Yevamot 103b (קג:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: All the goodness of the wicked

is evil for the righteous,

because the righteous hate the wicked and their souls recoil from deriving pleasure from them. Certainly, Yael did not enjoy Sisera’s coming to her.

As it is stated,

that the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Laban when he pursued Jacob:

“Take heed for yourself that you speak with Jacob neither good nor evil.”

And now,

granted

that he should not speak evil with him—

that is obvious!

It is understandable why He told him not to speak evil with him.

But why not good

should he speak with him?

Rather, learn from this: The goodness of the wicked is evil for the righteous,

as the righteous hate the wicked and their souls recoil from deriving pleasure from them. Therefore, He told him not to speak even good with him, because for the righteous it is evil.

And we raise an objection:

Granted, there,

in the incident involving Laban and Jacob, it is indeed possible that good words that Laban would speak with him would be evil for a righteous person.

And what evil could there be?

Perhaps he would mention to him the name [

lest he mention to him the name ]

of idolatry.

As indeed happened eventually, when Laban said to him: “Why did you steal my gods?”

But here,

in the incident involving Sisera,

what evil is there

in his having intercourse with her?

And we explain:

For he cast into her [

that Sisera cast into her ]

impurity.

For Rabbi Yohanan said: When the serpent came upon Eve

he cast impurity into her.

As for the Israelites who stood at Mount Sinai,

and were there rectified from every blemish,

their impurity ceased [

that same impurity which the serpent had cast into Eve, their mother ],

But

the gentiles, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, did not have their impurity cease.

We learned in our Mishna:

If she performed halitza with a shoe that is not his, and so on.

The Sages taught:

It is written: “And she shall remove

his shoe.” I have only

the shoe of the levir himself. But if the levir wears

the shoe of any other person

someone else,

from where

do we know that it is valid for halitza?

The verse states:

Since the word

“shoe” appears twice: “And she shall remove his shoe,” “the house of the one whose shoe was removed,” it implies

“And she shall remove his shoe,” and “the house of the one whose shoe was removed,” this indicates

in any event,

including even a shoe that is not his.

If so, what does the verse teach by saying “his shoe,”

for it could have written, “And she shall remove a shoe”?

From here we learn:

“His shoe”

means specifically a shoe

that is fit for him,

valid for halitza.

This excludes

a shoe

that is too large, so that he cannot walk in it,

and this excludes

a shoe

that is too small, which does not cover most of his foot,

and this excludes a shoe with a sole [

that has been split ],

which has no heel.

All of these are invalid for halitza.

Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef. A yevama came to perform halitza. He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Abaye:

Give

the levir

your shoe,

so that the yevama could remove it!

He gave him

Abaye gave the levir

a left-foot shoe [

a shoe for the left foot ]. He did so because he thought that a shoe that was not his was not valid ab initio, as will be explained below.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said:

I can say that the Sages said

in the Mishna that halitza performed with a left-foot shoe on the right foot is valid

after the fact.

But

did anyone say so ab initio?

And if so, how did you give him a left-foot shoe ab initio?

He said to him,

Abaye said:

If so, a shoe that is not his as well— I can say that the Sages said

that it is

after the fact

valid,

but did anyone say so ab initio?

And if so, how did you tell me to give the levir my shoe? It is a shoe that does not belong to the levir, and is valid only after the fact!

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said:

This is what I am telling you: Give him

your shoe

and transfer ownership of it to him,

and transfer it to him so that the shoe will be his, in order that the halitza be valid even ab initio.

We learned in our Mishna: Or with

a wooden shoe,

and so on, her halitza is valid.

Who

is the

tanna

who holds this opinion?

Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Meir.

As we learned: A legless person may go out with his wooden stump

on Shabbat,

the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei prohibits it.

We see that Rabbi Meir holds that the wooden stump of a legless person is considered a shoe.

Shmuel’s father says:

Our Mishna is speaking

of

a wooden shoe

covered with leather, and everyone agrees

that when it is covered with leather, everyone considers it a shoe.

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: A shoe [

in which leprosy appeared ]

that was quarantined,

meaning that definitive signs of leprosy were not seen on the garment, and the koen quarantined it for seven days,

she should not perform halitza with it,

lest she come to perform halitza with a shoe that had been definitely declared impure [below it will be explained what this means].

But if she performed halitza

with a quarantined shoe,

her halitza is valid.

But

a shoe that had been definitely declared impure,

meaning that definitive signs of leprosy were seen on it, or that the lesion spread during its quarantine, and it was declared impure for the leper,

she should not perform halitza with it. And if she performed halitza, her halitza is invalid.

The reason is that since the shoe used for halitza must have sufficient size to cover most of his foot, this shoe is invalid, for it lacks the requisite measure: since it is destined to be burned because of the lesion upon it, it is considered already burned, and its measure is regarded as crushed away.

But a quarantined shoe is valid after the fact, since it is not destined to be burned and its measure remains intact. Nevertheless, halitza should not be performed with it ab initio, lest people come to perform halitza with one that had been definitely declared impure.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

Whether a quarantined shoe or a shoe that had been definitely declared impure, she should not perform halitza with it. But if she performed halitza, her halitza is valid.

