Yevamot 119a — the Talmud in English

The woman whose husband went away, and

his other wife also went with him,

her rival-wife,

another wife whom her husband had,

to the overseas country,

and when they departed her husband had no sons.

And there came

witnesses

and said to her: “Your husband has died.”

She may not marry

outside

and may not perform yibbum

with the yavam, her husband’s brother,

until she knows

that her husband died without sons and she is permitted to the yavam, or until it becomes clear

that perhaps her rival-wife is pregnant,

and when she gives birth, she is permitted to marry outside.

And below, on folio 119b, the Gemara will explain why she should not perform halitza immediately, because of the uncertainty, and thereby become permitted to the outside world.

If she had

the woman

a mother-in-law

who departed for the overseas country, and she had no son except this woman’s husband,

she need not be concerned

that perhaps another son was born to her mother-in-law [the yavam] during her husband’s lifetime, and she is permitted to the outside world. [

You might say: Why in the first clause is she concerned that her rival-wife gave birth, whereas in the latter clause she is not concerned that her mother-in-law gave birth? The answer is: in the first clause, whatever she gives birth to, whether male or female, exempts her from yibbum. But in the latter clause, only if her mother-in-law gave birth to a male does she fall to yibbum, and there are two uncertainties here: a. perhaps she gave birth; b. perhaps it was male. For such a degree we are not concerned. Rashi ].

Her mother-in-law departed

and was

full

with pregnancy

she is concerned.

Since from now there is only one uncertainty: perhaps the fetus is male,

Rabbi Yehoshua says: She need not be concerned,

because there are still two uncertainties here: a. perhaps she miscarried; b. even if she did not miscarry, perhaps she gave birth—perhaps it was female.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that the woman must be concerned that perhaps her rival-wife is pregnant.

And we raised a difficulty:

What

is the meaning of “perhaps pregnant

is her rival-wife”?

Would it not have been sufficient to say, “perhaps her rival-wife is pregnant”?

And we answer:

This teaches us

by this extra wording, that only

this

rival-wife who went with him

is the one about whom we are concerned

that perhaps she is pregnant.

But if witnesses came that this rival-wife is not pregnant, then

with regard to another rival-wife,

that perhaps her husband married another wife in the overseas country, and perhaps that wife is pregnant by him,

we are not concerned,

and this woman is permitted to the yavam.

We learned in the Mishna: She may not marry outside and may not perform yibbum, this woman whose husband and rival-wife went together to the overseas country, and the husband died.

And we questioned:

Granted,

it is understandable that

she may not perform yibbum

with the yavam,

for perhaps she is pregnant

her rival-wife, and she gave birth to a son,

and this woman would encounter

this woman

the prohibition of a brother’s wife

when it is not in the place of the mitzva of yibbum, which is a prohibition punishable by karet

from the Torah.

But

the fact that the Mishna says that

she may not marry

outside is difficult.

For

why

may she not marry? If because of the concern that perhaps her husband died without sons, and she is bound to yibbum, you should say that it is reasonable that her husband died leaving offspring behind. For—

Follow the majority of women,

as in every uncertainty throughout the Torah, where we follow the majority. And

the majority of women become pregnant and give birth.

Presumably, her rival-wife who went with her husband to the overseas country also gave birth to offspring from him.

Shall we say

that we should prove from this that our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Meir, who is concerned for the minority?

As we find concerning the minority of the people from the Cutheans, the inhabitants of Mount Gerizim, who bowed to the image of a dove that was there, and Rabbi Meir decreed concerning all the Cutheans that they should be considered apostates, because of the minority.

And therefore our Mishna is concerned for the minority of women who do not give birth, and consequently she is forbidden to the outside world.

And we answer:

Even if you say

that our Mishna was stated according to the view of

the Rabbis,

who dispute Rabbi Meir and are not concerned for the minority, nevertheless she is forbidden to marry outside.

For

when the Rabbis follow the majority—

only

with a majority that is present before us,

where the majority is before us.

For example, nine shops,

which we see before us, most of which sell slaughtered meat, and the minority of which sell carcass and forbidden meat; in that case we follow the majority, and if meat is found in the city, we attribute it to the majority of permitted meat.

And a Sanhedrin,

where the majority of those acquitting are before us.

But a majority that is not present before us,

such as the majority of women in the world, who become pregnant and give birth,

the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

And we challenge: Behold, we find that even with a majority “that is not present before us,” the Rabbis also follow the majority.

And

as proof of this,

behold,

concerning the case of yibbum involving

a minor male and a minor female

[as will be explained immediately below],

it is a majority that is not present before us, and the Rabbis follow the majority.

For it was taught:

A yavam who is

a minor

or a yevama who is

a minor female—

they do not perform halitza and they do not perform yibbum; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

They said to him

the Rabbis

to Rabbi Meir: “You have spoken well that they do not perform halitza.”

Your reasoning is sound in this matter, since

“a man” is written in the passage

of halitza: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” [Deuteronomy 25]. And we expound: “a man,” but not a minor.

And

the woman who performs halitza must also be an adult and not a minor, because

we compare woman to man,

for afterward in the verse there is a comparison between them, as it is written: “And his yevama shall ascend to the gate.”

But what is the reason

that you say

they do not perform yibbum

the minors?

He said to them

Rabbi Meir:

A minor—

perhaps he will be found to be a eunuch,

who cannot beget children.

