Even if it is so that

the son of those liable to karet

is not a mamzer—

he is blemished

with regard to the priesthood;

nevertheless, he is!

And Rabbi Yehoshua was concerned about those whom he would blemish with regard to the priesthood.

And the disqualification of the son of those liable to karet with regard to the priesthood can be derived

by a kal va-chomer from

the son of

a widow

who had relations with a High Priest in violation of the prohibition.

Just as with regard to a widow, whose prohibition does not apply universally,

but only to a High Priest,

her son

born to a High Priest is

blemished

with regard to the priesthood, as he is a ḥalal.

This one,

the son of a rival wife of a forbidden relation who entered into levirate marriage,

whose prohibition applies universally—

all the more so is he blemished with regard to the priesthood!

And now the Gemara explains Rabbi Yehoshua’s words—how he answered those who asked him:

And we raised a difficulty:

They established,

they asked

him

Rabbi Yehoshua about the law of

the rival wives

of a forbidden relation: Are they permitted to enter into levirate marriage, in accordance with Beit Shammai, or are they subject to karet, in accordance with Beit Hillel?

And

if Rabbi Yehoshua

resolved for him

the law of

the sons

of the

rival wives,

whose mothers had married outside the levirate bond without ḥalitza, when he testified to them concerning their sons, among whom there were High Priests.

But it is obvious that the sons of rival wives of a forbidden relation who married outside the levirate bond are not mamzerim even according to Beit Shammai, since they are the sons of those liable for ordinary prohibitions, and are not mamzerim!?

And we answer:

Two

two issues

he was asking him

Rabbi Yehoshua:

The first:

the rival wives

themselves of a forbidden relation—

what,

what is their status?

And if you should say

that with regard to

the rival wives

of a forbidden relation the halakha is

in accordance with Beit Hillel,

we must ask a second question:

The sons of the rival wives

of a forbidden relation

according to Beit Hillel,

whose mothers married outside the levirate bond without ḥalitza—

according

to

Beit Shammai—

what

is their status?

Perhaps you will say:

What practical difference is there

what the status of the sons of rival wives of a forbidden relation is according to Beit Shammai, since the entire question concerned the possibility that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel?

Your answer is:

To resolve

from here the law concerning

the child of one who remarried his divorced wife

after she had married another man, her other husband divorced her, and the first husband took her back in violation of the prohibition [“Her first husband, who sent her away, may not take her again”]—

according to Beit Hillel.

That is, we learn from the view of Beit Shammai concerning the child of a woman who married outside the levirate bond that, according to Beit Hillel, he is merely the child of those liable for ordinary prohibitions, and likewise the child of one who remarried his divorced wife is merely the child of those liable for ordinary prohibitions.

But with regard to the child of a priest who violates a prohibition relating to priesthood, such as a divorced woman who marries a priest, it is obvious that he is forbidden by the law of a ḥalal, and it cannot be derived by a kal va-chomer.

Are we saying

that one should derive

a kal va-chomer

as follows:

Just as a widow who marries a High Priest, whose prohibition does not apply universally,

since she is prohibited only to a High Priest—

her son is blemished

with regard to the priesthood;

this one,

a divorced woman whom her husband remarried after she had married another man,

whose prohibition applies universally—

is it not logical that her son is blemished

with regard to the priesthood?

Or perhaps there is a way to refute

the kal va-chomer:

What is true of a widow

who marries a High Priest—

she herself becomes profaned

through this intercourse, and therefore her son is also a ḥalal.

Would you say the same with regard to one who remarries his divorced wife after she had married another man, who does not become profaned through his intercourse, since she was already forbidden to marry a priest from the time she was divorced?

And she is not disqualified from eating teruma, since a woman becomes profaned through intercourse with those liable for ordinary prohibitions only when the man was permanently a stranger to her, such as intercourse with a mamzer. But she does not become profaned through intercourse with one who has only now become forbidden to her, such as one who remarries his divorced wife after she had married another man, or a woman awaiting levirate marriage who marries outside the levirate bond without ḥalitza.

And he said to them

Rabbi Yehoshua:

the rival wives

themselves—

I am afraid

to tell you what their status is, since according to Beit Shammai they enter into levirate marriage, and their sons are the sons of those liable for karet, and the sons of those liable for karet are disqualified with regard to the priesthood; therefore, I am afraid of them.