Yevamot 117b — the Talmud in English

ta shma:

We learned in the Mishna below:

“She said, ‘My husband has died,’ and afterward

she said

‘My father-in-law has died,’ she shall marry and take

the marriage settlement,

but

her mother-in-law is forbidden

even though she first said, “My husband has died,” and it turns out that this woman is not her mother-in-law, and she is therefore like a foreign woman to her; even so, she is not believed to say, “My father-in-law has died,” and her mother-in-law remains in her prohibition.

What is the reason that her mother-in-law is forbidden,

for she is not her mother-in-law?

Is it not because we say, ‘Her husband did not die,’

and this one is still her mother-in-law,

and her father-in-law did not die, and that which she says

the daughter-in-law

thus, it is her intention to harm her mother-in-law.

And even though her husband, who is the son of her mother-in-law, is found in an overseas country, and his mother is not with him to speak to him of evil things about her daughter-in-law, even so

she thought

the daughter-in-law would harm her from now, so that

afterward,

when the daughter-in-law’s husband and her mother-in-law’s husband return, she will be driven to disgrace, and

they will not come to suffer.

Thus, we say that she sets her mind upon suffering that will come afterward; the same is true of a mother-in-law who will come afterward.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different, because she has felt the suffering

for this daughter-in-law had already felt the suffering that her mother-in-law caused her, and it is an old hatred; whereas with a mother-in-law who will come afterward, she had never been her mother-in-law and had never felt any suffering from her, it cannot be resolved.

Mishna:

a.

One

witness

says, ‘He has died,’ and she married

another man, or even if they merely permitted her to marry,

and

a

single witness came and said, ‘He did not die,’ she does not leave

the first permission, and she is permitted to marry ab initio. For wherever the Torah believed one witness, he is believed like two. But if they had not yet permitted her, since they had not yet relied upon the witness, he is not considered like two.

b.

One

witness

says, ‘He has died,’ and two say, ‘He has not died,’

if the one witness is disqualified by rabbinic law for other testimonies, and the two are likewise disqualified for other testimonies,

even though she married

before the two came,

she shall leave.

For wherever the Torah believed women and disqualified persons, one follows the majority of opinions.

c. If

two say, ‘He has died,’ and one witness

says

‘He has not died,’ even though she had not married

before the one witness came,

she shall marry,

for we follow the majority of opinions both leniently and stringently; and even though they had not yet permitted her, she shall marry:

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One witness says, “He has died,” and she married, and one witness came and said, “He did not die”; she does not leave.

And we infer:

The reason is that she married

already, that we say she does not leave;

but if she had not married,

ab initio

she shall not marry.

And we raise an objection:

But Ulla said: Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

for example, concerning a sota, where the Torah believed one witness who said, “I saw her become defiled,” and for example, concerning the beheaded heifer, where the Torah believed one witness to say, “I saw the killer,”

he is here like two;

the witness is considered like two. And here, where the Sages believed one witness who came to permit her, they made it like the Torah’s case ,

and the statement of the

witness

single

who came to forbid her is not accepted

in the place

where there is one witness to permit her, who is considered like

two.

By force of this objection, we interpret the Mishna as

saying this: One witness says, ‘He has died,’ and they permitted her to marry, and

a

single witness came and said, ‘He did not die’; she does not leave her first permission.

But if the forbidding witness came before they permitted her, Ulla admits that since they had not yet relied upon the witness, he is not considered like two.

We learned in the Mishna:

One

witness

says, ‘He has died,’ and two say, ‘He has not died,’ even though she married

before the two came,

she shall leave:

And we raise an objection: What does the Mishna teach us?

Is it not obvious that the statement of one has no standing in the place of two,

for Ulla admits that in relation to two, the permitting witness is considered like one and is nullified, and we do not say that they are two against two?

And we answer:

It is necessary;

the Mishna is speaking

of disqualified witnesses

for other testimonies in the Torah, and it teaches us that wherever the Torah believed women and disqualified persons, one follows the majority of opinions.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Nehemiah says, ‘Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

there is no law of testimony there; and just as one witness is effective, disqualified witnesses are also effective. Therefore

follow the majority of opinions,

and you need not examine whether they are qualified or disqualified.

And they made two women concerning one man

that is, they made two women who contradicted one witness and said, “He has not died,”

like two men concerning one man,

so that the first single witness is nullified, and even if she married, she shall leave.

Alternatively,

they did not make two women concerning one man like two men concerning one man, because

wherever a qualified witness initially comes

and they permitted her on his statement,

even a hundred women

who testify against him

are considered like one witness,

and just as one witness is nullified—for we say that the first witness who came to permit her is like two, and the statement of a later one has no standing in the place of two—so too a hundred women are nullified in relation to the first; and in such a case the Mishna did not teach us that she shall leave.

Rather,

the Mishna, which teaches that even though she married she shall leave, is speaking

for example, a woman came initially

and she married on her statement; and the Mishna teaches us that she shall leave on the basis of two women who come afterward, and we do not consider the woman who came initially as equivalent to a qualified witness, even though we considered her like two in order to permit her on her statement.

And

according to the alternative answer,

you can explain

the

w

ords of

Rabbi Nehemiah thus: Rabbi Nehemiah says, “Wherever the Torah believed one witness, follow the majority of opinions. And they made two women concerning one woman like two men concerning one man. But two women concerning one man are like half against half.”

For example, one witness says, “He has died,” and they permitted her to marry, and another came and said, “He has not died,” for the Mishna says that she does not leave her first permission:

We learned in the Mishna:

Two say, ‘He has died,’ and one witness

says

‘He has not died,’ even though she had not married

before the one witness came,

she shall marry:

And we raise an objection:

What does it teach us?

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

of disqualified witnesses

for other testimonies in the Torah, and it teaches us that wherever the Torah believed women and disqualified persons, one follows the majority of opinions.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah, who follows the majority of opinions.

And we raise an objection:

This is the same thing

as above.

And we answer:

It might have been said that when we follow the majority of opinions,

this is only

stringently,

as in the middle clause of the Mishna, which teaches that she shall leave,

but leniently

one might say

no; it teaches us:

Mishna:

The two wives of one man who came from an overseas country

a.

One says, ‘He has died,’

my husband,

and one says, ‘He has not died.’

The one who says, ‘He has died,’ shall marry and take her marriage settlement.

And the one who says, ‘He has not died,’ shall not marry and shall not take her marriage settlement. Since

she has forbidden herself, for she is believed concerning herself to make her like a forbidden piece, but concerning the other she is not believed to contradict her in order to forbid her, since she is her rival wife.

b.

One says, ‘He has died,’

by himself,

and one says, ‘He was killed,’

by others,

Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these women shall not marry.

And Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the first clause.

Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: Since this one and that one admit that he is not alive, they shall marry.

But if one admits and the other does not admit, neither of them shall marry, but only the one who testifies that he has died.

c.

One

witness

says, ‘He has died,’ and one

witness

says, ‘He has not died,’

and they came simultaneously.