Yevamot 108b (קח:) — the Talmud in English

5.

This is the principle:

If one gave

a get after a refusal and

she married another man,

she is forbidden to return to him.

Because the refusal cannot nullify the get that he gave her afterward, once he returned and remarried her.

But if there was

a refusal after a get, and

she went and married another man,

she is permitted to return to him.

Since the refusal uprooted the get, and whenever she leaves through refusal, she is permitted to return to him, even after she married another man.

This principle also applies to a minor girl who married several husbands one after another, for example:

a.

The girl who refused the man,

her first husband.

b.

And

she went and

married

a man

other than him.

And the

second husband divorced her.

c. And she went and married

a

man

other than him.

And she refused him,

her third husband.

d. And she went and married

a

man

other than him.

And the

fourth husband divorced her—

And this is the law governing her return to her husband:

This is the principle: whenever she leaves him by means of a get,

and afterward marries another man,

she is forbidden to return to him.

And even if she subsequently married another man and left him through refusal, she is forbidden to return to the first husband, because a refusal with the later husband does not nullify the get from the previous husband.

But whenever she leaves him

through refusal,

even if she married another man and he divorced her, she is

permitted to return to him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If one divorced his wife with a get and took her back, and afterward she left him through refusal, then even if she goes and marries another man and the latter divorces her, she is permitted to return to him.

The Gemara infers from this that he is permitted to take her back, even though he initially divorced her, whereas a man is forbidden to take back his divorced wife after she has married another man:

Apparently,

it is evident from here that

the

refusal

comes and nullifies

the

get

that preceded it, since her refusal reveals that she is a minor, whose actions have no legal effect, and she is no longer considered his divorced wife. Therefore, he may take her back even after she married another man.

And we raise a contradiction,

as the continuation of the Mishna presents a difficulty:

The girl who refused the man, married another man, and he divorced her,

and she married

another man and refused him,

and again married

another man, who divorced her.

This is the principle: whenever she leaves him by means of a get—

she is forbidden to return to him; through refusal—

she is permitted to return to him.

But here there was a refusal with the third husband after the get given by the second husband.

Apparently,

it is evident from here that

the refusal with the other husband does not come—

with the third husband—

and nullify his get,

the get given by the second husband!

But this contradicts the law stated earlier in the Mishna, that a refusal after a get nullifies the get that preceded it.

The reason for this is that refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no legal effect; consequently, the refusal with the second husband also uproots the first husband’s betrothal, and therefore her divorce is not considered a divorce.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is broken,

“broken”; divide the Mishna into the statements of two tannaim who disagree with one another:

the one who taught this,

the first law,

did not teach this,

the second law.

Rava said: But what difficulty is this?

What contradiction is there here!?

Perhaps

only

his own refusal—

her refusal with him—

nullifies his own get,

the get he gave before the refusal.

But

the refusal with the other husband—

does not nullify his get!

The Gemara is astonished at Rava’s distinction:

Rava too agrees that refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no legal effect. For this reason, the refusal of the minor with the other husband should also uproot his marriage, which preceded the other husband’s marriage; and once his betrothal is uprooted, his divorce is not a divorce.

Necessarily, then, there is another reason why refusal with the other husband does not uproot the earlier marriage, but only the marriage with the husband with whom she refused.

The Gemara now discusses the reason for this distinction.

And what is different about refusal with the other husband, such that it does not nullify his get—

The reason is that

since

the former minor wife whom he divorced and who married another husband still

is

able to recognize him

by his

hints and winks,

his gestures and signals,

with which he used to entice her.

Therefore, we must be concerned lest he

go—

the former husband who gave her the get—and

confuse her,

confusing her with his gestures and signals and enticing her to refuse her husband so that she can return to him, thereby taking her away from her husband,

and bringing her to himself,

bringing her back to him.

To prevent this conduct, the Sages instituted that if her husband divorced her and she married another man, then even if she leaves the second husband through refusal, she may no longer return to the first husband.

If so, one can ask: even one who leaves through

his own refusal,

after he himself divorced her and took her back,

should likewise not nullify

the refusal with him

his own get!

And if she marries a stranger and leaves him, she should be forbidden to return to the first husband, since the same reason for the decree applies to him as well: the man may recognize her by his gestures and signals,

since he recognizes her by his gestures and signals—

he goes and confuses

her, taking her away from her second husband,

and bringing her to himself,

bringing her back to him! And we answer: We need not be concerned that he will be able to confuse her and take her away from her second husband in order to bring her back to him, since

he has already confused her.

For he previously took her back after divorcing her,

and

nevertheless

he did not confuse her,

for although he succeeded in taking her back after divorcing her, he did not succeed in persuading her to remain with him, as we see that she refused him and left him despite his gestures and signals.