And likewise,

a minor female—

perhaps she will be found to be an aylonit,

who cannot give birth.

And since they are not capable of establishing a name, the Torah exempted them from yibbum, as it is written [Deuteronomy 25], “whom she shall bear,” excluding an aylonit.

It follows that they would encounter a forbidden sexual relation

of the prohibition of a brother’s wife when it is not in the place of the mitzva.

But the Rabbis

who did not accept his reason

hold

that the minor male and minor female are permitted in yibbum, since

go after the majority of minor males.

And the majority of minor males,

when they grow up,

are not eunuchs.

Go after the majority of minor females.

And the majority of minor females,

when they grow up,

are not ayloniyot.

Therefore we need not be concerned that perhaps they are not obligated in yibbum.

And from the fact that the Rabbis disputed Rabbi Meir and follow the majority that they are not eunuchs, it is proven that they follow the majority even when the majority is not before us.

If so, our Mishna, which does not follow the majority of women who become pregnant and give birth, is not according to the Rabbis!

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather, it is clear

and proven that

the Mishna

is according to the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who is concerned for the minority.

And we refute: If we establish the first clause of the Mishna

according to Rabbi Meir,

who is concerned for the minority, the latter clause will be difficult, since the first clause would be Rabbi Meir, and the latter clause the Rabbis!?

Say the latter clause: “If she had a mother-in-law”—

she need not be concerned

that her mother-in-law gave birth to a son, and she is permitted to the outside world.

And why?

There is a majority indicating that she gave birth to a son, for

follow the majority of women, and the majority of women become pregnant and give birth!?

And we answer: Since there is

a minority of women who miscarry,

who do not give birth to a viable offspring,

and all those who give birth

to a viable offspring give birth

half male and half female,

add

this side of the uncertainty, that perhaps she belongs to the

minority of those who miscarry, to the half who give birth to females.

By means of this, when you are uncertain whether her mother-in-law gave birth to a male, you have an equally balanced uncertainty whether she gave birth to a female.

And

you add to it the minority that perhaps she did not give birth at all, since it is possible that she miscarried.

The males become—

a minority

of all births, and therefore she is permitted to the outside world, since we follow the majority of births, which are not viable males.

But it is still possible to challenge:

And

to Rabbi Meir, who is concerned for the minority,

let him be concerned

for the minority of males, and she should be forbidden to the outside world.

And from the fact that the Mishna was not concerned for this, it is proven that we are not concerned for the minority, and the latter clause of the Mishna comes according to the Rabbis.

If so, it is difficult, for the first clause is according to Rabbi Meir and the latter clause according to the Rabbis!?

And we answer:

Perhaps

the latter clause too can be established according to Rabbi Meir.

And the fact that we are not concerned for the minority that her mother-in-law gave birth to a male is

because she was established

at the time of her departure as permitted

to the outside world,

since she had no yavam; therefore, where there is a presumption,

he is not concerned

for the minority.

And therefore, in the latter clause, “she need not be concerned,” since Rabbi Meir follows her presumption that she is permitted to the outside world.

And the Gemara asks: If so, since you say that Rabbi Meir follows a presumption—

The first clause, which was established

as permitted

to yibbum,

since when they departed her husband had no sons,

should she perform yibbum!

Let us establish her on her presumption, and why did we learn in the first clause that she may not perform yibbum?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: The first clause

of the Mishna, in which we are discussing permitting her to yibbum, and we are uncertain whether he has a son and she would encounter the prohibition of a brother’s wife when it is not in the place of the mitzva,

for

it would be

a prohibition punishable by karet, they were concerned

that perhaps her rival-wife became pregnant, and they do not establish her on a presumption where there is concern for karet, which is stringent.

The latter clause

of the Mishna, in which we permitted her to the outside world, and you are considering forbidding her because perhaps she has a yavam and would encounter a prohibition—since

the

prohibition

of

the outside world is only a prohibition

of a negative commandment, “The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man” [Deuteronomy 25],

they were not concerned

about it, that perhaps her mother-in-law became pregnant, and they establish the woman with the presumption of being permitted to the outside world.

Rava said

a refutation of Rav Nahman’s answer:

Since,

after all,

this,

the prohibition of a brother’s wife, is a prohibition

from the Torah.

And this,

the prohibition of a yevama to the outside world, is a prohibition

from the Torah.

What difference is there to me

if she possibly encountered

a prohibition punishable by karet, and what difference is there to me if she possibly

encountered

a prohibition of a negative commandment?

Behold, just as in a case of a possible prohibition punishable by karet you are concerned about permitting her to the yavam, so in a case of a possible prohibition of a negative commandment there should be concern, and one should refrain from permitting her to the outside world, rather than establish her on the presumption of being permitted.

Specifically with regard to precautions, where the Sages prohibit something permitted by the Torah so that people should not encounter a prohibition, there is room to distinguish, because karet is more severe, and therefore the Sages made a precaution for it, but they did not make a precaution for a negative commandment.

But not in a case of uncertainty, where perhaps he is actually committing a prohibition from the Torah. [Rashi]

If so, the question returns: the first clause, in which we were concerned for the minority, must be Rabbi Meir, whereas the latter clause, in which we are not concerned for the minority, is the Rabbis.

It follows that the first clause is Rabbi Meir, whereas the latter clause is the Rabbis!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: