Yevamot 104b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said to him:

it is written:

“Thus shall it be done,”

and the expression “thus” indicates that it is indispensable. If so, from this verse we learn:

Every act that is an act is indispensable!

And spitting is an act; if so, it should be indispensable!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Is this a proof?

It is written:

“Thus shall it be done to the man,”

which means:

Every act

of the woman

on

the body of the

man is indispensable.

This excludes spitting, which is not an act on the body of the man, but before him.

The deaf-mute

who had halitza performed upon him [

that is, his yevama performed halitza for him],

And the deaf-mute woman who performed halitza

for the yavam,

And she performs halitza for a minor

In all these cases ,

her halitza is invalid .

And this statement—that the deaf-mute woman who performed halitza has invalid halitza—means that through her halitza she is not released from yibum, and she has no remedy except yibum . And then, if the yavam wishes to divorce her, he divorces her with a get.

And regarding a deaf-mute man upon whom halitza was performed, whose halitza is invalid, this means that through the halitza she was disqualified from yibum when there is another brother who is fit for halitza and yibum .

A minor who performed halitza shall perform halitza

again

once she reaches majority .

And if she did not perform halitza

after she reached majority,

her halitza

which she performed as a minor

is invalid .

She performed halitza in the presence of

two

valid

men,

or

she performed halitza

in the presence of

three, and

one of them was found to be a relative or disqualified,

so that in the end she performed halitza only in the presence of two valid men,

her halitza is invalid.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yochanan the Sandalmaker deem it valid .

And there was an incident involving one who performed halitza between himself and her in the prison, and the matter came before Rabbi Akiva, and he deemed it valid.

Gemara:

Rava said: Now that you have said

that

recitation is not

indispensable, therefore a mute man and a mute woman

who are unable to recite,

who performed halitza, their halitza is valid.

We learned in the Mishna: A deaf-mute man upon whom halitza was performed, and a deaf-mute woman who performed halitza, and a woman who performs halitza from a minor—their halitza is invalid.

What is the reason

that the halitza of a deaf-mute man and deaf-mute woman is invalid?

Is it not because they are not fit for recitation!?

And we reject this:

No.

In truth, because they are not fit for recitation they would not be disqualified. The reason for their disqualification is

because they are not people of understanding.

And we raise an objection:

If so, a mute man and a mute woman also,

why are they fit for halitza? After all, they are not people of understanding!?

Rava said:

In truth,

a mute man and a mute woman are people of understanding; it is only their mouths that hurt them [that is, it is as though their mouths hurt them, and therefore they cannot recite. But in truth they are people of understanding].

that is, it is as though their mouths hurt them, and therefore they cannot recite the passage. In truth, however, they possess the necessary understanding.

And we raise an objection:

But the school of Rabbi Yannai said

that the reason for our Mishna, that a deaf-mute man and deaf-mute woman are disqualified from halitza, is

because

they cannot speak. For wherever our Mishna speaks of a deaf-mute, it means one who neither hears nor speaks; and if so,

they are not included

in what Scripture said: “And he

said, ‘I do not wish to take her,’” which is stated regarding the yavam, and

‘I do not desire to take her,’” referring to the yavam, and

“and she said, ‘My yavam refuses to establish a name,’” which is stated regarding the yevama!

‘My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother,’” referring to the yevama!

Rather, when it was stated

the statement

of Rava, it was stated concerning the latter part

of the Mishna;

it was stated

for the latter part of our Mishna, where we learned:

A deaf-mute man upon whom halitza was performed, and a deaf-mute woman who performed halitza, and a woman who performs halitza from a minor—their halitza is invalid.

And concerning this

Rava said: Now that you have said that recitation is indispensable,

which is the reason that a deaf-mute man and deaf-mute woman are disqualified from halitza,

therefore a mute man and a mute woman who performed halitza—their halitza is invalid,

for they are unable to recite .

And

the reason for the first part of the

Mishna,

which teaches that if she did not recite, her halitza is valid, is

according to

the words of

Rabbi Zeira

below.

