Temurah 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

He raised an objection to him:

from what we learned in a beraita:

It is stated concerning a firstborn:

(Numbers 18:17)

“It shall not be redeemed,”

it has no redemption by which the redemption proceeds—whether the animal or the money—would enter sanctity while the animal itself would become non-sacred,

but it is sold

it:

the kohen may sell it, and the purchaser eats it in a state of sanctity. It will be explained below whether this refers to an unblemished firstborn, in which case it means that a kohen eats it with the sanctity of a sacrifice, or to one with a blemish, whose sanctity means that it may not be slaughtered in a butcher’s shop or weighed by the pound.

The Gemara clarifies:

What are we dealing with?

With which firstborn does the beraita learn from the exposition of the verses that it cannot be redeemed

? If you say

it is a firstborn

nowadays,

and it is concerning such an animal that the Torah said that it has no redemption,

say the latter clause:

state the end of the verse, which says: “Only the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred.”

“You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar,”

“and their fat you shall burn as a fire-offering for a pleasing fragrance to the Lord”; but

is there an altar nowadays?

Rather, it is obvious

that the verse expounded by the beraita is speaking

of the time when the Temple is standing.

And what are we dealing with

—which firstborn is being discussed as not redeemable?

If you say it is one with a blemish, say the latter clause,

state the end of the verse,

“You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar, and their fat you shall burn.” And if it is one with a blemish,

is it fit for sacrifice,

is it in fact fit to be offered as a sacrifice?

Rather, is it not the case that

the beraita is speaking

of an unblemished animal,

during the time of the Temple,

and

nevertheless

it teaches: It is sold.

Apparently, the kohen has a right of ownership in it.

But this is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who says that it cannot be sold.

And we reject this:

Does it necessarily follow?

Is this truly a difficulty?! Indeed, the discussion is about the time of the Temple; however,

the first clause

of the verse, from which we inferred that it is sold, is speaking

of an animal with a blemish, whereas the latter clause,

which mentions sprinkling and burning, is speaking

of an unblemished animal.

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection:

Rav Mesharsheya cites a Mishna in tractate Yevamot (99b) to challenge Rav Naḥman’s statement.

The Mishna discusses a case of uncertain priestly status, in two forms. In the first, the wife of a kohen and her maidservant gave birth at the same time, and the offspring became intermingled; thus, in the case of each one, there is uncertainty whether he is a kohen or a slave of a kohen.

The second case is that after these individuals of uncertain status grew up, they emancipated one another: each one wrote a bill of emancipation for the other, subject to the uncertainty—“If I am the master and you are the slave, you are hereby free.” Following the emancipation, each one is of uncertain status, either a kohen or an emancipated slave, and his status is that of an Israelite.

In the first case there is both a stringency and a leniency. The stringency is that neither may marry an Israelite woman, since perhaps he is a slave, who is forbidden to an Israelite woman. The leniency is that both eat teruma, since even a slave of a kohen eats teruma. However, the tanna of this Mishna holds that teruma is not apportioned to them when they are alone, because “teruma is not apportioned to a slave unless his master is with him”; perhaps observers will see that teruma is being apportioned to him, assume that he is a kohen, and raise him to priestly status with regard to the other laws of the priesthood.

The second case likewise involves a leniency and a stringency. The leniency is that now both are permitted to marry an Israelite woman, since an emancipated slave may also marry an Israelite woman. The stringency is that they may not eat teruma, since there is uncertainty regarding each one: perhaps he is not a kohen, and an emancipated slave of a kohen may not eat teruma.

The Mishna there discusses many other laws resulting from their uncertain status, and the Mishna is cited here in abridged form and with its order changed.

Among the other matters discussed there, the Mishna addresses a firstborn born among their herds, as will be explained.

A woman of priestly status,

the wife of a kohen,

whose

offspring became intermingled with the offspring of her maidservant,

and it is not known which of them is a kohen and which is a slave,

these

eat teruma and receive one portion at the granary. When the intermingled offspring grew up, they emancipate

one another

and may not eat teruma.

