Yevamot 120a — the Talmud in English

And we answer: The practical difference is in a case such as that of our Mishna: a woman and her husband went overseas, and the rival wife came from overseas and said, “My husband has died.”

Do we, on the basis of this woman’s testimony, allow and permit

the rival wife to marry

outside the marriage,

before

she has married

herself

[that is, the woman herself who testifies]? For:

If you say

that the reason of Rabbi Elazar is because

a rival wife testifies for her fellow rival wife,

then

even though she has not married,

that the woman who testifies has not married, and if her husband comes she will not be ruined, nevertheless

we allow the rival wife to marry

on the basis of this woman’s testimony.

And we are not concerned that, since she hates her, she will want to ruin her.

But

if you say

that Rabbi Elazar concedes that we are concerned that, because she hates her, she will want to ruin her, and the reason in our Mishna is

because she

[the woman who testifies]

does not ruin herself,

and necessarily she married lawfully, for the husband truly died,

then only if she has already

married

[the woman who testifies]

do we allow the rival wife to marry.

For then we say: Were it not that the husband of the woman who testifies had indeed died, she would not have married and ruined herself [when her husband comes] both with regard to her husband and with regard to the one whom she married. And necessarily, the fact that she says that he died is not because she wants to ruin her rival wife.

But if she

has not married,

the woman who testifies, we are concerned about this,

and we do not allow her to marry

the rival wife, for perhaps, because she hates her, she wants to ruin her.

And therefore Rava is uncertain:

what

is Rabbi Elazar’s reason?

Come and hear:

The Gemara brings a proof from the Mishna.

For we learned:

Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamim, they were permitted to all people.

And Rabbi Elazar disagreed not in the first clause, but only in the latter clause, where they entered levirate marriage.

If it is understandable

that the reason of Rabbi Elazar is because

she does not ruin herself,

this is indeed well:

He disagreed specifically in the latter clause, and said, “Since they were permitted to the yevamim,”

for

only

when she has married

the woman who testifies, then

do we allow her to marry

the rival wife.

But if you say

that the reason of Rabbi Elazar is

because a rival wife testifies for her fellow rival wife,

and even if the woman who testifies has not married, her testimony is effective with regard to her fellow, then

even though she has not married, also

she is trustworthy; and if so, why did he disagree only in the latter clause? Let him disagree in the first clause as well.

Rather, conclude from this

that

the reason of Rabbi Elazar is because she married and therefore does not ruin herself.

And we reject this: In truth, Rabbi Elazar disagrees also in the first clause.

And Rabbi Elazar, according to the words

of the Sages,

said it to them.

According to my view, a rival wife testifies for her fellow rival wife, and even though she has not married, we allow her to marry

for we are not concerned that, because she hates her, she will want to ruin her.

But according to your view,

that you are concerned about this,

at least concede to me that where she has married

the woman who testifies,

we allow her to marry

the rival wife,

because

she necessarily speaks the truth that the husband died, since

she does not ruin herself.

And the Sages:

The reason they disagree even where she has married is that perhaps the woman who testifies

is acting in the manner of “Let me die with the Philistines,”

and, in order to ruin her rival wife, she married, knowing that we will infer from this that the husband died—that she would not have ruined herself—and permit her rival wife to marry, and when the husband comes she will be ruined.

And even though she too will be ruined, she does not care, for her principal concern is her desire that her rival wife be ruined.

Come and hear

from the Mishna above, on 118a, for it teaches:

A woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she came and said, “My husband has died,” may marry and take her marriage contract, but her rival wife is forbidden.

Rabbi Elazar says: Since she herself was permitted, her rival wife is also permitted.

And it implies that from the time the rival wife who testifies is permitted [that she is permitted immediately when she says, “My husband has died”], they also permit her rival wife to marry, although the rival wife who testifies has still not married, since a rival wife testifies for her fellow rival wife.

