Yevamot 117a — the Talmud in English

Question:

Behold,

the brothers do not enter into the inheritance

of her husband, in the manner that they permitted her to marry

on her word,

for the Merciful One said [Deuteronomy 19:15], “By the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established,” and only with regard to marriage did they rule leniently, so that she should not remain an aguna.

The House of Shammai said to them: But do we not learn from the text of the marriage contract

that she is to collect her marriage contract,

for he writes to her

in the marriage contract,

“If you marry another, you shall take what is written for you,”

and behold, you permit her to marry another; if so, her marriage contract reaches her when she marries.

And the House of Hillel returned to rule according to the words of the House of Shammai.

Gemara:

Rav Hisda said:

Although the brothers do not enter into the inheritance on her word, if her husband had no sons from her and

she performed yibbum

on her own word, behold,

the yavam

this brother who performed yibbum

enters into the inheritance

of her husband

on her word,

relying on her testimony. After

they expounded

in our Mishna

an interpretation of the marriage contract

and entitled her to collect her marriage contract by virtue of what is written in the marriage contract, “when you marry,” and so forth,

we too shall not

diminish, but rather add, if

we expound an interpretation of the Torah,

as it is written:

“[Deuteronomy 25:] He shall arise in the name of his brother,” the Merciful One said.

The explanation is: This one who performed yibbum with his wife shall take the deceased’s inheritance from his father’s property.

And behold, he has arisen

the one who performed yibbum.

Rav Nahman said: If she came to the court and said, “My husband died; permit me to marry,” they permit her to marry and give her her marriage contract.

But if she came to the court and said,

“Give me my marriage contract,” they do not permit her even to marry.

What is the reason

they do not permit her even to marry? The matter demonstrates that

she came with the marriage contract in mind,

and she has no intention of marrying at all. Thus, this is not a matter of an aguna, but rather the removal of money, and money is not removed except by two witnesses.

They raised a question before them:

If she came to the court and said the two statements together,

“Permit me to marry and give me my marriage contract,” what is the ruling?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say:

Since she mentioned her marriage contract, she came with the marriage contract in mind?

Or perhaps,

her intention is to marry, but

then if she mentioned the matter of the marriage contract before permission to marry, and said,

If she preceded the matter of the marriage contract to permission for marriage, and said

“Give me my marriage contract and permit me to marry,” what is the ruling?

Here, certainly, she came with the marriage contract in mind,

or perhaps,

even in such a case her intention is for marriage, but

since she did not know by what she would be permitted,

she therefore preceded the matter of the marriage contract.

The matter shall stand unresolved.

Mishna:

Everyone is believed to testify concerning her

about the death of her husband,

except for

five women who are presumed to hate one another, and there is concern that perhaps they intend to ruin her.

And these are they: a.

her mother-in-law,

who wishes to ruin her so that she will not live with her husband, because she says: “This one will consume all my labor,” for the son inherits his father, and not his father’s wife, who is her mother-in-law.

b.

and her mother-in-law’s daughter

who hates her, saying: “She will consume the labor of my father and mother, which this one’s husband inherits, and I will be pushed aside,” for a son precedes a daughter in inheritance.

c.

and her rival-wife,

his second wife, because she is jealous of her fellow wife’s thigh.

d.

and her yevama,

the wife of her husband’s brother, who thinks that if her husband’s brother dies without sons, she will be her rival-wife. And even her yevama who is her sister, and will never be her rival-wife, also may not testify, because of lo plug.

e.

and her husband’s daughter,

who says: “This one has come in place of my mother, and she will consume all my mother’s labor.”

What

is the difference

between a bill of divorce and death,

for with a bill of divorce even these five women are believed to bring her bill of divorce?

Because

the writing demonstrates

that she was divorced. And although they must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” the main reliance is on the document. But here we rely only on their testimony:

Gemara:

They raised a question before them: His brother-in-law’s daughter

who is not her mother-in-law’s daughter,

what is the ruling

with regard to her testifying about the death of her husband?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

The reason that her mother-in-law’s daughter

is not believed

is because there is a mother

who is this one’s mother-in-law

who hates her,

who hates her,

she,

her daughter,

also hates her,

for it is the way of a daughter to follow the ways of her mother.

But here,

with regard to her brother-in-law’s daughter,

there is no mother who hates her.

Or perhaps, the reason that her mother-in-law’s daughter

is not believed is because

she says, “She is consuming my mother’s labor,”

for she says: “She will consume my mother’s labor, which she brought to my father from her father’s house,”

here too,

with regard to her brother-in-law’s daughter, although this one does not consume the labor of the mother of her brother-in-law’s daughter, since this one’s husband is not her maternal brother, for her mother’s sons take what her mother brought, as we learned [in Ketubot 52]: “The male children that you will have from me shall inherit the money of your marriage contract beyond their share with their brothers,” even so

she says, “She is consuming the labor of the paternal household,”

for she consumes the labor of her father, which this one’s husband inherits, and she will be pushed aside, and she hates her.

Come and hear:

It is stated in the Mishna:

Everyone is believed to testify concerning her

that her husband died

except for five women; and if it is so

that her brother-in-law’s daughter is also not believed, then

they are six.

And we reject this: It is impossible to infer from here, for

perhaps, the reason that her mother-in-law’s daughter

is not believed is

because she says, “She is consuming the labor of the paternal household,”

and if so,

there is no difference between her mother-in-law’s daughter and her brother-in-law’s daughter,

and the Mishna mentioned one of them.

And the question was not resolved.

We learned in the Mishna that everyone is believed to testify concerning the death of her husband, except for five women.

And we raise an objection:

But we learned: “Except for seven women!”?

And we answer:

That is Rabbi Judah’s [opinion].

For we learned: Rabbi Judah adds

to those women who are not believed to testify

also a father’s wife and a daughter-in-law.

They said to him: A father’s wife is included in a husband’s daughter,

since once it is written in the Mishna that a husband’s daughter does not testify concerning the father’s wife, it follows by itself that a father’s wife also does not testify concerning her husband’s daughter. Therefore, this is not an addition, and it was unnecessary to mention it.

And likewise

a daughter-in-law is included in her mother-in-law,

for it follows by itself from the fact that her mother-in-law does not testify.

And Rabbi Judah,

who says that a father’s wife and a daughter-in-law were not included in the Mishna, does so because he holds that a daughter-in-law is not included in her mother-in-law, and a father’s wife is not included in a husband’s daughter.

And his reason is:

Granted, her mother-in-law

is not believed to testify concerning her daughter-in-law because

she hates her daughter-in-law, saying, “She is consuming my labor,”

for this one consumes my labor.

But why does a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law?

And

granted, a husband’s daughter

is not believed to testify concerning the father’s wife because

she hates the father’s wife, saying, “She is consuming my mother’s labor,”

for this one consumes my mother’s labor.

But why does the father’s wife hate the husband’s daughter?

And we challenge:

Rather, what then?

Since the daughter-in-law has no reason to hate her mother-in-law, and the father’s wife has no reason to hate the husband’s daughter, why does Rabbi Judah

add

Rabbi Judah these

two

to say that they are not believed?

And he answers:

Rather, why does a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law?

Because

the

her mother-in-law

reveals to her son all her deeds.

The father’s wife also hates the husband’s daughter,

because

the

the husband’s daughter

reveals to her father everything

that

things that

she

has done.

And the Rabbis,

who say that a daughter-in-law is included in her mother-in-law, and a father’s wife is included in a husband’s daughter, do so because they hold that their reason is the same: since the mother-in-law hates her daughter-in-law, the daughter-in-law hates her mother-in-law, and likewise, since the husband’s daughter hates the father’s wife, she too hates her, as it is written in the Book of Proverbs [27:19],

“As water reflects the face to the face,”

like these waters in which a person looks and sees a face like his own: if he smiles, they smile, and if he distorts [his face], they are distorted,

so is the heart of a person toward another person

the other: if he loves this one, the other also loves him, and if he hates this one, the other also hates him.

And Rabbi Judah,

who does not accept this reason, applies the verse as follows:

that verse is written with regard to words of Torah,

for according to the face that you show to Torah, your heart stands by you to establish the learning as practical halakha: if you labor over it, you find; if you do not labor over it, you do not find.

Rav Aha bar Avya said:

They asked in the West: A mother-in-law who will come afterward,

for example, her husband has a brother from his father but not from his mother, and if her husband dies without sons, she will perform yibbum with that brother, and the brother’s mother will be her mother-in-law,

what is the ruling

with regard to her testifying about the death of her husband?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do

we say that she hates her from now, because

she entertains the thought that the husband

of this one will die,

and she will fall before the yavam

her son,

and she hates her

because this one will consume her labor, and she intends to ruin her from now so that she will no longer perform yibbum with her son

or not.