Yevamot 120b (קכ:) — the Talmud in English

And here, it is with regard to a mole,

is it considered like a [precise identifying mark]

a distinctive identifying mark—

they disagree.

For everyone agrees that one may rely on a distinctive identifying mark even with regard to Torah prohibitions.

One Sage holds:

a mole

is a distinctive identifying mark

.

And one Sage holds:

a mole

is not a distinctive identifying mark

.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And according to that formulation

above,

as Rava said

in its explanation, that

identifying marks are by Torah law

, this is difficult:

but it teaches

in our Mishna that one does not testify concerning the dead man

even though there are identifying marks on his body and on his belongings!

The Gemara answers that it is referring to ordinary marks found among many people.

For example, the mark on

his body—

that he is tall or short,

meaning that he is tall or low in stature.

But regarding

his belongings,

the dead man’s clothes, which have distinctive identifying marks, it is also impossible to rely on them, since

we are concerned that they may have been lent.

We must be concerned that these are indeed that person’s clothes, but that he is not the deceased; perhaps he lent them to another person, and that person died while wearing the borrowed clothes.

The Gemara is astonished:

And if we are concerned that they may have been lent—

a donkey,

which we have established is returned to its owner

on the basis of identifying marks on its saddle

that is upon it—

how do we return it?

After all, it is possible that this saddle was borrowed and that the donkey belongs to someone else!

And we answer:

People do not borrow a saddle,

as it is not the practice of donkey owners to borrow a saddle,

as it injures

and harms

it

the saddle of another donkey

to the donkey.

Yet it can still be objected: If we are concerned that an item may have been lent, how do we return the bill of divorce when

it was found tied to a pouch, a purse, or a ring?

How do we return it,

as it is possible that these items were lent, and another person tied his bill of divorce to them or placed it inside them?

And we answer:

A ring

that bears a seal is not lent by people, because

a person is concerned

about forgery: perhaps someone will sign in his name with the ring and go to his house and remove all his property from there.

lest he seal in his name with the ring, go to his house, and remove all his property from there.

A pouch and a purse—

people regard them as auspicious,

in them

people

regard them as a source of good fortune,

and they do not lend them.

They do not lend them.

Alternatively, I will say: His belongings

mentioned in the Mishna, concerning which one does not testify on the basis of the identifying marks of his clothing, refer

to white and red garments.

One cannot testify on the basis of the identifying marks of clothing when the mark is that they are white or black, or red, since this is an ordinary mark found in the clothing of many people.

We learned in the Mishna:

And even if they saw him dismembered

—one does not testify concerning him that he died.

The Gemara infers:

Is this to say that a dismembered person can live?

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in tractate Oholot [6:6]:

A person does not impart ritual impurity

of a corpse

until his soul departs.

Even

if he was

dismembered, and even

if he was

in the throes of death,

he does not impart ritual impurity until he actually dies.

The Gemara infers:

He does not impart impurity,

because his soul has not yet departed,

but can he not remain alive!

For if he continues to live, it is obvious that he does not impart ritual impurity.

Abaye said: This is not difficult:

This

our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

.

That

the Mishna in tractate Oholot is the opinion of

the Rabbis

.

As it was taught in a beraita: One may testify concerning a dismembered person

that he is dead.

But one may not testify concerning a crucified person.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even concerning a dismembered person one may not testify, because he can cauterize

his wounds, healing them by burning them with fire, as will be explained below,

and live.

The Gemara is astonished:

And can you establish

our Mishna

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

But it teaches in the latter clause,

later in the chapter:

There was an incident in Asia, involving someone whom they lowered into the sea, but they were unsuccessful

in bringing him out of the water;

only his leg

emerged. His entire body disappeared into the water.

And the Sages said:

There is reason for concern that this man did not drown in the water, but emerged elsewhere.

The only matter that must be considered is whether he can continue to live without a leg.

Therefore, if his leg was severed

from the knee joint [

from the knee]

and above,

he can no longer live, and therefore

she may marry

his wife.

But if his leg was severed

from the knee joint and below—

his wife may not marry,

as perhaps he is alive!

Whereas according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, he can recover from his wound.

And we answer:

Water is different,

as one who falls into it with his leg severed dies, since it is the nature of water

to intensify

and aggravate the pain of the

wound.

The Gemara raises an objection: How is it possible for a dismembered person to live?

But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say: I myself saw that Ishmaelite shepherd

a shepherd of the Ishmaelites,

who took a sword and dismembered his camel,

and it died immediately,

and it did not complete its braying!

It did not manage to complete the sound of its braying before it died immediately!

Abaye said: That

camel

was emaciated,

and therefore it died immediately; this is not proof concerning a healthy creature.

Rava said: He dismembered it with a heated knife,

a knife heated in fire,

and everyone agrees

that our Mishna is referring to such a case, where the heat of the cauterization can heal the wound.

We learned in the Mishna:

And

even if

an animal is eating him

one does not testify concerning him.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught

that one does not testify concerning him

only

when the animal is eating him

from a place from which his soul does not depart.

But

if the animal ate him

from a place from which his soul departs—

one may testify

concerning him.

And Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

If

a person severed

a man

both

of his identifying organs, the windpipe and the esophagus,

or most of both, and he fled,

the person who was slaughtered—

one may testify

that he is no longer alive.

And we object:

Is that so? But Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If he severed both or most of both, and the person gestured and said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife”—

they shall write it and give it

to his wife as a bill of divorce! And it is thereby demonstrated that he remains alive.

And we answer: Indeed,

he is alive

now for a short period of time, sufficient to write a bill of divorce for his wife,

but ultimately he will die

within a short time.

And we object:

But from now,

since the person who slaughters him will certainly cause his death through the slaughter,

should the one responsible be exiled on his account

if a knife fell from his hand accidentally onto his fellow’s neck and the slaughtered person died later!

For it was taught in a beraita: If he severed both or most of both—

he is not exiled,

even if the slaughtered person subsequently died, because perhaps he died due to another cause!

And we answer:

This was stated with regard to it; Rav Hoshaya said: We are concerned that perhaps the wind confused him,

and as a result he died. Therefore, even though it is certain that he will die as a result of the slaughter, and one may testify to his wife concerning his death, this is not proof that the slaughter alone caused his death; and therefore, with regard to exile, the one who slaughtered him is exempt.