Yevamot 109a — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Elazar prohibits her, and his reason is explained in the Gemara: does he hold that the first marriage establishes the bond for levirate marriage, or is his reason different?

and his reasoning is explained in the Gemara: Does he hold that the first marriage effects the fall to levirate marriage, or is his reasoning based on something else?

.

And likewise, if one divorces an orphan girl, meaning a minor whom her mother or brothers married off,

who is a minor whom her mother or brothers married off,

and then takes her back—

whether he takes her back while she is still a minor or takes her back after she becomes an adult, she is

permitted to the yavam, her brother-in-law obligated in levirate marriage. She does not become forbidden to him while she is divorced, as the wife of his brother who is not subject to a mitzva, because it is the brother’s death, rather than the first marriage, that establishes her as subject to levirate marriage.

and she does not become prohibited at the time when she is divorced, by the prohibition of a brother’s wife when there is no mitzva, because it is death that effects the fall to levirate marriage, and not the marriage that effects the fall.

And Rabbi Elazar prohibits her. His reason will be explained in the Gemara.

His reasoning will be explained in the Gemara.

.

A minor whom her father married off, whose betrothal is valid by Torah law through her father,

whose betrothal, performed by her father, is valid by Torah law,

and who was divorced, and her father received her bill of divorce—she does not return to her father’s authority, and her father cannot betroth her again.

with her father having received her bill of divorce—she does not return to her father’s authority, and her father cannot betroth her again.

Rather, she is

like an orphan during her father’s lifetime: her father cannot betroth her, and she herself cannot be betrothed by Torah law. Thus, by Torah law, she remains the divorced wife of her first husband.

as her father cannot betroth her, and she cannot betroth herself by Torah law; and she remains, by Torah law, his divorcee.

And

Therefore, if

her husband takes her back by her betrothing herself to him, his betrothal is not valid by Torah law. Consequently, by Torah law she is forbidden to his brother as the forbidden relationship with a brother’s wife. If the husband dies after taking her back, she does not fall before him for levirate marriage by Torah law; rather, she is forbidden to him as the wife of his brother. Therefore—

by her betrothing herself to him, his betrothal is not valid by Torah law. Consequently, she is prohibited to his brother by Torah law, under the prohibition of a brother’s wife. And if her husband died after taking her back, she does not fall before him for levirate marriage by Torah law; rather, she is prohibited to him under the prohibition of a brother’s wife. Therefore—

according to everyone,

she is

forbidden to the yavam.

Gemara:

Eifa said [a Sage’s name]:

the name of a Sage]:

What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, who says in our Mishna that if the deceased brother divorced his wife and then took her back, she is forbidden to the yavam?

who says in our Mishna that if the deceased brother divorced his wife and took her back, she is prohibited to the yavam?

Since she was once subject to a prohibition concerning him, namely, the prohibition of a brother’s wife when there is no mitzva, at the time of her divorce.

the prohibition of a brother’s wife when there is no mitzva, at the time of her divorce.

The Sages said to Eifa: If so, if her prohibition is the Torah prohibition of a brother’s wife—

her prohibition being the forbidden relationship of a brother’s wife—

she should not even require halitza!?

And if you would say,

perhaps one might say,

so too, according to Rabbi Elazar she indeed does not require even halitza,

as Rabbi Elazar holds that she does not require even halitza.

That answer is impossible, because—

but it was taught in a beraita: They said in the name of Rabbi Elazar—

she performs halitza!

Rather, Eifa said: As for Rabbi Elazar,

I do not know his reason,

what his reason is.

Abaye said: This is the reason of Rabbi Elazar:

He is uncertain whether death establishes the woman as subject to levirate marriage,

placing the yevama, the woman subject to levirate marriage, before the yavam,

or whether the force of

whether the power of

the first marriage is what

is what

establishes her as subject to levirate marriage. Therefore—

to levirate marriage. Therefore—

If death establishes her—

she is now before him—

she falls before him

for levirate marriage, because she was not forbidden to him at the time she became subject to levirate marriage.

as she was not prohibited to him at the time of the fall.