For

there is a Mishna in Tractate Menachot: One who says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of sixty-one tenths of an ephah of fine flour,” brings sixty tenths in one vessel and one tenth in another vessel. And the Gemara explains the reason: because the Sages have established that sixty tenths are mixed well in one vessel, but sixty-one are not mixed well.

The Gemara asks: And if they are not mixed well, what of it? After all, we learned in another Mishna there that if he did not mix the meal-offering at all, it is valid!?

And

Rabbi Zeira said

there: This is the reason:

Anything fit for mixing [

for the mixing]

does not have

the

mixing be indispensable to it,

and therefore, if there were sixty tenths in the vessel, which can be mixed properly, even if he did not mix them at all, the meal-offering is valid.

And

if

anything that is not fit for mixing has the mixing be indispensable to it.

For we require it to be fit for mixing, so that the mitzva of mixing the meal-offering could be performed with it. Therefore, if he brought sixty-one tenths in one vessel, which are not fit for the meal-offering to be mixed, the meal-offering is invalid.

And the same applies to our matter. In truth, recitation is not indispensable, and therefore we learned in our Mishna that if she did not recite, her halitza is valid. But she must be fit for recitation; therefore, the mute man and mute woman are disqualified from halitza .

They sent to Shmuel’s father: A yevama who spat

before the court, not at the time of fulfilling the mitzva of halitza,

shall perform halitza

for the yavam, and she can no longer enter into yibum, since through her spitting she was disqualified with regard to the brothers.

And we say:

By implication, she was disqualified with regard to the brothers

concerning yibum, and therefore she can only perform halitza.

Whose view is this?

According to which opinion was this law stated?

If you say

it is according to

Rabbi Akiva’s

view in our Mishna, who said that if she performed halitza and recited but did not spit, her halitza is valid,

this cannot be so!

Now, if in a place of mitzva,

that is, at the very time of the halitza,

where it can be said that it is analogous to the sacrificial portions

of an offering,

for when they are not present,

when they are not before us—for example, when they became impure or were lost, and it is impossible to offer them—

they do not prevent

the flesh of the offering from being eaten,

and

nevertheless

when they are present,

when they are before us,

they prevent

the flesh from being eaten, since until the sacrificial portions are offered, the flesh is forbidden to be eaten,

so too it would have been possible to say here, concerning halitza, that although spitting is not an act on the body of the man, nevertheless, if it is possible to spit, the spitting should be indispensable,

and nevertheless

Rabbi Akiva said

that spitting

is not indispensable.

If so, we see that spitting is not considered an act of halitza at all; how, then, can it be said that if she spat

she was disqualified with regard to the brothers

because she began the act of halitza!?

Rather, what shall we say—that our statement is

we must say that our statement is

according to

the view of

Rabbi Elazar,

who said in our Mishna that if she did not spit, her halitza is invalid?

But they are two things that permit,

that is, spitting is part of the act of halitza, together with removing the shoe and the recitation, and all these things together permit the woman to marry outside,

and two things that permit do not bring about the effect of one without the other!

If so, how can spitting alone prohibit her to the brothers!?

Rather, it is according to

the view of

Rabbi.

It is.

As it was taught: The rams of Shavuot do not sanctify

the two

loaves

so that they become sanctified with bodily sanctity and become disqualified through removal outside the Temple courtyard or through remaining overnight

except through slaughter.

How so?

He slaughtered them for their sake

[for the sake of the rams of Shavuot],

and he sprinkled their blood for their sake—the loaves became sanctified.

He slaughtered them not for their sake, and sprinkled for their sake—the loaves did not become sanctified.

He slaughtered them for their sake, and sprinkled their blood not for their sake—the loaves became sanctified

to become disqualified through being taken outside and so that they could no longer be redeemed,

but they did not become sanctified

to become permitted for eating [Rashi, Pesachim 13b; see there].

These are the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: It never becomes sanctified until he slaughters them for their sake and sprinkles their blood for their sake.

So too here: since she spat and performed part of the mitzva of halitza, although the mitzva of halitza was not fulfilled in its entirety, she was nevertheless disqualified with regard to the brothers.

And we are astonished:

Did Rabbi Akiva say

that

spitting does not disqualify

the yevama with regard to the brothers?