As for their firstborn,

born in the herd of one of them,

they shall graze until they become blemished,

until a defect occurs in them,

and they shall eat them once they are blemished.

They do not give the animal to a kohen, as will be explained.

The Gemara clarifies the law stated by the Mishna concerning the firstborn:

What are we dealing with,

which firstborn is being discussed, one for which there is no remedy while it is alive until a defect occurs in it?

If you say

that it is a firstborn

nowadays,

this is difficult:

What is the difference between ours and theirs?

What distinguishes their firstborn from ours—that is, from other firstborn born in the herd of an Israelite? After all,

ours also require blemishes,

and without a blemish there is no remedy allowing it to be eaten.

Rather,

is it

not

the case

that the Temple is standing?!

Therefore, our firstborn are given to a kohen as an entirely unconditional gift while they are unblemished, and the kohen slaughters them in the Temple and eats them.

This is unlike the firstborn of the intermingled individuals. For, on the one hand, they possess the sanctity of a firstborn, but each one is forbidden to eat it, because perhaps he is an Israelite [a non-kohen], who is forbidden to eat a firstborn when it is offered as a sacrifice. Nor does he wish to give it to a kohen for nothing. Therefore, he prefers to wait until a defect occurs in it and then eat it.

When a defect occurs in it, it is permitted to eat it, because the prohibition against a non-kohen eating it no longer applies; only the obligation to give it to a kohen remains, and if he does not give it to a kohen, he is subject to the prohibition against robbery. When does this prohibition apply? In the case of an Israelite. But in the case of one whose status as a kohen is uncertain, he is not even subject to the prohibition against robbery, since he can claim: “Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to him.” Therefore, he does not give it to a kohen while it is unblemished, because it is worthwhile for him to wait until a defect occurs.

And now,

, granted, if you say: He has

a kohen’s right of ownership in it, this is well:

this intermingled individual has the power to keep it in his possession and say: “Perhaps I am a kohen, and I acquired it first; I am not prepared to give it to another kohen for nothing. I will wait until a defect occurs so that I can eat it”—

But if you say that he does not have

a kohen’s right of ownership in the firstborn at all while it is alive, this is difficult: Why is he permitted to prevent it from being offered upon the altar?

Let the treasurer come,

let the treasurer come

and take it,

taking it against his will, offering it, and giving it to the kohanim of the priestly watch. After all, according to Rav Naḥman, a kohen has no right in a firstborn while it is alive. It must therefore be said that he does have a right of ownership in it while it is alive, which is difficult for Rav Naḥman.

And we reject this:

Actually,

the case is

nowadays,

and therefore he does not eat it until a defect occurs.

As for what is difficult for you—what is the difference between ours and theirs,

since every firstborn is kept until a defect occurs—the distinction is simple:

we,

we Israelites,

give it to a kohen once it is blemished,

and we are forbidden to retain it for ourselves because of the robbery of the kohen. But

they,

the intermingled individuals,

since there is an element of priestly status among them,

since each one claims that he is the kohen,

remove it from the kohanim

by exempting it from being given to a kohen, as explained: he claims, “Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to you.” When a defect occurs in it, he eats it, as explained, because he is not subject to the prohibition against robbery with regard to it.

This resolves the matter: the Mishna is not teaching anything about the prohibition against eating it until it becomes blemished, but rather about exemption from the obligation to give it to a kohen.

Another version:

If you say

that the Mishna is speaking of a firstborn

nowadays,

this is difficult:

Why specifically

did the Mishna speak only of

the firstborn of these individuals of uncertain status,

when

even

the firstborn

of ours—

must also graze?

Rather, it is obvious

that the case is

when the Temple is standing.

And

which firstborn is being discussed?

If it is one with a blemish,

did the Mishna say concerning one with a blemish

“They shall graze until they become blemished”—they are already blemished and exist?!

A blemish has already occurred in it.