If the first marriage establishes her—

she was once subject to a prohibition concerning him,

at the time she became subject to levirate marriage, when his brother divorced her.

Rava said: In fact, it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar—

in accordance with the Sages—

that death establishes her as subject to levirate marriage;

he was not uncertain about this.

However, everyone knows—

they are aware—

about a divorce,

as people hear that she was divorced,

but

but

not everyone knows when a divorced wife has been taken back,

because not everyone hears that she was taken back. If the husband dies and his brother performs levirate marriage with her, people will say that he performed levirate marriage with his brother’s divorced wife, who is forbidden to him by the severe punishment of karet! And they challenge this explanation:

On the contrary,

if

she returned to him, people will not make this mistake,

because

since she is living with him,

as people see her living in his household—

the matter becomes publicly known! Surely there is publicity that he took her back.

For there is certainly a public report that he took her back!

And they answer:

Is it so—

is it not the case that

we are dealing in our Mishna also with a case

in our Mishna also with a case

where he took her back at night,

when he took her back after nightfall,

and died in the morning,

so that no one saw her living with him after he took her back, and the fact that he had taken her back was not publicized.

In such a case, if his brother performs levirate marriage with her, people will say that he performed levirate marriage with his brother’s divorced wife.

Rav Ashi said: This is the reason of Rabbi Elazar:

He issued a decree concerning these women,

concerning all women divorced during their husbands’ lifetimes and then taken back by them, that they may not enter into levirate marriage—

because of the case of an orphan during her father’s lifetime,

whose father betrothed her and received her bill of divorce. According to everyone, if her husband returns to her—

and takes her back while she is still a minor, and then dies, she may not enter into levirate marriage, because she is forbidden to his brother by the Torah prohibition concerning a brother’s wife, while she is not his yevama by Torah law.

while she was a minor and then died, she may not enter into levirate marriage, for she is prohibited to his brother by the Torah prohibition of a brother’s wife, yet she is not his yevama by Torah law.

The Gemara supports Rav Ashi’s explanation.

This too is reasonable,

in accordance with Rav Ashi.

From the fact that the latter clause teaches: “A minor whom her father married off and who was divorced”,

and whose father received her bill of divorce, she is

like an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

And

And if

her husband took her back,

her husband having done so—

according to everyone, she is forbidden to the yavam.

This

halakha, which the Mishna records as part of our Mishna—

what is it teaching us?

What new point does it contain, and why did the tanna choose to state it here? It is

obvious

that once her father betrothed her and received her divorce, she left his authority with regard to betrothal, so taking her back cannot again establish her as subject to levirate marriage if the husband who took her back later dies. By Torah law she is a divorced wife of his brother, for whom levirate marriage is not permitted, since she does not again become subject to levirate marriage through a marriage valid by Torah law!

Rather, is it not teaching us

that by stating this halakha here, the tanna teaches that

the reason of Rabbi Elazar

is

that he decreed against

concerning

these women,

those women whom their husbands divorced and then took back, that they may not enter into levirate marriage when the husbands die,

because of this case,

so that people will not err and perform levirate marriage with an orphan during her father’s lifetime as well—one whom her father betrothed and whose divorce he received, and whom her husband took back while she was a minor, and then died, in which case she is forbidden to his brother by the karet prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And they conclude: Indeed,

conclude from this

from our Mishna, in accordance with Rav Ashi, that this is Rabbi Elazar’s reason.

The Gemara brings an additional proof that this is indeed Rabbi Elazar’s reason:

It was taught

in a beraita,

in accordance with Rav Ashi:

The Sages agree with Rabbi Elazar concerning a minor whom her father married off and who was divorced,

so that from that point onward

she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

And

And if

her husband took her back,

her husband having done so—

she is forbidden to the yavam, because her divorce was a complete divorce,

by Torah law,

while her return to him is not a complete return,

since she is a minor who becomes betrothed by her own decision, and such a betrothal does not take effect by Torah law. She does not become subject to levirate marriage by Torah law; rather, she is his brother’s divorced wife.

When does this apply,

that the Sages agree with Rabbi Elazar?

When he divorced her while she was a minor and took her back

to him

while she was still a minor.

But

if

he divorced her while she was a minor and took her back after she became an adult,

so that by taking her back then he betroths her in a manner valid by Torah law—

Alternatively,

if

he took her back while she was a minor, she came of age while living with him, and he died,

so that his betrothal took effect by Torah law, since we say that ordinarily the first intercourse he had with her after she became an adult constitutes betrothal by Torah law, and afterward the husband who had taken her back through a betrothal valid by Torah law died, leaving her subject to levirate marriage before his brother—

she either performs halitza or enters into levirate marriage.

They said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: She performs halitza but does not enter into levirate marriage.

This proves that the Mishna first stated the Sages’ agreement with Rabbi Elazar concerning an orphan during her father’s lifetime because Rabbi Elazar decreed that all divorced women whom their husbands took back may not enter into levirate marriage, because of the case of an orphan during her father’s lifetime. The Sages said that although they agree with him concerning an orphan during her father’s lifetime, they disagree with his decree concerning all divorced women whom their husbands took back.

Rava asked Rav Nahman:

A woman whose husband divorced her and then took her back—according to Rabbi Elazar, if her husband dies, she may not enter into levirate marriage because of the decree that people might perform levirate marriage with an orphan during her father’s lifetime whom her husband had taken back—

what is the status of her rival wife,

the other wife of the same husband, whom the husband did not divorce but who remained married to him throughout—

what is her status

?

He said to him,

Rav Nahman:

The woman herself,

the one who was divorced and taken back, is forbidden to enter into levirate marriage only by force of a

rabbinic decree.

of the Sages.

And

And

should we then arise and issue a decree

that her rival wife also may not enter into levirate marriage, making this

a decree safeguarding another decree?

They challenge Rav Nahman:

But it was taught: They said in the name of Rabbi Elazar, concerning a woman whose husband took her back and then died:

with regard to one who took back his divorcee and then died:

She and her rival wife perform halitza!

And we consider this:

Could it enter your mind that she and her rival wife

both perform halitza? After all, halitza by one of them is enough to release her rival wife as well.

Rather, is it not

that the beraita should be corrected as follows:

Either she or her rival wife performs halitza!

This nevertheless proves that they decreed that the rival wife of one who took back his divorced wife may not enter into levirate marriage, contrary to Rav Nahman’s statement.

And they answer:

Are you not correcting

the beraita, whose wording is not accurate and requires correction?

If so,

also correct

and adjust the wording of the beraita so that

this

is what it teaches, in accordance with Rav Nahman:

She,

the divorced woman herself whom her husband took back,

performs halitza

but does not enter into levirate marriage, because of the decree concerning an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

Whereas

her rival wife—

either performs halitza or enters into levirate marriage.

This is because one does not issue a decree safeguarding another decree.

Mishna:

.

Two brothers

who were

married to two sisters,

who were orphans,

minors,

whose marriages were established only by rabbinic law.

And the husband of one of them died,

leaving her subject to levirate marriage before his brother by rabbinic law, as the sister of his wife by rabbinic law—

she

is released because she is the “sister of his wife””,

by rabbinic law, and she requires neither halitza nor levirate marriage.

And likewise,

the same law applies to two brothers who were married to

two deaf-mute women,

whose legal status is like that of minors.

B. But if the two brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom was

an adult,

whose marriage was valid by Torah law,

and

and the other was

a minor,

whose marriage was valid only by rabbinic law, then—

if

the husband of the minor died—

the minor is released because of the forbidden relationship of

the

“sister of his wife”,

by Torah law, and she is exempt from both halitza and levirate marriage.

But if

the husband of the adult died—

she now becomes subject to levirate marriage before the husband of the minor sister, as his yevama by Torah law, while she is the sister of his wife by rabbinic law.

We must now determine the law governing the two sisters—

The adult sister, the yevama who becomes subject to levirate marriage before the surviving brother, is not exempt from halitza and levirate marriage as a sister of one’s wife by Torah law, since she is only the sister of his wife by rabbinic law.

Rather, she is forbidden to him in levirate marriage only by rabbinic law, because she is the sister of his wife by rabbinic law.

