Yevamot 104b (קד:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said to him:

it is written:

“Thus shall be done,”

and the wording “thus” indicates that it is indispensable. If so, we learn from this verse:

Anything that is an act is indispensable!

But spitting is an act, and therefore it should be indispensable!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Is there proof from there?

It is written:

“Thus shall be done to the man,”

which indicates:

Anything that is an act

of the woman

on

the body of the

man is indispensable.

This excludes spitting, which is not an act performed on the man’s body, but before him.

A deaf-mute

whose halitza was performed [

that is, whose yevama performed halitza for him],

And a deaf-mute woman whose halitza was performed

for a yavam,

And she performs halitza with a minor

In all these cases ,

her halitza is invalid .

The statement that the halitza of a deaf-mute woman is invalid means that she is not released from yibbum through her halitza, and she has no remedy other than yibbum . Then, if the yavam wishes to divorce her, he must divorce her with a bill of divorce.

And the statement that the halitza of a deaf-mute man is invalid means that through the halitza she is disqualified from yibbum when there is another brother who is fit for halitza and yibbum .

A minor who performed halitza must perform halitza

again

when she comes of age .

And if she did not perform halitza

after she came of age,

her halitza

which she performed while a minor

is invalid .

If she performed halitza in the presence of

two

qualified

judges,

or

she performed halitza

in the presence of

three

and one of them was found to be a relative or otherwise disqualified,

so that ultimately she performed halitza only in the presence of two qualified judges,

her halitza is invalid.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker deem it valid .

And there was an incident involving a man who performed halitza between himself and her in a prison, and the case came before Rabbi Akiva, who deemed it valid.

Gemara:

Rava said: Now that you have said

that

the recitation does not

make the halitza indispensable, therefore a mute man and a mute woman,

who cannot recite the passages,

whose halitza they performed is valid.

We learned in the Mishna: A deaf-mute man whose halitza was performed, a deaf-mute woman who performed halitza, and a woman who performed halitza with a minor—their halitza is invalid.

What is the reason

that the halitza of a deaf-mute man and woman is invalid?

Is it not because they are not capable of reciting the passages!?

And we reject this:

No.

In fact, the fact that they are not capable of reciting the passages would not disqualify them. The reason for their disqualification is

that they do not possess legal understanding.

And we object:

If so, a mute man and a mute woman should also be

disqualified. Why are they fit for halitza, seeing that they do not possess legal understanding?!

Rava said:

In fact,

a mute man and a mute woman do possess legal understanding; it is only that their mouths cause them pain [

that is, it is as though their mouths hurt them, and therefore they cannot recite the passages. But in truth they possess legal understanding].

And we object:

But the school of Rabbi Yannai said

that the reason for our Mishna’s ruling that a deaf-mute man and woman are unfit for halitza is

because

they cannot speak. For wherever our Mishna speaks of a deaf-mute, it means one who can neither hear nor speak; and if so,

they are not included

in what the verse states: “And he

shall say,

‘I do not desire to take her,’” referring to the yavam, and

“and she shall say,

‘My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother,’” referring to the yevama!

Rather, when

the statement

of Rava was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter part

of the Mishna;

it was stated

with regard to what we learned in the latter part of the Mishna:

“A deaf-mute man whose halitza was performed, a deaf-mute woman who performed halitza, and a woman who performed halitza with a minor—their halitza is invalid.”

And concerning this

Rava said: Now that you have said that the recitation is indispensable,

which is the reason that a deaf-mute man and woman are unfit for halitza,

therefore, the halitza of a mute man and a mute woman who performed halitza is invalid ,

since they cannot recite the passages .

And

the reason for the first part of the

Mishna,

which teaches that if she did not recite the passage her halitza is valid, is

in

the words of

Rabbi Zeira

below.

For

there is a Mishna in Tractate Menahot: If one says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of sixty-one tenth-measures of fine flour,” he brings sixty seahs in one vessel and one seah in another. The Gemara explains the reason: the Sages determined that sixty tenths are mixed well in a single vessel, but sixty-one are not mixed well.

