Yevamot 116b (קטז:) — the Talmud in English

The difference between them is in a case where he was accustomed to quarrel:

the quarrel arose because of him.

According to the rationale that she was lying, she said this only because of his quarrel with her, and once her anger had passed, she would not lie; therefore, she is deemed credible.

But according to the rationale that she said it based on an assumption, even when he was accustomed to quarrel with her, we judge that she said this based on an assumption, and she is not deemed credible.

They raised a dilemma before them: What is the halakha concerning one witness

who testified that her husband had died

in

a case where the husband went to a country overseas, and there was

a quarrel

between him and her?

What is

the halakha: Is the one witness deemed credible to say that her husband died, or not?

And these are the sides of the dilemma:

What is the reason

that the Sages were lenient because of the plight of a woman whose husband is missing,

that one witness is deemed credible

to testify that her husband died?

It is because, in a matter that is destined to become known, he does not lie; here too,

in a case involving a quarrel,

he does not lie

and is deemed credible.

Or perhaps, the reason that one witness is deemed credible is

because we rely on the woman,

as she investigates carefully and then marries

—that she will thoroughly investigate the matter, examining the pretexts and all the details that prove what happened, until she arrives at information upon which it is proper to rely.

But here, since she has quarreled with him, she will not investigate carefully and marry. The dilemma remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never

deemed credible unless she came crying and with her garments torn.

It was taught in a beraita: The Sages said

to Rabbi Yehuda:

According to your statement, a clever woman

who knows that she must come to the court and cry

will marry,

whereas a foolish woman,

who lacks the understanding to substantiate her words by crying in court,

will not marry?

Rather, the Sages said: Both this woman and that woman may marry.

There was an incident involving

a certain woman who came to the court of Rabbi Yehuda to testify that her husband had died.

They said to her: Eulogize your husband, tear your garments,

tear your cloak,

loosen your hair,

unravel your garments.

And we challenge this:

They taught her to lie!

Did they teach her to lie? If they held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that she is not deemed credible unless she cries, why did they instruct her to cry?

And we answer:

They held in accordance with the Rabbis,

who deem her credible in every circumstance. And

they said: Do this

in court

so that they will permit her

—so that they would permit her even if they judged her according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Mishna:

Beit Hillel say: We have heard of her marrying on the basis of her testimony

only when she came from the harvest,

and from the harvest

where there is a common danger that a person might die because of the heat of the sun or because snakes are common,

and in that country,

meaning, when she said that he died in that country, as the matter is close at hand and can be verified.

And in accordance with the incident that occurred.

For people went to harvest wheat, and a snake bit one of them, and he died. His wife came and reported it in court, and they sent messengers who found that it was as she had said. The Sages permitted only a case resembling that one, in which the matter is close at hand, and she is afraid and does not lie. But in a country overseas, since there are not usually people who know what happened, she is not deemed credible.

Beit Shammai said to them: Both the woman who comes from the harvest, and the woman who comes from the olive harvest, and the woman who comes from the grape harvest

of grapes,

and the woman who comes from one country to another

—since she investigates carefully and then marries, she is deemed credible.

And

the Sages spoke of the harvest only because that was the incident that occurred.

That is how the incident happened, but the same law applies to all locations.

Beit Hillel retracted their ruling and ruled in accordance with Beit Shammai.

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement, that the Sages permitted her to marry on the basis of her testimony only in a case resembling the incident that occurred,

if so,

I have only

the wheat harvest, which resembles the incident that occurred;

from where

do I have

the one who harvests grain,

the one who gathers

grapes,

the one who picks

olives,

the one who cuts

dates,

the one who hoes

and gathers figs—

from where

do I know that she is also deemed credible in such cases?

Rather, the incident occurred during the harvest, and the same law applies to all of them.

Here too,

with regard to a woman who comes from one country to another,

the incident occurred in that country, and the same law applies to all of them.

But Beit Hillel

disagree, because

in that country, where people are common, she is afraid

and does not lie, whereas

when she comes from one country to another, where people are not common, she is not afraid

and we are concerned that she may lie.

And Beit Shammai

hold that

here too,

when she comes from one country to another,

caravans are common

and people who know what happened are common.

What was the incident that occurred?

As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It was at the end

of the

wheat harvest. Ten people went to harvest wheat, a snake bit one of them, and he died. His wife came and reported it to the court, and they sent messengers who found that it was as she had said.

At that time they said: A woman who says, “My husband has died,” may marry. “My husband has died”

and he has no son,

she must perform yibbum.

And the Gemara brings another dispute concerning a decree that the Sages enacted because of an incident that occurred: Did they enact it only for a case resembling the incident that occurred, or not? It attempts to compare this dispute to the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai in our Mishna.

Shall we say: Rabbi Hananya ben Akiva and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the same dispute as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel?

As it was taught in a beraita: A person may not carry the water of purification and the ashes of purification and transport them in

the

Jordan River, in

a manner in which he transports them in a

boat.

This is because of the incident that occurred in the Jordan and in a boat, in which they became impure, as we will say below.

And he may not stand on this side

of the river

and throw them to the other side

of the river, as this resembles a boat, which flies through the air over the surface of the water.

And he may not float them on the surface of the water.

And he may not carry them

through the water,

neither on an animal nor on another person

—that is also comparable to a boat, since the person carrying it sits in his place while his boat bears him and transports him. And although the animal touches the ground, a boat too sometimes scrapes against and touches the ground—

unless the feet

of the one above

are touching

the water

on the ground.

But he may transport them over a bridge

as it is like solid ground, and the person transporting them walks on his feet the entire time, so it is not comparable to a boat.

And this law was stated with regard to

both the Jordan and other rivers:

whether in the Jordan or in other rivers.

Rabbi Hananya ben Akiva says: They spoke

—they enacted the prohibition—

only

in the

Jordan and in a boat, in accordance with the incident that occurred,

which will be brought below.

Let us say that the Rabbis,

who say that the enactment was not enacted precisely in accordance with the incident that occurred, but applies both to the Jordan and to other rivers,

hold in accordance with Beit Shammai,

who likewise say that the enactment permitting a woman to be deemed credible was not made precisely in accordance with the incident that occurred, but applies both when she comes from that country and when she comes from one country to another.

And Rabbi Hananya ben Akiva,

who says that the enactment prohibiting the transport of the water of purification was enacted precisely in accordance with the incident that occurred—in the Jordan and in a boat—

holds in accordance with Beit Hillel,

who likewise say that the Sages enacted that she may be permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony only in a case resembling the incident that occurred, in that country.

And we reject this:

The Rabbis could say to you: We say that we hold even in accordance with Beit Hillel,

as

Beit Hillel stated there

that they enacted the law in accordance with the incident that occurred

only because

they held that the reason for the enactment permitting her to marry on the basis of her testimony is

that she is afraid,

and therefore they said that the enactment applied only in a case resembling the incident that occurred,

in a nearby place,

where the reason of

being afraid

applies, and not

in a distant place,

where she

is not afraid.

Unlike that,

here,

Beit Hillel would agree that there is no reason to distinguish in the enactment between the Jordan and other rivers, since

what difference is there between the Jordan and other rivers?

And

Rabbi Hananya ben Akiva could say to you: I say that I hold even in accordance with Beit Shammai,

as

Beit Shammai stated there

that the Sages enacted that she may be permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony even when she comes from one country to another, which does not resemble the incident that occurred,

only because

they held that the reason for the enactment deeming her credible is

that she investigates carefully and then marries.

Therefore, there is no reason to distinguish between a nearby place and a distant place, since

what difference is there between a nearby place and a distant place?

In both cases, she investigates carefully and then marries. Unlike that,

here, because of the incident that occurred,

in which a mishap occurred and the water of purification became impure, they issued a decree. Therefore, Beit Shammai would agree that

with regard to the Jordan and a boat, where the incident occurred, the Sages issued a decree. With regard to other rivers, where no incident occurred, the Sages did not issue a decree.

What was the incident that occurred?

As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It happened that a man was transporting the water of purification and the ashes of purification in the Jordan in a boat, and an olive-bulk of a corpse was found embedded in the bottom of the boat,

and the vessel containing the water of purification cast its tent over them, and they became impure.

At that time they said: A person may not carry the water of purification and the ashes of purification and transport them in the Jordan in a boat.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say:

The woman whom they permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony

may marry and collect her ketuba.

Beit Hillel say: She may marry but may not collect her ketuba.

Beit Shammai said to them,

are these not a kal va-homer? If

you permitted a forbidden relation

that is

severe,

on the basis of her testimony,

should we not permit money, which is lenient?

Beit Hillel said to them: We find

that money is not permitted,