Yevamot 117b (קיז:) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear:

We learned in the mishna below:

If she said: “My husband died, and afterward

she said:

“My father-in-law died,” she may marry and receive

her ketuba,

but

her mother-in-law is forbidden

even though she first said, “My husband died,” and it turns out that this woman is not her mother-in-law, but rather is like a stranger to her; nevertheless, she is not believed to say, “My father-in-law died,” and her mother-in-law remains forbidden.

What is the reason that her mother-in-law is forbidden,

when she is not her mother-in-law?

Is it not because we say: “Her husband did not die,

and this woman is still her mother-in-law,

and her father-in-law did not die; and that which

the daughter-in-law

said this way, she intended to cause harm to her mother-in-law”?

And even though her husband, who is the son of her mother-in-law, is in a country overseas, and his mother is not with him to tell him evil things about his daughter-in-law, nevertheless

she reasoned

that the daughter-in-law intended to harm her from now, so that

later on,

when the daughter-in-law’s husband and her mother-in-law’s husband return, she will be subject to disgrace, and

she will not come to suffer.

Evidently, we say that she considers suffering that will come afterward; the same should apply to a mother-in-law who will come afterward.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different, as she already feels the pain

that this woman’s mother-in-law has caused her, and it is an old hatred. This is not so with a mother-in-law who comes afterward, whom she has never before had as a mother-in-law and from whom she has never experienced any suffering; therefore, this cannot be resolved from there.

Mishna:

a.

One

witness

says that he died, and she married

another man, or even if they merely permitted her to marry,

and

one

witness came and said that he did not die, she need not leave

the status of her initial permission, and she may marry ab initio. For wherever the Torah believed one witness, he is trusted like two. But if they have not yet permitted her to marry, since they have not yet relied upon the witness, he is not considered like two.

b.

One

witness

says that he died, and two say that he did not die;

if the one witness is disqualified by rabbinic law for other testimony, and the two are likewise disqualified for other testimony,

even if she married

before the two came,

she must leave.

For wherever the Torah believed women and those disqualified from testimony, we follow the majority of opinions.

c. If

two say that he died, and one witness

says

that he did not die, even though she had not married

before the one witness came,

she may marry,

as we follow the majority of opinions both for leniency and for stringency. Thus, even though they had not yet permitted her, she may marry:

Gemara:

We learned in the mishna: One witness says that he died, and she married, and one witness came and said that he did not die, she need not leave.

And we infer:

The reason is that she married

already, in which case we say that she need not leave;

but if she had not married,

ab initio

she may not marry.

And we raise an objection:

But Ulla said: Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

such as in the case of a sota, where the Torah believed one witness who said, “I saw her become defiled,” and such as in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, where the Torah believed one witness to say, “I saw the killer,”

he is here like two.

The witness is considered like two. And here, where the Sages believed one witness who came to permit her, they made his status like that of a witness believed by the Torah ,

and the statement of the

one

witness

who came to forbid her is not accepted

in the presence of

one witness who came to permit her, who is considered like

two.

On the basis of this objection, we explain the mishna as follows:

One witness says that he died, and they permitted her to marry, and

one

witness came and said that he did not die; she need not leave her initial permission.

But if the witness who forbids her came before they permitted her, Ulla agrees that, since they had not yet relied upon the witness, he is not considered like two.

We learned in the mishna:

One

witness

says that he died, and two say that he did not die, even though she married

before the two came,

she must leave.

And we ask: What does the mishna teach us?

It is obvious that the statement of one has no force in the presence of two,

as Ulla agrees that in relation to two witnesses, the witness who permits her is considered like one and is nullified; we do not say that these are two witnesses against two witnesses.

And we answer:

It is necessary,

as the mishna is speaking

of witnesses disqualified

for other testimony in the Torah, and it teaches us that wherever the Torah believed women and those disqualified from testimony, we follow the majority of opinions.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Neḥemya.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

the law of testimony does not apply there, and just as one witness is effective, disqualified witnesses are also effective. Therefore,

follow the majority of opinions,

and you need not investigate whether they are qualified or disqualified.

And they made two women in relation to one man

—two women who contradicted one witness and said that he did not die—

like two men in relation to one man,

so that the first witness is nullified, and even if she married, she must leave.

Alternatively,

they did not make two women in relation to one man like two men in relation to one man, because

whenever one qualified witness comes initially

and they permitted her on his statement,

even one hundred women

who testify against him

are considered like one witness.

Just as one witness is nullified—for we say that the first witness who came to permit her is like two, and the statement of a later witness cannot prevail against two—so too, one hundred women are nullified in relation to the first witness. In such a case, the mishna would not teach us that she must leave.

Rather,

the mishna, which states that even though she married she must leave, is speaking

when a woman came initially

and she married on her statement. The mishna teaches us that she must leave on the basis of two women who came afterward, and we do not consider the woman who came initially equivalent to a qualified witness, even though we considered her like two in order to permit her on the basis of her statement.

And

according to the alternative explanation,

explain

the

statement

of

Rabbi Neḥemya as follows: Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah believed one witness, follow the majority of opinions. And they made two women in relation to one woman like two men in relation to one man. But two women in relation to one man are considered an even division.

For example, one witness says that he died and they permitted her to marry, and another came and said that he did not die; in the mishna it states that she need not leave her initial permission:

We learned in the mishna:

Two say that he died, and one witness

says

that he did not die, even though she had not married

before the one witness came,

she may marry:

And we ask:

What does it teach us?

And we answer: The mishna is speaking

of witnesses disqualified

for other testimony in the Torah, and it teaches us that wherever the Torah believed women and those disqualified from testimony, we follow the majority of opinions.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Neḥemya, who follows the majority of opinions.

And we ask:

Is this not the same thing

as above?

And we answer:

Lest you say that when we follow the majority of opinions

it is only

for stringency,

as in the middle clause of the mishna, which states that she must leave,

but for leniency

you might say

no; it teaches us otherwise:

Mishna:

Two wives of one man who came from a country overseas:

a.

One says: “He died,”

my husband,

and one says: “He did not die.”

The one who says that he died may marry and receive her ketuba.

And the one who says that he did not die may not marry and may not receive her ketuba. Since

she rendered herself forbidden, as she is believed regarding herself to make herself like a piece of forbidden matter; but she is not believed regarding the other woman to contradict her and forbid her, since she is her rival wife.

b.

One says: “He died,”

my husband of natural causes,

and one says: “He was killed”

by others,

Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, neither of them may marry.

Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the first clause.

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Since both this one and that one acknowledge that he is no longer alive, they may marry.

But if one acknowledges it and the other does not, neither of them may marry; rather, only the one who testifies that he died may marry.

c.

One

witness

says that he died, and one

witness

says that he did not die,

and they came simultaneously.