Yevamot 103b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: All the goodness of the wicked ![](pamud.bmp "

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is evil for the righteous,

because the righteous hate the wicked, and their souls are disgusted by deriving benefit from them. And certainly Jael did not derive benefit from Sisera’s coming to her.

As it is stated,

for the Holy One, blessed is He, said to Laban when he pursued Jacob:

“Beware for yourself lest you speak with Jacob from good to evil.”

And now,

granted

that he should not speak with him

evil—may he live!

It is understandable why He said to him that he should not speak with him evil.

But why not good

should he speak with him?

Rather, learn from here: The goodness of the wicked is evil for the righteous,

for the righteous hate the wicked, and their souls are disgusted by deriving benefit from them. And therefore He said to him that he should not speak with him even good, because for the righteous it is evil.

And we raise an objection:

Granted, there,

in the incident of Laban and Jacob, it is indeed possible that good speech which Laban would speak with him would be evil for a righteous person.

And what is the evil that there could be?

Perhaps he would mention to him the name [

lest he mention to him the name ]

of idolatry.

As indeed happened in the end, when Laban said to him: “Why did you steal my gods?”

But here,

in the incident of Sisera,

what evil is there

in his having intercourse with her?

And we explain:

For he cast into her [

which Sisera cast into her ]

filth.

For Rabbi Yohanan said: When the serpent came upon Eve,

he cast filth into her.

Israel who stood at Mount Sinai,

and were repaired there from every defect,

their filth ceased [

that same filth which the serpent cast into Eve, their mother ],

But

the gentiles, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, their filth did not cease.

We learned in our Mishna:

If she performed halitza with a sandal that is not his, and so forth.

The Sages taught:

It is written: “And she shall remove

his shoe.” I have only

the shoe of the halitza performer himself. But if the halitza performer wears

the shoe of any person

else,

from where

do we know that it is valid for halitza?

The verse teaches:

Since it is written twice

“shoe, shoe”:

“And she shall remove his shoe,” “the house of the one whose shoe was removed”—it implies

in any event,

including even a shoe that is not his.

If so, what does the verse teach by saying “his shoe,”

since it would have been possible to write “And she shall remove a shoe”?

From here we learn:

“His shoe”

means specifically a shoe

appropriate for him,

which is valid for halitza.

Except for a

shoe

that is large, so that he cannot walk in it,

and except for a

shoe

that is small, so that it does not cover most of his foot,

and except for a sandal with a sole [

that has been hollowed out ],

which has no heel.

For all these are not valid for halitza.

Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef. A yevama came to perform halitza. He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Abaye:

Give

the yavam your

sandal,

so that the yevama may remove it!

He gave him

Abaye gave the yavam

a sandal of the left [

a sandal for the left foot ]. And he did this because he thought that a sandal that is not his is not valid ab initio. And as will be explained below.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said:

I would say that the Sages said

in the Mishna that halitza with a left-foot sandal on the right foot is valid

after the fact.

But

did anyone say [it is permitted] ab initio?

And if so, how did you give him a left-foot sandal ab initio?

He said to him,

Abaye said:

If so, with regard to a sandal that is not his as well, I would say that the Sages said

that it is

after the fact

valid,

but did anyone say [it is permitted] ab initio?

And if so, why did you tell me to give the yavam my sandal? After all, this is a sandal that does not belong to the yavam, and it is valid only after the fact!

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said:

This is what I am saying to you: Give him

your sandal

and transfer ownership of it to him,

and transfer it to him so that the sandal will be his, in order that the halitza be valid even ab initio.

We learned in our Mishna: Or with

a wooden sandal

and so forth, her halitza is valid.

Who

is the

tanna

who holds this view?

Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Meir.

For we learned: A person who is missing a leg may go out with his wooden prosthesis

on Shabbat,

the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei prohibits it.

It is evident that Rabbi Meir holds that the wooden prosthesis of one who is missing a leg is considered a shoe.

Shmuel’s father says:

Our Mishna is speaking

of a

wooden sandal

covered with leather, and it is the view of everyone,

for one covered with leather is considered a shoe according to everyone.

Rav Papi said in the name of Rava: A sandal [

in which leprosy appeared ]

under observation,

that is, complete signs of leprosy were not seen on the garment, and the koen quarantined it for seven days,

she should not perform halitza with it,

lest she come to perform halitza with a sandal that has been declared definitive [below it will be explained what “definitive” means].

And if she performed halitza

with the sandal under observation,

her halitza is valid.

But

a sandal that has been definitively declared,

that is, complete signs of leprosy were seen in it, or the lesion spread in it during the days of its quarantine, and it was declared definitive for the leper,

she should not perform halitza with it. And if she performed halitza, her halitza is invalid.

And the reason is that since the shoe used for halitza must have a measure sufficient to cover most of his foot, this shoe is invalid, for it has no measure: since it is destined to be burned because of the lesion in it, it is like something burned, and its measure is crushed away.

But a sandal under observation is valid after the fact. For it is not destined to be burned, and its measure remains. Nevertheless, one should not perform halitza with it ab initio, lest they come to perform halitza with one definitively declared.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

Whether a sandal under observation or a sandal definitively declared, she should not perform halitza with it. And if she performed halitza, her halitza is valid.

It was objected: A house under observation transmits impurity from within it,

that is, if he touched the wall that is inside the house, even though his body did not enter the house—in which case he would become impure because of that which is written, “And he who enters the house shall be impure”—nevertheless, he becomes impure.

Whereas a house

definitively declared

transmits impurity

from within it, and

also

from behind it,

that is, even if he touched the back of the house, and not its interior, nevertheless he becomes impure.

And this matter is learned from the verses in the Sifra: one under observation transmits impurity from within it but not from behind it, whereas regarding one definitively declared it is written, “It is impure”; it added another impurity for it, to tell you that it transmits impurity even from behind it.

And both this and that,

whether a house under observation or a house definitively declared,

transmit impurity through entering.

That is, if most of him entered into it, he is impure because of “And he who enters the house.”

And if it enters your mind

that something destined to be crushed is considered as crushed, if so, here too, the house

is considered as crushed,

since its law is that it must be demolished.

But

in order to become impure

we require “And he who enters the house,” and there is none,

since the house is as though it does not exist!

And we answer:

It is different there, for the verse says: “And he shall demolish the house.”

It is evident from this verse that

even at the time of demolition

it is still

called a house.

Come and hear: A cloth

afflicted with leprosy,

which has

a size of

three by three

fingerbreadths,

even though it does not have

the measure of

an olive-bulk,

for example, it was spun from a thin thread, whose volume is small while its measured area is large,

once most of it enters a pure house, it renders it impure.

That is, it rendered all the vessels of the house impure.

For this is the law: a leper renders impure that which is in the house by his entering the house. And likewise an afflicted garment and an afflicted stone—all of them render impure that which is in the tent. And since most of the cloth entered, it is as though all of it entered, and it rendered the house impure.

Is it not

speaking of a cloth

definitively declared

for leprosy? And even so we say: cast the minority after the majority, and it is considered as though all of it entered the house and renders it impure. But if we say that it is considered as crushed, then only what entered the house is significant, and there is not in the house a cloth measuring three by three, so the cloth should not render the house impure!

And we reject this:

No.

The beraita is speaking of a cloth

under observation.

But with one definitively declared, indeed we do not follow the majority.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, say the latter clause: If there were in it

in the cloth a measure of

several olive-bulks,

even though it had only the size of three by three fingerbreadths—that is, for example, it was woven from a thick thread, whose volume is large while its measured size is small—

once an olive-bulk of it enters a pure house,

even though a measure of a garment did not enter the house, for the entire garment is only three by three, and most of it did not enter the house, nevertheless

it renders it impure.

And now,

if you grant

that the beraita is speaking of a cloth

definitively declared, this is

why it renders impure with an olive-bulk even though there is not here a garment measuring three by three: because a leper definitively declared

was likened [

was compared ]

to a corpse,

and a corpse transmits impurity with an olive-bulk.

And where was he likened? For it is written that Aaron said to Moses concerning Miriam when she became afflicted with leprosy: “Let her not be, please, like a corpse.” That is, Miriam was under observation, and Aaron said to Moses: Let her not, please, become definitively declared a leper, so that she should not be like a corpse.

But if you say

that it is speaking of a cloth

under observation, why was it likened to a corpse?

After all, nowhere do we find that a leper under observation was likened to a corpse!

And we answer: Rather, indeed, there it is speaking of a cloth definitively declared, and even so we say that the minority follows the majority with regard to impurity, and we do not say that it is considered crushed, because

it is different there, for the verse says: “And he shall burn the garment,”

which implies that

even at the time of burning

it is still

called a garment.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let us derive from it!

That is, if so, let us learn from there also with regard to halitza, that a sandal definitively declared should be considered whole, and we should not say that its measure is crushed away!

And we answer:

We do not derive a prohibition from impurity,

because the laws of impurity are an innovation, and one does not learn from them for other matters.

Rava said: The halakha is: Whether a sandal under observation, or a sandal definitively declared, or a sandal of idolatry,

that is, one places it on the image when transporting it from place to place,

she should not perform halitza

with them ab initio.

And

nevertheless,

if she performed halitza

after the fact,

her halitza is valid.

And the reason for Rava’s ruling is:

With regard to the sandal definitively declared, as we said above, even at the time of burning it is called a garment, and therefore we do not say that its measure is crushed away.

And with regard to that of idolatry, since the sandal is designated for walking, it is therefore valid for halitza. And a sandal is considered an accessory of idolatry, and it is not destined to be burned, because it can be remedied through nullification. And even though it is forbidden to derive benefit from accessories of idolatry, halitza is not considered benefit, for mitzvot were not given for deriving benefit.

But a sandal

of an offering to idolatry,

that is, they sacrificed it and placed it before the image as a gift,