But one who divorced his minor wife, and she went and married another man—the very man who divorced her—and she wished to remain with him, can persuade her to return to him, since she desires him.

But if there is a difficulty,

it is from the refusal

with the other husband—

the

refusal

with the other husband is difficult!

For we learned in our Mishna:

She refused him, and he took her back; he gave her a get, and she married another man, and was widowed or divorced—

she is forbidden to return to him.

The Gemara infers:

The reason is that she was widowed or divorced

by the second husband; therefore she is forbidden to return to her first husband, who divorced her.

But

if

she refused

the second husband—

she is permitted to return to him,

to the first husband.

Apparently, the refusal with the other husband comes,

the refusal with the second husband,

and nullifies

the

get of the first husband,

the first husband’s get.

Since the refusal reveals that she is a minor and has no need to leave through a get, her divorce is not a divorce; therefore, he is not forbidden to take her back as one who takes back his divorced wife after she married another man.

And we raise a contradiction,

from the continuation of the Mishna:

The girl who refused the man, married another man, and he divorced her,

and she married

another man and refused him—

This is the principle: every

woman

who leaves him by means of a get—

she is forbidden to return to him.

And every woman who leaves him

through refusal—

she is permitted to return to him.

Apparently, the refusal with the other husband does not come and nullify his get,

even though the refusal with the other husband follows the get and reveals that she is a minor even with regard to the other husband’s get, which preceded it!

Rabbi Elazar said: It is broken! The one who taught this—

did not teach this.

Ulla said:

In fact, one tanna taught the entire Mishna, and

it is a case where she

has

three times been divorced,

having already received gets from three husbands,

so that she appears

in this respect

to be an adult.

Therefore, her refusal does not nullify the gets that preceded it. For by receiving three gets, she appears to conduct herself as an adult; the refusal does not demonstrate her minority, and the husbands who divorced her before the refusal may not take her back, since she married a stranger after their divorces.

But if she received only two gets from two husbands, then indeed the refusal with the other husband comes and nullifies all the gets that preceded it.

The Gemara now discusses the words of those who said above, “It is broken; the one who taught this did not teach this.” According to them, there is a tanna in our Mishna who indeed holds that “the refusal with the other husband does not come and nullify his get.”

And we were occupied

with it:

Who is the tanna?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

The tanna who taught this is the following tanna—

For we learned:

What

is the meaning of the verse

that is written

in the Book of Lamentations [chapter 5]:

“With our money we drink our water;

our wood comes at a price”?

At a time of danger,

during a time of persecution, when they decreed a prohibition against Torah study, the statement in this verse was fulfilled, for they had to pay a great deal of money for an answer to a question that

was requested

an answer concerning

this halakha:

If she left

the minor girl

from

her

first husband by means of a get, and

afterward left

her

second husband

through refusal—

may she return to the first husband?

That is, does the refusal with the other husband nullify the first husband’s get?

The Sages had no solution to this question.

They hired one man for four hundred zuz, and asked Rabbi Akiva,

who was imprisoned

in the prison

because he taught Torah, this question,

and he forbade

her to return to her first husband.

They likewise asked

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,

who was

in Netzivin, and

he too

forbade it!

According to both of them, we learned in our Mishna the law that the refusal with the other husband does not come and nullify the first husband’s get.

The Gemara now brings the words of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, who disagrees with Rav:

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: For

this question

itself

we had no need

to ask at all, since it is obvious that she is permitted to return to her first husband.

For if with regard

to the prohibition

of a married woman, which is severe, as marriage according to Torah law incurs the punishment of

karet,

you have eased and

permitted

the annulment of a minor’s marriage through refusal alone, without a get, because her refusal with her husband reveals her minority and therefore her actions have no legal effect—

with regard

to the prohibition of taking back one’s divorced wife after she married another man, which is only a prohibition of

a negative commandment

alone—

all the more so

you should permit it through refusal, even through refusal with the other husband!

For refusal with the other husband reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no legal effect; therefore, her betrothal to the first husband also lapses through this refusal, and consequently he is not considered one who takes back his divorced wife!

It thus follows that what we said—that the words of the Mishna must be divided between two tannaim, each of whom teaches a different position—refers to Rav [who is also considered a tanna] and Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yishmael, adds and says:

However,

rather,

this is what they asked: If

she

was

a minor whom her mother or brothers married off—

his mother’s brother’s wife.

She

is forbidden to him only by rabbinic decree, even if she had been an adult and her betrothal had been by Torah law. For a mother’s brother’s wife is only

“a secondary forbidden relation to him”,

and she is not forbidden to him as an incestuous relation by Torah law.