The Gemara raises an objection: A quarantined house transmits impurity from within,

meaning that if one touched the wall on the inside of the house, although he did not enter his body into the house, in which case he would become impure because of that which is written, “And whoever enters the house shall be impure,” nevertheless he becomes impure.

Whereas a house that is

definitely declared impure

transmits impurity

from within, and

even

from behind,

meaning that even if he touched the rear of the house, and not its interior, he nevertheless becomes impure.

This matter is derived from the verses in Torat Kohanim: A quarantined house transmits impurity from within but not from behind, whereas concerning a house that was definitely declared impure it is written, “It is impure,” adding another form of impurity, to teach you that it transmits impurity even from behind.

Both this and that,

both a quarantined house and a house that was definitely declared impure,

transmit impurity through entry.

That is, if most of him enters its interior, he becomes impure because of “and whoever enters the house.”

And if it enters your mind

that an object destined to be crushed is considered crushed, then here too, the house

should be considered crushed,

since it is destined to be demolished.

But

in order to become impure

we require “whoever enters the house,” and that is absent,

since the house is considered nonexistent!

And we answer:

It is different there, as the verse says: “And he shall demolish the house.”

We see from this verse that

even at the time of demolition

it is still

called a house.

Come and hear: A leprous cloth

that is

three

fingerbreadths

by three

fingers,

even though it does not contain

the measure of

an olive-bulk,

for example, if it was spun from a thin thread, whose bulk is small while its dimensions are large,

once most of it enters a ritually pure house, it renders it impure.

That is, it renders all the vessels in the house impure.

For this is the law: A leper renders impure whatever is in the house when he enters the house. Likewise, a leprous garment and a leprous stone all render impure whatever is in the enclosure. Since most of the cloth enters, it is as though all of it entered, and it renders the house impure.

Is that not

speaking of a cloth

definitely declared impure

with leprosy? And nevertheless we say: Disregard the minority in favor of the majority, and consider it as though the entire cloth entered the house and renders it impure. But if we say that it is considered crushed and its measure obliterated, then only what entered the house should be considered, and there is not a measure of three by three handbreadths of cloth in the house, so the cloth should not render the house impure!

And we reject this:

No.

The beraita is speaking of a cloth

that was quarantined.

But in the case of one that was definitely declared impure, we indeed do not follow the majority.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, say the latter clause: If it contained

the measure of

several olive-bulks,

although it had only the dimensions of three by three fingers, as, for example, if it was woven from a thick thread, whose bulk is large while its dimensions are small,

once an olive-bulk of it enters a ritually pure house,

even though a garment-measure did not enter the house, since the entire garment is only three by three, and most of it did not enter the house, nevertheless

it renders it impure.

And now,

if you say, granted,

that the beraita is speaking of a cloth

that was definitely declared impure, this is

why it renders the house impure through an olive-bulk, even though there is not here a garment measuring three by three, because a leper who was definitely declared impure

is compared [

was compared ]

to a corpse,

and a corpse transmits impurity through an olive-bulk.

And where is he compared to a corpse? For it is written that Aaron said to Moses concerning Miriam when she became leprous: “Let her not be, please, like a corpse.” This means that Miriam was quarantined, and Aaron said to Moses: Let her not become a leper who has been definitely declared impure, so that she will not be like a corpse.

But if you say

that it is speaking of a cloth

that was quarantined, why is it compared to a corpse?

For nowhere do we find that a quarantined leper is compared to a corpse!

And we answer: Rather, it is indeed speaking there of a cloth that was definitely declared impure, and nevertheless we say that the minority follows the majority with regard to impurity, and we do not say that its measure is regarded as crushed, because

it is different there, as the verse says: “And he shall burn the garment,”

implying that

even at the time of burning

it is still

called a garment.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let us derive from it!

That is, if so, let us learn from there even with regard to halitza that a shoe that was definitely declared impure should be considered whole, and we should not say that its measure is crushed away!

And we answer:

We do not derive matters of prohibition from matters of impurity,

because the laws of impurity are a novelty, and one does not derive from them for other matters.

Rava said: The halakha is: Whether a quarantined shoe, a shoe that was definitely declared impure, or a shoe of idolatry,

meaning one placed on an idol when it is transported from place to place,

she should not perform halitza

with them ab initio.

And

nevertheless,

if she performed halitza

after the fact,

her halitza is valid.

The reason for Rava’s ruling is as follows:

With regard to a shoe that was definitely declared impure, as we said above, even at the time of burning it is called a garment, and therefore we do not say that its measure is crushed away.

As for one of idolatry, since the shoe is designated for walking, it is therefore valid for halitza. A shoe is considered an accessory of idolatry and is not destined to be burned, because it can be rectified through nullification. And although it is prohibited to derive benefit from accessories of idolatry, halitza is not considered benefit, for mitzvot were not given in order to derive benefit from them.

But a shoe

of an offering to idolatry,

meaning that it was offered and presented before the idol as a gift,