Yevamot 118b (קיח:) — the Talmud in English

In the preceding Mishna, we learned of two disputes between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, the Mishna now teaches additional matters about which they disputed.

Mishna:

1.

If a man betrothed one of five women, and does not know which one he betrothed, each one

of the five

says: “He betrothed me,”

and he does not wish to marry all of them,

he must give a bill of divorce to each and every one, and place the ketuba between them

and withdraw. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a proper way to

remove himself from transgression, until he gives a bill of divorce and a ketuba to each and every one.

2.

If he robbed one of five

people,

and does not know from which one

of them

he robbed, each one says: “He robbed me,”

he places the stolen item between them and withdraws. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a proper way

to

remove himself from transgression, until he pays each and every one,

since he committed a prohibition by robbing:

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he betrothed one of five women, etc.”

And we infer:

It teaches: “He betrothed”; it does not teach: “He had intercourse with.”

For it may be said that Rabbi Tarfon stated that he places the ketuba between them specifically when he betrothed her, because he did not perform an act with her. But when he had intercourse with her, Rabbi Tarfon concedes that, since he performed an act with her and disgraced her through betrothal by intercourse, he must remove himself from transgression and give a ketuba to each and every one, due to the uncertainty.

And likewise, with regard to the latter clause of the Mishna, one may infer:

It teaches: “He robbed”; it does not teach: “He purchased.”

For it may be said that Rabbi Akiva imposed a penalty specifically in the case of robbery, where he committed a prohibition. But if he purchased an item from one of five people and does not know from whom he purchased it, Rabbi Akiva concedes that he places the purchase price between them.

We raise a difficulty concerning this:

Who is the author of the Mishna?

It is neither the first tanna nor Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree with regard to one who betrothed

one of five women and does not know which one he betrothed, that he places the ketuba between them and withdraws.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had intercourse with

one of five women:

Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the ketuba between them and withdraws; Rabbi Akiva says: He must pay each and every one.

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree with regard to one who purchased an item from five people and does not know from which one he purchased it, that he places the purchase price between them and withdraws.

They disagreed only

in a case

where he robbed five people, for Rabbi Tarfon said: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws, while Rabbi Akiva says: He must pay the stolen item to each and every one.

And we infer:

From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that they did not disagree with regard to betrothal and purchase,

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva,

by inference, the first tanna holds that they did disagree

with regard to betrothal and purchase, because there is not such a serious prohibition involved. But with regard to intercourse and robbery, even Rabbi Tarfon concedes.

And accordingly we ask:

Who is

the author of the Mishna, which teaches the cases of betrothal and robbery?

If it is the first tanna, let it teach: “Betrothed” and “purchased.”

If it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach: “Had intercourse” and “robbed.”

And we answer:

Actually,

the Mishna is in accordance with

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

for they disagree with regard to intercourse and robbery.

And what does “betrothed”

in the Mishna mean?

Betrothed by intercourse,

for he disgraced her; nevertheless, Rabbi Tarfon exempted him from paying a ketuba to each one.

And do not say that it should teach the dispute only with regard to robbery, and that there was no need to bring the dispute with regard to betrothal, for both cases are necessary.

It taught the case of betrothal

by intercourse

to inform you of the force of Rabbi Akiva’s position: Although he committed only a rabbinic prohibition,

as Rav had one who betrothed by intercourse flogged, and this is not a prohibition from the Torah, nevertheless,

he imposed a penalty.

And

it also taught

the dispute with regard to

robbery, to inform you of the force of Rabbi Tarfon’s position: Although he committed a prohibition from the Torah,

nevertheless,

he did not impose a penalty:

Mishna:

1.

A woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and her son was with them, and she came and said: “My husband died”

first,

“and afterward my son died,”

and I am not subject to levirate marriage, since at the time of my husband’s death my son was still alive,

she is deemed credible

to marry outside the levirate bond, since she could have said that her son was alive, as until now she had the presumptive status of being permitted to marry outside the levirate bond.

And if she said:

“My son died, and afterward my husband died,”

and I am subject to levirate marriage,

she is not deemed credible

to enter into levirate marriage,

but we are concerned about her statement

that she is forbidden to marry outside the levirate bond, since by her statement she renders herself as a piece of forbidden matter,

and she must perform halitza but may not enter into levirate marriage.

2. A woman who went with her husband to a country overseas without a son, and said:

“A son was given to me in the country overseas,” and then said: “My son died, and afterward my husband died,” she is deemed credible

to enter into levirate marriage, since when she left she had the presumptive status of being subject to levirate marriage.

And if she said:

“My husband died, and afterward my son died,”

and she is not subject to levirate marriage,

she is not deemed credible

to marry outside the levirate bond without halitza.

But we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform halitza but may not enter into levirate marriage,

because with regard to her husband the Sages deemed her credible to remove her from the presumptive status of a married woman, as she investigates carefully; but they did not deem her credible to remove herself from the levir, since at times she hates him.

3. She went with her mother-in-law to a country overseas with the presumptive status that she had no levir, and when she came she said:

“A levir was given to me in the country overseas; my mother-in-law gave birth to a son.”

If she said: “My husband died, and afterward my levir died,”

and likewise if she said: “My

levir died, and afterward

my

husband died,”

in either case she is permitted to marry outside the levirate bond, since she has no levir,

she is deemed credible,

because “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

4.

She went with her husband and her levir to a country overseas, and said: “My husband died, and afterward my levir died,”

and likewise if she said: “My

levir died, and afterward

my

husband died,” she is not deemed credible, since a woman is not deemed credible to say that her levir died so that she may marry

outside the levirate bond, since at times she hates him, and there is only a prohibition of a negative commandment; therefore, we are concerned that it may be easy in her eyes to make such a claim.

5.

Nor

is she deemed credible to say:

“Her sister died,” so that she may enter the house

of her sister’s husband; and 6.

a man is not deemed credible to say: “My brother died,” so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his wife,

so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife; 7.

nor

is he deemed credible to say:

“His wife died”

in order

“to marry her sister”

([A sister’s two sisters are forbidden to him while both are alive]), because only a woman investigates carefully before marrying so that she will not become forbidden to her husband, but a man does not.

Gemara:

A man who wishes to confer a bill of divorce upon his wife through another person, so that the other person receives the bill of divorce in her place and acquires it for her, and she becomes divorced when the bill of divorce reaches the other person, based on the principle that one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, cannot do so. He cannot do this because the bill of divorce is a detriment to the woman, and one may not cause a detriment to a person through another in his absence.

And the Gemara raises a doubt:

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: In the case of one who confers a bill of divorce upon his wife

through an agent of receipt, so that she will become divorced immediately,

in the place of a levir

who has a brother, and through the bill of divorce she will be released from the levir in the event that her husband dies;

what is

the halakha? Does the bill of divorce take effect, and is she exempt from levirate marriage, or not?

Do we say:

Since she hates him,

the levir, and wishes to be released from him, therefore

it is a benefit for her, and one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence,

and she is divorced?

Or perhaps, since at times she loves him,

as there are times when she loves the levir,

it is a detriment to her

to be released from the levir,

and one may not cause a detriment to a person in his absence,

and she is not divorced.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

We learned

that whether the woman left here with the presumptive status of being permitted to marry outside the levirate bond and came back claiming for herself the status of a woman subject to levirate marriage, or whether she left here with the presumptive status of being subject to levirate marriage and came back claiming for herself the status of being permitted to marry outside the levirate bond, the law is that

we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform halitza but may not enter into levirate marriage,

and we do not say that she is certainly lying because of hatred or love for the levir.

This proves that the matter is uncertain.

If so, the same is true with regard to one who confers a bill of divorce: It is uncertain whether she loves the levir and it is a detriment to her, or whether she hates him and it is a benefit for her. Therefore, if her husband dies, she must perform halitza but may not enter into levirate marriage.

The Gemara raises another doubt:

Ravina said to Rava: In the case of one who confers a bill of divorce upon his wife

through an agent of receipt, so that she will become divorced immediately,

in a situation of discord, what is the halakha?

Do we say:

Since she is in a state of discord with him,

she therefore hates him and

it is a benefit for her

to become divorced?

Or perhaps, it is preferable,

despite the discord, for her to remain married rather than remain alone,

as a body is preferable for her,

and if so, becoming divorced is a detriment to her.

Come and hear: For Reish Lakish said: It is better to sit as two than to sit as a widow.

A woman prefers to live together with another person, even if he is not entirely suitable for her, rather than to live alone.

And if so, divorce is a detriment to her, even in a situation of discord.

The Gemara further cites cases in which a woman prefers to remain married.

Abaye said: If her husband is a shumshemana,

even if the woman has a husband who is as short as an ant,

her chair is placed among the noblewomen,

the woman feels important by virtue of being married, and places her chair among the prominent women, the noblewomen of the land.

Rav Pappa said: If her husband is a naftza,

even if her husband has a despised occupation, such as beating wool,

she can be called to the threshold of the gate and sit

there beside him in public without shame.

Rav Ashi says: If her husband is a kolesa,

even if a trace of disqualification was found in her husband,

she does not need lentils for the pot,

even lentils, which are a simple and inexpensive food, she does not request from him, because the main thing for her is that his name be associated with hers.

It was taught: And all of them,

all those women whose husbands are lowly, and who display affection toward them, do so only because they

commit adultery

beneath them, and when they become pregnant,

they attribute

their pregnancies

to their husbands,

and it is satisfactory for them to have any sort of men, since they commit adultery beneath them.

We have completed Chapter “The Woman Who Went to a Country Overseas.”

The first Mishna of this chapter deals with a woman whose husband died without children, and it is not known whether she is obligated in yibbum. The Mishna clarifies two forms of doubt:

The first is a case in which it is uncertain whether he had children from another wife, in which case she is exempt from yibbum and permitted to marry anyone.

The second is a case in which it is uncertain whether her husband had a brother, and she therefore has no yavam.

Mishna: