Temurah 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah: “And an ox or a sheep that has a limb extended or contracted, you may make it a donation, but for a vow it shall not be accepted.” As was already explained above, this verse certainly cannot be interpreted as permitting these animals with defects to be offered upon the altar if they were consecrated as a donation. Rather, what is the meaning of the phrase

“you may make it a donation”? These are consecrated animals for Temple maintenance—

to sell them, with their proceeds going toward the needs of the Temple.

And

from what is stated, “you may make it a donation,”

I have derived

only the inclusion of

a donation—

consecrating an animal for Temple maintenance as a donation, such as when one says: “This blemished animal is hereby designated for Temple maintenance.” But

a vow—

if he said: “I undertake to bring a blemished animal for Temple maintenance”—

from where

do we know that he is commanded to set aside a blemished animal?

The verse states: “And for a vow.”

And we expound it as though it said: “You may make it a donation, and for a vow.” That is, whether one consecrates it with the language of a donation or with the language of a vow, he should consecrate it for Temple maintenance!

And the beraita continues:

Could it be that this applies even to consecrated animals designated for the altar?

The verse states: “But for a vow it shall not be accepted,”

and we expound:

this refers to consecrated animals designated for the altar,

with regard to which the term “acceptance” is applicable.

And

from what is stated, “but for a vow it shall not be accepted,”

I have derived only a vow—

that one who vows, “This animal is incumbent upon me as a burnt offering,” may not bring a blemished animal.

From where is a donation derived—

from where do we know that it is forbidden to say of a blemished animal, “This is for the altar,” so that it will be sold and another animal will be brought with its proceeds?

The verse states: “A donation.”

And we expound it as though it were written: “A donation, but for a vow it shall not be accepted.” That is, it is forbidden to consecrate a blemished animal for “acceptance”—that is, for the altar—whether with the language of a vow or with the language of a donation.

And the beraita continues:

Rabbi says:

The Torah said

“it shall not be accepted”—the acceptance of its body—

that is, as an offering for the altar—

is what the verse is discussing.

Apparently, Rabbi’s words are identical to those of the first tanna. Therefore, the Gemara clarifies: Rabbi’s words

are they

the words of

the first tanna?

Is that not the dispute between them:

the first tanna maintains

that it is forbidden to consecrate a blemished animal for any purpose connected with the altar, and

even if he consecrated it for the value of libations, he is likewise flogged,

as Rava said?

And

if

Rabbi maintains: For the acceptance of its body,

when one consecrates it for the purpose of offering the animal itself

he

is flogged, but

when he consecrates it

for the value of libations—

he is not flogged,

unlike Rava’s view.

And we conclude:

Learn from here

that Rava’s statement is not accepted by all the tannaim.

The Gemara asks: After the entire verse has been expounded,

but,

what purpose does the Torah’s statement “you may make it a donation”

“it”—what do I need it for?

What does it come to exclude?

For

another exposition,

as

in

as it was taught:

We learned in a beraita: The Torah said

“you may make it a donation,”

and we expound:

“it”

refers to an animal with an extended or contracted limb, and to all animals with blemishes;

you

may consecrate them for Temple maintenance, but you may not designate unblemished animals for Temple maintenance. From here the Sages said

that

one who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance violates a positive commandment,

that is, a prohibition derived by implication from a positive commandment.

And from where

do we know that he violates

also a prohibition? The verse states

at the beginning of the passage:

“And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying”—this teaches with regard to the entire passage that it is subject to a prohibition. These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda .

The Gemara explains the exposition.

Rabbi said to bar Kappara: What is the indication

of this exposition? What is the basis for deriving from this verse a prohibition?

He said to him,

bar Kappara to Rabbi:

As it is written: “saying,”

and we expound:

say a “no” in words,

that is, the Holy One, blessed be He, said: In the “words”—that is, in the words of the passage—say a “no” that is not stated explicitly. [Since we find a positive commandment concerning one who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, it follows that the “no” applies to this matter.]

In Rav’s academy,

in Rav’s beit-midrash,

they said: “Saying” is expounded as

“say a

‘no’” [with the vowel holam]. That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses: Tell Israel that one who transgresses any of the matters stated in this passage violates a “no.”

That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses: Tell Israel that one who violates anything stated in this passage violates a prohibition.]

The Gemara cites a dispute between Abaye and Rava concerning what we learned above in the beraita: that there is a separate prohibition for burning all of the animal, and a separate prohibition for burning part of it.

It was stated

in the beit-midrash:

One who places the limbs

of

blemished animals on the altar, piece by piece, until he has completed placing all of them, as is the procedure for a burnt offering—

Rava said

He transgresses

and is flogged for two prohibitions: one

because of the prohibition, “You shall not burn all of it, and”

the other

because of the prohibition, “You shall not burn part of it.”

Abaye said

He does not receive two sets of lashes, because of the principle that

“one is not flogged for a prohibition encompassing several acts,”

but receives one set of lashes. Since burning all of it and burning part of it are derived from a single prohibition—from the statement “and you shall not offer any of them as a fire-offering,” as explained above—therefore he is not flogged twice.

This is understandable with regard to the other prohibitions: consecration, slaughter, and sprinkling, for a separate prohibition was stated for each one, as detailed above [6b]. But with regard to burning, only one prohibition was stated, one that “encompasses” both the whole and part of it; and since it is a prohibition encompassing several acts, he receives only one set of lashes.

The Gemara raises an objection,

bringing a beraita to challenge Abaye:

As it was taught:

One who consecrates blemished animals for the altar violates five designations.

The beraita counts a separate prohibition for burning all of it and a separate prohibition for burning part of it.

This is a refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

Abaye said:

The beraita does not mean that one person performed all these transgressions and is liable for five sets of lashes. Rather,

it is taught with regard to different people:

it is discussing two people who burned the animal, one of whom transgresses the prohibition of burning all of it, when he burned all of it, and the other of whom transgresses the prohibition of burning part of it, when he burned part of it. Indeed, if one person burned all of it, he is not liable for two sets of lashes, but only one, because of burning all of it.

The Gemara challenges Abaye’s answer:

If

the beraita is speaking

of different people,

of two people, why did we learn

“he transgresses”—

should it not have said

“they transgress”?

Rather, it is obvious

that the beraita is speaking

of one person, and this is a refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

He can say to you,

Abaye: Remove one of them —

remove one of the two burnings from the beraita’s count of five prohibitions, either burning all of it or burning part of it.

And

in order to complete the count of five,

insert

—add—

receiving the blood,

which is the fifth prohibition, derived above from the verse: “And from the hand of a foreigner you shall not offer.”

And we ask:

Receiving the blood?! Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable for it,

whereas

the first tanna does not hold that one is liable for it. Yet the first tanna counted five prohibitions without including the prohibition of receiving the blood, and does not hold at all that receiving the blood is prohibited.

The first tanna counted five prohibitions without including the prohibition of receiving the blood, and does not hold at all that receiving the blood entails a prohibition.

And we conclude:

It is difficult—

indeed, the beraita presents a difficulty for Abaye’s position!

Alternatively:

How can one answer that receiving the blood is the fifth prohibition,

when, from the fact that the latter clause is Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds one liable for receiving the blood, it follows that

the first clause is the Sages,

who do not hold that one is liable for receiving the blood? It is therefore evident that one violates five prohibitions without including receiving the blood—which proves that he violates both for burning all of it and for burning part of it. And we conclude:

This is a refutation of Abaye; this is a refutation.

Mishna:

The Mishna explains that one may designate as a substitute only his own offering, and not the offering of another.

Kohanim may perform substitution with

offerings

that are theirs,

which they set aside for themselves,

and Israelites may perform substitution with theirs.

There is no distinction between kohanim and Israelites; each may perform substitution with his own offering.

But

kohanim may not perform substitution with either a sin offering or a guilt offering

that an Israelite gave them to offer. For they have no share whatsoever in the offering, and it is not theirs; rather, they receive the meat after the sacrificial portions have been burned. Therefore, if a priest substituted his animal for a sin offering or a guilt offering, the substitution is not effective.

Nor with a firstborn,

which he received from an Israelite. Although there is reason to say that a firstborn differs from other offerings, as will be explained.

The Mishna’s statement that a priest may not perform substitution with a “firstborn” is the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri disagrees and maintains that a priest may perform substitution with a firstborn.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: Why may

kohanim

not perform substitution with a firstborn?

It belongs entirely to the kohanim, and the Israelite gives it to the kohanim while it is alive, and the owners do not attain atonement through it.

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

A firstborn is derived from a sin offering and a guilt offering, because

a sin offering and a guilt offering are

a gift to a priest;

they are among the twenty-four gifts of the priesthood.

And

likewise,

a firstborn is

a gift to a priest,

and they should be equated:

Just as one may not perform substitution with a sin offering or a guilt offering,

so too one may not perform substitution with a firstborn.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri

to Rabbi Akiva:

What is the relevance,

that is, why do you bring me a comparison to a sin offering and a guilt offering?

If one may not perform substitution with a sin offering or a guilt offering,

that is logical, because

the kohanim do not

have

rights to them while they are alive.

Can you say this with regard to a firstborn, which

the kohanim

do have rights to while it is alive,

and it is entirely theirs?! Why, then, may they not perform substitution with it?

Rabbi Akiva said to him,

to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri:

But it has already been stated [

Leviticus 27]:

“And it and its substitute shall be holy,”

the Torah thereby equated substitution with the consecrated animal itself.

Where does sanctity take effect upon it,

upon the consecrated animal?

In the domain of the owner,

and a person cannot consecrate something that is not his. From this we learn that

also substitution

takes effect only

in the domain of the owner,

and not in the domain of a priest. Therefore, if a priest performed substitution with it, the substitution does not take effect, since the firstborn is not in the domain of its owner, even though it was given as a gift to a priest. But if the Israelite who owns the firstborn performed substitution with it, the substitution is effective, since sanctity takes effect upon the firstborn while it is in his domain.

The Sugya of “A Firstborn Animal May Be Sold”

The Gemara discusses at length the laws of a firstborn animal [and not the laws of substitution]. This sugya is connected to our Mishna, as will be explained.

An Israelite who has a firstborn kosher animal born in his herd gives it to a priest as an irrevocable gift; the priest offers it in the Temple, and its meat is eaten by priests.

A firstborn animal that has a blemish, whether it was born with its blemish or developed a blemish after having been born unblemished, belongs to the priest. If he wishes, he may eat it anywhere, sell it, or feed it to whomever he wishes, even to a gentile, because it is non-sacred property; it is the priest’s property.

This mitzva of setting aside a firstborn animal applies both when the Temple is standing and when the Temple is not standing. When the Temple is not standing, he leaves it until it develops a blemish.

Nevertheless, even a firstborn animal with a blemish is forbidden to be shorn or worked, and when a priest sells its meat, it may not be sold in a butcher shop or weighed by the litra [as explained above, 5b].

The Gemara discusses whether a firstborn animal is the priest’s property.

Gemara:

We learned there,

in a Mishna in tractate Ma’aser Sheni [chapter 1]:

A firstborn animal

—the priests

may sell it

when it is

unblemished

and

alive. And

when it is

blemished

, the priests may sell it whether

alive or

whether it is

slaughtered. And they may betroth a woman with it

, because it is their property.

It appears simply that this law applies both when the Temple is standing and in the present era.

Therefore, when the Temple is standing, the priest who received the firstborn animal may sell it to another priest, and that priest will offer it. When does this apply? When it is alive; but when it has been slaughtered, the priest may not sell it, because this would be a degradation of sacred offerings, as it is improper to conduct commerce in offerings.

In the present era, the priest may sell it to another priest [or to an Israelite, as the Gemara discusses on the following page]. The purchaser must leave it until it develops a blemish. But the owner may not sell it, since that would be robbing the priest. When does this apply? When it is alive; but in the present era, there is no such thing as an “unblemished slaughtered animal,” since it is forbidden to slaughter it. If one slaughtered it, it must be buried and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

The Gemara inquires:

Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: They taught

that when an unblemished firstborn animal is alive, it is the priest’s property, and he may sell it and betroth a woman with it,

only in the present era

, when it is unfit to be offered.

Since the priest has an ownership right in it

, and he acquired it.

But when the Temple is standing, since an unblemished animal stands fit for offering

, it is designated for offering,

they may not sell it unblemished and alive

, and the priests have no right to it during its lifetime; rather, after the sacrificial portions have been burned, the priest acquires its meat. The Gemara brings Mishnayot and baraitot to challenge what Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha. The first challenge is based on a precise inference from this very Mishna:

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman

: The Mishna states:

They may sell it unblemished and alive.

Let us infer: When it is

alive

—

no

; indeed, they may sell it, whereas when it is

slaughtered

—

no

, they may not sell it.

When

, what time period is the Mishna discussing?

If you say the present era, is there such a thing as an unblemished slaughtered animal?!

It is forbidden to slaughter it, since it is sanctified with the sanctity of an offering, and it is forbidden to slaughter sacred offerings outside the Temple. If one slaughtered it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

Rather, obviously

, the Mishna is speaking

when the Temple is standing

. And

with regard to this it

teaches

:

They may sell it unblemished and alive

, and how could you say that they may not sell it unblemished and alive?

No! Actually,

And we answer:

No! In fact

, we should establish the Mishna

when the Temple is standing

, because

does it teach

“They may sell it unblemished and alive”—

“no, slaughtered”

, so that we should infer from it that it is discussing the time of the Temple? Rather, the Mishna is speaking of the present era, and therefore it did not state anything concerning a slaughtered animal, since there is no such possibility as an unblemished slaughtered animal in the present era. The Mishna did not write “unblemished and alive” so that we should infer anything from it. Rather,

this itself is what it comes to teach us

: This point itself is a novelty—

that a firstborn animal may be sold unblemished and alive

—lest you say that priests have no rights in a firstborn animal until it develops a blemish.