Yevamot 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

And this is your mnemonic

for the six brothers:

Initially, there were four brothers together in the world.

Two of the brothers married two sisters.

The first

brother, who was married to one of the sisters, died.

The fifth

brother was born, and found the first brother’s wife before she had undergone levirate marriage, and she became permanently forbidden to him, in accordance with the law concerning the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

And the third

of the four brothers performed levirate marriage with the first brother’s wife.

The second

brother, who was married to the second sister, died.

The sixth

brother was born, and found the first brother’s wife after she had undergone levirate marriage, and she is not forbidden to him, according to Rabbi Shimon [“he performed levirate marriage and afterward the brother was born”].

And the fourth

brother performed levirate marriage with the second brother’s wife.

The third and fourth brothers then died, and the two sisters fell before the fifth and sixth brothers for levirate marriage.

For the fifth brother, the sister who had previously been married to the first brother is forbidden, since when he was born he found her before she had undergone levirate marriage, and she therefore became permanently forbidden to him as the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

But the second sister is permitted to him, since he and the second brother had both been present in the world together.

For the sixth brother, the first brother’s wife is permitted to him, since he found her after she had undergone levirate marriage.

But the second brother’s wife is forbidden to him, by the law concerning the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world, who is permanently forbidden to him.

And, as stated, such a possibility exists only according to Rabbi Shimon.

For according to the Rabbis, in every case both sisters are forbidden to the fifth and sixth brothers by the law concerning the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world.

The levirate marriage performed with the sisters by the other brothers does not prevent the prohibition applying to them, as the wives of brothers who were not alive in their world, with regard to the brothers who were born later.

And since Rabbi Hiyya taught that with regard to all the women mentioned in our Mishna, if they were two sisters married to two brothers, I apply to them the formulation, “the one forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother,” and this is possible with regard to the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world only according to Rabbi Shimon—then our Mishna also teaches cases that are subject to dispute.

The question therefore returns: Why did Rabbi say to Levi, when Levi asked him why the tanna did not also teach the case of his mother, his father’s raped wife, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, “It seems to me that he has no brain in his skull”!?

And on the basis of this objection, the Gemara explains Rabbi’s statement differently:

Rather, according to Rabbi,

he does not hold these principles

of Rabbi Hiyya;

he does not have them!

Tosafot ask why the Mishna does not also count the prohibition of a married woman, which is a forbidden relative that exempts her rival wife from levirate marriage. For example, a man divorces his wife on the condition that she not marry a man named Reuven, and she then marries Shimon, Reuven’s brother. Shimon dies, and she becomes subject to levirate marriage before Reuven. She may not enter into levirate marriage with him, because if she has relations with him, the divorce will be annulled and she will be forbidden to him as a married woman. The early authorities offered several explanations for this difficulty. First, she is not currently forbidden to Reuven as a married woman, since she is completely divorced; only if she has relations with him will her divorce be retroactively nullified, making her a married woman. Since she is not currently forbidden to him as a married woman, she is not considered a forbidden relative who exempts herself and her rival wife from levirate marriage. Second, even if we say that she has the exemption of a married woman, since the fact that she would become a married woman if she entered into levirate marriage prevents her from doing so, nevertheless her rival wife is not considered the rival wife of a married woman. The status of a married woman would apply to her only if she entered into levirate marriage after her husband’s death. A forbidden relative exempts her rival wife only when the status of a forbidden relative applies at the time she becomes subject to levirate marriage, when the husband dies, and not when she becomes forbidden as a forbidden relative after her husband’s death, when she enters into levirate marriage with him. The Rashba adds at the beginning of the tractate that it seems she herself must perform the ritual of release from levirate marriage, since one cannot say of her, “Anyone who cannot enter into levirate marriage cannot perform the ritual of release from levirate marriage.” That rule applies only when she cannot enter into levirate marriage because she has the status of a forbidden relative. In this case, however, she has no such status; rather, the condition prevents her from entering into levirate marriage, because if she did so, her divorce would be annulled, and she would not be a woman who had become subject to levirate marriage at all. The Rashba cites the Ramban, however, who was uncertain about this matter, and whose words tend to indicate that she herself does not require the ritual of release from levirate marriage, since anyone who cannot enter into levirate marriage cannot perform that ritual. The Rashba wrote about this: “Our opinion is not decisive in its proper place.”

He does not hold those principles, because the formulation “the one forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother” can apply to the wife of a brother who was not alive in his world only according to Rabbi Shimon.

And according to Rabbi, the tanna of our Mishna does not teach a matter that is subject to dispute.

According to Rabbi, the Mishna is speaking of a brother who was born and afterward performed levirate marriage, and this case is agreed upon by all.

Rav Adda,

who was called

“Karkhina”,

and who was sitting

before

Rav Kahana, said in the name of Rava:

Actually, Rabbi does hold

also holds

these principles

of Rabbi Hiyya.

And this is what he said to him

Rabbi to Levi when he said, “It seems to me that he has no brain in his skull”:

The reason the tanna did not teach in our Mishna the erva of his mother who was his father’s raped wife, according to Rabbi Yehuda, is that I cannot apply both principles to her simultaneously [the first, “the one forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother,” and the second, that there be a case of “her sister who is his yevama”].

Rather, only one principle or the other can possibly apply to her.

And since Rabbi agrees with Rabbi Hiyya that this is the tanna’s intention in the Mishna—to enumerate only those women to whom both principles apply simultaneously—Rabbi answered Levi that it is impossible to include his father’s raped wife among the women in the Mishna, because both principles cannot apply to her simultaneously:

For

his mother, his father’s raped wife—

only

one

of the two principles

can be found in her;

one or the other can be applied to her.

But

both,

to apply both principles to her simultaneously—

cannot be found in her.

For whichever way one looks at it, how can both principles apply to her together?

The Gemara illustrates this with a man named Jacob who had sons from several women, so that his sons were paternal but not maternal brothers.

If Jacob

raped two sisters,

and fathered a son with each of them, and Jacob had two other sons from other women,

and Jacob’s two other sons married the two sisters whom their father Jacob had raped, and the two brothers died,

the two sisters, who were the mothers of the two remaining sons, now fall before their sons [whom Jacob had fathered with them when he raped them].

Both women are therefore forbidden to both sons. With regard to each son, one of them is his mother, and the other is his mother’s sister, who is also an erva to him.

Therefore, the case of

“her sister who is his yevama”—

indeed

can be found: it is found when two sisters fall before him, both of whom are his yevamot. [

when two sisters who are both women subject to levirate marriage become subject to him.

But, of course, neither of them performs halitza, since both are ervot to him.]

But the principle

“the one forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother”—

cannot be found

in her.

For both are forbidden to both sons: one because she is his mother, and the other because she is his mother’s sister.

And if

their father Jacob

raped

two

unrelated

women, who were not sisters,

then—

they bore him two sons, and the two raped, unrelated women married two of Jacob’s sons from another woman. The brothers died, and the two unrelated women now fall before their sons.

“The one forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother”—

can be found.

For each of the sons is permitted to the unrelated woman, his father’s raped wife, and forbidden to his mother.

But

“her sister who is his yevama”—

cannot be found!

For we have established that the two women are unrelated.

Rav Ashi said: Actually, Rabbi does not hold these principles

of Rabbi Hiyya.

Therefore, the reason for not teaching the case of his mother, his father’s raped wife, is not that both principles cannot be applied to his mother, his father’s raped wife.

And

Rabbi does hold that he

does teach a matter that is subject to dispute!

The reason he did not teach his mother, his father’s raped wife, is not that he does not address a matter that is subject to dispute.

And what is the meaning of “It seems to me that he has no brain in his skull,”

which he said to him

Rabbi to Levi?

This is what he said to him: Why did you not analyze the Mishna carefully

[the continuation of our Mishna, below, on 13a], which proves

that the Mishna

our Mishna, follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda, who forbids a father’s raped wife.

Therefore, according to him, it is impossible for another brother to marry his father’s raped wife, and consequently there cannot be a case in which his father’s raped wife falls before him for levirate marriage.

