Yevamot 118b — the Talmud in English

In the preceding Mishna we learned two disputes between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva; therefore the Mishna now teaches additional matters in which they disputed.

Mishna:

1.

If he betrothed one of five women and does not know which one he betrothed, each one

of the five

says: “He betrothed me,”

and he does not wish to marry all of them,

he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one, and leaves the marriage contract between them

and withdraws; these are the words of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a good way to be

removed from transgression, until he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract to each and every one.

2.

If he robbed one of five

people,

and does not know from which one

of them

he robbed, each one says: “He robbed me,”

he leaves the robbed property between them and withdraws; these are the words of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way

to be good

removed from transgression, until he pays each and every one,

since he committed a prohibition by robbing:

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he betrothed one of five women, etc.”

And we infer:

It teaches “he betrothed”; it does not teach “he had intercourse,”

for one might say that specifically concerning betrothal Rabbi Tarfon says that he leaves the marriage contract between them, because he did not perform an act with her. But concerning intercourse, Rabbi Tarfon concedes, since he performed an act with her and disgraced her through betrothal by intercourse, that he must remove himself from transgression and give a marriage contract to each and every one because of the uncertainty.

And likewise, concerning the end of the Mishna, one should infer:

It teaches “he robbed”; it does not teach “he took,”

for one might say: specifically in the case of robbery, because he committed a prohibition, Rabbi Akiva penalizes him; but in the case of one who took from one of five and does not know from whom he took, Rabbi Akiva concedes that he leaves the value of the purchase between them.

And we examine it:

Who is the author of the Mishna?

It is neither the first tanna nor Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute concerning one who betrothed

one of five women and does not know which one he betrothed, that he leaves the marriage contract between them and withdraws.

Concerning what did they dispute? Concerning one who had intercourse with

one of five women:

Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the marriage contract between them and withdraws; Rabbi Akiva says: Until he pays each and every one.

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute concerning one who took a purchase from five people and does not know from which one he took it, that he leaves the value of the purchase between them and withdraws.

They disputed only

in a case

where he robbed five people, for Rabbi Tarfon said: He leaves the robbed property between them and withdraws, while Rabbi Akiva says: Until he pays the robbed property to each and every one.

And we infer:

From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that, concerning betrothal and taking, they did not dispute,

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva,

by inference, the first tanna holds that they did dispute

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva concerning betrothal and taking, because there is not such a great prohibition; but concerning intercourse and robbery, even Rabbi Tarfon concedes.

And according to this we ask:

Who is

the author of our Mishna, which teaches betrothal and robbery?

If it is the first tanna, let him teach “betrothed” and “took.”

If it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let him teach “had intercourse” and “robbed.”

And we answer:

Actually,

the Mishna is according to

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

for they dispute concerning intercourse and robbery.

And what is meant by “betrothed”

in the Mishna?

He betrothed through intercourse,

for he disgraced her, and nevertheless Rabbi Tarfon exempted him.

And do not say: Let him teach the dispute concerning robbery and there would be no need to bring the dispute concerning betrothal, for both of them are necessary:

The tanna taught “betrothed”

through intercourse

to inform you of the power of Rabbi Akiva, for although he committed a rabbinic prohibition

since Rav flogged one who betrothed through intercourse, and here there is no prohibition from the Torah, nevertheless he

penalizes him.

And

the tanna

also taught the dispute concerning

robbery, to inform you of the power of Rabbi Tarfon, for although he committed a prohibition from the Torah,

nevertheless he

does not penalize him:

Mishna:

1.

A woman who went, she and her husband, to an overseas country, and her son was with them, and she came and said: “My husband died

first,

and afterward my son died,”

and I am not subject to yibbum, since at the time of my husband’s death my son was still alive,

she is believed

to marry outside the levirate bond, since she could have said, “My son is alive,” for until now she had the presumptive status of being permitted to marry outside the levirate bond.

And if she said:

“My son died, and afterward my husband died,”

and I am subject to yibbum,

she is not believed

to enter into yibbum,

but we are concerned for her words

that she is forbidden to marry outside the levirate bond, since she has made herself as though a piece of forbidden matter,

and she performs halitza but does not enter into yibbum.

2. A woman who went with her husband to an overseas country without a son, and said:

“A son was given to me in the overseas country,” and she said: “My son died, and afterward my husband died,” she is believed

to enter into yibbum, for when she went she had the presumptive status of being subject to yibbum.

And if she said:

“My husband died, and afterward my son died,”

and she is not subject to yibbum,

she is not believed

to marry outside the levirate bond without halitza.

But we are concerned for her words, and she performs halitza but does not enter into yibbum,

because, concerning her husband, the Sages believed her to remove her from the presumptive status of a married woman, since she takes care to verify; but they did not believe her to remove her from the levir, because sometimes she hates him.

3. She went with her mother-in-law to an overseas country with the presumptive status that she had no levir, and when she came she said:

“A levir was given to me in the overseas country”; my mother-in-law gave birth to a son.

If she said: “My husband died, and afterward my levir died,”

and likewise if she said, “My

levir died, and afterward

my

husband died,”

in either case she is permitted to marry outside the levirate bond, since she has no levir,

she is believed,

for “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

4.

She went, she and her husband and her levir, to an overseas country; she said: “My husband died, and afterward my levir died,”

and likewise if she said, “My

levir died, and afterward

my

husband died,” she is not believed, for a woman is not believed to say that her levir died so that she may marry

outside the levirate bond, because sometimes she hates him, and there is only a prohibition of “you shall not,” and therefore we are concerned lest it be lenient in her eyes.

5.

Nor

is she believed to say:

“My sister died,” so that she may enter his house

of her sister’s husband; and

a man is not believed to say: “My brother died,” so that he may perform yibbum with his wife,

so that I may perform yibbum with his wife; 7.

nor

is he believed to say:

“His wife died”

so that

he may marry her sister

[two sisters are forbidden to him when both are alive], because only a woman takes care before marrying so that she will not become forbidden to her husband, but a man does not.

Gemara:

A man who wishes to acquire a get for his wife through another person, who will receive the get in her place and acquire the get for her, so that she will be divorced when the get reaches the other person, by the principle of “one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence,” cannot do this, since the get is a liability for the woman, and one may not cause a liability to a person through another in his absence.

And the Gemara raises a doubt:

Rava asked Rav Nahman: If one acquires a get for his wife

through a designated agent for receipt, so that she is divorced immediately,

in the place of a levir

who has a brother, and through the get she is released from the levir, in the event that the husband dies,

what is the law?

Does the get take effect, and is she exempt from yibbum, or not?

Do we say:

Since she hates him,

the levir, and wishes to be released from him, if so,

it is a benefit for her, and one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence,

and she is divorced?

Or perhaps, since at times she loves him,

the levir,

it is a liability for her

to be released from the levir,

and one may not cause a liability to a person in his absence,

and she is not divorced.

He said to him,

Rav Nahman:

We have learned it:

whether when the woman left here she had the presumptive status of being permitted to marry outside the levirate bond and came and established herself as subject to the levir, or whether when she left here she had the presumptive status of being subject to the levir and came and established herself as permitted to marry outside the levirate bond, the law is that

we are concerned for her words, and she performs halitza but does not enter into yibbum,

and we do not say that she is certainly lying because of hatred or love of the levir.

And it is demonstrated that the matter is uncertain.

If so, the same is true concerning one who acquires a get: It is uncertain whether she loves the levir and it is a liability for her, or perhaps she hates him and it is a benefit for her; therefore, if her husband dies, she performs halitza but does not enter into yibbum.

The Gemara raises another doubt:

Ravina said to Rava: If one acquires a get for his wife

through a designated agent for receipt, so that she is divorced immediately,

in a place of quarrel, what is the law?

Do we say:

Since she has a quarrel with him,

if so, she hates him and

it is a benefit for her

to be divorced?

Or perhaps, it is preferable;

despite the quarrel, she prefers to remain under her husband rather than remain alone,

for the body is preferable for her,

and if so, it is a liability for her to be divorced.

Come and hear: For Reish Lakish said: It is better to sit as two than to sit as a widow.

A woman prefers to sit together with another, even if he is not entirely suitable for her, rather than sit alone.

And if so, divorce is a liability for her, even in a place of quarrel.

The Gemara further brings situations in which a woman prefers to remain under her husband.

Abaye said: If her husband is a shumshamna

even if the woman has a husband as short as an ant,

they place her chair among the noblewomen,

the woman considers herself important in that she is married, and places her chair among the important women, the noblewomen of the land.

Rav Pappa said: If her husband is a wool-fluffer,

even a husband whose occupation is repulsive, who fluffs wool,

she may be called to the doorstep and sit,

she is not ashamed to call him to the threshold of the house to sit there with him in front of everyone .

Rav Ashi said: If her husband is a kulsasa,

even if they found a trace of disqualification in her husband,

she does not require lentils for the pot,

even lentils, which are a light and inexpensive food, she does not request from him, because the main thing for her is that his name be called upon her.

The tanna taught: And all of them,

all those women whose husbands are lowly, and their showing them affection is only because they

commit adultery

beneath them, and when they become pregnant

they attribute

their pregnancy

to their husbands,

and it is convenient for them to have any sort of men, because they commit adultery beneath them

We have completed for you the chapter “The Woman’s Peace.”

The first Mishna in this chapter deals with a woman whose husband died without sons, and it is not known whether she is obligated in yibbum. The Mishna clarifies two forms of uncertainty:

The first: a case in which it is uncertain whether he has sons from another woman, in which case she is exempt from yibbum and permitted to the outside world.

The second: a case in which it is uncertain whether her husband has a brother, and she has no yavam.

Mishna: