Yevamot 108b — the Talmud in English

5.

This is the rule:

One who gave

a get after a refusal and

she married another—

she is forbidden to return to him.

Since the refusal cannot annul the get that he gives her afterward, after he returned and took her back.

But if there was

a refusal after a get, and

she went and married another—

she is permitted to return to him.

Since the refusal uprooted the get, and anyone who leaves through refusal is permitted to return to him, even after she married another man.

And this rule also applies to a minor who married several husbands one after the other, as follows—

a.

The one who refused the man,

her first husband.

b.

And

she went and

married

a man

another.

And the

second husband divorced her.

c. And she went and married

a

man

another.

And she refused him,

her third husband.

d. And she went and married

a

man

another.

And the

fourth husband divorced her—

And this is the law of her return to her husband—

this is the rule: anyone who leaves him through a get,

and afterward married another—

she is forbidden to return to him.

And even if afterward she married another and left him through refusal! For refusal with another does not annul the get from the previous husband.

But anyone who left him

through refusal—

even if she married another and he divorced her, she is

permitted to return to him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who divorced his wife with a get, and took her back, and afterward she left him through refusal—even if she goes and marries another man, and the other divorces her, she will be permitted to return to him.

And the Gemara infers from this that it is permitted for him to take her back, even though initially he divorced her; and a man is forbidden to take back his divorced wife after she married another man:

Evidently,

it is proved from here that

comes

the

refusal, and annuls

the

get

that preceded it, since her refusal reveals that she is a minor, whose actions have no effect, and she is no longer considered his divorced wife. Therefore, he may take her back even after she married another.

And it is contradicted,

there is a difficulty against this from the continuation of the Mishna:

The one who refused a man, and married another, and he divorced her,

and she married

another, and refused him,

and again married

another, and he divorced her.

This is the rule: anyone who left him through a get—

she is forbidden to return to him; through refusal—

she is permitted to return to him,

and here there was refusal with the third husband after the get of the second husband.

Evidently,

it is proved from here that

the refusal of the other does not come

with the third husband

and annul his get,

which the second husband gave!

And this contradicts the law that the Mishna stated earlier, that refusal after a get annuls the get that preceded it.

And the reason for the matter is that refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no effect; thereby the refusal with the second husband also uproots the betrothal of the first husband, and consequently her divorce is not considered a divorce.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: It is broken, “broken,” divide the Mishna into the statements of two tannaim who disagree with one another, and

“break it apart”; divide the Mishna into the statements of two tannaim who disagree with one another,

the one who taught this,

the first law,

did not teach this,

the second law.

Rava said: And what is the difficulty?

What contradiction is this!?

Perhaps

only

his refusal,

his own,

annuls his get,

which he gave before the refusal!

But

the refusal of the other—

does not annul his get!

And the Gemara is astonished at Rava’s distinction:

After all, Rava too admits that refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no effect; and for this reason, the refusal with which the minor refused the marriage to the other should also uproot her marriage to the previous husband, which preceded her marriage to the other. And once his betrothal is uprooted, his divorce is not a divorce.

Necessarily, there is another reason by virtue of which refusal with the other does not uproot her marriage to the husband who preceded the other, but only the marriage to the other, with whom she refused.

The Gemara now discusses the reason for this distinction.

And in what way is refusal with the other different, that it does not annul his get—

After all, the reason for this is that

since,

because

the

minor who was formerly his wife, whom he divorced and who married another husband, still

recognizes

she recognizes him from the time when she was his wife

by his gestures and winks,

with which he used to entice her.

And therefore, we must be concerned lest

he go,

her previous husband, who gave her the get, and

confuse,

confuse her with his gestures and winks, and entice her to refuse her husband in order to return to him, and remove her from her husband,

and bring her,

and bring her back to him.

And so that they should not act in this manner, the Sages instituted that if her husband divorced her and she married another, even if she leaves her second husband through refusal, she may no longer return to him.

And if so, it should be difficult that also one who leaves through

his refusal,

after he himself divorced her and took her back,

also should not annul

the refusal with him

his get!

And if she marries a stranger and leaves him, she should be forbidden to return to him, since the same reason for the decree applies to him himself: refusal with him should not annul his get that preceded the refusal,

since she recognizes him by his gestures and winks—

he goes, confuses,

and removes her from her second husband,

and brings her,

and brings her back to him! And we answer: We need not be concerned that he will be able to confuse her and remove her from her second husband in order to take her back. For

he has already confused her.

For previously, he took her back after he divorced her,

and

nevertheless

he did not confuse her,

for although he succeeded in taking her back after divorcing her, he did not succeed in convincing her to remain with him, for we see that she refused him and left him despite his gestures and winks.

But one who divorced his minor wife, and she went and married another, who is the one who divorced her, and she wanted to remain with him, he can appease her so that she will return to him, since she desires him.

But if it is difficult,

from the refusal

of the other—

the

refusal

of the other is difficult!

Since we learned in our Mishna:

She refused him, and he took her back, he gave her a get, and she married another, and he died or divorced her—

she is forbidden to return to him.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that he died or divorced her,

from the second husband; therefore she is forbidden to return to her first husband, who divorced her.

Here,

if

she refused

the second husband—

she is permitted to return to him,

to the first husband.

Evidently, the refusal of the other comes,

of the second husband,

and annuls

the

get of him,

of the first husband.

Since the refusal reveals that she is a minor and has no need to leave through a get, and her divorce is not a divorce; therefore he is not forbidden to take her back because of taking back his divorced wife after she married.

And it is contradicted

by the continuation of the Mishna:

The one who refused a man, and married another, and he divorced her,

and she married

another, and refused him—

This is the rule: everyone

who

left him through a get—

she is forbidden to return to him.

And everyone who left him

through refusal—

she is permitted to return to him.

Evidently, the refusal of the other does not come and annul his get,

even though the refusal with the other is after the get, and it reveals that she is a minor also with regard to the get of the other, which preceded it!

Rabbi Elazar said: It is broken! The one who taught this—

did not teach this.

Ulla said:

One tanna always taught the entire Mishna, and

for example, when she

ha

d three gets,

she had already received a get from three husbands,

she appears

she thereby appears

to be an adult.

And therefore, her refusal does not annul the gets that preceded it. For by receiving three gets she appears to be acting as an adult, and the refusal does not reveal that she is a minor; and the men who divorced her before the refusal are not permitted to take her back, since she married a stranger after their divorces.

But if she received only two gets from two husbands, indeed the refusal with the other comes and annuls all the gets that preceded it.

And now the Gemara discusses the words of those who said above, “It is broken; the one who taught this did not teach this.” According to them, there is a tanna in our Mishna who indeed holds that “the refusal of the other does not come and annul his get.”

And we considered it:

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna who taught this law, that the refusal of the other does not annul his get!?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

The tanna who taught this is this tanna—

For thus we learned:

What is,

what is the explanation of the verse

that is written

in the Book of Lamentations [chapter 5],

“With our money we drink water.

Our wood comes for a price”?

At a time of danger,

at a time of persecution, when they decreed a prohibition against studying Torah, what is stated in this verse was fulfilled: they had to pay a great deal of money for an answer to a question that

was requested

an answer to, concerning

this halakha:

If she left

the minor

from

her

first husband with a get, and

afterward left

from

her

second husband through refusal—

what is the law concerning her returning to the first?

That is, does the refusal with the other annul his get?

And the Sages had no solution to this question.

They hired one man for four hundred zuz, and asked Rabbi Akiva,

who was imprisoned

in the prison,

because he taught Torah, this question,

and he prohibited

her from returning to her first husband.

And likewise they asked

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,

who was

in Netzivin, and

he too

prohibited!

And according to both of them, we learned in our Mishna the law that the refusal of the other does not come and annul his get.

And now the Gemara brings the words of Rabbi Yishmael ben Rabbi Yosei, who disagrees with Rav:

Rabbi Yishmael ben Rabbi Yosei said: For

this question

this—

we did not need

to ask at all, for it is obvious that she is permitted to return to her first husband.

For if

with regard to the prohibition

of a married woman, which is severe, for a marriage according to Torah entails the punishment of

karet,

you were lenient and

permitted

the annulment of a minor’s marriage through refusal alone, without a get, since her refusal with a husband reveals to us that she is a minor, and therefore her actions have no effect—

with regard to the prohibition

of taking back his divorced wife after she married another, which is only a prohibition of

a negative commandment

alone—

is it not all the more so

that you permitted it through refusal, even through the refusal with the other!

For refusal with the other reveals to us that she is a minor and that her actions have no effect; therefore her betrothal to the first husband also lapses through this refusal, and consequently he is not considered one who takes back his divorced wife!

And now it emerges that what we said, that the words of the Mishna must be divided according to two tannaim, each of whom teaches differently, refers to Rav [who is also considered a tanna], and Rabbi Yishmael ben Rabbi Yosei.

And Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yishmael adds and says:

However,

rather,

this is what they asked: If

she

was

a minor whom her mother or brothers married off—

the wife of his maternal uncle.

She

is forbidden to him only by rabbinic words, and even if she were an adult and her betrothal were according to Torah. For the wife of his maternal uncle is only

“a secondary relation to him,”

and is not forbidden to him as a Torah prohibition of forbidden relations.

And his paternal brother married her, and died,

his brother died, and now this minor falls before him for levirate marriage—

what is the law: may she now refuse,

now, when she is awaiting levirate marriage, in her first marriage to his maternal uncle,

and thereby uproot

them,

the earlier marriages,

of her maternal uncle, so that she will no longer be forbidden to him as a “secondary relation,”

and enter into levirate marriage

with him?

And this question was asked only concerning the prohibitions of secondary relations. But concerning Torah prohibitions of forbidden relations, there is no doubt that even in the marriage of a minor, which is only rabbinic, refusal performed after the brother’s death cannot permit her for levirate marriage!

And the question is: Is there

refusal,

does the refusal of the woman awaiting levirate marriage with regard to her previous marriage help to annul her marriage to her husband

after death

of her husband?

That is, can the refusal with which the woman now awaiting levirate marriage refuses her previous marriage to her deceased husband permit her now for levirate marriage,

in the place of a mitzva

of levirate marriage,

or not,

does refusal now not help with regard to the previous marriage?

They hired two men for four hundred zuz, and they came

and asked Rabbi Akiva in the prison, and he prohibited

permitting her for levirate marriage through refusal with regard to the previous marriage, after the brother’s death.

And likewise they asked

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira in Netzivin, and he prohibited.

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashian said: And Rav concedes,

who disagrees and holds that the refusal of the other does not annul his get,

that

she is forbidden to return only to the divorcer himself, since her refusal with the other was not effective to permit him to take her back after she married another.

But

she is permitted

to marry another after the refusal with the other husband, even

the brother of this one

who divorced her,

to whom she was forbidden

to return after she married another.

Since refusal with the other husband is effective to annul all her previous betrothals, because refusal reveals that she is a minor and that her actions have no effect.

Therefore, after this refusal she is permitted to all the relatives of all her former husbands.

And this refusal was effective for only one matter: so that she could return to the husbands from whom she was divorced and afterward married other husbands. For this is an independent institution of the Sages, that her refusal should not be effective to allow her to return to him, thereby preventing him from having the possibility of removing her from under her husband through his winks and gestures in order to take her back.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

It is obvious

that she is permitted to his brother, for refusal annulled all her marriages to her former husbands, and she is not forbidden to the relatives of her husbands; there was only a special institution of the Sages that the divorcing husband could not take her back after she married, in order to prevent him from enticing her through his winks and gestures to leave her second husband.

After all, only

he,

the divorcing husband,

is he,

he is the one

that

she

recognizes by his gestures and winks.

But

by the gestures and winks of

his brother,

she

does not

recognize him, and he cannot entice her; so what novelty is there in the fact that she is permitted to him!?

And we answer:

Lest you say, let us decree concerning this one,

that she should also be forbidden to his brother,

because of this one,

because of him, lest people who see that she is permitted to his brother say that the get was annulled through refusal with the other, and that she is permitted to return even to the husband who divorced her, also after she married another—

it teaches us

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashian that they did not decree to forbid her to his brother.

And some say

he said as follows:

Rav Yitzhak bar Ashian said: Just as she is forbidden to him, so she is forbidden to the brothers.

And we are astonished:

But she does not recognize their winks and gestures

of the brothers, so why did they forbid her to them?!

And we answer:

A decree

concerning

his brothers—

because of him, because of the divorcing husband, lest they come to permit her to return to him as well, seeing that the prohibition of the relatives of her husband has lapsed from her, and think that even the divorcing husband is permitted to take her back.

because of the husband who divorced her. This was done so that people would not come to permit her to return to him as well, seeing that the prohibition concerning her former husband’s relatives had been removed and thinking that even the husband who divorced her may take her back.

Mishna:

One who divorces a woman and takes her back,

and afterward dies—she is

permitted to the yavam.

That is, we do not say, “The first marriage causes the fall,” meaning that the cause of levirate marriage to the levirating brother begins already with the marriage to the deceased brother; consequently, the “time of the fall” into levirate marriage begins from the time of the deceased brother’s marriage.

For if we say that the first marriage causes the fall, it follows that when the brother divorced her, she became forbidden to the yavam with the prohibition of a brother’s wife not in the place of a mitzva, at the time when she falls to levirate marriage. This prohibition applies to her forever and cannot become permitted even if his brother takes her back, dies, and she falls to levirate marriage because his brother took her back as a wife.

For every prohibition of “a brother’s wife not in the place of a mitzva” that takes effect upon a woman at the time of her fall to levirate marriage never has a dispensation. And a mitzva of levirate marriage that arises afterward cannot permit it.

Rather, on the contrary: once the prohibition of “a brother’s wife not in the place of a mitzva” takes effect upon her at the time of the fall to levirate marriage, she no longer falls to levirate marriage, as is the law with other forbidden relations, which the Torah excluded from the law of levirate marriage.

Rather, only “death causes the fall”: the time of the fall to levirate marriage is only at the time of the brother’s death, and not at the time of the deceased brother’s marriage.

Therefore, her divorce during the brother’s lifetime does not make her eternally forbidden with the prohibition of a brother’s wife not in the place of a mitzva, since this is not the time of the fall to levirate marriage. And if his brother takes her back and dies, she enters into levirate marriage.