The Gemara asks: And what if they are not mixed well? What difference does it make? We learned in another Mishna there that if he did not mix the meal-offering at all, it is valid?!

And

Rabbi Zeira said

there that this is the reason:

Anything fit for mixing [

for the mixing]

does not

have the

mixing rendered indispensable for it,

and therefore, if there were sixty tenths in the vessel, which could be mixed properly, then even if he did not mix them at all, the meal-offering is valid.

And

if

anything that is not fit for mixing has its mixing rendered indispensable for it.

For it must be fit for mixing, so that the mitzva of mixing the meal-offering could be fulfilled. Therefore, if he brought sixty-one tenths in a single vessel, which are not fit for the meal-offering to be mixed, the meal-offering is invalid.

The same applies in our case. In fact, the recitation is not indispensable, and therefore our Mishna teaches that if she did not recite the passage, her halitza is valid. But she must be fit to recite it; therefore, a mute man and a mute woman are unfit for halitza .

They sent the following question to Shmuel’s father: A yevama who spat

before the court, not during the fulfillment of the mitzva of halitza,

must perform halitza

with the yavam, and she may no longer enter into yibbum, since she has been disqualified from the brothers through her spitting.

And we say:

This implies that she has been disqualified from the brothers

with regard to yibbum, and therefore she can only perform halitza.

Whose opinion is this?

According to which view was this law stated?

If you say

that it follows the view of

Rabbi Akiva

in our Mishna, who said that if she performed halitza and recited the passage but did not spit, her halitza is valid,

this cannot be so!

Now, if in a place where there is a mitzva,

that is, during the halitza itself,

where it could be said that it is comparable to the sacrificial portions

of an offering,

for when they are absent,

when they are not before us—for example, if they became impure or were lost, and it is impossible to offer them—

they do not prevent

the flesh of the offering from being eaten;

and

nevertheless,

when they are present,

when they are before us,

they prevent

the flesh from being eaten, for until the sacrificial portions have been offered, the flesh is forbidden to eat,

the same could have been said here, with regard to halitza: Although spitting is not an act performed on the man’s body, nevertheless, when it is possible for her to spit, the spitting should be indispensable.

And nevertheless,

Rabbi Akiva said

that spitting

is not indispensable.

If so, we see that spitting is not considered an act of halitza at all; how, then, can it be said that if she spat,

she is disqualified from the brothers

because she began the act of halitza?!

Rather,

what shall we say—that our statement follows

the

view of

Rabbi Elazar

in our Mishna, who said that if she did not spit, her halitza is invalid?

But they are two acts that effect the release,

that is, spitting is part of the act of halitza, together with removing the shoe and reciting the passage, and all these acts together permit the woman to marry outside the levirate bond;

and two acts that effect the release cannot bring about the result independently of one another!

If so, how can spitting alone cause her to be forbidden to the brothers?!

Rather, it is

the view of

Rabbi

that is being followed.

As it is taught in a beraita: The Shavuot lambs do not sanctify

the two

loaves

to become sanctified with inherent sanctity and to become disqualified through leaving the Temple courtyard or through remaining overnight

except through slaughter.

How so?

If he slaughtered them for their sake [

for the sake of the Shavuot lambs],

and he sprinkled their blood for their sake, the two loaves become sanctified.

If he slaughtered them not for their sake, and sprinkled the blood for their sake, the loaves do not become sanctified.

If he slaughtered them for their sake, and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, they become sanctified

to become disqualified through leaving the Temple courtyard and so that they may no longer be redeemed,

but they do not become sanctified

so as to be permitted for eating [Rashi, Pesahim 13b; see there].

This is the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: They never become sanctified until he slaughters them for their sake and sprinkles their blood for their sake.

So too here: Once she spat and performed part of the mitzva of halitza, although the mitzva of halitza was not fulfilled in its entirety, she is nevertheless disqualified from the brothers.

And we wonder:

Did Rabbi Akiva say

that

spitting does not disqualify

the yevama from the brothers?