Yevamot 118a — the Talmud in English

And so,

one woman

says,

“He died,” and one woman

says,

“He did not die”—this one may not marry.

Since the second one came before they permitted her on the basis of the first, and even if the second is her rival wife, she prohibits her through her denial.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Two women of one husband came, and one says, “He died,” and the other says, “He did not die”; the one who says, “He did not die,” may not marry.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

The reason

that she may not marry is because

she said, “He did not die.”

And we infer from it:

If the second one remained silent,

she

may marry

on the testimony of the first.

And we object:

But a rival wife does not testify for her fellow wife.

And we answer: In fact, if the second one remained silent, she may not marry.

And the reason that the Mishna did not say that even if the second one remained silent she may not marry is not so that we should infer from this that if the second one remained silent she may marry on the testimony of the first, for it is obvious to us that she may not marry on the testimony of her fellow wife. And that which we learned in the Mishna, that when she

“said, ‘He did not die,’

the tanna needed to inform us that if the second one denies it, the first one also may not marry.

For

it might have entered your mind to say:

Since the second one came to challenge, it is reasonable to say:

“He has died,”

that the husband indeed died.

And this that she says, “He did not die,” is because she intends to harm her rival wife,

to leave her unable to marry; and even though through her testimony she too is prohibited from marrying, nevertheless she testifies,

“and let her soul die with the Philistines,” she is saying.

Therefore, I might have said that even the second one herself should be permitted in such a case;

it teaches us

that the second one is prohibited.

We learned in the Mishna:

One says, “He died,” and one says, “He was killed.” Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these women may not marry:

And we object:

And let Rabbi Meir differ

also

at the beginning,

in the case where one says, “He died,” and one says, “He did not die,” for since they contradict one another, even the one who says, “He died,” may not marry.

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said:

That is indeed so; the beginning as well

is stated as a dispute.

And

the beginning is according to

Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon,

who hold that a rival wife does not deny her fellow wife.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: You may even say

that the beginning is according to

Rabbi Meir.

For in this case,

at the beginning, where one says, “He died,” and one says, “He did not die,”

even Rabbi Meir agrees, for every “He did not die”—

in the testimony of a woman, is not a contradiction!

For the Rabbis believed the first one who said, “He died,” and therefore she may marry, since she was not contradicted.

We learned:

One

witness says, “He died,” and one

witness

says, “He did not die”; one woman

one

says, “He died,” and one woman

one

says, “He did not die,”

and even if she is her rival wife, since the second witness or the woman came and said, “He did not die,” before they permitted her on the basis of the first witness,

she may not marry.

And we object:

Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, the anonymous

Mishna

is according to Rabbi Meir.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, it is difficult.

And we conclude: Indeed, it is difficult.

Mishna:

A woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and came and said, “My husband died,”

she herself may marry, and she collects her ketuba.

But her rival wife is prohibited

from marrying, since the rival wife who testified is not trusted concerning her to permit her to marry.

And if

she was

a

daughter of Israel

who was married

to a kohen,

for their husband was a kohen,

she may eat teruma

presuming that her husband is alive, and she need not be concerned about the testimony of her rival wife; since she is not trusted to permit her to marry, she is likewise not trusted to disqualify her,

the words of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a way

of

removing her from transgression.

For sometimes the second one prefers to remain in the status of a woman whose husband has disappeared, as the wife of a kohen, so that she can eat teruma; and even if she can know that her kohen husband died, she does not investigate this but continues eating teruma as though she were still his wife.

For this reason we are concerned

even

to that extent, for we say

that she should be prohibited from marrying, and also prohibited from eating teruma,

until she establishes that he is indeed alive.

A woman who went with her husband and her father-in-law to a country overseas, and when she returned

said, “My husband died,” and afterward

said,

“My father-in-law died,”

she may marry, and she collects her ketuba.

And

if

her mother-in-law is prohibited.

For just as her mother-in-law is not trusted concerning her daughter-in-law, so too a daughter-in-law is not trusted concerning her mother-in-law, since “as water reflects the face to the face, so the heart of a man is to the man.” And even though she first said, “My husband died,” and her mother-in-law was not her rival wife, since her son was no longer in the world, nevertheless she is not trusted, for we are concerned lest, out of her hatred for her mother-in-law, she said earlier, “My husband died,” in order to prohibit her mother-in-law to her husband.

And if her mother-in-law

was a daughter of Israel

who was married

to a kohen, she may eat teruma, the words of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not a way of removing her from transgression, until she is prohibited from marrying and prohibited from eating teruma:

Gemara:

And it is necessary

for our Mishna to state the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva twice.

For if it were stated

that the dispute applies only to

the first one,

concerning the rival wife, I might have said that only

in this case Rabbi Tarfon said

that the rival wife is not trusted at all, even concerning teruma,

because of bodily distress,

for she is distressed by her rival wife, who prevents her from having relations with her husband; and for this reason she certainly lies in order to harm her, so that she will marry, and even though she herself marries and is thereby harmed, this is because she says, “Let her soul die with the Philistines.”

But

at the end of the Mishna, concerning

the mother-in-law, whose distress is only distress over worldly matters, I might say that he agrees with him,

Rabbi Tarfon

with Rabbi Akiva,

that we do not establish her as such a liar; indeed, she is not trusted to permit her to marry, but as a stringency, concerning teruma, one should be concerned about her words.

And if it were stated

that the dispute applies only

in this case,

at the end, concerning the mother-in-law, I might have said that only

in this case Rabbi Akiva said

that we are concerned about her words and she is prohibited from teruma, because the distress is over worldly matters.

But in the first case

at the beginning, concerning the rival wife, where there is bodily distress,

I might say that he agrees with Rabbi Tarfon

that she certainly lies in order to harm her, so that she will marry.

For this reason

it is necessary

to state these two disputes.

Rabbi Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is according to Rabbi Tarfon.

Abaye said: We too have learned

in a beraita according to the words of Rabbi Tarfon, concerning a woman who went with her husband to a country overseas, and when she left here she had no son and stood under the presumption of requiring yibbum, and she came and said,

“A son was given to me in the country overseas.”

And

“My son died, and afterward”

died

my husband;

since she did not remove herself from her original presumption, for she still requires yibbum, therefore she is

trusted

and is permitted to undergo yibbum.

But if she said, “My

husband, and afterward

my

son died,” she is not trusted

to marry outside the levirate bond,

and we are concerned about her words,

for she removed herself from the presumption of requiring yibbum; and if the yavam comes to perform yibbum with her, we do not allow her to undergo yibbum,

but she performs halitza and does not undergo yibbum,

because the Rabbis trusted the woman only concerning the death of her husband, for the reason that she investigates and marries, but concerning what she says to exempt herself from yibbum, they did not trust her, since at times she hates the yavam.

And we infer: “about her words” implies a limitation, only

about her words are we concerned; but concerning the words of a rival wife,

if she says this,

we are not concerned,

and we establish her on her original presumption,

learn from this

in accordance with the words of Rabbi Tarfon: