Yevamot 119b — the Talmud in English

The first clause

of the Mishna, which speaks of a woman whose husband and her rival wife went to the overseas country, and at the time of departure it was established that he had no sons, she has

a presumptive status

that she falls

for yibbum.

And

opposite this presumptive status we have

a majority,

for the majority of women conceive and give birth, and presumably her rival gave birth, and she was released from yibbum, and is permitted

to the market.

And

when there is a presumptive status opposite a majority, the

presumptive status is not superior

in its force

to a majority,

but, on the contrary, a majority is superior. For a majority and a presumptive status, the majority is superior [Kiddushin 80].

And here, the majority permits her to the market, and we should have permitted her.

But

bring the minority of those who miscarry, attach it

and combine it

with the presumptive status.

And then

it would be

the uncertainty whether her rival gave birth, considered

as half and half,

and its law is like an evenly balanced uncertainty.

And therefore, in the first clause,

the woman may not marry

to the market,

and may not undergo yibbum

with the yavam. For we follow neither the presumptive status nor the majority.

But in the

latter clause,

which speaks of a case where her mother-in-law departed without a yavam,

and the woman was established

as permitted

to the market.

And likewise

the majority,

that the majority of fetuses are miscarriages and female children [as we said above], permits her

to the market.

And opposite this stands the uncertainty whether her mother-in-law gave birth to a male, in which case she requires yibbum, for in any event there is a minority who give birth to males.

And

since

it would be

the minority of males who require her to undergo yibbum, when it stands opposite the presumptive status of permission to the market, and also opposite the majority of females and miscarriages, it is considered

a minority of a minority.

And for a minority of a minority —

Rabbi Meir is not concerned.

And therefore, in the latter clause she is not concerned, and is permitted to the market, even though there is a minority that would forbid her.

We learned in the Mishna: A woman whose husband and rival wife went to the overseas country, and they came and told her, “Your husband died,”

may not marry

to the market

and may not undergo yibbum

with the yavam:

And we wonder:

Forever [in astonishment]? Is she required to wait forever, until it becomes clear whether her rival was pregnant or not?

And why should she not perform halitza immediately, even if it is not known to her whether her rival conceived or not? For whether she is obligated in yibbum or whether she is exempt from it, she is permitted to marry into the market after halitza, immediately.

For in either case she is permitted:

If she was obligated in yibbum, her halitza releases her.

And if she was exempt from yibbum, her halitza neither adds nor detracts.

And we answer:

Zeiri said: For her own sake,

even if she has no rival wife, she must wait

three months,

in order to determine whether she is pregnant from her husband.

And even if it is certain that she is not pregnant from him, such as where her husband was in the overseas country for more than three months and afterward died, nevertheless she must wait three months after his death, as we say in the chapter HaCholeitz [Yevamot 42b], that even a woman concerning whom there is no concern that she is pregnant, and for whom waiting for determination is not applicable, must wait three months.

But for the sake of

her companion,

to know whether her rival is pregnant, she must wait

nine

months,

and

perform halitza

after nine months,

in either case,

whether she is obligated in yibbum or exempt, and she is permitted to marry into the market.

But she cannot perform halitza and marry within nine months, for perhaps her rival is pregnant, and the fetus is viable. And since this is so, she is released from yibbum only through the fetus, and not through halitza. And the fetus does not release her until it emerges into the air of the world.

And if she marries within nine months of the husband’s death, perhaps she was not released through her halitza, and she remains forbidden to the market as long as her rival has not given birth.

But after nine months, she is permitted in either case. For if her rival was pregnant, she has already given birth, and the fetus released her from yibbum.

And if her rival did not conceive, and the woman was obligated in yibbum, she was released through halitza.

b.

Rabbi Hanina said: For

herself

she must wait

three

months.

For her companion,

for the sake of her companion, in case her rival is pregnant, she may never marry and may not undergo yibbum, until she knows clearly whether her rival has a child or not.

And we challenge:

And let her perform halitza

after nine months,

in either case,

even if it is not known to her whether her rival has a child, and let her marry into the market.

For if her rival gave birth, she was released from yibbum through the child.

And if her rival did not give birth, her halitza releases her! And we answer:

Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Hanina bar Avin both said:

The reason is

a decree, lest there be

a

viable fetus,

and it is the fetus that releases her from yibbum.

And

when the matter becomes clear that she was released because of the fetus, and halitza was unnecessary,

you will find that you require a proclamation,

to announce that she is not included among women who performed halitza, who are disqualified even from an ordinary koen, but she is permitted

to priesthood.

And we challenge: What are you saying—that she cannot perform halitza after nine months because perhaps her halitza will be found superfluous, and you will require a proclamation announcing that she is permitted to priesthood?

Then let him require

a proclamation; what is bad about that?

And we answer: We must be concerned

perhaps there are

people

who were at the

time of

halitza

in the court and saw her halitza,

but did not

hear

the proclamation.

And those people, when they see her married to a koen

and

no one protests against her,

say, “The Rabbis permitted

a woman who performed

halitza to a koen.”

And we refute:

We learned

in the Mishna above [Yevamot 118b]: A woman who departed without sons and returned and said:

a.

A son was given to me in the overseas country.

And she added within the time of speech,

and said: “My son died”

first,

and afterward

her

husband

died, and I require yibbum —

she is deemed credible

to permit herself to the yavam.

b. But if she said, “A son was given to me in the overseas country,”

and my husband died

first,

and afterward

my

son

died, and I am exempt from yibbum —

she is not deemed credible

to permit herself to marry into the market.

Since she departed with a presumptive status of requiring yibbum, we are concerned that, because she hates the yavam and does not wish to fall before him, she says this in order to release herself from him.

And nevertheless,

we are concerned for her statement

that perhaps it is true.

And since she is not deemed credible, her law is that she

performs halitza

in order to permit herself to marry into the market,

but does not undergo yibbum,

since we are concerned for her statement that perhaps it is true, and she does not require the yavam, but is forbidden to him.

And why should she perform halitza?

Let us be concerned: perhaps witnesses will come and say as she said,

that her first husband died and afterward her son, and she is exempt from yibbum, and from the outset she did not require the yavam at all, and her halitza is nothing,

and you will find that you require a proclamation

that she is permitted

to priesthood.

It is proved that we do not decree this way; if so, why did Rabbi Hanina say that she may never perform halitza because of this decree?

And the Gemara brings two answers:

a.

Rav Pappa said:

There it speaks of a case where

the woman was

divorced

already by another man.

the woman

And therefore, even if her halitza is superfluous, so that it is nothing, she is already disqualified from priesthood forever because of the divorce, and there is no proclamation.

b.

Rav Hiyya, son of Rav Huna, said: When she said, “I and he hid in a cave,”

and there is no man with us who can come and testify. And there is no concern that witnesses will come and she will require a proclamation. Therefore, there she performs halitza, since there is no concern that she will require a proclamation concerning priesthood. But in our Mishna, where there is concern that you will require a proclamation concerning priesthood, we decree that she may never perform halitza, lest a person see her halitza and not hear the proclamation. And when he sees her married to a koen, he will say: “The Rabbis permitted a woman who performed halitza to priesthood.”

Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna above [Yevamot 117a]: Everyone is deemed credible to testify concerning a woman that her husband died, except for five women, among them her yevama.

And as a continuation of this, the Mishna says that if there were:

Two yevamot,

the wives of two brothers, such that the law of each one is that when her husband dies, she falls before the husband of the other for yibbum.

And if the two yevamin died, it is found that they have no yavam, and they are permitted to the market.

And now the two yevamot come before us, when:

This one says, “My husband died.”

And she is deemed credible.

If both levirs died, it turns out that the women have no levir, and they are permitted to marry anyone.

And this one says, “My husband died,”

and she is deemed credible.

And nevertheless, both of them are forbidden to the market.

This one who said, “My husband died,”

is forbidden because of the husband of this one

the other, who is her yavam.

And perhaps he is alive, and she requires him for yibbum.

And even though his wife says that he died, she is not deemed credible with this testimony to testify for her companion, but only for herself.

For she is one of the five women whom we learned above are not deemed credible to testify about her and permit her to the market.

And likewise

this one

the other, who said, “My husband died,”

is forbidden because of the husband of this one

the first, who is her yavam, and perhaps she requires him.

And concerning these women: if

this one

has

witnesses

that her husband died,

and this one has no witnesses

concerning her husband’s death,

has

that

woman

who has witnesses

concerning her husband’s death

is forbidden to marry into the market, for perhaps the husband of the second, who is her yavam, is alive, and she requires him.

And her witnesses add nothing for her, for she is deemed credible concerning her husband’s death even without them.

And that one,

the second,

who has no witnesses

concerning her husband’s death, but she says that he died—and a woman who says, “My husband died,” is deemed credible—

she is deemed credible concerning her husband’s death,

and is permitted

to the market. For she has no yavam, since her companion’s witnesses testify concerning her yavam that he died.

Or if

this one

has

sons

from her husband

and this one has no sons

from her husband, and neither of them has witnesses concerning their deaths,

that

woman

who has sons is permitted

to marry into the market, since she is deemed credible concerning her husband’s death to permit herself, and she does not fall for yibbum, as she has sons.

And that

second yevama

who has no sons,

and requires yibbum when her husband dies,

is forbidden

to the market, perhaps her yavam is alive, and her yevama is not deemed credible to testify about her and permit her.

And when those yevamot have two brothers of their husbands, and this one says, “My husband died,” and this one says, “My husband died,” and they have neither sons from their husbands nor witnesses concerning their deaths—they are deemed credible concerning their husbands’ deaths. For a woman who says, “My husband died,” undergoes yibbum

when she has a yavam, and they fall before the brothers for yibbum.

and becomes subject to levirate marriage when her husband dies, is

They underwent yibbum

with their husbands’ brothers,

and after some time the yevamin died —

They are forbidden to marry

into the market.

This woman is forbidden because of the first husband of the second, who is her yavam.

And this woman is forbidden because of the first husband of her companion, who is her yavam.

For perhaps they are still alive and fell before them for yibbum.

And although at first we accepted their statement that their husbands had died, and permitted them, on the basis of their testimony, to marry the yavam,

anyone.

nevertheless, now that they wish to marry into the market, the testimony of one yevama is found to benefit her companion [as in the first clause of the Mishna]. And yevamot do not testify for one another. Specifically at first, when their credibility concerned themselves, they were deemed credible.

And

Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to the yevamin,

and had the presumptive status that their husbands had died—

they are permitted to every person, and we are not concerned that perhaps they are alive. And in the Gemara its reason will be explained.

Gemara:

A baraita taught another case concerning these yevamot, in the first clause of our Mishna:

If for

this one

there are

witnesses

concerning her husband’s death,

and sons

from him,

and for this one

there are

neither witnesses

concerning her husband’s death

nor sons

from him—

both are permitted!

This one who has witnesses and sons is permitted, since there is no bond of yibbum here because of her sons.

And this one who has neither witnesses nor sons is permitted, for there are witnesses brought by the other woman that her yavam died.

We learned in the Mishna:

They underwent yibbum

these yevamot with their husbands’ brothers,

and the yevamin died —

they are forbidden to marry

into the market, for now the testimony of one yevama is found to benefit her companion.

Rabbi Elazar says: Since

they had the presumptive status that their husbands had died

and were permitted to the yevamin —

they are permitted

to marry

every person.

Rava asked: What is Rabbi Elazar’s reason

for permitting them to marry on the basis of the yevama’s testimony?

Is it

because

he disagrees with the Mishna above, for

he holds that a rival wife testifies for her companion,

and he is not concerned that the rival will say, “The husband died,” in order to ruin her companion, by causing her to marry into the market unlawfully, so that when her husband comes she must leave both her husband and the one to whom she married?

And therefore a yevama also testifies for her companion, despite the fact that she is her rival wife.

For according to the Rabbis, the reason a yevama is disqualified from testifying is that she hates her, because she fears that her companion will ultimately become her rival wife [and this is when she stands before her husband for yibbum, or when both fall before one yavam].

And therefore yevamot are like rival wives, and according to the Rabbis they are not deemed credible, for perhaps one yevama wishes to disqualify her companion, and the yevama says, “My husband died,” so that her companion will marry into the market unlawfully, and she will thereby be required to receive a bill of divorce from the husband and become forbidden to the yavam.

And according to Rabbi Elazar, because of the aspect of rivalry, they were not disqualified from testifying for one another.

Or perhaps,

Rabbi Elazar’s reason is that since the rival wife married [or the yevama underwent yibbum], it necessarily follows that the husband died, since

she

[the testifying woman]

does not ruin herself

by marrying unlawfully and thereby ruining herself.

And we examine it:

What practical difference

is there in Rava’s uncertainty as to what Rabbi Elazar’s reason is!?

would not cause herself harm

by marrying unlawfully and thereby causing harm to herself.

The Gemara asks:

What practical difference

does it make which of these is Rabbi Elazar’s reason?