Temurah 8a — the Talmud in English

It was objected to him:

from what we learned in a beraita:

“Concerning a firstborn it is stated

[Numbers 18:17]

‘It shall not be redeemed,’

it has no redemption by which the redemption [the animal or the money] enters into sanctity and it goes out to non-sacred status,

but it is sold

it;

the kohen sells it, and the buyer eats it in sanctity. And below it will be explained whether this refers to an unblemished firstborn, in which case its meaning is that a kohen eats it with the sanctity of an offering, or to one with a defect, whose sanctity means that it may not be slaughtered in a butcher shop or weighed by the pound.

The Gemara clarifies:

With what are we dealing?

With which firstborn does the beraita learn from the exposition of the verses that it is not redeemed?

If you say

it is a firstborn

in the present time,

and concerning it the Torah said that it has no redemption,

say its latter clause,

state the end of the verse, which says there: “Only the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat—you shall not redeem; they are sacred.”

“You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar,

and their fat you shall burn as a fire-offering for a pleasing fragrance to the Lord”—but

in the present time, is there an altar?

Rather, it is obvious

that the verse which the beraita expounded is speaking

of the time when the Temple exists.

And with what are we dealing —

which firstborn is it speaking of that is not redeemed?

If you say it is one with a defect, say its latter clause,

state the end of the verse,

“You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar, and their fat you shall burn.” But if it is one with a defect,

is it fit for sacrifice,

and is it fit as an offering?

Rather, is it not

that the beraita is speaking

of an unblemished animal,

at the time of the Temple,

and

nevertheless

it teaches: It is sold.

Evidently, the kohen has a right in it.

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who says that it is not sold?

And we reject this:

Does it necessarily follow?

Is this a difficulty?! Indeed, it is speaking of the time of the Temple, but

the first clause

of the verse, from which we inferred that it is sold, is speaking

of one with a defect, and the latter clause,

in which sprinkling and burning are stated, is speaking

of an unblemished animal.

Rav Mesharsheya objected:

Rav Mesharsheya brings a Mishna in tractate Yevamot [99b] to challenge Rav Naḥman’s statement.

The Mishna discusses a doubtful kohen, and there are two situations. The first is that a kohen’s wife and her maidservant gave birth together, their offspring became intermingled, and concerning each one there is doubt whether he is a kohen or a kohen’s slave.

The second situation is that after these doubtful ones grew up, they set each other free: each one wrote a bill of freedom for the other conditionally, “If I am the master and you are the slave, then you are free.” After the release, each one is a doubtful kohen, doubtful emancipated slave. And his law is that of an Israelite.

In the first situation there is a leniency and a stringency. The stringency is that neither of them is permitted to marry an Israelite woman, because perhaps he is a slave, who is forbidden to an Israelite woman. The leniency is that both of them eat teruma, since a kohen’s slave also eats teruma. However, the tanฺna of this Mishna holds that teruma is not distributed to them when one is not in the presence of the other, because “teruma is not distributed to a slave unless his master is with him,” lest observers see that teruma is distributed to him, assume that he is a kohen, and raise him to the status of a kohen for the other laws of the priesthood.

There is also a leniency and a stringency in the second situation. The leniency is that now both are permitted to marry an Israelite woman, since an emancipated slave also marries an Israelite woman. The stringency is that they are forbidden to eat teruma, because concerning each one there is doubt that perhaps he is not a kohen, and an emancipated kohen’s slave does not eat teruma.

The Mishna there also discusses many other laws resulting from their being in doubt , and the Mishna is brought here in abridged form and in a changed order.

Among the other matters, the Mishna there discusses a firstborn born in their herd, as will be explained.

A woman of priestly status,

a kohen’s wife,

whose

offspring became intermingled with the offspring of her maidservant,

and it is not known which of them is a kohen and which of them is a slave,

behold,

these eat teruma. And they receive one portion at the threshing floor. When the intermingled ones grew up, they release

each other

and do not eat teruma.

Their firstborn,

born in the herd of one of them,

shall graze until it becomes blemished,

until a defect occurs in it,

and they shall eat it through its defect.

And they do not give it to a kohen, as will be explained.

And the Gemara clarifies: the law which the Mishna stated concerning a firstborn,

with what are we dealing,

which firstborn is it speaking of that has no remedy while alive until a defect occurs in it?

If you say,

if it is said that it is a firstborn

in the present time,

this is difficult:

what is different about ours and what is different about theirs,

what is different about their firstborn animals from our firstborn animals—that is, from other firstborn animals born in an Israelite’s herd? Is it not that

ours also require defects,

and without a defect there is no remedy for eating it?

Rather,

is it

not

speaking

of the time when the Temple exists?!

Therefore, our firstborn animals are given to a kohen while unblemished as a complete gift, and the kohen slaughters it in the Temple and eats it.

Unlike the firstborn animals of the intermingled sons. For on the one hand there is here the sanctity of a firstborn, but each one of them is forbidden to eat it, lest he be an Israelite [a non-kohen], who is forbidden to eat a firstborn when it is offered as an offering, and he does not wish to give it to a kohen for nothing. Therefore, he prefers to wait until a defect occurs in it, and eat it.

And when a defect occurs in it, it is permitted to eat it, because there is no prohibition against its consumption by non-kohanim, but only an obligation to give it to a kohen, and when he does not give it to a kohen, he is subject to a prohibition of robbery. When do these matters apply? In the case of an Israelite. But in the case of a doubtful kohen, he is not subject even to a prohibition of robbery, since he claims, “Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to him.” Therefore, he does not give it to a kohen while it is still unblemished, because it is worthwhile for him to wait until a defect occurs in it.

And now

, if you say that it is satisfactory: He has

a right in it, the kohen has a right in it, it is well

that this intermingled son has the power to keep it with him and say, “Perhaps I am a kohen, and I acquired it first, and I am not prepared to give it for nothing to another kohen. I will wait until a defect occurs in it and eat it”—

. But if you say that he has no right

that the kohen has no right at all in the firstborn while it is alive, this is difficult: Why do they permit him to prevent its being offered upon the altar?

Let the treasurer come,

let the treasurer come

and take it,

and take it against his will, offer it, and give it to the kohanim of the watch. For according to Rav Naḥman, the kohen has no right in the firstborn while it is alive. And it is necessary to say that, indeed, he has a right in it while it is alive—and this is difficult for Rav Naḥman? And we reject this:

And we reject this:

In fact,

it is speaking

of the present time,

and therefore he does not eat it until a defect occurs in it.

And what is difficult for you, “What is different about ours from theirs,”

is it not the case that with every firstborn one waits until a defect occurs in it? The distinction is simple:

We,

we Israelites,

give it to a kohen when it has its defect,

and it is forbidden for us to withhold it for ourselves because of the robbery of the kohen. But

they,

the intermingled sons,

since there is in them a portion of priesthood,

since each one of them claims that he is the kohen,

they remove it from the kohanim ,

they exempt it from being given to a kohen, as explained, for he claims, “Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to you.” And when a defect occurs in it, he eats it, as explained, since he has no prohibition of robbery concerning it.

And it is resolved that the Mishna teaches nothing new concerning the prohibition of eating it until it becomes one with a defect, but rather concerning exemption from the obligation to give it to a kohen.

Another formulation:

If you say

that the Mishna is speaking of a firstborn

in the present time,

this is difficult:

Why particularly—

why did the Mishna speak specifically of

the firstborn of these doubtful ones,

of these intermingled sons? Is it not that

even

the firstborn

of ours—

must also graze?

Rather, it is obvious

that it is speaking

of the time when the Temple exists.

And

which firstborn is it speaking of?

If it is one with a defect,

did the Mishna say concerning one with a defect

“They shall graze until they become blemished”—they are already blemished and standing?!

A defect has already occurred in it.

Rather, it is obvious

that it is speaking

of unblemished animals. And these —

these intermingled sons—

are the ones who cannot sell,

they are forbidden to sell, because each one of them is a doubtful Israelite who is obligated to give it to a kohen for nothing. And let us infer:

certain kohanim may sell,

they are permitted to sell a living, unblemished animal even while the Temple exists—and this is difficult for Rav Naḥman?

