Yevamot 120a (קכ.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The practical difference is in a case such as that of our Mishna, where a woman and her husband went overseas, and the rival wife came from overseas and said: “My husband died.”

Do we, on the basis of this woman’s testimony, allow and permit

the rival wife to marry

someone outside the levirate bond,

before

she has married

herself

—the woman who testified? For:

If you say

that Rabbi Elazar’s reason is because

a rival wife may testify on behalf of her fellow rival wife,

then

even though she has not married,

meaning that the woman who testified has not married, and if her husband should appear she would not be discredited, nevertheless

we allow the rival wife to marry

on the basis of this woman’s testimony.

And we do not fear that, since she hates her, she intends to discredit her.

But

if you say

that Rabbi Elazar concedes that we fear that, because she hates her, she intends to discredit her, and that his reason in our Mishna is

because she

—the woman who testified—

does not discredit herself,

and it is necessarily the case that she married lawfully, because the husband truly died,

then only if she has already

married

—the woman who testified—

do we allow the rival wife to marry.

For then we say: If the husband of the woman who testified had not in fact died, she would not have married and discredited herself [when her husband appeared], both in relation to her first husband and in relation to the man whom she married. Therefore, it is certain that when she says that he died, this is not because she wishes to discredit her rival wife.

But if the woman who testified

has not married,

we fear this,

and we do not allow her

rival wife to marry, because perhaps, out of hatred for her, she intends to discredit her.

And therefore Rava is uncertain:

What

is Rabbi Elazar’s reason?

Come and hear,

the Gemara brings a proof from the Mishna.

As we learned:

Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamin, they were permitted to everyone.

And Rabbi Elazar disagreed only in the latter clause, where they entered levirate marriage.

Granted, if you say

that Rabbi Elazar’s reason is

because she does not discredit herself,

that is well:

he disagreed specifically in the latter clause, and said: “Since they were permitted to the yevamin,”

for

only

when she has married

the woman who testified,

do we allow her

rival wife to marry.

But if you say

that Rabbi Elazar’s reason is

because a rival wife testifies on behalf of her fellow rival wife,

and even if the woman who testified has not married, her testimony is effective with regard to her fellow rival wife, then

even though she has not married, as well

she is believed. If so, why did he disagree only in the latter clause? Let him disagree in the first clause as well.

Rather, conclude from this

that

Rabbi Elazar’s reason is because she has married and therefore does not discredit herself.

And we reject this: In truth, Rabbi Elazar also disagreed in the first clause.

And Rabbi Elazar, in accordance with the words

of the Rabbis,

spoke to them.

According to my view, a rival wife testifies on behalf of her fellow rival wife, and even though she has not married, we allow her

because we do not fear that, out of hatred for her, she intends to discredit her.

But according to your view,

that you are concerned about this,

at least concede to me that where she has married

the woman who testified,

we allow her

rival wife to marry,

because

she must be telling the truth that the husband died, since

she does not discredit herself.

And the Rabbis:

The reason they disagree even where she has married is that perhaps the woman who testified

acted according to the principle, “Let me die with the Philistines,”

and married in order to discredit her rival wife. She knows that we will infer from this that the husband died, since she would not discredit herself, and we will permit her rival wife to marry; and when the husband appears, she will be discredited.

Even though she too will be discredited, she does not care, because her primary concern is her desire that her rival wife be discredited.

Come and hear

from the earlier Mishna, on page 118a, which teaches:

If a woman and her husband went overseas, and she returned and said, “My husband died,” she may marry and collect her marriage contract, but her rival wife is forbidden.

Rabbi Elazar says: Since she herself was permitted, her rival wife is also permitted.

This indicates that from the time the rival wife who testified is permitted [that she is permitted immediately when she says, “My husband died”], they also permit her rival wife to marry. This is so even though the rival wife who testified has not yet married, since a rival wife testifies on behalf of her fellow rival wife.

And we reject this: In truth, a rival wife does not testify on behalf of her fellow rival wife.

And say

that the intention of the Mishna is to say:

Since she was permitted and married.

And the reason is that, since she married, she does not discredit herself.

And we raise a difficulty: If Rabbi Elazar’s reason is that she does not discredit herself, and in fact the husband died,

should we not be concerned lest

the rival wife who testified

came with a bill of divorce,

meaning that she was divorced from him by a bill of divorce and is permitted to marry, since she possesses a bill of divorce from the husband, although he is in fact alive?

And the fact that she said this,

that she said, “My husband died” [and did not produce the bill of divorce in order to marry], is because

she intends to discredit her rival wife,

so that we will also permit her rival wife to marry, and she will marry someone outside the levirate bond unlawfully and thereby become discredited when the husband appears.

And in order for us to believe her that her husband died and permit her rival wife on the basis of her testimony, she hid the bill of divorce, intending thereby to prove that she herself married another man as a widow, which would demonstrate that her husband had indeed died.

And she herself would not be discredited, because when her husband appeared she could produce the bill of divorce and show everyone that she had been permitted to marry.

If so, we should be concerned that perhaps she testifies that the husband died in order to discredit her rival wife.

Indeed, in the Mishna, where they entered levirate marriage, there is no concern that she came with a bill of divorce in her possession.

For if she had a bill of divorce, she would not have hidden it and said, “My husband died,” and entered levirate marriage with her husband’s brother in order to discredit her rival wife, since in that case she too would be discredited when her husband appeared: It would become clear that she had entered levirate marriage unlawfully, since her husband was alive. And if she produced the bill of divorce, she would leave the brother because she was a divorced wife of his brother.

It is therefore necessarily the case that the husband truly died, because she does not discredit herself.

But when she married someone outside the levirate bond, where there is reason for this concern—that perhaps she came with a bill of divorce and would not be discredited even when the husband appeared—should we not be concerned?

And we explain:

If

the rival wife who testified

had married

an Israelite,

it would indeed be so:

we would not permit her rival wife, because there is reason to fear that the husband is alive and she would not be discredited when he appeared, since she possesses a bill of divorce. And in order to discredit her rival wife, she says, “My husband died,” so that her rival wife will marry unlawfully.

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where she married a priest.

For if her husband appeared, she would be discredited as long as she did not produce the bill of divorce, since she was a married woman and had married unlawfully.

And if she produced her bill of divorce and showed that she had been permitted to marry, in any event she would be disqualified from remaining with her husband because she was a divorcee married to a priest.

Therefore, here there is proof that she is telling the truth. Since she married, it is certain to us that she does not discredit herself, and it is certain that her husband died.

From this Mishna until the end of the chapter, the discussion concerns the laws of testimony regarding death.

Mishna:

One may testify

that a person died

only on the basis of

the

form

and shape of the

face,

that is, the cheeks [Tosafot Yom Tov],

together with the nose.

But if they did not see him by the form of his face, or if his nose had been removed, they cannot recognize and identify him with certainty, and they may not testify in order to permit his wife to marry, lest this not be her husband.

And even though the deceased has

identifying marks on his body and in his belongings

[his clothing], they cannot identify him on the basis of the marks and testify that he died in order to permit his wife to marry.

One may not testify

that he died even when they saw him in the throes of death and close to dying,

until his soul departs

literally.

And even if they saw him

severely wounded,

cut up and filled with wounds and sword blows [Rashi], or

crucified,

hanging on a crucifixion tree,

or

they saw that the

wild animal

was trampling him and

eating him.

Since they did not see that his soul had actually departed, they cannot testify that he died.

One may testify only

if they recognized him

within three days

of his death,

but if they did not see him until after three days, we fear that the appearance of his face had changed and that this is not the person they think he is.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: Not every person, not every place, and not every hour are the same,

for there is a person who becomes bloated more quickly than other people, such as an obese person.

And there is a place upon which the sun shines more intensely.

And there is an hour when the world is hot, and the deceased quickly begins to decompose and change.

Later, the Gemara will be uncertain whether Rabbi Yehuda came to be stringent beyond the words of the first tanna, saying that even within three days there are times when they cannot testify, or whether he came to be lenient, saying that even after more than three days they may testify [Rashi].

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

If they recognized him only by his

forehead,

meaning his brow,

and not

by the

form of his face;

or they recognized him by the

form of his face, but not

by his

forehead—

they may not testify

about him

until both are present,

the forehead together with the form of the face,

together with the nose.

Abaye said, and some say Rav Kahana said:

What

support is there for this from a

verse?

As it is written in the Book of Isaiah [chapter 3]:

“The recognition of their faces bears witness against them.”

Abba bar Marta, who was Abba bar Minyomi, was being pressed

—they were demanding payment

from him, by

the members of the household of

the Exilarch, money

that he owed them.

He brought wax,

Abba bar Marta brought wax,

stuck it to a worn cloth,

attaching the wax to a cloth made from a worn garment,

stuck

the wax and the cloth

to his forehead,

on his brow,

passed before them,

passing before his creditors,

and they did not recognize him.

They did not identify him and did not trouble him.

We learned in the Mishna that one may testify about a person only if they recognized him by the form of his face together with his nose. Without this, they may not testify about him

even though there are identifying marks

on his body.

And we raise a difficulty:

Does this mean

that we should say

that identifying marks

are considered definitive evidence

not of Torah authority?

And we juxtapose

a contradiction to this from what we learned in tractates Gittin [27b] and Bava Metzia [27b]:

If someone brings a bill of divorce to a woman, and the bill was lost before he gave it to her, and afterward he

found

the bill of divorce

tied in a pouch

belonging to him,

or in his wallet or ring

belonging to him,

or the bill was found

among

his belongings

of the person bringing the bill of divorce,

even

if it was found

after

a

long time—

it is a bill of divorce

that is valid!

There is no concern that perhaps the pouch, wallet, or ring does not belong to him, and likewise that this bill of divorce is not his, since he recognizes his belongings by the identifying marks that they contain.

This demonstrates that we rely on identifying marks even to permit a married woman, so why should we not rely on identifying marks found on the body of the deceased to permit his wife to marry?

Abaye said: It is not difficult:

This

the law that we rely on identifying marks when a bill of divorce has been lost, is according to

Rabbi Eliezer ben Mehabai,

who permits relying on them also for identifying the deceased.

Whereas

this,

our Mishna, is according to

the Rabbis

who disagree with him.

As it was taught: One may not testify on the basis of a mole

—a mark on the skin—in order to permit the wife of the deceased on the basis of this sign.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Mehabai says: One may testify.

What, is it not the case that they disagree about this:

One master

—Rabbi Eliezer ben Mehabai—

holds: Identifying marks

that are relied upon as definitive evidence are a law

of Torah authority,

both in testimony concerning death and in returning a lost object.

And the other master,

the Rabbis,

holds: Identifying marks

are rabbinic.

By Torah law, it is impossible to rely on them.

Rava said: Everyone

holds that identifying marks are of Torah authority;

they are a matter of Torah law.

And this law is derived from the return of a lost object through identifying marks, which the Sages expounded from the verse in the section concerning lost objects [in Bava Metzia 27a].

Whereas

here,

where they disagree, the disagreement is

concerning a mole:

whether it

is common

to be found also

on a person born under the same constellation

as this person [born in the same period and under the same astrological sign],

is the subject of their dispute.

One master holds: A mole is common

also

on a person born under the same constellation,

and therefore it is not an identifying mark of the person who bears the mole, since perhaps it belongs to someone born under the same constellation.

And the other master holds: It is not common on a person born under the same constellation.

Therefore one may rely on it like other identifying marks.

Some say:

Here, the disagreement concerns a mole:

whether it

is apt

to

change

from its appearance at the time of death

after death, is the subject of their dispute.

One master holds: It is apt

for the appearance of a mole

to change after death,

and one may not rely on it, since it is possible that it changed and no longer establishes his identity.

And the other master holds: It is not apt to change after death.

Therefore it is an identifying mark upon which one may rely.

And some say:

Rava said: Everyone

holds that identifying marks are rabbinic.

identifying marks are rabbinic.