As it teaches

in the continuation of our Mishna:

six forbidden relationships,

which are

more severe than these

fifteen forbidden relationships in our Mishna, and their additional severity is

because they are married to other men

rather than to the brothers, since they are forbidden equally to all the brothers—

their rival wives are permitted!

For the rival wife of an erva is forbidden only in a case of levirate marriage, and with regard to the six forbidden relationships who cannot marry any of the brothers, there is no falling for levirate marriage. Therefore, they do not render forbidden their rival wives who were married together with them to one man.

And these are they:

his mother, his father’s wife, and his father’s sister,

and so forth.

And we raised a contradiction concerning this:

What is the meaning of “his mother”?

In what manner is she forbidden as the erva of his mother?

If you say

his mother who is

married to his father?

That is his father’s wife,

and it should not be listed as a separate erva!

Rather, is it not

his mother who is

his father’s raped wife?

And it teaches: “Because they are

[the six more severe forbidden relationships]

married to other men.”

And we must infer: specifically

“to others, yes,”

they can be married.

But

to the brothers—

no,

it is impossible for his father’s raped wife to marry them!

Whom do you hear holding this position,

that a father’s raped wife is forbidden to marry the brothers?

It is Rabbi Yehuda,

who

forbids a father’s raped wife

from marrying any of the brothers, by a prohibition.

And

that is why he did not teach it

as the law of his mother, his father’s raped wife, in the preceding Mishna, which exempts her rival wife, since it is impossible for his father’s raped wife to marry one of the brothers, as she is forbidden to all the brothers by a prohibition, by virtue of being his father’s raped wife.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: According to Rabbi Yehuda, too, one can find

sixteen rival wives of forbidden relationships—in the case of the rival wife of his father’s raped wife.

For if he transgressed

the prohibition forbidding his brother to take his father’s raped wife,

and married her,

and then died, his mother, his father’s raped wife, would fall before him for levirate marriage!

And we answer:

“If”,

which is a forbidden act that could occur only after the fact—

he does not teach it.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Without “if”,

without the deceased brother having transgressed by marrying her,

one can also find

a case of his mother, his father’s raped wife, falling before him for levirate marriage and rendering her rival wife forbidden:

For example:

Jacob raped

by transgression

his daughter-in-law,

the wife of his son Reuven,

and fathered a son with her,

who was a mamzer, since his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him by karet.

It follows that the mamzer whom Jacob’s daughter-in-law bore from him is the brother of her husband, Reuven!

And Reuven died without children.

And she fell

Reuven’s wife

before her son,

before her mamzer son, who was her husband’s brother!

And since she,

Reuven’s wife,

is forbidden

to undergo levirate marriage with her son, because she is the erva of his mother,

her rival wife is likewise forbidden

to undergo levirate marriage, since she is the rival wife of the erva of his mother.

Here, Reuven, the brother of the deceased, did not transgress any prohibition; the transgressions were committed by others.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: Only

with regard to “her sister”

[a sisterhood]

that is permitted,

where the brotherhood of the brothers was established permissibly,

is it speaking,

as the verse speaks in the passage concerning levirate marriage: “When brothers dwell together.”

But

with regard to her sisterhood that is forbidden,

where the mamzer brother was created through a transgression—

it is not speaking!

There is no falling for levirate marriage here at all.

The Gemara adds:

And nevertheless,

despite Rabbi’s response to Levi’s claim that his mother, his father’s raped wife, should be included in our Mishna—“It seems that he has no brain in his skull”—

he examined it

and Levi added it

in the Mishna.

Levi taught: His mother—

sometimes

she

exempts her rival wife,

and sometimes she does not exempt her rival wife.

How so?

If his mother was married to his father, and was “married” to his paternal brother

[although with regard to the erva of his mother she is permitted to his brother, since he was born to another mother, she is nevertheless forbidden to him by karet because of the erva of his father’s wife],

and his

paternal brother died—

This is his mother who does not exempt her rival wife!

For his brother’s betrothal did not take effect with his mother at all, since she was forbidden to him as his father’s wife.