Yevamot 104a (קד.) — the Talmud in English

And

so too, a sandal

belonging to a city condemned to destruction, and

so too, a sandal

of an elder made for his honor,

that is, intended for burial shrouds

she may not perform halitza

with them.

And if she performed halitza,

even after the fact,

her halitza is invalid.

The reason in the case of an object used in the worship of an idol is that it can never be nullified and is destined to be burned; therefore, it is considered as though its measure has already been crushed.

A sandal belonging to a city condemned to destruction is likewise destined to be burned, since the law is that all the spoils of the city must be burned.

A sandal used for burial shrouds is invalid for halitza because it was not made for walking.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is the difference

between a sandal

of an elder made for his honor

that it is invalid for halitza? Because

it was not made for walking!

If so, a sandal

of the court,

a sandal of the court designated for halitza, should likewise be invalid, since it

too was not made for walking,

but only for the purpose of halitza in court!

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

If the court’s agent were to walk in it

of the court,

if the court’s agent were to walk in this sandal for any purpose,

would the judge object to it?

It follows that this sandal is also intended for walking, and is therefore valid for halitza.

Mishna:

If she performed halitza at night, her halitza is valid.

And Rabbi Elazar invalidates it.

The reason for their dispute will be explained below in the Gemara.

If she performed halitza with the

left

foot,

the left

of the yavam,

her halitza is invalid.

And Rabbi Elazar deems it valid.

Gemara:

Shall we say that the tanna kamma and Rabbi Elazar disagree about this:

the tanna kamma and Rabbi Elazar:

One master,

the tanna kamma,

holds: We derive

[we juxtapose]

laws

[judgments]

from leprous afflictions,

as it is written: “Every dispute and every affliction.” Leprous afflictions are examined by a koen specifically during the day, as it is written: “And on the day that the affliction appears in him.” Since the laws were juxtaposed to leprous afflictions, we say that laws too are adjudicated specifically during the day. And halitza is a legal proceeding, since she collects her ketuba through the halitza, and therefore it is performed specifically during the day.

And the other master,

Rabbi Elazar,

holds: We do not derive laws from leprous afflictions,

and therefore halitza may be performed both during the day and at night!

And we reject this:

No. For

necessarily,

everyone

holds that

we do not derive laws from leprous afflictions.

Because

if we did derive them,

we would have to say that

even the final pronouncement of judgment may not be made at night.

But we learned in the Mishna in tractate Sanhedrin: “Cases involving monetary law are adjudicated during the day, and the judgment is concluded at night”!

Rather, they certainly do not disagree about this.

Here they disagree about this: One master,

the tanna kamma,

holds: Halitza is comparable to the beginning of a legal proceeding.

And just as the beginning of a legal proceeding is conducted specifically during the day, as we learned in the Mishna cited above, halitza too is performed specifically during the day.

And the other master,

Rabbi Elazar,

holds: Halitza is comparable to the conclusion of a legal proceeding.

And just as the conclusion of a legal proceeding may take place both during the day and at night, so too halitza.

Rabba bar Hiyya Kattusfa'a performed an act

[he performed an act of halitza]

with a felt shoe

made of felt, although it was not made of leather,

and alone,

that is, not in the presence of three,

and at night.

Shmuel said: How great was the power

[how great was the power of Rabba bar Hiyya]

that he acted like an individual,

acting in accordance with the view of a minority authority! He said this as a criticism.

And we inquire:

What difficulty did he have

with Rabba bar Hiyya’s act?

If

what troubled him was that he performed halitza with a

felt shoe,

then

it is taught without attribution

above: “With the wooden leg of a lame person, with a felt shoe, with feet pressed together,” and this is not the view of a minority authority!

And

if

what troubled Shmuel was that Rabba performed halitza at

night,

then this too troubled Shmuel:

but

this too

is taught without attribution

in our Mishna, which states that halitza performed at night is valid!

Rather,

what troubled Shmuel was that Rabba performed halitza

alone.

Samuel.

How could he act alone, since

it is taught as the view of a minority authority!

As we learned: If she performed halitza before two

fit persons,

or

if she performed halitza before

three

people,

and

afterward

one of them was found

of those three

to be a relative or disqualified,

so that ultimately she performed halitza before two,

her halitza is invalid.

And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yohanan the Sandal-Maker deem it valid.

And there was an incident involving a man who performed halitza between himself and her alone

[when only he and his yevama were present]

in a prison, and the matter came before Rabbi Akiva, and he deemed

the halitza valid.

And Rav Yosef bar Minyomi

said in the name of Rav Nahman:

The halakha is not in accordance with that pair,

that is, with Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yohanan.

In any event, we see that the one who deems halitza performed alone valid is Rabbi Akiva, and this is the view of a minority authority!

And if you wish, say: All of them as well,

all those things that Rabba did,

are taught as the view of a minority authority.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha perform halitza with a felt shoe, alone, and at night. We learned in our Mishna:

“With the left foot, her halitza,” and so on.

What is the reason of the Rabbis,

who hold that halitza performed with the left foot is invalid?

Ulla said: We derive

by means of a gzera shava

“foot” “foot” from the leper.

For with regard to halitza it is written: “And she shall remove his shoe from upon his foot,” while with regard to the leper it is written: “Upon the great toe of his right foot.”

Just as there,

in the case of the leper,

the right

is specifically required, as it is written: “His right foot,”

so too here,

with regard to halitza,

the right

is specifically required.

And we raise an objection:

Does Rabbi Elazar not derive

this gzera shava

“foot” “foot” from the leper?!

But was it not taught: Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived with regard to ear-piercing

[that the ear of a Hebrew slave who does not wish to leave after six years is pierced]

that it

is performed

on the right ear?

It is stated here,

with regard to ear-piercing,

“ear,”

as it is written: “And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl,”

and it is stated there,

with regard to the leper,

“ear.” Just as there,

in the case of the leper,

the right

is specifically required,

so too here,

with regard to ear-piercing, the

right ear

is specifically required!

We see that Rabbi Elazar derives the gzera shava “ear” “ear” from the leper with regard to ear-piercing. If so, he can derive from that same gzera shava “foot” “foot” from the leper with regard to halitza!

Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: The positions are reversed

in our Mishna. In truth, Rabbi Elazar, whom we saw elsewhere deriving the gzera shava “ear” “ear” from the leper, must hold here as well that the gzera shava is derived, and therefore he holds that halitza must be performed specifically with the right foot. The tanna kamma, however, holds that the gzera shava is not derived, and therefore the right foot is not specifically required.

Rava said: Actually, do not reverse

the positions. Rabbi Elazar agrees that the gzera shava may be derived specifically with regard to ear-piercing because the two words

“ear” “ear,”

from which the gzera shava is derived,

are superfluous,

for the word “ear” in the section concerning the leper is superfluous and is present for purposes of exposition, as we say in tractate Menaḥot. And with regard to ear-piercing, “ear” is written twice: “And his master shall pierce his ear,” and “you shall place it against his ear.” Necessarily, one of them is superfluous for purposes of exposition.

But the words

“foot” “foot,”

from which the gzera shava is derived with regard to halitza,

are not superfluous

on both sides. Although the word “foot” written with regard to the leper is superfluous, as we said, since the entire passage is stated for purposes of exposition, the word “foot” written with regard to halitza is not superfluous.

Rabbi Elazar holds that when the words from which a gzera shava is derived are superfluous on both sides—that is, when both words of the gzera shava are superfluous—the exposition cannot be refuted. But if they are not superfluous on both sides, even though the word on one side is superfluous, the gzera shava may indeed be derived, but it can be refuted.

And therefore the Gemara asks:

But if the words “

foot, foot” are not superfluous, why still can one not derive from that gzera shava?

What refutation is there,

what refutation is there of the gzera shava?

And we explain: This is what

can be used to refute

the gzera shava:

As for the leper,

who has an additional stringency,

for he requires cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool

for his purification; therefore, one cannot derive the law of halitza from him.

Mishna:

If she removed

his shoe,

and spat

before him,

but did not recite “

So shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house,”

her halitza is valid.

The reason is that with regard to halitza it is written: “So shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house.” The expression “so” indicates that something is indispensable, and the wording “so shall be done” implies that specifically an act prevents the halitza from being valid. This excludes recitation, which is not an act but mere speech.

As follows below.

If she recited

the recitation,

and spat

before him,

but did not remove the shoe, her halitza is invalid.

If she removed the shoe and recited, but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her halitza is invalid.

Rabbi Akiva says: Her halitza is valid.