Rather, it is obvious

that the case is

of unblemished animals. And these

—these intermingled individuals—

are the ones who cannot sell them,

as they are forbidden to sell them, since each one is possibly an Israelite who is obligated to give the animal to a kohen as a free gift. And we infer:

but certainly identified kohanim may sell them;

they are permitted to sell a live, unblemished animal even while the Temple is standing. This is difficult for Rav Naḥman.

And we reject this:

Actually,

the case is

nowadays. As for what is difficult for you—“even ours must also graze,”

there is no difficulty here, because

we,

we Israelites,

cannot drive it away from the kohen

who claims it, and we are obligated to give it to him, because

there is no uncertainty regarding priestly status here.

This is unlike

these individuals of uncertain status, who drive away the kohen,

rejecting the kohen’s claim, and

each and every one says to the kohen, “I am the kohen,” and “I am the kohen,”

and “Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to you.”

This is the principal novel point of the Mishna: that he is not obligated to give it to a kohen, as explained.

He raised an objection:

The Gemara cites a beraita in tractate Sanhedrin (112b) concerning an apostate city, to challenge Rav Naḥman’s statement.

The Torah says in the passage concerning an apostate city (Deuteronomy 13): “You shall utterly destroy it and all that is in it, and its animals, with the sword. And you shall gather all its spoil into the midst of its open square, and burn with fire the city and all its spoil.”

And the beraita says:

Rabbi Shimon says:

The Torah says

“its animals,”

and we expound: its own animals, in which the Most High has no share—

excluding the firstborn animals and the animal tithe in it

—if there were firstborn animals there, or an animal tithe belonging to an Israelite, whose fat and blood are offered, they are not destroyed with the city, because they are not called “its animals.”

It is further stated

“its spoil,”

and we expound: its own spoil, in which the Most High has no share—

excluding the money of second tithe in it,

which is inside the city, for the money is not destroyed.

The Gemara clarifies:

What are we dealing with,

what is the beraita discussing?

If you say it is nowadays, is there

is there in fact nowadays

an apostate city?

But didn’t we learn

(Sanhedrin 2a):

An apostate city may be brought to judgment only by a court of seventy-one

—the Great Sanhedrin, which does not exist nowadays.

Rather, obviously,

it is speaking

of a time when the Temple is standing.

And with regard to what

firstborn animal is it speaking?

If you say

that it is speaking

of a blemished animal,

that is difficult:

that is the meaning of “its animal,”

that is, how can it be excluded by the phrase “its animal”? It is indeed included among the animals of the city, since it has no portion designated for Heaven at all and may be eaten by anyone?

Rather, obviously,

it is speaking

of an unblemished animal,

which is fit to be sacrificed and has a portion designated for Heaven.

And

now,

if it is acceptable to say

that with regard to an unblemished firstborn animal during the time when the Temple is standing,

the priest has a right of ownership in it,

that is,

it is well:

it was necessary to exclude it by means of a special derivation, and it cannot be excluded by the general derivation, “its spoil—and not the spoil of Heaven,” since it is not entirely “the spoil of Heaven,” as the priest has a right of ownership in it.

But if you say that he has no right

of ownership in it, and it is entirely the spoil of Heaven,

why do I need

a derivation from

“its animal”? It follows

that it could be excluded by the derivation of

“its spoil, and not the spoil of Heaven.”

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who holds that a priest has no right of ownership in a living, unblemished firstborn animal during the time when the Temple is standing?

We reject this:

Actually,

it is speaking

of a blemished animal. And as for what you find difficult,

that is, your objection:

“That is the meaning of its animal,”

since it may be eaten by its owners and has no portion designated for Heaven at all, it is entirely “its animal”; why is it not subject to destruction?

The answer is that “its animal” refers to

one that is eaten as “its animal,”

that is, as entirely non-sacred meat. Therefore,

there are excluded [

that is, they are excluded: ]

the firstborn and the animal tithe

animals,

which are not

eaten as “its animal,”

and certain laws of sanctity apply to them —

As we learned

[Bekhorot 31a]:

All disqualified consecrated animals may be sold in a butcher’s shop and weighed by the litra

except for the firstborn and the animal tithe,

because

their benefit belongs to their owners.

Therefore they are excluded by “its animal.”

Meytivi,

Rava brings a beraita that was taught with regard to the “oath of the deposit” in order to challenge Rav Naḥman’s statement.

The oath of the deposit applies when one entrusts an item to another person, and the bailee denies possessing the deposit, takes an oath, and subsequently admits it. His law is stated explicitly in the Torah [Leviticus 5]: he must pay the principal, an additional fifth, and bring a guilt-offering. But if one entrusts consecrated animal property to another person, such as a sin-offering or guilt-offering, an “oath of the deposit” is not applicable at all, since one does not take an oath concerning consecrated property.

The beraita discusses one who entrusts with another person kodashim kalim, which are consecrated property that is also the property of the owners. Since the Torah says, “and he denies his fellow,” it is possible to say that the guardian has “denied his fellow”; is he therefore obligated to pay the principal and the additional fifth and bring a guilt-offering?

As it is taught [there]: “When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord and denies his fellow.” That which is stated,

“and commits a trespass against the Lord,”

comes

to include kodashim kalim,

meaning that if one entrusted an animal of kodashim kalim [such as a peace-offering, firstborn, or animal tithe] to another person, and he denied possessing the deposit, took an oath concerning it, and subsequently admitted it, he pays the principal, the additional fifth, and a guilt-offering,

because they are the property of the owners,

and it is possible to apply to them the phrase “and he denied his fellow,”

the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

They are included by what the Torah wrote, “to the Lord,” and kodashim kalim contain both an aspect of “to the Lord”—the sacrificial portions that are offered to Heaven—and an aspect of “his fellow,” namely, the sacrificial meat belonging to the owners.

Ben Azzai says:

It does not come to include all kodashim kalim, but rather

to include peace-offerings,

which alone are his property. But an animal tithe is not the property of the owners, since they cannot sell it, whether alive or slaughtered, whether unblemished or blemished, as explained above [5b].

Abba Yosei ben Dosai says: Ben Azzai did not say

that all peace-offerings are the property of the owners, since sanctity rests upon them and they require laying on of hands, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh,

but only with regard to the firstborn.

For if a priest entrusted the firstborn that he had received from an Israelite to another person, and that person denied possessing it, took an oath, and admitted it, he pays the principal, the additional fifth, and a guilt-offering.

The Gemara clarifies:

With regard to what case are we dealing?

What case is the beraita discussing?

If you say that it is referring to the present time,

that cannot be said, for

it teaches the case of the firstborn as analogous to the case of peace-offerings,

and peace-offerings are not practiced at the present time.

Rather, obviously,

the beraita is speaking

of a time when the Temple is standing.

And with regard to what case are we dealing,

what firstborn animal is it speaking of?

If you say that it is referring to a blemished animal,

that cannot be said, for

it teaches the case of the firstborn as analogous to the case of peace-offerings,

and with regard to peace-offerings it certainly speaks of unblemished animals, which are the property of their owners during their lifetime , and there is no misuse of consecrated property involving them [except with regard to the sacrificial portions after the blood has been sprinkled].

With regard to a firstborn animal, it is understandable that one can distinguish, as Rav Naḥman does, between an unblemished animal and a blemished one: an unblemished firstborn animal may be said not to become the priest’s property until he receives it from the “table of the Most High,” after the sacrificial portions have been burned, whereas a blemished animal, which is not fit to be sacrificed, becomes his property immediately. But with regard to peace-offerings, it cannot be said that the owners acquire them from the “table of the Most High,” for even when they are unblemished they belong to their owners. Whether unblemished or blemished, they belong to their owners, and they are properly called “his fellow’s” [according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili].

Rather, is it not

the case that the beraita is speaking of an unblemished firstborn animal, and concerning it the beraita obligates [according to all opinions] payment of the principal and the additional fifth and a guilt-offering for denying possession of it, and it is called “his fellow’s”?

And derive from this: The priest has a right of ownership in it.

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman?