Temurah 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

Ravina said: Actually

the beraita is speaking

of an unblemished animal,

but nevertheless, the beraita presents no difficulty to Rav Naḥman, because it is not speaking of a firstborn animal designated for sacrifice. Rather, it is speaking:

of a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael,

where the kohen acquires it while it is alive, and does not acquire it from the table of the Most High, since presumably it is not designated for sacrifice, as will be explained.

Therefore, Rav Naḥman concedes that it belongs to the kohen, just as peace-offerings belong to him while alive, until he offers them.

That is to say: Indeed, if they were to bring it from outside Eretz Yisrael to the Temple and offer it, the kohen would acquire it from the table of the Most High. But since it is not designated for that purpose, it belongs to him without acquisition from the table of the Most High. And it is concerning this firstborn animal that the beraita said that it is called “with its fellow

And

the beraita

is the view of Rabbi Shimon, who says:

Ideally, one need not bring firstborn animals from outside Eretz Yisrael in order to offer them. But after the fact,

if unblemished animals came, they are offered.

And since it is not brought ab initio, it is not “designated for sacrifice.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

The Gemara cites our Mishna in order to challenge the words of Rav Naḥman.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to him: What difference is there if he may not effect temura with a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, since

they do not belong to the kohen,

as

the kohanim

do not acquire them during their lifetimes; can you say the same with regard to a firstborn animal, which they acquire during its lifetime

and it therefore belongs to the kohen? Why, then, may he not effect temura with it?

The Gemara clarifies:

With what are we dealing? If you say it is during

the present time,

that cannot be said, because

it teaches the firstborn animal by analogy to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering—the Mishna compares the firstborn animal to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, whereas in the present time there are no sin-offerings or guilt-offerings—

The Mishna compares a firstborn animal to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, whereas during the present time there are no sin-offerings or guilt-offerings—

Rather, it is obvious

that the Mishna is speaking

of the time when the Temple is standing.

And if it is speaking of a firstborn animal with a defect,

that too cannot be said, because

ultimately, it teaches the firstborn animal by analogy to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering—

It certainly speaks of unblemished sin-offerings and guilt-offerings. Concerning them the Mishna taught that the kohanim do not acquire them “during their lifetimes”; they do not acquire them “during their lifetimes,” but after slaughter they do acquire them. Whereas sin-offerings and guilt-offerings with defects

are not acquired by them either during their lifetimes or after their deaths.

Rather, it is obvious

that the Mishna is speaking

of an unblemished animal. And it teaches:

A firstborn animal

“which they acquire during its lifetime.”

And this presents a difficulty to Rav Naḥman, who holds that the kohen does not acquire it during its lifetime?

And we reject this:

Ravina said: This too

the Mishna is speaking

of a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, and

the Mishna is the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who says: If unblemished animals came, they are offered;

ideally, they should not be brought, and therefore it is presumed not to be designated for sacrifice. Consequently, the kohen acquires it during its lifetime. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri therefore holds that the kohen may effect temura with it during its lifetime. Rabbi Akiva disputes him, as explained in the Mishna, because temura must be performed in the owner’s domain, and that owner is the Israelite in whose herd it was born.

After all the challenges to Rav Naḥman have been rejected, the Gemara discusses:

Is it possible to say that Rav Naḥman’s opinion is

subject to a dispute between tannaim—

that Rav Naḥman’s words depend on the dispute between tannaim who disagree over whether the kohen acquires an unblemished firstborn animal during its lifetime when the Temple is standing, and that not all tannaim agree with him? For we learned in a beraita:

A firstborn animal in the owner’s domain effects temura; in the kohen’s domain it does not effect temura,

the words of the first tanna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Once it has come into the possession of a kohen, one may not effect temura.

And the beraita requires explanation, for Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s words

are identical to

the words of

the first tanna?

Is it not that we should interpret it as

follows:

This is what it says:

A firstborn animal in the owner’s domain—the owner effects temura.

In the domain of a kohen, he

the kohen

effects temura, but the owner,

the Israelite in whose herd the firstborn animal was born,

does not effect temura.

The kohen effects temura because it now belongs to him.

Apparently,

the first tanna holds that

the kohen has an acquisition in it.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that once it comes into the possession of the kohen, the kohen does not effect temura, because he follows Rav Naḥman and holds that the kohen has no acquisition in it. The difficulty is: Is it possible to say that this is subject to a dispute between tannaim?

And we reject this:

It is not difficult. This is the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, and that is the view of Rabbi Akiva.

Actually, with regard to a live, unblemished firstborn animal in Eretz Yisrael, during the time when the Temple is standing, everyone agrees with Rav Naḥman, and the kohen cannot effect temura with it, since it does not belong to him, like a sin-offering or a guilt-offering.

The dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar concerns a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael. With regard to such an animal, Rav Naḥman holds that everyone agrees that it is the kohen’s property. Therefore, the first tanna holds that the kohen can effect temura with it, in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s position in the Mishna—and the Mishna too speaks of a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, as Ravina established it according to Rav Naḥman. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar follows the method of Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, he holds that the kohen cannot consecrate it, since it is not in the “owner’s domain,” even though it belongs to him and he acquired it during its lifetime.

We learned in a beraita: A firstborn in the owner’s house performs substitution,

Another version:

Is it possible to say that this is subject to a dispute between tannaim?

We learned in a beraita:

A firstborn animal in the owner’s domain effects temura,

the owner, and not the kohen.

In the kohen’s domain, “neither one nor the other”

both the owner and the kohen

may effect temura. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Once it has come into the possession of a kohen, one may not effect temura.

The words of the beraita require explanation, for Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s words

are identical to

the words of

the first tanna?

Is it not that we should interpret the beraita

as saying:

Is the dispute between them whether or not Rav Naḥman’s position applies?

The first tanna holds that neither one may effect temura, because he follows Rav Naḥman and the kohen does not own it. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that once it has come into the possession of a kohen, the “owner” may not effect temura, whereas the kohen may, since he acquired it and it now belongs to him—contrary to Rav Naḥman’s words.

The difficulty is: Is it possible to say that this is subject to a dispute between tannaim?

And we reject this:

No! Everyone accepts Rav Naḥman’s position

with regard to a live, unblemished firstborn animal in Eretz Yisrael during the time of the Temple,

and here

the beraita is speaking of a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, and they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and Rabbi Akiva.

The first tanna follows Rabbi Akiva and therefore holds that although it is the kohen’s property, he cannot effect temura with it, since it is not in the “owner’s domain.” Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar follows Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and therefore holds that since it is a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael and belongs to him, he can effect temura with it.

Another version:

According to this version, the questioner understood that the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar never disputed the law of temura, and everyone holds that one cannot effect temura even with a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, since it is not “in the owner’s domain.” Rather, the questioner inferred from the words of the first tanna that he holds that the kohen may not effect temura but may sell it, contrary to Rav Naḥman, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that he may not sell it, in accordance with Rav Naḥman .

And we reject this: No, everyone follows Rav Naḥman, and a firstborn animal in Eretz Yisrael during the time of the Temple may not be sold. The first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar disagree with regard to a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, and their dispute follows that of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and Rabbi Akiva.

We learned in the Mishna: “A firstborn animal may be sold when unblemished and alive” .

Rav Ḥisda said: They taught

that it is permitted to sell it

only when a kohen

sells it

to a kohen.

But a kohen may not sell it to an Israelite

to sell it.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Perhaps the Israelite will go—the Israelite who purchased it—

and inflict a defect in it,

and deliberately cause a defect in it,

and bring it

to a sage,

and say to him

to the sage:

“The kohen gave me this firstborn animal with its defect,

and the defect occurred while it was under the kohen’s authority.” The sage will believe him and permit it contrary to halakha .

And why would the sage believe him? Because of the halakha that we learned [Bekhorot 35a]: With regard to all defects that could have been caused by a person, where it is possible to say that a person inflicted them—for example, its eye was blinded or its hand was severed [excluding congenital defects, such as an animal with five legs]—Jewish shepherds are trusted to say that the defects occurred on their own. Since the sage would believe him, it is prohibited to sell it to an Israelite.

But it is permitted to sell it to a kohen, since kohen shepherds are not trusted, and kohanim were suspected with regard to firstborn animals, as explained there. When a firstborn animal is brought to a sage for permission, witnesses must be brought to testify that the particular defect occurred on its own. Therefore, it is permitted to sell it to a kohen, since the sage will not permit it until witnesses are brought.

We challenge this reason:

Can a sage permit it in this manner?

Can the sage permit it solely on the basis of his statement that he received an animal with a defect from the kohen?!

But Rav Yehuda said:

The Sages do not

examine

a firstborn animal belonging to an Israelite unless a kohen is with him,

because they suspect him of having a firstborn animal born in his herd and wanting to evade giving it to the kohen, while being concerned only about the prohibition of “sacred animals outside [the Temple].” Therefore, he must bring a kohen with him, so that he can give it to him.

If so, this is difficult: Why should we be concerned that the Israelite will inflict a defect in it by saying that the kohen gave it to him with its defect? The kohen whom he brought with him, who according to his claim sold it to him, will contradict him! And we answer:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

Indeed, this is not the reason that Rav Ḥisda prohibited selling it to an Israelite. Rather,

this is the reason an Israelite is prohibited

and the reason that an Israelite may not purchase an unblemished firstborn animal from a kohen is

because he appears like a kohen assisting at the granary—

winnowing and gathering produce so that the terumot will be given to him. This is prohibited because it constitutes a desecration of God’s Name, as it appears that he is receiving the terumot as payment for his labor.

And likewise, this priest, who sells to an Israelite, appears as though he is selling it cheaply [and ordinarily an unblemished firstborn animal nowadays is sold cheaply, since it is not fit to be eaten immediately until a blemish occurs, and meanwhile the purchaser must keep it and cannot profit from its shearing or labor] so that he will give him other firstborn animals that will be born in his flock.

Rav Ashi disagrees with Rav Ḥisda and maintains that this reason—that he appears to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors—applies only when he gives the Israelite the firstborn as a gift, but not when he sells it to him.

The Gemara relates an incident that occurred:

Mar Zutra happened to come to the house of

he arrived at the home of

Rav Ashi.

The members of the household said to him

the members of the household said to Mar Zutra:

Let the master taste something,

let him eat something!

They brought meat before him

, and

said to him,

when they served him the meat:

Let the master eat, for it is healthy,

this meat is healthy,

because it is a firstborn

firstborn meat

it is!

as its meat is healthier than other meat.

He said to them:

From where do you have this?

How do you know that it is firstborn meat? Are you not priests?

They said to him, because so-and-so priest

sold it to us

a certain priest.

He said to them: Do you not accept

do you not maintain

that which Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said,

that it is forbidden to purchase a firstborn from a priest,

because he appears to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors?

They said to him: We do not accept it,

indeed, we do not maintain this,

because we purchased it,

we bought it, and there is no concern that we appear to be assisting him, since he did not give it to us as a gift.

He said to them: Do you not accept,

do you not maintain

that which we learned,

that which we learned in the Mishna in tractate Bekhorot [26b]:

How long is an Israelite obligated to care for a firstborn

nowadays—to take the trouble to raise it before giving it to a priest?

With

a small

animal—

thirty days,

and with a large animal—

fifty days. If during this period he says to the priest, “Give it to me

and I will care for it,”

he may not give it to him.

And Rav Sheshet said: What is the reason

why may he not give it to him?

Because he appears to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors,

as the priest takes it and is prepared to trouble himself with it so that the owner will give it to him rather than to another priest.

They said to him: There,

when he takes it before its appointed time,

the matter is evident

it is evident that he takes it so that the owner will not give it to another priest, since this is why the priest is prepared to care for it already at that point.

But

here, we are purchasing it.

When we purchased it from him, he does not appear to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors.

An alternative version .

He said to them: Have you not heard that which Rav Ḥisda said

etc.,

and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Because he appears to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors?!

They said to him: We have not heard it. That is, we do not accept it!

We do not accept at all that there is a prohibition because one “appears to be assisting.”

He said to them: But it is a Mishna, as we learned

etc.

And Rav Sheshet said, “Because he appears to be a priest who assists at the threshing floors”?

How can you say, “We do not accept it,” when it is stated in a Mishna?

They said to him

to Mar Zutra:

There, he does not pay money,

he does not give the priest money for the firstborn; rather, the priest cares for it gratuitously so that they will give it to him and not to another. But

here, we did pay money,

after all, we purchased it from the priest, and he is not doing us a favor so that we will give one to him at another time!

What will you say

if you have an answer to this—that there is nevertheless concern

perhaps the priest lowers the price for him,

perhaps he sells it cheaply because

he thinks that when he has

this Israelite has

another firstborn, he will give it to me!

as the priest calculates that the Israelite will give it to him at another time. This

does not enter his mind,

the priest does not take this into consideration, because

he does not forgo something certain that he holds in his hand,

he does not relinquish the firstborn that the Israelite certainly has in his possession and lower its price

and seize something uncertain, for he does not know whether he will give it to him or not

relying on the possibility that the Israelite might give it to him another time, since perhaps he will not give it to him, and he does not rely on that.