And we reject this:

In fact,

it is speaking

of the present time. What is difficult for you, “Even ours must also graze”?

There is no difficulty here, because

we,

we Israelites,

cannot repel him to the kohen

who claims it from us, and we are obligated to give it to him, because

there is no doubt here concerning priesthood.

Unlike

these doubtful ones, who repel the kohen,

they repel the kohen’s claim, and

each and every one says to the kohen, “I am a kohen” and “I am a kohen,”

“Bring me proof that I am not a kohen, and I will give it to you.”

And this is the principal novelty of the Mishna: that he is not obligated to give it to a kohen, as explained.

It was objected:

The Gemara brings a beraita in tractate Sanhedrin [112b] concerning an “apostate city” to challenge Rav Naḥman’s statement.

The Torah said in the passage of the apostate city [Deuteronomy 13]: “You shall surely destroy it and all that is in it, and its animals, with the sword. And all its spoil you shall gather into the midst of its open square, and you shall burn with fire the city and all its spoil.”

And the beraita says:

Rabbi Shimon says:

The Torah said

“its animals,”

and we expound: its own animal, in which the Most High has no share,

to exclude the firstborn animal and the animal tithe that are in it,

for if there were firstborn animals in it, or an animal tithe belonging to an Israelite, whose fat and blood are offered, they are not destroyed with it, because they are not called “its animals.”

And it further says

“its spoil,”

and we expound: its own spoil, in which the Most High has no share,

to exclude the money of second tithe that is in it,

which is within the city, for the money is not destroyed .

The Gemara clarifies:

With what are we dealing,

what is the beraita speaking about?

If you say in the present time, is there

is there, then, in the present time,

an apostate city?

But we learned

[Sanhedrin 2a]:

An apostate city is established only by a court of seventy-one ,

which is the Great Sanhedrin, and it does not exist in the present time.

Rather, it is obvious,

that it is speaking

of the time when the Temple is standing.

And with what—

which firstborn is being discussed?

If you say,

if it is said that it is speaking

of a blemished animal,

it is difficult:

this is “its animal,”

that is to say, how can it be excluded by “its animal”? For it is properly among the animals of the city, since it has no portion at all for the Most High, and it is eaten by every person?

Rather, it is obvious

that it is speaking

of an unblemished animal,

which is designated for sacrifice and has a portion for the Most High.

And

now,

if you say reasonably that it is speaking

of an unblemished firstborn during the time of the Temple,

it has acquisition in it,

the koen has a right in it—

properly so,

for it was necessary to exclude it by a special exposition, and it cannot be excluded by the general exposition, “its spoil—but not the spoil of Heaven,” since it is not entirely “the spoil of Heaven,” as the koen has a right in it.

Rather, if you say that it does not have

a right for the koen, and it is entirely the spoil of Heaven,

why do I need

an exposition from

“its animal”? It should follow

that it can be excluded by the exposition of

“its spoil, but not the spoil of Heaven.”

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who holds that the koen has no right in a living, unblemished firstborn during the time of the Temple?

And we reject this:

In reality,

it is speaking

of a blemished animal. And that which is difficult for you,

and concerning which you raised the objection:

“This is its animal,”

since they are eaten by the owners and have no portion at all for the Most High—they are entirely “its animal”; why are they not included in the ban?

Concerning this we shall answer: “its animal” refers to

one that is eaten under the designation of “its animal,”

that is, entirely non-sacred meat. Therefore,

there went out [that is, they were excluded]

—

the firstborn and the animal tithe,

of livestock,

which are not

eaten under the designation of “its animal,”

and certain laws of sanctity apply to them—

For we learned

[Bekhorot 31a]:

All disqualified consecrated animals are sold in a butcher’s market and are weighed by the litra

except for the firstborn and the tithe,

because

their benefit belongs to the owners.

Therefore they were excluded by “its animal.”

It was objected;

Rava brings a beraita that was taught concerning “the oath of the deposit,” to raise an objection against Rav Naḥman’s words.

“The oath of the deposit” applies when one deposits an item with his fellow, and the bailee denies the deposit, takes an oath, and afterward admits. Its law is explicitly stated in the Torah [Leviticus 5]: he must pay the principal, a fifth, and bring a guilt-offering. But if one deposited a consecrated animal with his fellow, such as a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, “the oath of the deposit” is altogether impossible, since “one does not swear concerning consecrated property.”

The beraita discusses one who deposits with his fellow kodashim kalim, which are an item of consecrated property that is also the property of the owners. Since the Torah said, “and he deals falsely with his fellow,” and it is possible to say that the guardian “dealt falsely with his fellow,” would he be liable for the principal, the fifth, and the guilt-offering?

For it was taught [there]: “When a person sins and commits treachery against the Lord and deals falsely with his fellow.” That which is stated,

“and commits treachery against the Lord,”

comes

to include kodashim kalim,

so that if one deposited a kodashim kalim animal [such as a peace-offering, a firstborn, or an animal tithe] with his fellow, and he denied the deposit, took an oath concerning it, and afterward admitted, he pays the principal, a fifth, and a guilt-offering, because

they are the property of the owners,

and it is possible to apply to them “and he dealt falsely with his fellow,”

the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

And they were included by what the Torah wrote, “to the Lord,” for kodashim kalim contain both “to the Lord”—the sacrificial portions that ascend to the Most High—and “his fellow” can also be read concerning them, referring to the flesh of the offering that belongs to the owners.

Ben Azzai says:

It did not come to include all kodashim kalim, but rather

to include peace-offerings,

and they alone are his property. But “the animal tithe” is not the property of the owners, for he cannot sell it, neither alive nor slaughtered, neither unblemished nor blemished, as explained above [5b].

Abba Yosei ben Dosai says: Ben Azzai did not say

that all peace-offerings are the property of the owners, since sanctity has taken effect upon them, so that they require laying on of hands, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh,

but only concerning the firstborn.

For if the koen deposited the firstborn that he received from an Israelite with his fellow, and he denied it, took an oath, and admitted, he pays the principal, a fifth, and a guilt-offering.

And the Gemara clarifies:

With what are we dealing?

What is the beraita dealing with?

If you say, during the present time—

it is impossible to say so,

for it teaches it as comparable to peace-offerings,

and the beraita compares and distinguishes between “firstborn” and “peace-offerings,” while peace-offerings do not apply during the present time.

Rather, it is obvious

that the beraita is speaking

of the time when the Temple is standing.

And with what are we dealing,

which firstborn is being discussed?

If you say, with a blemished animal,

it is impossible to say so,

for it teaches it as comparable to peace-offerings,

and with peace-offerings it certainly speaks of unblemished animals, and they are the property of the owners during their lifetimes , and there is no misuse of consecrated property in them [except with regard to the sacrificial portions after the sprinkling of the blood].

And it is reasonable concerning a firstborn that it is possible to distinguish, in accordance with Rav Naḥman’s distinction, between an unblemished animal and a blemished animal: with regard to an unblemished firstborn, it may be said that the koen acquires it only from the table of the Most High after the sacrificial portions have been burned, whereas a blemished animal, which is not designated for sacrifice, he acquires immediately. But concerning peace-offerings, it is impossible to say that the owners acquire them from the table of the Most High, for even when they are unblemished, they are the property of their owners. Both unblemished animals and blemished animals are the property of their owners, and they are properly called “his fellow” [according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean].

Rather, is it not so that the beraita is speaking of an unblemished firstborn, and concerning it the beraita made him liable [according to all opinions] for the principal, the fifth, and the guilt-offering for his denial, and it is called “his fellow,”

the case that the beraita is speaking of an unblemished firstborn animal, and concerning it the beraita obligates [according to all opinions] payment of the principal and the additional fifth and a guilt-offering for denying possession of it, and it is called “his fellow’s”?

and derive from this: the koen has acquisition in it.

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman?