Yevamot 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And we conclude: Indeed,

there is a difficulty

for Rav Sheshet: How does he explain the latter clause in accordance with Rabbi Akiva? But the tanna should have stated explicitly that it is speaking in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, so that everyone would know that this is not a continuation of the first clause, which disagrees with Rabbi Akiva.

The amoraim disagreed concerning the resolution of the beraita, according to Rabbi Yohanan and according to Reish Lakish.

Rav Ashi, he holds in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who maintains that the brothers are liable to receive karet for the halutza. Therefore, the latter clause is satisfactory for him: If one of the brothers arose and betrothed the halutza, and he died, she does not require halitza from the brothers, because the brother’s betrothal did not take effect with regard to her.

But the first clause is difficult for him, as it states that if the brother who performed halitza subsequently betrothed the halutza and died, she requires halitza from the brothers. This proves that she is not forbidden to them by karet.

And Rav Ashi resolves it

according to Reish Lakish with regard to the first clause, by explaining that it is speaking of brothers who were born after the brother performed halitza and betrothed her.

It follows that these brothers did not encounter her at the time she fell before them from the first brother [at which time she would have become forbidden to them under the law of “the wife of his brother who was not in his world”].

Therefore, they are not forbidden to her on account of the first brother, because they encountered her only as the wife of the second brother, who performed halitza and betrothed her. It would even have been permitted for them to perform yibbum with her, were it not for the fact that she is forbidden to the brother who died by a prohibition of a negative mitzva; therefore, they must perform halitza with her.

And

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that in such a case they are not forbidden to her under the law of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, as the Gemara will explain immediately.

Whereas

Ravina holds in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that the brothers of the one who performed halitza are forbidden to the halutza only by a prohibition of a negative mitzva. Thus, the first clause is satisfactory for him: If the one who performed halitza subsequently betrothed her and died, she requires halitza from the brothers, as is the law with regard to those subject to a prohibition of a negative mitzva.

But the latter clause is difficult for him, as it states that if the brother of the one who performed halitza betrothed her and died, she does not require halitza.

And he resolves

the latter clause

in accordance with the Rabbis.

The brother of the one who performed halitza betrothed her, and she then fell for yibbum before brothers who were born after the death of the first brother. According to the Rabbis, she does not require them, because she is forbidden to them by the prohibition of a forbidden relationship of “the wife of his brother who was not in his world.”

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Ashi holds in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who maintains that the brothers are forbidden to the halutza by karet.

And he resolves it

with regard to the first clause of the beraita, which states that if the brother who performed halitza and betrothed her died, she requires halitza from the brothers—

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon:

—

And this is what the beraita says in its first clause:

One who performs halitza with his yevama and subsequently betroths her

—

which brothers

, meaning, which brothers must perform halitza with her?—

the brothers who were born!

They were born after he performed halitza and betrothed her, and she does not become forbidden to them by karet on account of the first brother, since they encountered her only after the one who performed halitza had performed halitza with her and betrothed her. From this point onward, she is destined to fall for yibbum before the brothers who have now been born only on account of the betrothal of the second brother, and she is not forbidden to them on account of the first brother.

In accordance with whom—

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that if the second brother performed yibbum with the wife of the first brother, and after the yibbum the third brother was born, she is not forbidden to the third brother, who was born only now, on account of the prohibition of the wife of his first brother who was not in his world, since he encountered her without the bond resulting from the first brother’s death; rather, she is destined to fall before him only as a result of the marriage to the second brother, who was in his world.

But with regard to the latter clause, the beraita states:

If one of the

brothers

who had already been born

, meaning, who had been born before the halitza,

arose and betrothed her

, and died—

he has no claim upon her.

She does not now require halitza from the brothers who were with him in his world, since she had already fallen before them for yibbum from the first brother. And since they did not perform halitza with her, she remains forbidden to them by karet as the wife of the first brother. This law applies both according to Rabbi Shimon and according to the Rabbis.

In accordance with whom—

in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who maintains that the halutza is forbidden to the other brothers by karet.

Whereas

Ravina holds in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, and he resolves it

with regard to the beraita

in accordance with the Rabbis:

One who performs halitza with his yevama and subsequently betroths her,

and dies—

she requires halitza from the brothers.

Which brothers—

the brothers who had already been born,

and they are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of a negative mitzva, after she underwent halitza through their brother’s “agency.”

In accordance with whom—

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that the one who performs halitza performs it as the agent of all the brothers. Therefore, the brothers too are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of a negative mitzva, like him.

Therefore, they must perform halitza with her when their brother betrothed her and died.

But if

one of the

brothers

who were born

, who were born after the halitza, arose, and thus it emerges that the one who performed halitza did not perform it as their agent, since at the time of the halitza they had not yet been born; and now that they have been born, they encountered her as the wife of the first brother. With regard to them, there was no agency for the halitza.

It follows that they are forbidden to her by karet as the wife of the first brother.

And

therefore, if

one of them betrothed her

—one of the brothers born after the halitza—his betrothal does not constitute a valid betrothal, since she is forbidden to him by karet as the wife of the first brother.

Therefore, if that brother who betrothed her died—

he has no claim upon her.

This law applies even if the brother was born after the one who performed halitza betrothed her, since the betrothal by the brother who performed halitza does not remove from her the prohibition of the wife of the first brother.

In accordance with whom—

in accordance with the Rabbis,

who maintain that in every case, even where one performed yibbum and the brother was born afterward, she is forbidden to him as the wife of his brother who was not in his world.

It was stated: If one engages in intercourse with a yevama, and one of the brothers engages in intercourse with her rival—

Rav Aha and Ravina disagree concerning this.

One says:

his status

is karet.

As will be explained.

And one says:

his status is

a

transgression of the prohibition of

a positive mitzva,

namely, “He builds one house, but he does not build two houses.”

The one who says that it is karet—

he maintains

in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who maintains that the yibbum or halitza performed with the yevama is not performed as the agency of all the brothers and all the yevamot. Therefore, since the rival of the yevama did not undergo yibbum, she remains forbidden to the other brothers by karet.

And the one who says that it is a positive mitzva—

he maintains

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that the yibbum is performed as the agency of all of them. Just as the one who performs yibbum himself is forbidden to his yevama’s rival only by a prohibition of a positive mitzva, so too the other brothers are forbidden to her only by a prohibition of a positive mitzva.

A woman who committed adultery while married and thereby became forbidden to her husband may not undergo yibbum and is exempt from halitza, since she was forbidden to her husband by the law applying to a zona, and it is impossible for her to fall for yibbum.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A sota’s rival is forbidden.

Here the reference is to the rival of a zona, who certainly committed adultery while married and thereby became forbidden to her husband, and not to a “doubtful sota,” whose husband merely warned her not to seclude herself and she did so, but it is not known that she committed adultery.

The reason that the zona also renders her rival forbidden for yibbum, like herself, despite the fact that the zona is not a forbidden relationship, is as follows:

Since

“impurity” is written with regard to her

—“and she became impure” [Numbers 5].

Just

Just as “impurity” is written with regard to

forbidden relationships

—“Do not defile yourselves through all these” [Leviticus 18].

And just as a forbidden relationship renders her rival forbidden for yibbum, so too a sota renders her rival forbidden for yibbum.

[See the note, concerning the status of the sota herself, and whether she is exactly like a forbidden relationship, who is exempt from both halitza and yibbum, or whether she merely renders her rival forbidden for yibbum but is not exempt from halitza.

Rav Hisda raised an objection

from what we learned in the Mishna in tractate Yevamot, at the beginning of the chapter “The Great Woman”:

If a woman’s husband went overseas, and one witness came and testified to her, “Your husband died,” and the Sages leniently permitted her to rely on him, and she married another man,

if her first husband subsequently came, she must leave both this one and that one!

The Sages enacted that she becomes forbidden to her first husband like a zona, despite the fact that she married the second man lawfully, relying on the testimony of one witness whom the Sages deemed credible. And she must also leave her second husband, since a woman who commits adultery is forbidden to the man with whom she committed adultery just as she is forbidden to her husband.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The Sages prohibited her from returning only to her husband after she had married [albeit permissibly] another man, but they did not enact a prohibition with regard to the yavam.

Therefore, if her first husband died after returning, and he had another wife, then

her intercourse or her halitza

[of the woman who married a stranger and became forbidden to her husband],

from the brother of

the

first

husband—

exempts her rival!

Even the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon disagree only with regard to her herself, that she may not undergo yibbum; but her rival may undergo yibbum according to everyone!

This proves that the rival of a zona is permitted for yibbum, because if she does not fall for yibbum at all, how can the zona’s intercourse “exempt” her rival?

Rav can say to you: I am speaking to you of a sota by Torah law,

with regard to whom “impurity” is written, as with forbidden relationships, by Torah law; both she and her rival are exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

And

if

you had said,

meaning, if you were raising an objection

to me

from

a sota by rabbinic law,

whom the Sages decreed must leave both this one and that one, in order that she be careful to locate suitable witnesses, then it is obvious that by Torah law she is subject to halitza and yibbum! And the Gemara explains what Rav Hisda’s initial assumption was in comparing a rabbinic decree with a Torah law:

And as for the one who raised it,

when Rav Hisda raised this objection—

what prompted him to raise it,

meaning, why did he raise it?

He was of the opinion

that Rav Hisda held:

Whatever the Sages enacted

they enacted in the manner of Torah law.

And if the law is as Rav says, that the rival of a zona may not undergo yibbum and may not perform halitza, we would likewise prohibit the rival of the sota in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas from undergoing yibbum.

Rav Ashi raised an objection: If a husband warned his wife not to seclude herself with a certain man, and nevertheless

she

entered into seclusion with him and remained with him for the time sufficient for defilement—

she is

forbidden to her home,

meaning, to her husband, under the law of a sota, until she is examined by drinking the bitter waters.

And

if she was married to a koen, she is

forbidden to eat teruma.