The minor wife of the surviving brother, meanwhile, is the sister of a woman who is subject to levirate marriage by Torah law. Her status depends on whether the relatives of a yevama become forbidden to the yavam when the yevama is bound and awaiting levirate marriage.

According to the one who says that “there is a bond,” the bond between the yavam and the yevama is considered a marital relationship [by Torah law], to the extent that the Sages prohibited the yevama’s relatives to the yavam [and likewise the yavam’s relatives to the yevama].

According to this view, the minor sister, the wife of the surviving brother, is forbidden to him as the “sister of a woman bound to him.”

According to the one who says that “there is no bond,” the bond between a yevama and a yavam is not considered a marital relationship by Torah law. The Sages therefore did not prohibit the yevama’s relatives to the yavam, and the yavam’s minor wife is not forbidden to him as the sister of a woman bound to him.

Three opinions were stated concerning this law:

The first opinion:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

his minor wife cannot remain with him, since she is forbidden to him as the “sister of a woman bound to him.”

Therefore,

we instruct the minor to refuse him,

her husband, thereby uprooting her marriage from that point onward retroactively. The yavam can then perform levirate marriage with her sister, who is subject to levirate marriage before him by Torah law.

For after the refusal, no prohibition of a wife’s sister applies to her, not even by rabbinic law. As we learned, after refusal all prohibitions based on the closeness between the husband and wife cease, because refusal retroactively uproots her betrothal, and she is considered as one who was never married to him at all.

The second opinion:

Rabban Gamliel says:

we do not instruct her to refuse him, because she is permitted to remain with him. In his view, there is no prohibition of the “sister of a woman bound to him,” since Rabban Gamliel holds that “there is no bond.”

Rather,

if she refuses

on her own—

she has refused,

and her adult sister may then enter into levirate marriage.

But if not,

if she does not refuse on her own,

the minor wife waits

while remaining with him

until she becomes an adult.

And

And once she becomes an adult, so that her marriage is valid by Torah law—

the other one,

her sister, the yevama,

is released because of the forbidden relationship of

the

“sister of his wife”,

and is released without halitza.

But he may not perform halitza with the yevama’s sister before his wife becomes an adult, because then his wife would become forbidden to him as the “sister of a woman to whom he performed halitza.”

The third opinion:

Rabbi Yehoshua says:

there is no remedy for him concerning either sister.

Since Rabbi Yehoshua holds that “there is a bond,” his wife is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman bound to him. He must divorce her with a bill of divorce, and then her adult sister becomes forbidden to him as the sister of his divorced wife [by rabbinic law].

And

Woe [alas]

alas]

to him because of his wife,

and

and woe [alas]

alas]

to him because of his brother’s wife.

He sends away his wife with a bill of divorce, and his brother’s wife through halitza.

According to Rabbi Yehoshua, we do not instruct her to refuse him, because he holds that one should avoid refusals.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that we instruct his minor wife to refuse her husband.

And they challenge this:

Is it permitted

to instruct a minor to refuse her husband?

But bar Kappara taught: A person should always adhere to three things and distance himself from three things:

He should adhere to three things: to halitza, to bringing

peace, and to the annulment of vows,

as will be explained below.

And he should distance himself from three things: from refusal, from deposits, and from surety, [so that he should not become a guarantor], as will be explained below!

so that he will not become a guarantor], as will be explained below!

And they answer: Here, where it is

a refusal for the sake of a mitzva,

for the purpose of fulfilling the Torah mitzva of levirate marriage—

it is different!

With regard to the matter itself, bar Kappara taught: A person should always adhere to three things:

to halitza

and not to levirate marriage—

in accordance with Abba Shaul.

As it was taught in a beraita: Abba Shaul says: One who takes his yevama in levirate marriage for the sake of her beauty,

or

for the sake of marriage,

or

for some other purpose,

rather than to fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage, is

as though

he

were having relations with a forbidden woman,

namely, his brother’s wife.

And it is likely in my eyes that the child

born from that levirate marriage is

a mamzer.

To bringing peace—

as it is written

in the Book of Psalms [chapter 34]:

“Seek peace and pursue it!”