Yevamot 116b — the Talmud in English

The difference between them is in a case where he habitually quarrels.

That the quarrel came about because of him.

According to the reason that she was lying, she said this only because of his quarrelling, and once her anger had passed she does not lie, and she is therefore trustworthy.

But according to the reason that she said it imaginatively, even when he habitually quarrels, we judge her as having said this imaginatively, and she is not trustworthy.

They raised a dilemma before them: What is the law concerning one witness

who testified that her husband had died

in

a case where the husband went to a country overseas, and

a quarrel

was between him and her:

what

is it? Is the one witness trustworthy to say that her husband died, or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

What is the reason

that the Sages were lenient, because of the plight of a woman whose husband’s whereabouts are unknown,

that one witness is trustworthy

to testify that her husband died?

Because a matter whose disclosure is likely, he does not lie; here too,

in a quarrel, he

does not lie

and is trustworthy.

Or perhaps, the reason that one witness is trustworthy is because

we rely on the woman,

for she investigates carefully and marries

—that she will thoroughly investigate, through claims and all the matters that prove the truth, to know how the matter was, until she reaches something upon which it is proper to rely—

but here, since there is a quarrel between them, she does not investigate carefully and marry. It remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never

trustworthy unless she came crying and with her garments torn.

It was taught in a beraita: The Sages said

to Rabbi Yehuda:

According to your words, a clever woman

who knows that she needs to come to the court and cry

will marry,

whereas a foolish woman,

who does not have the understanding to authenticate her words through crying in court,

will not marry?

Rather, the Sages said: Both this one and that one will marry.

An incident occurred with

a certain woman who came to the court of Rabbi Yehuda to testify that her husband had died.

They said to her: Mourn for your husband, tear your garments,

tear your coat,

undo your adornments,

unravel your garments.

And we object:

They taught her to lie!

Did they teach her to lie? If they held like Rabbi Yehuda, that she is not trustworthy unless she cries, why did they instruct her to cry?

And we answer:

They held like the Sages, that

she is trustworthy in every case. And

they said: Let her do this

in court

so that they will permit her,

so that they would permit her even if they judged her according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Mishna:

The School of Hillel say: We have heard nothing

that she may marry on her own testimony

except when she comes from the harvest,

for it is common that an accident occurs, that he dies because of the sun’s heat, or because snakes are common,

and from that same country,

that is, when she said that he died in that same country, for the matter is close and it is possible to investigate it.

And as was the incident that occurred.

For people went out to harvest wheat, and a snake bit one of them, and he died; his wife came and informed the court, and they sent and found the matter as she had said. The Sages permitted only a case like it, where the matter was close, and she was afraid and did not lie. But in a country overseas, since people who know are not common there, she is not trustworthy.

The School of Shammai said to them: Both the woman who comes from the harvest, and the woman who comes from the olive harvest, and the woman who comes from the grape harvest

of grapes,

and the woman who comes from one country to another,

since she investigates carefully and marries, is trustworthy.

And

the Sages spoke of the harvest only because that was the circumstance.

For the incident that occurred was so, but the same law applies to all places.

The School of Hillel returned to rule in accordance with the School of Shammai:

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: The School of Shammai said to the School of Hillel: According to your words, that the Sages permitted her to marry on her testimony only in a case resembling the incident that occurred,

if so,

I have only wheat harvest,

which resembles the incident that occurred;

from where do I derive the same law for barley harvest?

And I have only a harvester

of grain;

a grape harvester,

of grapes,

an olive picker,

of olives,

a date gatherer,

of dates,

a fig gatherer,

who gathers figs—

from where

do I derive that she is trustworthy in such a case as well?

Rather, the incident occurred during the harvest, and the same law applies to all of them.

Here too,

with regard to one who comes from one country to another,

the incident occurred in that same country, and the same law applies to all of them.

And the School of Hillel

disagrees, because

in that same country, people are common and she is afraid

and does not lie, unlike

from one country to another country, where people are not common and she is not afraid,

and we are concerned that she may lie.

And the School of Shammai

hold that

here too,

from one country to another,

caravans are common

and people who know are common.

What was the incident that occurred?

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: It was at the end of

the

wheat harvest. Ten people went to harvest wheat, a snake bit one of them, and he died. His wife came and informed the court, and they sent and found the matter as she had said.

At that time they said: A woman who says, “My husband has died,” may marry. “My husband has died”

and he has no son,

she must perform levirate marriage.

And the Gemara brings another dispute concerning a decree that the Sages enacted because of an incident that occurred: whether they enacted it only for a case resembling the incident that occurred, or not; and it attempts to compare it to the dispute between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai in our Mishna.

Shall we say: Rabbi Hanania ben Akiva and the Sages disagree in the same dispute as the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel?

For it was taught in a beraita: A person may not carry the water of purification and the ashes of purification and transport them in

the

Jordan, or

in a manner in which he transports them in a

boat.

Because of an incident that occurred in the Jordan and in a boat, and they became impure, as we will say below.

And he may not stand on this side

of the river

and throw them to the other side

of the river, for this is similar to a boat, which flies through the air over the surface of the water.

And he may not float them on the surface of the water.

And he may not ride them

in the water,

neither on an animal nor on his fellow

—that is also similar to a boat, for the person carrying them sits in his place, and his boat carries him and transports him; and although the animal touches the floor, a boat too sometimes scrapes and touches the floor—

unless his feet

of the upper person

are touching

the water

on the ground.

But he may transport them over a bridge,

for it is like solid ground, and the person transporting them walks on his feet the entire time, and it is not similar to a boat.

And this law was stated concerning

both the Jordan and other rivers,

whether in the Jordan or in other rivers.

Rabbi Hanania ben Akiva says: They did not say

—they did not enact a prohibition—

except

in the

Jordan and in a boat, as was the incident that occurred,

which will be brought below.

Shall we say that the Sages,

who say that the enactment was not enacted precisely like the incident that occurred, but both in the Jordan and in other rivers,

stated their view like the School of Shammai,

who likewise say that the enactment concerning the woman’s trustworthiness was not enacted precisely like the incident that occurred, but both when she comes from that same country and when she comes from one country to another?

And Rabbi Hanania ben Akiva,

who says that the enactment prohibiting the transport of the water of purification was enacted precisely like the incident that occurred—in the Jordan and in a boat—

stated his view like the School of Hillel,

who likewise say that the Sages enacted that she may marry on her testimony only in a case resembling the incident that occurred, in that same country.

And we reject this:

The Sages can say to you: We state our view even according to the School of Hillel,

for

the School of Hillel stated their view there only

that they enacted it like the incident that occurred

because

they hold that the reason for the enactment permitting her to marry on her testimony is

that she is afraid,

and therefore they said that the enactment applied only to a case resembling the incident that occurred

in a nearby place,

where there is the reason of

being afraid,

and not

in a distant place,

where she

is not afraid.

But

here,

the School of Hillel would agree that there is no reason to distinguish in the enactment between the Jordan and other rivers, for

what difference is there to me between the Jordan and other rivers?

And

Rabbi Hanania ben Akiva can say to you: I state my view even according to the School of Shammai,

for

the School of Shammai stated their view there only

that the Sages enacted that she may marry on her testimony even in a case where she comes from one country to another, which does not resemble the incident that occurred,

because

they hold that the reason for the enactment, that she is trustworthy, is

that she investigates carefully and marries,

and therefore there is no reason to distinguish between a nearby place and a distant place, for

what difference is there to me between a nearby place and a distant place,

in both she investigates carefully and marries. But

here, because of the incident that occurred,

which caused a mishap, that the water of purification became impure, they enacted a decree. Therefore the School of Shammai would agree that

in the Jordan and in a boat, since there was an incident, the Sages enacted a decree. In other rivers, since there was no incident, the Sages did not enact a decree.

What was the incident that occurred?

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: An incident occurred involving a man who was transporting the water of purification and the ashes of purification in the Jordan and in a boat, and an olive-sized portion of a corpse was found embedded in the floor of the boat,

and the vessel containing the water of purification formed a tent over them, and they became impure.

At that time they said: A person may not carry the water of purification and the ashes of purification and transport them in the Jordan and in a boat.

Mishna:

The School of Shammai say:

The one whom they permitted to marry on her testimony

may marry and collect her marriage settlement.

The School of Hillel say: She may marry but may not collect her marriage settlement.

The School of Shammai said to them,

are these not a kal va-chomer: If

you permitted a forbidden sexual relation

that is

serious,

through her testimony,

will we not permit money, which is lenient?

The School of Hillel said to them: We find

that money is not permitted,