And we reject this: In truth, a rival wife does not testify for her fellow rival wife.

And say

that the intention of the Mishna is to say:

Since she was permitted and married.

And its reason is that, since she married, she does not ruin herself.

And we raise an objection: If the reason of Rabbi Elazar is because she does not ruin herself, and he truly died,

let us be concerned lest

the rival wife who testifies

came with a divorce document,

meaning that she was divorced from him by a divorce document and is permitted to marry, since she has a divorce document from the husband, although in truth he is alive.

And the fact that she says this,

that she said, “My husband has died” [and did not produce the divorce document in order to marry], is because

she intends to ruin her rival wife,

so that we will also permit her rival wife to marry, and she will marry outside the marriage unlawfully, and then be ruined when the husband comes.

And in order that we believe her that her husband died and permit her rival wife on the basis of her testimony, she hid the divorce document, with the aim of demonstrating through this that she herself married another man as a widow, that her husband indeed died.

And she herself is not ruined, for when her husband comes she will produce the divorce document and show everyone that she had been permitted to marry.

And if so, we should be concerned that perhaps she testifies that the husband died in order to ruin her rival wife.

Indeed, in the Mishna, where they entered levirate marriage, there is no such concern that she came with a divorce document in her possession.

For if she had a divorce document, she would not have hidden it and said, “My husband has died,” and entered levirate marriage with her husband’s brother in order to ruin her rival wife, since in that case she too would be ruined when her husband came, because it would become clear that she had entered levirate marriage unlawfully, since her husband was alive. And if she produced the divorce document, she would leave his brother because of the status of a divorced brother’s wife.

And necessarily, the husband truly died, because she does not ruin herself.

But when she marries outside the marriage, where there is reason to be concerned about this—that perhaps she came with a divorce document and she herself is not ruined even when the husband comes—should we not be concerned?

And we answer:

If

the rival wife who testifies

had married

an Israelite,

so too

we would not permit her rival wife, because there is reason to be concerned that the husband is alive, and she is not ruined when the husband comes because she has a divorce document. And in order to ruin her rival wife, she says, “My husband has died,” so that her rival wife will marry unlawfully.

Here with what are we dealing? With one who married a kohen.

For if her husband comes, she will be ruined as long as she does not show the divorce document, since she is a married woman and married unlawfully.

And if she produces her divorce document and shows that she had been permitted to marry, in either event she becomes disqualified from her husband, because of being a divorcee married to a kohen.

And therefore, in this case there is proof that she speaks the truth. Since she married, it is certain to us that she does not ruin herself, and certainly her husband is dead.

And from this Mishna until the end of the chapter, the discussion concerns the laws of testimony of death.

Mishna:

They testify

that a person has died

only on the basis of

the

structure

and form of the

face

—that is, the cheeks [Tosafot Yom Tov]—

together with the nose.

But if they did not see him by the structure of his face, or his nose had been removed, they cannot recognize him and identify him clearly, and they do not testify in order to permit his wife to marry, lest this not be her husband.

And although the deceased has

identifying marks on his body and in his belongings

[his clothing], they cannot identify him on the basis of the marks and testify about him that he has died in order to permit his wife to marry.

They do not testify

about him that he has died even when they saw him mortally ill and close to death,

but only until his soul departs

literally.

And even if they saw him

cut to pieces,

dissected and full of sword wounds and blows [Rashi], or

crucified,

hanging on a crucifixion tree,

or

they saw that the

wild beast

was trampling him and

eating him.

Since they did not see that his soul had actually departed, they cannot testify that he has died.

They testify only

if they recognized him

within three days

of his death,

but if they did not see him until after three days, we are concerned that the appearance of his face changed and that this is not the person they believe it to be.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: Not every person, not every place, and not every hour is the same,

for there is a person who swells more quickly than other people, such as a fat person.

And there is a place upon which the sun shines more strongly.

And there is an hour when the world is hot, and the deceased begins to putrefy and change more quickly.

And later the Gemara is uncertain whether Rabbi Yehuda came to be stringent concerning the words of the first tanna, so that even within three days at times they cannot testify, or whether he came to be lenient, so that even after more than three days [Rashi].

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

They recognized him only by the

forehead,

the brow,

and did not

recognize him on the basis of the

structure of the face.

Or they recognized him on the basis of the

structure of the face, but not

on the basis of the

forehead—

they do not testify

about him,

until both of them are present,

the forehead together with the structure of the face,

together with the nose.

Abaye said, and some say Rav Kahana:

What

support is there for this from a

verse?

As it is written in the Book of Isaiah [chapter 3]:

“The recognition of their faces testified against them.”

Abba bar Marta, who was Abba bar Minyomi, was being pressed

they were demanding payment

from him, by the household of

the members of the household of

the Exilarch, money

that he owed them.

He brought wax,

Abba bar Marta brought wax,

stuck it to a worn cloth,

he stuck the wax to a cloth made from a worn garment,

stuck

the wax and the cloth

to his forehead,

on his forehead,

passed before them,

he passed before his creditors,

and they did not recognize him.

They did not recognize him and did not trouble him.

We learned in the Mishna that they testify about a person only if they recognized him by the structure of the face together with the nose. And apart from this, they do not testify about him

even though there are identifying marks

on his body.

And we raise an objection:

Does this mean

that we should say

that identifying marks

are like testimony that establishes the matter

not of Torah law?

And we raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned in tractate Gittin [27b] and in tractate Bava Metzia [27b]:

If one who brings a divorce document to a woman lost the divorce document before giving it to her, and afterward

found it

the divorce document

tied in his pouch

of his,

and in his wallet and ring

of his,

or it was found

the divorce document

among his belongings

of the one who brings the divorce document,

even

if it was found

after

a

long time—

it is a

valid

divorce document!

And there is no concern that perhaps the pouch, wallet, or ring are not his, and likewise this divorce document is not his divorce document, since he recognizes his belongings by the identifying marks that they contain.

Abaye said: This is not difficult:

This

the law that we rely on identifying marks concerning a lost divorce document, is according to

Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai,

who permits relying on them also in recognizing the deceased.

Whereas

this,

our Mishna, is according to the words of

the Sages,

who disagree with him.

For it was taught: They do not testify concerning a mole,

which is a mark on the skin, in order to permit the wife of the deceased on the basis of this mark.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai says: They testify.

Is it not that they disagree about this—

One master,

Rabbi Eliezer ben Mahavai,

holds: Identifying marks

reliance upon them as a complete clarification is a law

of Torah law,

both concerning testimony of death and concerning the return of a lost object.

And one master,

the Sages,

holds: Identifying marks

are rabbinic.

And by Torah law it is impossible to rely upon them.

Rava said: Everyone

holds that

identifying marks are of Torah law.

And this law is learned from the return of a lost object by identifying marks, which the Sages expounded from the verse in the section of lost objects [in tractate Bava Metzia 27a].

Whereas

here,

where they disagree, it is

concerning a mole:

whether it

is common

also to be

in the person of his counterpart

who was born in the same period and under the same constellation [as this person],

they disagree.

One master holds: A mole is common

also

in the person of his counterpart,

and it is not a sign identifying the owner of the mole, for perhaps he is his counterpart.

And one master holds: It is not common in the person of his counterpart.

And therefore one may rely upon it as upon other identifying marks.

And there are those who say:

Here, concerning a mole,

whether

it is liable

to

change

from its appearance at the time of death

after death, they disagree.

One master holds: It is liable

for the appearance of the mole

to change after death,

and one may not rely upon it, for it is possible that it changed and does not establish his identity.

And one master holds: It is not liable to change after death.

And therefore it is a sign upon which one may rely.

And there are those who say:

Rava said: Everyone

holds that

identifying marks are rabbinic.