Yevamot 11a — the Talmud in English

And we conclude: Indeed,

there is a difficulty for Rav Sheshet: how does he explain the conclusion according to Rabbi Akiva? But the tanna should have said this explicitly, that he is speaking according to Rabbi Akiva, so that everyone would know that this is not a continuation of the beginning, which disagrees with Rabbi Akiva.

for Rav Sheshet: How does he explain the latter clause according to Rabbi Akiva? But the tanna should have stated explicitly that it is speaking according to Rabbi Akiva, so that everyone would know that this is not a continuation of the first clause, which disagrees with Rabbi Akiva.

The amoraim disagreed in resolving the beraita, according to Rabbi Yohanan and according to Reish Lakish.

Rav Ashi holds like Reish Lakish, who maintains that the brothers are liable to karet for the halutza. Therefore, the conclusion is satisfactory for him: if one of the brothers arose and betrothed the halutza, and he died, she does not require halitza from the brothers, since the brother’s betrothal did not take effect with her.

who holds that the brothers are liable to receive the punishment of karet for having relations with a woman who underwent ḥalitza. Therefore, the latter clause is clear to him: If one of the brothers stood up and betrothed the woman who had undergone ḥalitza, and he then died, she does not require ḥalitza from the brothers, because the brother’s betrothal did not take effect with regard to her.

But the beginning is difficult for him, for it says that if the brother who performed halitza subsequently betrothed the halutza, and died, she requires halitza from the brothers. It follows that she is not forbidden to them by karet.

And Rav Ashi explains it with regard to the beginning: that it is speaking of brothers who were born after the brother performed halitza and betrothed her.

Rav Ashi explains the first clause as referring to brothers who were born after the brother performed ḥalitza and betrothed her.

And it turns out that these brothers did not encounter her at the time when she fell before the first brother [at which time she would have been forbidden to them under the law of “the wife of a brother who was not in his world”]].

Therefore they are not forbidden to her on account of the first brother, since they encountered her only as the wife of the second brother, who performed halitza and betrothed her. It would even have been permitted for them to perform yibbum with her, were it not that she is forbidden to the brother who died by a prohibition of lav. Therefore, they must perform halitza with her.

And

according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that in such a manner they are not forbidden to her under the law of the wife of a brother who was not in his world, as the Gemara will explain immediately.

who holds that in such a case they are not forbidden to her as the wife of a brother who was not alive together with them, as the Gemara will explain immediately.

But

Ravina holds like Rabbi Yohanan, for according to him, the brothers of the one who performed halitza are forbidden to the halutza only by a prohibition of lav. The beginning is therefore satisfactory for him: if the one who performed halitza subsequently betrothed her and died, she requires halitza from the brothers, as is the law with those subject to a prohibition of lav.

who holds that the brothers of the man who performed ḥalitza are forbidden to the woman who underwent ḥalitza only by a prohibition from the Torah. Therefore, the first clause is clear to him: If the man who performed ḥalitza subsequently betrothed her and died, she requires ḥalitza from the brothers, as is the law in the case of those subject to a prohibition from the Torah.

But the conclusion is difficult for him, for it says that if the brother of the one who performed halitza betrothed her and died, she does not require halitza.

And he explains

the conclusion

according to the Rabbis. The brother of the one who performed halitza betrothed her, and she fell for yibbum before brothers who were born after the death of the first brother; and according to the Rabbis she does not require them, since she is forbidden to them by the prohibition of erva of “the wife of a brother who was not in his world

”.

The Gemara explains:

Rav Ashi holds like Reish Lakish, that the brothers are forbidden to the halutza by karet,

who holds that the brothers are forbidden to the woman who underwent ḥalitza with the punishment of karet.

and he explains

the beginning of the beraita, which says that if the brother who performed halitza and betrothed her died, she requires halitza from the brothers

according to Rabbi Shimon:

—

according to Rabbi Shimon: And this is what the beraita says at the beginning:

One who performs halitza with his yevama and subsequently betroths her

she requires halitza from the brothers.

Who are the “brothers

— who are the brothers who must perform halitza with her?

The brothers who were born!

Who were born after he performed halitza and betrothed her. She is not forbidden to them by karet on account of the first brother, since they encountered her after the one who performed halitza had performed halitza with her and betrothed her. From now on, she is destined to fall for yibbum before the brothers who were now born only on account of the betrothal of the second brother, and she is not forbidden to them on account of the first brother.

In accordance with whom

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who holds that if the second brother performed yibbum with the wife of the first brother, and after the yibbum the third brother was born, she is not forbidden to the third brother, who was now born, on account of the wife of his first brother who was not with him in his world, since he encountered her without the bond resulting from the fall before the first brother, but only when she was standing to fall before him from the marriage of the second brother, who was in his world.

who holds that if the second brother performed levirate marriage with the wife of the first brother, and the third brother was born afterward, she is not forbidden to the third brother, who was born only then, as the wife of a brother who was not alive together with him. This is because he encountered her without the bond created by the first brother’s death; she was to fall before him for levirate marriage only because of the marriage of the second brother, who was alive together with him.

But in the conclusion the beraita says:

One of the

brothers

who were born

who had already been born before the halitza

arose and betrothed her,

and died

she has nothing against him. For she does not now require halitza from the brothers who were with him in his world, since she had already fallen before them for yibbum from the first brother. And since they did not perform halitza with her, she continues to be forbidden to them by karet, as the wife of a brother, on account of the first brother. This law applies both according to Rabbi Shimon and according to the Rabbis.

She does not now require ḥalitza from the brothers who were alive together with him, since she had already fallen before them for levirate marriage from the first brother. And since they did not perform ḥalitza with her, she remains forbidden to them with the punishment of karet as the wife of the first brother. This law applies both according to Rabbi Shimon and according to the Rabbis.

In accordance with whom

in accordance with Reish Lakish, who holds that the halutza is forbidden to the other brothers by karet.

who holds that the woman who underwent ḥalitza is forbidden to the other brothers with the punishment of karet.

But

Ravina holds like Rabbi Yohanan, and explains

the beraita

according to the view of the Rabbis:

One who performs halitza with his yevama and subsequently betroths her,

and dies

she requires halitza from the brothers.

Who are the brothers

the brothers who were born

previously, and they are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of lav, after halitza was performed with her by their brother “as their agent

”. In accordance with whom

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the one who performs halitza performs the halitza as the agent of all the brothers. Therefore, the brothers too are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of lav, like him.

who holds that the man who performs ḥalitza does so as the agent of all the brothers. Therefore, the brothers too are forbidden to her only by the same prohibition from the Torah that applies to him.

Therefore, they must perform halitza with her when their brother betrothed her and died.

But if

one of the

brothers

who were born, who were born after the halitza, and it turns out that the one who performed halitza did not perform it as their agent, for at the time of the halitza they had not yet been born, and now that they have been born they encountered her as the wife of the first brother. With regard to them, there was no agency for the halitza.

stood up—those born after the ḥalitza—it turns out that the man who performed ḥalitza did not do so as their agent, since at the time of the ḥalitza they had not yet been born. When they were born, they encountered her as the wife of the first brother; with regard to them, there was no agency for the ḥalitza.

And it turns out that they are forbidden to her by the prohibition of karet of the wife of the first brother.

And

therefore, if

one of the brothers who were born after the halitza betrothed her—there is no betrothal in his betrothal, since she is forbidden to him by karet as the wife of the first brother.

his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, since she is forbidden to him with the punishment of karet as the wife of the first brother.

Therefore, if that brother who betrothed her dies

she has nothing against him.

And this law applies even if the brother was born after the one who performed halitza betrothed her, since the betrothal of the brother who performed halitza does not remove from her the prohibition of the wife of the first brother.

In accordance with whom

in accordance with the Rabbis, who hold that in every case, even where he performed yibbum and the brother was subsequently born, she is forbidden to him as the wife of his brother who was not in his world.

who hold that in every case—even if the second brother performed levirate marriage and the third brother was born afterward—she is forbidden to him as the wife of his brother who was not alive together with him.

It was stated: If one has intercourse with a yevama, and one of the brothers has intercourse with her rival—

Rav Aha and Ravina disagree about it.

One said:

his law is

with karet.

As will be explained.

And one said:

his law is

with

a transgression of the prohibition of

a positive commandment, of “He builds one house, and he does not build two houses

”

The one who says: with karet

holds

like Reish Lakish, who maintains that the yibbum or halitza with the yevama is not performed as the agency of all the brothers and as the agency of all the yevamot. Therefore, the rival of the yevama, since she did not undergo yibbum, remains forbidden to the other brothers by karet.

that levirate marriage or ḥalitza with the sister-in-law is not performed as the agency of all the brothers and all the sister-in-laws. Therefore, the rival of the sister-in-law, since she did not undergo levirate marriage, remains forbidden to the other brothers with the punishment of karet.

And the one who says: by a positive commandment

holds

like Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that the yibbum is performed as the agency of all of them. Just as the one who performs yibbum himself is forbidden to the rival of his yevama only by a prohibition of a positive commandment, so the other brothers are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of a positive commandment.

that levirate marriage is performed as the agency of all of them. Just as the brother who performs levirate marriage is forbidden to the rival of his sister-in-law only by violation of a positive mitzva, so too the other brothers are forbidden to her only by violation of a positive mitzva.

A woman who committed adultery while married to her husband and became forbidden to him does not undergo yibbum and is exempt from halitza. For she was forbidden to her husband by the law of a woman who committed adultery, and it is impossible that she should fall for yibbum.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The rival of a sota is forbidden.

The reference here is to the rival of a woman who certainly committed adultery while married to her husband and became forbidden to him, and not to a “doubtful sota,” whose husband merely warned her and she secluded herself, but it is not known that she committed adultery.

The reason that the woman who committed adultery also forbids her rival for yibbum, like herself, despite the fact that the woman who committed adultery is not an “erva,” is:

since

“impurity” is written with regard to her, the woman who committed adultery—“and she became impure” [Numbers 5

.

Just

as “impurity” is written with regard to

forbidden relationships—“Do not become impure through all these” [Leviticus 19].

“Do not defile yourselves through all these” [Leviticus 19].

And just as an erva forbids her rival for yibbum, so too a sota forbids her rival for yibbum. [

And see the note, what is the law of the sota herself, and whether she is exactly like an erva, who is exempt from halitza and yibbum, or whether she merely forbids her rival for yibbum, but is not exempt without halitza].

Rav Hisda raised an objection

from what we learned in the Mishna in tractate Yevamot, at the beginning of the chapter “The woman of great authority

” If a woman’s husband went overseas, and one witness came and testified to her, “Your husband has died,” and the Sages were lenient to rely upon him, and she married another man,

if afterward her first husband came—she must leave both this one and that one!

For the Sages instituted that she is forbidden to the first husband under the law of a woman who committed adultery, even though she married the second man lawfully, on the basis of the testimony of one witness, whom the Sages made credible. She must also leave her second husband, since a woman who commits adultery is forbidden to the one with whom she committed adultery just as she is forbidden to her husband.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The Sages forbade her to return only to her husband after she had married [albeit permissibly] another man, but they did not decree this with regard to the yavam.

Therefore, if her first husband died after he returned, and he had another wife, then

her intercourse or her halitza [of the woman who married a stranger and became forbidden to her husband],

[of the woman who had married a stranger and thereby became forbidden to her husband]

from the brother of the

husband

first—

husband—

exempts her rival!

And even the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Shimon disagree only with regard to her herself, that she does not undergo yibbum; but her rival undergoes yibbum, according to everyone!

And it follows that the rival of a woman who committed adultery is permitted for yibbum, for if she does not fall for yibbum at all, how does the intercourse of the woman who committed adultery “exempt” her rival?

Rav can say to you: I am speaking to you of a Torah-law sota,

with regard to whom “impurity” is written, like forbidden relationships, by Torah law, so that she and her rival are exempt from halitza and yibbum.

And

if

you had said,

you are raising an objection

to me

from

a rabbinic-law sota,

for whom the Sages decreed that she must leave both this one and that one, so that she would be precise in finding suitable witnesses—and obviously, by Torah law she is subject to halitza and yibbum! The Gemara explains what Rav Hisda’s initial assumption was in comparing a rabbinic decree with a Torah law:

And as for the one who raises it, when Rav Hisda raised this difficulty

when Rav Ḥisda raised this question—

what was he raising it for!?

why did he raise this objection?

He holds—

Rav Hisda:

Whatever the Sages instituted

they instituted in the form of Torah law. And if the law is as Rav said, that the rival of a woman who committed adultery does not undergo yibbum and does not perform halitza, we would forbid the rival of a sota in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas from undergoing yibbum.

And if the law is as Rav says, that the rival of an adulterous woman may neither undergo levirate marriage nor perform ḥalitza, then we should likewise prohibit the rival of a woman suspected of adultery whose husband went overseas from undergoing levirate marriage.

Rav Ashi raised an objection:

If a woman’s husband warned her not to seclude herself with a certain man, and nevertheless

she entered into seclusion with him and remained with him for the amount of time sufficient for impurity—

she is

forbidden to her home, to her husband, under the law of a “sota,” until she is examined through drinking the bitter waters.

to her husband, under the law of a woman suspected of adultery, until she is examined by drinking the bitter waters.

And

if she was married to a

she is forbidden to eat teruma.