Yevamot 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

But if

his mother was his father’s rape victim, and she married his paternal brother, who then died

—and now his mother and her rival wife fall before him—

this is his mother, who exempts her rival wife.

And although the Sages taught in our Mishna, “Fifteen

women exempt their rival wives,”

we must add a sixteenth case, such as this one:

his father’s rape victim.

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan:

According to Levi, who said, “For even

a forbidden relation that is permitted only after the fact, such as his father’s rape victim,

is also taught

in our Mishna—

let it also teach

in our Mishna:

one who performs halitza with his yevama,

who after the halitza is not forbidden to him by an issur karet, but only by a prohibition, “He shall not build”—once he did not build, he shall not build again,

and then betroths her again

despite the prohibition—that is, after the fact; and the betrothal takes effect, since she is forbidden to him only by a prohibition.

And he dies,

the brother who betrothed her,

without children,

and she consequently falls to levirate marriage together with her rival wife before the other brothers—neither she nor her rival wife may enter into levirate marriage.

For since

she is

herself

herself

forbidden

to enter into levirate marriage with the other brothers, because she is forbidden to them by the issur karet of the forbidden relation of a brother’s wife—according to the view of Reish Lakish, as stated below—

her rival wife is likewise forbidden

to enter into levirate marriage, just as she is, by the law governing the rival wife of a forbidden relation involving a brother’s wife!

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to Reish Lakish: The reason we did not teach this case in our Mishna is

because it does not involve a rival wife of a rival wife.

For the rival wife of the yevama with whom halitza was performed is equally forbidden to all the brothers, and this rival wife cannot enter into levirate marriage with another brother and thereby render her own rival wife forbidden as well.

The Gemara asks: Rabbi Yohanan himself disputes Reish Lakish and maintains below that the woman with whom halitza was performed is not forbidden to the brothers by the issur karet of a brother’s wife, but only by a prohibition: “Once he did not build, he shall not build again.”

And

if so,

let Rabbi Yohanan say to him

another answer: The woman with whom halitza was performed is forbidden to the brothers only as one of the category of

“those subject to prohibitions.”

And those subject to prohibitions

are subject to halitza and levirate marriage!

That is, the woman with whom halitza was performed, who was subsequently betrothed again and whose husband died, still requires levirate marriage—even though in practice she cannot enter into levirate marriage, as will be explained below, she is not released without halitza—because those subject to prohibitions are not comparable to a wife’s sister, since they are not subject to karet.

And therefore the tanna did not teach this case in the Mishna.

And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan

was speaking according to the position

of Reish Lakish

and said to him,

and this is what he meant:

According to my position—

the woman with whom halitza was performed and her rival wife

are subject to prohibitions.

And those subject to prohibitions are subject to halitza and levirate marriage.

This is the reason that the Mishna does not teach the case of the woman with whom halitza was performed who was subsequently betrothed again.

But according to you,

according to your view that the woman with whom halitza was performed and her rival wife are in the category of

“those subject to karet,”

I must explain the reason they were not taught in the Mishna as follows:

because they do not involve a rival wife of a rival wife.

The Gemara now cites the source of the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish concerning the status of the woman with whom halitza was performed:

It is stated in the passage concerning levirate marriage, when the yavam refuses to perform levirate marriage with his yevama:

“Then his yevama shall approach him before the elders, remove his shoe from upon his foot, spit before him, and say: So shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house!”

“And his name shall be called in Israel, ‘The house of the one whose shoe was removed.’”

We derive two teachings from these verses:

a. “He builds one house, but does not build two houses.”

Or: “Once he did not build, he shall not build again.” b. “He removes the shoe from one woman, but does not remove the shoe from two women.”

Therefore, if one brother was married to two women and died, and both yevamot fell before his brothers, one of them enters into levirate marriage or has halitza performed with her by one of the brothers, whereas the other is permitted to marry outside without halitza.

The yevama with whom halitza was performed is forbidden to the brother who performed the halitza himself only by this prohibition—“Once he did not build, he shall not build again”—and she is not subject to the issur karet of a brother’s wife.

However, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree concerning the status of the yevama with whom halitza was performed with respect to the other brothers: Are they also not liable to karet for her and forbidden to her only by this prohibition, or does she remain forbidden to them under the prohibition against a brother’s wife?

They likewise disagree concerning the status of the rival wife of the yevama with whom halitza was performed: Does she remain forbidden as a brother’s wife, or is her status like that of the woman with whom halitza was performed, so that she is forbidden only by a prohibition?

This dispute applies both to the status of the brother who performs halitza with her and to the status of the other brothers with respect to her.

It was stated: One who performs halitza with his yevama and then

the brother who performed the halitza himself

betroths her—

Reish Lakish said: He,

the brother who performed the halitza himself,

is not

liable to karet for the woman with whom halitza was performed,

and therefore his betrothal takes effect.

But

the other

brothers

are liable to karet for the woman with whom halitza was performed.

Whereas

with regard to the rival wife

of the woman with whom halitza was performed, who was released and permitted to marry outside by the halitza performed with the other yevama,

both he and the brothers are liable to karet for the rival wife

because the prohibition of a brother’s wife remains applicable to her.

The reason for this will be explained below.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Both he and the brothers

are not liable, neither to karet for the woman with whom halitza was performed nor to karet for the rival wife.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

What is the reason of Reish Lakish?

The verse says

Deuteronomy 25:

“Who will not build.”

The verse teaches:

Once he did not build,

but performed halitza—

he shall not build again!

Therefore, only

he,

the brother who performed halitza,

is the one who stands under

“Once he did not build—

he shall not build again.”

For this is what the verse says: Once he performed halitza with her, she is no longer forbidden to him by the punishment of karet for a brother’s wife, but only by the prohibition “He shall not build.”

But his brothers,

who did not perform halitza with her,

remain,

just as they were forbidden to her before his halitza, by the issur karet of a brother’s wife—if they did not enter into levirate marriage with her or perform halitza with her—so too they

remain

now, after his halitza, subject to the prohibition of karet.

And

likewise, only

with regard to her

with regard to her

does he stand

the brother who performed halitza

under “He shall not build.”

But

with regard to the

rival wife

of the woman with whom halitza was performed,

they remain,

the brother who performed halitza and his brothers, subject to the issur karet of a brother’s wife,

they remain

so even after his halitza.

And

if

Rabbi Yohanan

maintains:

Can there be such a thing,

is it possible

that initially,

when the two yevamot fell before all the brothers,

this one may perform halitza

one brother

and this one may perform halitza

another brother

with her?

And with this one

yevama

he may perform halitza, and with this one

yevama

he may perform halitza.

And now,

after the halitza—

he should stand over her,

so that all the brothers would be liable to karet for the woman with whom halitza was performed and for her rival wife, and the brother who performed halitza himself would likewise be liable for the rival wife of the woman with whom halitza was performed,

by karet?!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

he,

the brother who performed halitza,

acts as the agent of the brothers.

For he is acting as the agent of all of them in performing halitza, and from now on she is forbidden to all the brothers only by the prohibition, “Once he did not build, he shall not build again.”

And likewise, the woman with whom halitza was performed,

she—

acted as the agent of the rival wife.

It is therefore as though halitza had been performed with both of them.

Consequently, from now on, after the halitza, neither she nor her rival wife is forbidden to any of the brothers except by a prohibition.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish

from a beraita that we learned:

One who performs halitza with his yevama and then

the brother who performed halitza

betroths her, and dies—

she

requires halitza from the brothers!

Granted, according to my position, which says

that the woman with whom halitza was performed and her rival wife, both with respect to the brother who performed halitza and with respect to the brothers, are in the category of

“those subject to prohibitions”

alone,

they are—

this is why she requires

now, after the brother who performed halitza betrothed her again and died,

halitza from the brothers.

For his betrothal takes effect with her, and there is here a falling to levirate marriage of a yevama who is subject to prohibitions with respect to the brothers.

But according to you,

that the woman with whom halitza was performed is forbidden to the brothers by karet—

why does she require halitza

from them?!

Yet although the betrothal of the brother who performed halitza took effect with her, she should not require halitza from the brothers, since according to you she is forbidden to them by karet!

Reish Lakish answered Rabbi Yohanan with a question:

And according to your position,

your view, Rabbi Yohanan, that the brother who performed halitza acted as the agent of the brothers and that from now on all of them are forbidden to her only by a prohibition,

say the latter clause

of that same beraita:

If one of the brothers

of the brother who performed halitza

arose and betrothed her,

and died—

she has no claim whatsoever against him!

This is because the brother’s betrothal did not take effect with her. Reish Lakish proves that the brother of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her with the punishment of karet, and therefore his betrothal did not take effect. For:

And if

we say in accordance with your statement, Rabbi Yohanan, that the prohibition of the women with whom halitza was performed to the brothers is only in the category of

“those subject to prohibitions”—

why does she have no claim

against the brother who betrothed her and died,

whatsoever against him?

Yet according to you, since the woman with whom halitza was performed is merely subject to prohibitions with respect to all the brothers, her betrothal takes effect with all the brothers.

And once the brother’s betrothal takes effect with her, she falls from him to levirate marriage or halitza; how, then, can she be released without anything?!

Rav Sheshet said: The latter clause

of the beraita, which says that she does not require halitza,

refers—

they,

according

to the words of

Rabbi Akiva, who says: Betrothal does not take effect with those subject to prohibitions!

But the first clause follows the view of the Rabbis, who maintain that betrothal takes effect with those subject to prohibitions.

However, according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva, she is only in the category of those subject to prohibitions, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan.

And we challenge this: If the latter clause follows only the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, the tanna should have stated this explicitly:

And let him teach: “According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva—

she has no claim whatsoever against him”!