Yevamot 118a (קיח.) — the Talmud in English

And

a woman

one

says, “He died,” and a woman

one

says, “He did not die,” she may not marry.

This is because the second woman came before the first woman’s testimony had been accepted to permit her to marry; and even if the second woman is her rival wife, she renders her forbidden through her denial.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Two women who were married to one husband came, and one says, “He died,” while the other says, “He did not die”; the one who says, “He did not die,” may not marry.

And we raised a question about this:

The reason

that she may not marry is because

she said, “He did not die.”

And we inferred from it:

If the second woman remained silent,

she

may marry

on the basis of the testimony of the first woman.

And we objected:

But a rival wife cannot testify on behalf of her fellow rival wife.

And we answered: In fact, if the second woman remained silent, she may not marry.

The reason the Mishna did not say that even if the second woman remained silent she may not marry is not so that we should infer from this that if the second woman remained silent she may marry on the basis of the first woman’s testimony, for it is obvious to us that she may not marry on the testimony of her fellow wife. Rather, the reason that we learned in the Mishna that when she “said” that he did not die she may not marry is because

“He did not die” was necessary

for the tanna to teach us: If the second woman contradicts the first, the first woman may not marry either.

For

it might have entered your mind to say:

Since the second woman came to challenge the first woman’s testimony, it is reasonable to say:

In fact, he died,

that the husband indeed died.

And when she says, “He did not die,” she intends to harm her rival wife,

to leave her unable to marry; and although through her testimony she too is forbidden to marry, nevertheless she testifies

and is saying, “Let me die with the Philistines,”

so I might have said that even the second woman herself should be permitted in such a case.

Therefore, it teaches us

that the second woman is forbidden.

We learned in the Mishna:

One says, “He died,” and one says, “He was killed.” Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, neither of them may marry:

And we objected:

Why does Rabbi Meir not also differ

also

in the first clause,

where one says, “He died,” and one says, “He did not die”? Since they contradict one another, the one who says, “He died,” should not be permitted to marry either.

And we answered:

Rabbi Elazar said:

Yes, that is indeed so; even the first clause

is stated as a dispute.

And

the first clause is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,

who hold that a rival wife does not contradict her fellow rival wife.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: You may even say

that the first clause is in accordance with

Rabbi Meir.

Since in this case,

in the first clause, where one says, “He died,” and one says, “He did not die,”

even Rabbi Meir concedes that every statement of “He did not die”—

when given in the testimony of a woman, is not considered a contradiction!

For the Rabbis believed the first woman who said that he died, and therefore she may marry, since her testimony was not contradicted.

We learned:

One

witness says, “He died,” and one

witness

says, “He did not die”; a woman

one

says, “He died,” and a woman

one

says, “He did not die,”

and even if she is her rival wife, since the second witness or the woman came and said, “He did not die,” before she had been permitted to marry on the basis of the first witness,

she may not marry.

And we objected:

Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, the anonymous

Mishna

is in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, it is difficult.

And we concluded: Indeed, it is difficult.

Mishna:

A woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and she came and said, “My husband died,”

she herself may marry, and she may collect her marriage contract.

But her rival wife is forbidden

to marry, since the rival wife who testified is not believed with regard to her so as to permit her to marry.

And if

she was

her rival wife,

an Israelite woman

who was married

to a kohen,

as their husband was a kohen,

she may eat teruma

on the presumption that her husband is alive, and she need not be concerned about the testimony of her rival wife. Since the rival wife is not believed to permit her to marry, she is not believed to disqualify her either.

This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a proper way

to

remove her from transgression.

For at times the second woman prefers to remain in the status of an aguna, as the wife of a kohen, so that she can eat teruma; and even if she could ascertain that her kohen husband had died, she does not investigate the matter, but continues to eat teruma as though she were still his wife.

For this reason, we are concerned

even

to such an extent that we say

that she is forbidden to marry and is also forbidden to eat teruma,

until she ascertains that he is indeed alive.

A woman who went with her husband and her father-in-law to a country overseas, and when she returned

said, “My husband died,” and afterward

said

“My father-in-law died,”

she may marry and collect her marriage contract.

And

if

her mother-in-law is forbidden.

Just as her mother-in-law is not believed with regard to her daughter-in-law, so too a daughter-in-law is not believed with regard to her mother-in-law, since “As in water face answers to face, so does the heart of man to man.” And although she first said, “My husband died,” and her mother-in-law was therefore no longer her daughter-in-law’s rival wife, nevertheless, since her son was no longer alive, she is still not believed, because we are concerned that perhaps, out of hatred for her mother-in-law, she first said, “My husband died,” in order to render her mother-in-law forbidden to her husband.

And if her mother-in-law

was an Israelite woman

who was married

to a kohen, she may eat teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a proper way to remove her from transgression, until she is forbidden to marry and forbidden to eat teruma:

Gemara:

And it is necessary

for our Mishna to state the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva twice.

For if it were stated

that the dispute applies only to

the first case,

with regard to her rival wife, I might have said that only

in this case Rabbi Tarfon says

that the rival wife is not believed at all, even with regard to teruma,

because of bodily distress,

since she suffers because her rival wife prevents her from having relations with her husband. Therefore, she certainly lies in order to harm her, so that she will marry and thereby be disqualified, even though she herself also marries and is thereby disqualified; this is because she is saying, “Let me die with the Philistines.”

But

in the latter clause of the Mishna, with regard to

her mother-in-law, whose distress is only distress over ordinary matters, I might have said that he concedes to him

Rabbi Tarfon

with regard to Rabbi Akiva

that we do not presume her to be such a liar; although she is not believed to permit her to marry, as a stringency, with regard to teruma, she should be concerned about her statement.

And if it were stated

that the dispute applies only

to this case

in the latter clause, with regard to her mother-in-law, I might have said that only

in this case Rabbi Akiva says

that we are concerned about her statement and she is forbidden to eat teruma, because her distress concerns ordinary matters.

But in that case

in the first clause, with regard to her rival wife, where there is bodily distress,

I might have said that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon

that she certainly lies in order to harm her, so that she will marry.

For this reason, it is

necessary

to state both of these disputes.

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon.

Abaye said: We too have learned

in a beraita in accordance with the words of Rabbi Tarfon, regarding a woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and when she left here she had no son and was presumed to require yibbum, and she came and said

“A son was born to me in the country overseas.”

And

“My son died, and afterward

died

my husband,”

since she did not remove herself from her original presumption—for she still requires yibbum—therefore she is

believed

and permitted to undergo yibbum.

But if she said, “My

husband died, and afterward

died

my son,” she is not believed

to marry outside the levirate bond,

and we are concerned about her statement

that she removed herself from the presumption that she requires yibbum. If the yavam comes to perform yibbum with her, we do not allow her to undergo yibbum;

she must perform halitza and may not undergo yibbum,

because the Rabbis believed a woman only with regard to her husband’s death, based on the principle that she investigates carefully and then marries. But they did not believe what she says to exempt herself from yibbum, since at times she hates the yavam.

And we inferred: The expression “about her statement” implies a limitation: only

about her statement are we concerned; but about the statement of a rival wife,

if she says this,

we are not concerned,

and we leave her with her original presumption.

Conclude from this

that it is in accordance with the words of Rabbi Tarfon: