Yevamot 119a (קיט.) — the Talmud in English

The woman whose husband went, and

his other wife also went with him

as her rival wife,

another wife whom her husband had,

to a country overseas,

and when they departed, her husband had no children.

And

witnesses

came and said to her: “Your husband has died.”

She may not marry

anyone else

and may not perform yibbum

with the yavam, her husband’s brother,

until she knows

that her husband died without children and she is permitted to the yavam, or until it becomes clear

that perhaps her rival wife is pregnant,

and when she gives birth, she is permitted to marry anyone else.

And below, on folio 119b, the Gemara will explain why she may not immediately perform ḥalitza, based on the doubt, and thereby become permitted to marry anyone else.

If she had

a woman

a mother-in-law

who departed for a country overseas, and she had no son other than this woman’s husband,

she need not be concerned

that perhaps her mother-in-law gave birth to another son [a yavam] during her husband’s lifetime, and she is permitted to marry anyone else.

[You might ask: Why, in the first clause, is she concerned that her rival wife may have given birth, whereas in the latter clause she is not concerned that her mother-in-law may have given birth? The answer is that in the first clause, anything to which she gives birth—whether male or female—exempts her from yibbum. In the latter clause, however, she falls to yibbum only if her mother-in-law gives birth to a male, and there are two doubts here: a. perhaps she gave birth; b. perhaps the child is male. We do not entertain such a remote concern. Rashi.]

If her mother-in-law

departed

pregnant,

she must be concerned.

Since there is now only one doubt—whether the fetus is male—

Rabbi Yehoshua says: She need not be concerned,

because there are still two doubts here: a. perhaps she miscarried; b. even if she did not miscarry, perhaps she gave birth—and perhaps the child is female.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that the woman must be concerned that her rival wife may be pregnant.

And we raise a difficulty:

What

is the meaning of “perhaps

she is the pregnant rival wife”?

It would have been sufficient to say: “Perhaps her rival wife is pregnant.”

And we answer:

This teaches us

through this extra wording, that only

this

rival wife who went with him

is the one concerning whom we are concerned

that she may be pregnant.

But if witnesses came and testified that this rival wife was not pregnant, then

with regard to another rival wife,

that perhaps her husband married another woman in the country overseas, and perhaps that woman is pregnant by him,

we are not concerned,

and this woman is permitted to the yavam.

We learned in the Mishna: This woman, whose husband and rival wife went together to a country overseas and the husband died, may neither marry anyone else nor perform yibbum.

And we ask:

Granted,

it is understandable that

she may not perform yibbum

with the yavam,

since perhaps her rival wife is pregnant

and gave birth to a son,

and this woman would encounter

this woman

as the wife of a brother

not in a situation in which there is a mitzva of yibbum, which is a karet prohibition

by Torah law.

But

the Mishna’s statement that she

may not marry

anyone else is difficult.

For

why

may she not marry? If it is because of the concern that her husband died without children and she requires yibbum, it may be said that it is reasonable to assume that her husband died leaving offspring behind. For—

Follow the majority of women,

as in every uncertainty throughout the Torah, where we follow the majority. And

the majority of women become pregnant and give birth.

Presumably, her rival wife, too, who went with her husband to the country overseas, gave birth to a child by him.

Let us say:

Should we prove from this that our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Meir, who takes the minority into consideration?

As we find with regard to the minority of the Kutim, the inhabitants of Mount Gerizim, who bowed to the image of a dove that was there, and Rabbi Meir decreed that all Kutim be treated as apostates because of that minority.

Therefore, our Mishna takes into consideration the minority of women who do not give birth, and consequently she is forbidden to marry anyone else.

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna was stated according to the view of

the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir and do not take the minority into consideration; nevertheless, she is forbidden to marry anyone else.

For

when the Sages follow the majority—

only

when it is a majority present before us,

where the majority is observable before us.

For example, nine shops,

which we see before us, most of which sell kosher slaughtered meat, while a minority sell unslaughtered or non-kosher meat. In that case we follow the majority, and if meat is found in the city, we attribute it to the majority of kosher shops.

And a Sanhedrin,

where the majority of judges before us find the defendant innocent.

But a majority that is not present before us,

such as the majority of women in the world who become pregnant and give birth,

the Sages do not follow.

And we challenge this: We find that even with regard to a majority “that is not present before us,” the Sages follow the majority.

And

as proof,

for

with regard to the yibbum of

a minor boy and a minor girl

[as will be explained immediately below],

it is a majority that is not present before us, and the Sages follow the majority.

As it was taught: If the yavam is

a

minor

or the yevama is

a

minor girl, they may neither perform ḥalitza nor perform yibbum; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

They said to him

the Sages

to Rabbi Meir: You have spoken well in saying that they may not perform ḥalitza.

Your reasoning is sound in this regard, since

“man” is written in the passage

concerning ḥalitza: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” [Deuteronomy 25]. And we interpret this as: “man,” but not a minor.

And

the woman who undergoes ḥalitza must likewise be an adult and not a minor, because

a woman is juxtaposed to a man,

as there is a juxtaposition between them later in the verse, as it is written: “And his yevama shall ascend to the gate.”

But what is the reason

for your saying

that they may not perform yibbum

when they are minors!?

He said to them,

Rabbi Meir:

A minor boy—

perhaps he will prove to be a eunuch,

who cannot father children.

And likewise, a

minor girl—

perhaps she will prove to be an aylonit,

who cannot give birth.

Since they are not capable of establishing a name, the Torah exempted them from yibbum, as it is written [Deuteronomy 25], “that she shall bear,” excluding an aylonit.

It would emerge that they encounter a forbidden relation,

the prohibition of a brother’s wife when there is no mitzva of yibbum.

But the Sages,

who did not accept his reasoning,

hold

that a minor boy and minor girl may perform yibbum, since

we follow the majority of minor boys.

And the majority of minor boys,

when they grow up,

are not eunuchs.

Follow the majority of minor girls.

And the majority of minor girls,

when they grow up,

are not aylonitot.

Therefore, we need not be concerned that they are not obligated in yibbum.

Since the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Meir and followed the majority that they are not eunuchs, it is proven that they follow a majority even when it is not present before us.

If so, our Mishna, which does not follow the majority of women who become pregnant and give birth, cannot accord with the Sages!

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather, it is clear

and demonstrable that

the Mishna

follows the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who takes the minority into consideration.

And we challenge this: If we establish the first clause of the Mishna

according to Rabbi Meir,

who is concerned about the minority, then the latter clause, which is not concerned about the minority, is difficult; the first clause would follow Rabbi Meir, while the latter clause would follow the Sages!

Consider the latter clause: If she had a mother-in-law—

she need not be concerned

that perhaps her mother-in-law gave birth to a son, and she is permitted to marry anyone else.

And why?

There is a majority indicating that she gave birth to a son, for

we follow the majority of women, and the majority of women become pregnant and give birth!?

And we answer: Since there is

a minority of women who miscarry,

who do not give birth to a viable child,

and all women who give birth

to viable children give birth

to half males and half females,

combine

this element of doubt—perhaps she belongs to the

minority who miscarry—with the half who give birth to females.

By being uncertain whether her mother-in-law gave birth to a male, there is an evenly balanced doubt that she gave birth to a female.

And

you add to this the minority possibility that she did not give birth at all, because she may have miscarried.

The males become—

a minority

of all births. Therefore, she is permitted to marry anyone else, since we follow the majority of births, which are not viable males.

But it is still possible to raise a difficulty:

And

according to Rabbi Meir, who takes the minority into consideration,

let him be concerned

about the minority of male births, and she should be forbidden to marry anyone else.

Since the Mishna does not take this into consideration, it is proven that we do not take the minority into consideration, and the latter clause of the Mishna follows the Sages.

If so, there is a difficulty: The first clause follows Rabbi Meir, while the latter clause follows the Sages!

And we answer:

Perhaps

the latter clause, too, can be established according to Rabbi Meir.

The reason we are not concerned about the minority possibility that her mother-in-law gave birth to a male is:

Since she had already been established

at the time she departed as being permitted

to marry anyone else,

since she had no yavam, then in a case involving an established presumption

Rabbi Meir is not concerned

about the minority.

Therefore, in the latter clause, “she need not be concerned,” since Rabbi Meir follows her presumption that she is permitted to marry anyone else.

The Gemara asks: If so, if you say that Rabbi Meir follows an established presumption—

The first clause, which had already been established

as permitted

for yibbum,

since when they departed her husband had no children,

should she perform yibbum!?

Let us maintain her established presumption, and why, then, does the first clause teach that she may not perform yibbum?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: The first clause

of the Mishna, in which we are discussing permitting her to perform yibbum, while we are uncertain whether her husband has a son and she would thereby encounter the prohibition of a brother’s wife when there is no mitzva,

because it would be

an

extremely severe karet prohibition, they were concerned

that her rival wife may have become pregnant, and we do not maintain her established presumption in a case involving concern about karet, which is more severe.

The latter clause

of the Mishna, in which we permitted her to marry anyone else, while you seek to forbid her because perhaps she has a yavam and she would thereby encounter a prohibition—since

the

prohibition

of

marrying anyone else is only a

negative commandment, “The wife of the dead shall not marry outside to a stranger” [Deuteronomy 25],

the Sages were not concerned

that her mother-in-law may have become pregnant, and they maintain the woman’s presumption of being permitted to marry anyone else.

Rava said

a refutation of Rav Naḥman’s answer:

Since,

after all,

this

the prohibition of a brother’s wife is a prohibition

by Torah law.

And this

the prohibition of a yevama marrying anyone else is a prohibition

by Torah law.

What difference is there to me

if she might encounter

a karet prohibition, or what difference is there to me if she might

encounter

a negative-commandment prohibition?

Just as in the case of uncertainty involving a karet prohibition you are concerned about permitting her to the yavam, so too, in the case of uncertainty involving a negative-commandment prohibition, you should be concerned and refrain from permitting her to marry anyone else, rather than maintain her presumption of permissibility.

It is specifically with regard to protective measures in which the Sages prohibit something permitted by Torah law in order to prevent people from encountering a prohibition that there is room to distinguish between them, because karet is more severe and therefore the Sages instituted a protective measure for it, but they did not institute one for a negative commandment.

But this does not apply in a case of uncertainty, where she may actually be committing a prohibition by Torah law [Rashi].

If so, the difficulty returns: The first clause, in which we were concerned about the minority, must necessarily follow Rabbi Meir, whereas the latter clause, in which we are not concerned about the minority, follows the Sages.

It follows that the first clause follows Rabbi Meir, while the latter clause follows the Sages!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: