Yevamot 117a (קיז.) — the Talmud in English

The question is:

behold,

the brothers do not enter into possession of the inheritance

of her husband, in the case where they permitted her to marry

on her testimony,

for the Torah says: “By the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), and they were lenient only with regard to marriage, so that she would not remain an aguna.

The School of Shammai said to them: But do we not learn from the wording of the marriage contract

that she collects her ketuba,

as he writes to her

in the marriage contract,

“If you marry another man, you shall take whatever is written for you,”

and behold, you permit her to marry another man; if so, she is entitled to her ketuba when she marries.

And the School of Hillel returned to rule in accordance with the words of the School of Shammai.

Gemara:

Rav Hisda said:

Although the brothers do not enter into possession of the inheritance on her testimony, if her husband had no sons from her and she

performed yibbum

on her own testimony, behold,

the yevama

whom this yavam married

enters into possession of the inheritance

of her husband

on her testimony,

relying on her testimony. After

they expounded

in our Mishna

the interpretation of the marriage contract

and granted her the right to collect her ketuba by virtue of what is written in the marriage contract, “when you marry,” and so on,

we too do not

diminish but rather add: if

we expound the interpretation of the Torah,

as it is written,

“He shall establish the name of his brother,” the Merciful One said

—meaning, the one who performs yibbum with his wife shall take the deceased man's inheritance from his father's property.

And he has indeed established

the name of the yavam.

Rav Naḥman said: If she came to the court and said, “My husband died; permit me to marry,” they permit her to marry and give her her ketuba.

But if she came to the court and said,

“Give me my ketuba,” they do not even permit her to marry.

What is the reason

that they do not permit her even to marry? The circumstances indicate that

I came with the ketuba in mind,

and she has no intention of marrying at all. Therefore, this is not a case of preventing her from remaining an aguna; rather, it is merely a matter of extracting money, and money is not extracted on the testimony of one witness.

They raised a dilemma:

If she came to the court and made both statements at once,

“Permit me to marry and give me my ketuba,” what is the law?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say:

Since she mentioned her ketuba, she came with the ketuba in mind?

Or perhaps,

her intention is to marry, but

a person tells the court everything that concerns him. [

And if you say: A person tells the court everything that concerns him, ]

If she stated the matter of the ketuba before requesting permission to marry, and said,

“Give me my ketuba and permit me to marry,” what is the law?

Here, certainly, she came with the ketuba in mind,

or perhaps

even in such a case her intention is marriage; rather,

since she did not know by virtue of what she would be permitted,

she mentioned the matter of the ketuba first.

Teyku:

Mishna:

All are deemed credible to testify for her

about the death of her husband,

except for

five women, who are presumed to hate one another, and there is concern that perhaps they intend to undermine her.

And these are they: a.

Her mother-in-law,

who wishes to undermine her so that she will not live with her husband, because she says: “This woman will consume all my labor,” since the son inherits his father, but not his father's wife, who is her mother-in-law.

b.

Her mother-in-law's daughter,

who hates her, saying: “She will consume the labor of my father and mother, inheriting her husband, while I will be pushed aside,” since a son precedes a daughter with regard to inheritance.

c.

Her rival wife,

her husband's other wife, because she is jealous of her fellow wife's husband.

d.

And her yevama,

her husband's brother's wife, who thinks that if her husband's brother dies without children, she will become her rival wife. And even her yevama who is her sister, and who will never become her rival wife, likewise may not testify, because of the principle that the Sages did not distinguish between cases.

e.

And her husband's daughter,

who says: “This woman has come in place of my mother, and she will consume all my mother's labor.”

What

is the difference

between a bill of divorce and death,

as with a bill of divorce even these five women are deemed credible to deliver her bill of divorce?

Because

the document proves

that she was divorced. And although they must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” the primary reliance is on the document. But here, we rely only on their testimony.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma: What is the law with regard to her father-in-law's daughter

who is not her mother-in-law's daughter,

whether

she may testify about the death of her husband?

The sides of the dilemma are:

The reason that her mother-in-law's daughter

is not deemed credible

is because there is a mother

who is this woman's mother-in-law

who hates her;

she hates her,

and she,

her daughter,

also hates her,

as it is the way of a daughter to follow her mother's ways.

But here,

with regard to her father-in-law's daughter,

there is no mother who hates her.

Or perhaps, the reason that her mother-in-law's daughter

is not deemed credible is

because she says: “She is consuming my mother's labor,”

saying: “She will consume the labor of my mother, which she brought to my father from her father's house,”

so too here,

with regard to her father-in-law's daughter, although this woman does not consume the labor brought by the mother of the father-in-law's daughter—for this woman's husband is not her maternal brother, and the maternal sons inherit what their mother brought, as we learned: “The male children that you will have from me shall inherit the money of your ketuba beyond their portion with their brothers”—even so,

she says: “She is consuming the labor of my father's household,”

as she consumes the labor of her father, which this woman's husband inherits, while she will be pushed aside; and therefore she hates her.

Come and hear:

It is stated in the Mishna:

“All are deemed credible to testify for her

that her husband died,

except for five women; and if it is so

that her father-in-law's daughter is also not deemed credible, then

there would be six.

And we reject this proof: It is not possible to infer from here, for

perhaps the reason that her mother-in-law's daughter

is not deemed credible is

because she says: “She is consuming the labor of my father's household,”

and if so,

there is no difference between her mother-in-law's daughter and her father-in-law's daughter,

and the Mishna mentions one of them.

And the dilemma remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna that all are deemed credible to testify for her about the death of her husband, except for five women.

And we ask:

But did we not learn: “Except for seven women”!?

And we answer:

That statement is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

As we learned: Rabbi Yehuda adds

to those women who are not deemed credible to testify

also a father's wife and a daughter-in-law.

They said to him: “A father's wife is included among a husband's daughter,”

since once it is stated in the Mishna that a husband's daughter may not testify for the father's wife, it follows automatically that the father's wife may likewise not testify for her husband's daughter. Therefore, this is not an addition, and there was no need to mention it.

And likewise,

a daughter-in-law is included among a mother-in-law,

as it follows automatically from the ruling that a mother-in-law may not testify for her.

But Rabbi Yehuda

who says that a father's wife and a daughter-in-law were not included in the Mishna holds that a daughter-in-law is not included among a mother-in-law, and a father's wife is not included among a husband's daughter.

And his reason is that

granted that a mother-in-law

is not deemed credible to testify for her daughter-in-law because

she hates her daughter-in-law, saying: “She is consuming my labor,”

as this woman consumes the fruits of her labor.

But why would a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law?

And

granted that a husband's daughter

is not deemed credible to testify for her father's wife because

she hates the father's wife, saying: “She is consuming my mother's labor,”

as this woman consumes the fruits of her mother's labor.

But why would the father's wife hate her husband's daughter?

And we challenge this:

Rather, what

is the reason that, since a daughter-in-law has no reason to hate her mother-in-law, and a father's wife has no reason to hate her husband's daughter,

does

Rabbi Yehuda

add these two

to say that they are not deemed credible?

And he answers:

Rather, why does a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law,

because

her

mother-in-law

reveals all her misdeeds to her son.

The father's wife likewise hates her husband's daughter,

because

the

husband's daughter

reveals to her father everything

that

she

has

done.

And the Rabbis,

who say that a daughter-in-law is included among a mother-in-law, and a father's wife among a husband's daughter, hold that their reasons are equivalent: Since the mother-in-law hates her daughter-in-law, the daughter-in-law hates her mother-in-law; and since the husband's daughter hates the father's wife, the father's wife likewise hates her, as it is written in the Book of Proverbs:

“As water reflects a face to a face,”

like water in which a person gazes and sees a face resembling his own—if he smiles, it smiles, and if he distorts his face, it is distorted—

so is the heart of a person toward another person;

if one loves the other, the other also loves him, and if one hates the other, the other also hates him.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who does not accept this reasoning, interprets the verse as referring to

that which is written with regard to words of Torah,

for according to the face that you show the Torah, your heart is enabled to establish the version as practical halakha: if you toil in it, you will find it; if you do not toil in it, you will not find it.

Rav Aḥa bar Avya said:

They raised a dilemma in the West: What is the law with regard to a future mother-in-law,

for example, when her husband has a paternal brother but not a maternal brother, and if her husband dies without children, she will perform yibbum with that brother, whose mother will then be her mother-in-law;

whether

she may testify about the death of her husband.

The sides of the dilemma are:

Who

says that she already hates her, because

she anticipates that this woman's husband will die

and

fall before the yavam

her son,

and she will hate her

because this woman will consume the fruits of her labor? And she intends to undermine her already, so that she will no longer perform yibbum with her son,

or perhaps not.