And his paternal brother married her and died,

and now this minor falls before him for levirate marriage—

may she now refuse,

now, while awaiting levirate marriage, in her original marriage to her mother’s brother’s wife,

and thereby uproot

that

earlier marriage,

to her mother’s brother, so that she will no longer be forbidden to him as “a secondary forbidden relation,” and

perform levirate marriage

with him?

This question was asked only with regard to secondary forbidden relations. But with regard to Torah prohibitions of incestuous relations, there is no doubt that even in the case of a minor’s marriage, which is only rabbinic, a refusal performed after the brother’s death cannot permit her to enter into levirate marriage!

The question is:

is there refusal—

does the refusal of the yevama with regard to her earlier marriage benefit her with regard to her marriage to her husband—

after the death

of her husband?

That is, can the refusal that the yevama now performs with regard to her earlier marriage to her deceased husband permit her now to enter into levirate marriage

in place of a mitzva

of levirate marriage?

Or not

—does the refusal now benefit her with regard to the earlier marriage?

They hired two men for four hundred zuz, and they came

and asked Rabbi Akiva in the prison, and he forbade it,

forbidding her to enter into levirate marriage through refusal with regard to the earlier marriage, after the brother’s death.

They likewise asked

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin, and he forbade it.

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashyan said: And Rav concedes,

although he disagrees and holds that the refusal with the other husband does not nullify his get,

that

she is forbidden to return only to the husband who divorced her, since the refusal with the other husband was ineffective in permitting her to return to him after she married another man.

But

she is permitted

to marry another man after refusing the other husband, even

the brother of this man,

who divorced her,

to whom she was forbidden

to return after she married another man.

For the refusal with the other husband is effective in annulling all her earlier betrothals, since the refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no legal effect.

Therefore, after this refusal she is permitted to all the relatives of all her former husbands.

This refusal was ineffective for only one matter: allowing her to return to husbands from whom she was divorced and after whose divorces she married other husbands. For this is an independent rabbinic ordinance, that the refusal should not enable her to return to him, thereby preventing him from taking her away from her husband through his signals and gestures in order to bring her back to him.

The Gemara raises an objection:

It is obvious

that she is permitted to his brother, since the refusal annulled all her marriages to her previous husbands, and she is not forbidden to the relatives of her husbands. There was only a special rabbinic ordinance that the divorcing husband may not take her back after she married another man, to prevent him from enticing her through his signals and gestures to leave her second husband.

After all, only

he,

the divorcing husband,

is

the one

who

she

recognizes by his gestures and signals.

But

his brother’s gestures and signals—

his brother’s—

she

does not

recognize, and he cannot entice her; so what novelty is there in saying that she is permitted to him!?

And we answer:

Lest you say, let us decree against this one,

so that she will also be forbidden to his brother,

because of this one,

on his account, lest people who see that she is permitted to his brother say that the get was nullified by the refusal with the other husband, and that she is permitted to return even to the husband who divorced her, after she married another man—

it teaches us

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashyan’s ruling: the Sages did not decree that she be forbidden to his brother.

And some say

that this is what

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashyan said: Just as she is forbidden to him, so she is forbidden to his brothers.

And we ask:

But she does not recognize their signals and gestures,

so why did they forbid her to them?!

And we answer:

It is a decree

concerning

his brother—

because of him,

because of the divorcing husband, lest people come to permit her to return to him as well when they see that the prohibition concerning her husband’s relatives has lapsed, and think that even the divorcing husband may take her back.

Mishna:

One who divorces a woman and takes her back,

and afterward dies—she is

permitted to the yavam.

That is, we do not say that “the first marriage causes the fall” and that the cause of her becoming subject to levirate marriage with the yavam began with her marriage to the deceased brother; consequently, the “time of the fall” into levirate marriage began at the time of her marriage to the deceased brother.

For if we say that the first marriage causes the fall, then when the brother divorced her, she would become forbidden to the yavam with the prohibition of a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva, at the time when she falls before him for levirate marriage. This prohibition would apply to her permanently and could not become permitted even if her brother took her back, then died, and she fell before the yavam because her brother had taken her back as his wife.

For any prohibition of “a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva” that applies to a woman at the time she falls before the yavam for levirate marriage is never permitted. A mitzva of levirate marriage that arises later cannot permit it.

Rather, on the contrary: once the prohibition of “a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva” takes effect upon her at the time of the fall before levirate marriage, she no longer falls before the yavam for levirate marriage, as is the law with regard to other incestuous relations, which the Torah excluded from the law of levirate marriage.

Rather, only “death causes the fall”: the time of the fall before levirate marriage is only at the time of the brother’s death, and not at the time of the deceased brother’s marriage.

Therefore, her divorce during the brother’s lifetime does not forbid her permanently with the prohibition of a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva, since this is not the time of the fall before levirate marriage. If his brother takes her back and dies, she may enter into levirate marriage.