Temurah 7b — the Talmud in English

For the Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah [there, Leviticus 22]: “And an ox or a sheep that is deformed or has a split hoof, you shall make it a donation, but for a vow it shall not be accepted.” And it has already been explained above that it certainly cannot be interpreted that the Torah permits one to offer these blemished animals upon the altar if he consecrated them as a donation. Rather, what is the purpose of stating

“you shall make it a donation”? This refers to consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple,

to sell them, and their monetary value shall fall to the needs of the Temple.

And

from that which is stated, “you shall make it a donation,”

I have only

to include

a donation,

to consecrate [the animal] for the maintenance of the Temple in the manner of a donation, such as when he says, “This blemished animal is hereby for the maintenance of the Temple.” But

a vow,

if he said, “This blemished animal is hereby incumbent upon me for the maintenance of the Temple,”

from where

[do we know] that it is a mitzva to set aside a blemished animal?

The verse states: “And for a vow.”

And we expound it as though it were stated: “You shall make it a donation, and for a vow.” That is to say, whether you consecrate it with the language of a donation or with the language of a vow, consecrate it for the maintenance of the Temple!

And the beraita continues:

Could it be even consecrated property of the altar?

The verse states: “And for a vow it shall not be accepted,”

and we expound:

this refers to consecrated property of the altar,

with regard to which “acceptance” applies.

And

from that which is stated, “and for a vow it shall not be accepted,”

I have only a vow,

that one who vows, “This burnt offering is incumbent upon me,” may not bring a blemished animal.

A donation—from where,

from where do we know that it is forbidden to say of a blemished animal, “This is for the altar,” so that it will be sold and another animal will be brought with its monetary value?

The verse states: “A donation.”

And we expound it as though it were written: “A donation, and for a vow it shall not be accepted.” That is to say, it is forbidden to consecrate a blemished animal “for acceptance,” that is, for the altar, whether with the language of a vow or with the language of a donation.

And the beraita continues:

Rabbi says:

The Torah stated

“it shall not be accepted,” in the acceptance of its body,

that is, it is speaking of [bringing it] as an offering upon the altar;

the verse speaks.

At first glance, Rabbi’s words are identical to the words of the first tanna. Therefore, the Gemara clarifies: Rabbi’s words

are

the words of

the first tanna?

Is it not that they disagree in this dispute:

the first tanna holds

that it is forbidden to consecrate a blemished animal for any altar-related purpose, and

even if he consecrated it for the value of libations, he too is flogged,

in accordance with the words of Rava.

And

if

Rabbi holds: for the acceptance of its body,

when he consecrates it for the purpose of offering the animal itself,

he

is flogged, but

when he consecrates it

for the value of libations—

he is not flogged,

unlike the words of Rava.

And we conclude:

learn from it

that Rava’s words are not agreed upon by all the tannaim.

And the Gemara asks: after the entire verse has been expounded,

but then,

what is the purpose of what the Torah wrote, “you shall make it a donation,”

“it”—what do I need it for,

what does it come to exclude?

For

another exposition,

as

in

as it was taught,

we learned in a beraita: The Torah stated

“you shall make it a donation,”

and we expound:

“it,”

the deformed and split-hoofed animal and all blemished animals,

you

consecrate for the maintenance of the Temple, but you may not consecrate unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple. From here the Sages said

:

one who consecrates unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple transgresses a positive commandment,

that is, a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment.

And from where

do we know that he transgresses

also a negative commandment? The verse states

at the beginning of the passage

“And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying”—this teaches concerning the entire passage that it is subject to a negative commandment. These are the words of Rabbi Judah .

The Gemara explains the exposition.

Rabbi said to bar Kappara: What is the implication,

what is the meaning of the exposition, and from where do we learn from this verse a “do not”?

He said to him,

bar Kappara to Rabbi:

For it is written “saying,”

and we expound:

do not say it in words,

that is, the Holy One, blessed is He, said: In “words,” that is, in the words of the passage, say a “do not” that is not stated explicitly. [And since we find a positive commandment concerning one who consecrates unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple, it follows by itself that the “do not” concerns this matter].

In the school of Rav,

in Rav’s academy,

they say: “‘Saying’ is expounded as

“a ‘do not’ say” [the mem with the holam]. That is to say, the Holy One, blessed is He, said to Moses: Say to Israel that one who transgresses everything stated in this passage transgresses a “do not.”

“say a prohibition.” [

That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses: Tell Israel that one who violates anything stated in this passage violates a prohibition.]

The Gemara cites the dispute of Abaye and Rava concerning what we learned above in the beraita: that there is a separate negative commandment for burning all of it, and a separate negative commandment for burning part of it .

It was stated,

they said in the academy:

One who places the limbs,

piece by piece until he completed all of them in the manner of the offering of a burnt offering, of

blemished animals with regard to the altar—

Rava said

He transgresses

and is flogged for two negative commandments: one,

because of “you shall not burn all of it,” and

the other

because of “you shall not burn part of it.”

Abaye said

He is not flogged with two sets of lashes, because of the principle that

“one is not flogged for a negative commandment encompassing several matters,”

but with one set of lashes בלבד. And since the burning of all of it and the burning of part of it are learned from one negative commandment, from that which is stated, “You shall not offer any of them as a fire offering,” as explained above, therefore he is not flogged twice.

And this is understandable with regard to the other negative commandments: consecration, slaughter, and sprinkling—the Torah stated a specific negative commandment for each one of them, as specified above [6b]. But with regard to burning, only one negative commandment was stated, which “includes” all of it and part of it; and since it is a “negative commandment encompassing several matters,” he is flogged only once.

He challenged,

the Gemara cites a beraita to challenge Abaye:

For it was taught:

One who consecrates blemished animals with regard to the altar transgresses on account of five designations.

And the beraita counts a separate negative commandment for burning all of it and a separate negative commandment for burning part of it.

A refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

Abaye said:

The meaning of the beraita is not that one person performed all these transgressions and is liable for five sets of lashes; rather,

it teaches with regard to persons,

it refers to two people who burned it: one of them transgresses for burning all of it, when he burned all of it, and the other transgresses for burning part of it, when he burned part of it . Indeed, if one burned all of it, he is not liable for two sets of lashes, but only one, for burning all of it.

And we challenge Abaye’s answer:

If,

if the beraita is speaking

with regard to persons,

with regard to two people, why did we learn

“he transgresses”—

is it not that

“they transgress” should have been required?

Rather, it is obvious

that the beraita is speaking

of one person, and it is a refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

He could say to you

Abaye: Remove one of them

remove from the beraita one of the burnings from the count of the five negative commandments, either all of it or part of it,

and

in order to complete the count of five,

insert

insert

the receiving of the blood,

and this is the fifth negative commandment, derived above from the verse, “And from the hand of a foreigner you shall not offer.”

And we wonder:

The receiving of the blood?! Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah holds that he has it.

But

the first tanna does not hold that he has it,

and the first tanna counted five without the negative commandment of receiving the blood, and does not hold at all that there is a negative commandment concerning receiving the blood.

And we conclude:

It is difficult,

indeed, the beraita is difficult for Abaye’s words!

Another version:

How can it be answered that the receiving of the blood is the fifth negative commandment,

but since the latter clause is Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah,

who imposes liability for receiving the blood,

the first clause is the Sages,

who do not hold that one is liable on account of receiving the blood? And it is compelled that they transgress five negative commandments without receiving the blood; thus they transgress for both all of it and part of it. And we conclude:

A refutation of Abaye, a refutation.

Mishna:

The Mishna explains that a person can designate for temura only his own offering, and not that of others .

The priests perform temura with

offerings

belonging to them,

which they set aside for themselves,

and Israelites perform temura with those belonging to them.

There is no distinction between priests and Israelites, and each one performs temura with his own offering.

But

the priests do not perform temura with either a sin offering or a guilt offering,

which an Israelite gave to him to offer , for he has no share whatsoever in the offering and it does not belong to him; rather, he receives the meat after the burning of the sacrificial portions. Therefore, if he exchanged his animal for a sin offering or a guilt offering, its temura is not a temura.

And not with a firstborn,

which he received from an Israelite. And although there is room to say that a firstborn differs from other offerings, as will be explained.

And that which the Mishna stated, that the priest does not perform temura with a “firstborn,” is the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri disagrees and holds that a priest performs temura with a firstborn.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: Why do the priests not

the priests

perform temura with a firstborn?

Is it not entirely the property of the priests? And the Israelite gives it to the priests while it is alive, and the owners also do not gain atonement through it?

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

A firstborn is learned from a sin offering and a guilt offering, because

a sin offering and a guilt offering—

are a gift to a priest,

and they are one of the twenty-four priestly gifts;

and

so too

a firstborn—

is a gift to a priest,

and they should be compared:

just as one does not perform temura with a sin offering or a guilt offering,

so too one does not perform temura with a firstborn.

He said to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri

to Rabbi Akiva:

What is it to me,

that is, what comparison are you bringing me from a sin offering and a guilt offering!

If he does not perform temura with a sin offering or a guilt offering,

it is a logical matter, because

the

priests

do not acquire them during their lifetimes.

Can you say this with regard to a firstborn, for

the priests

acquire it during its lifetime,

and it is entirely his?! Why, then, do they not perform temura with it?

Rabbi Akiva said to him

to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri:

But it has already been stated [Leviticus 27]

[Leviticus 27]

“And it and its replacement shall be sacred,”

the Torah compared temura to the consecrated property itself.

Where does sanctity take effect upon it,

upon the consecrated property,

in the domain of the owners,

and a person cannot consecrate something that is not his. And from it we learn that

also temura

takes effect only

in the domain of the owners,

and not in the domain of a priest. Therefore, if the priest performed temura with it, the temura does not take effect, since the firstborn is not in the domain of the owners, even though it was given as a gift to a priest. But if the Israelite who owns the firstborn performed temura with it, its temura is a temura, since sanctity takes effect upon the firstborn in his domain .

The Section of “They Sell a Firstborn”

The Gemara discusses at length the laws of a firstborn [and not matters of substitution]. And the section belongs to our Mishna, as will be explained.

An Israelite to whom a firstborn of a pure animal was born in his herd gives it to a priest as a complete gift, and the priest offers it in the Temple, and its flesh is eaten by priests.

A firstborn that has a blemish, whether it was born with its blemish or a blemish befell it after it was born unblemished, belongs to the priest. If he wishes, he eats it anywhere, or sells it, or feeds it to whomever he wishes, even to a gentile, because it is non-sacred property, and it is the property of the priest.

This mitzva of setting aside a firstborn applies both when the Temple is standing and when the Temple is not standing. And when the Temple is not standing, he leaves it until a blemish befalls it.

However, even a blemished firstborn is forbidden for shearing and labor, and when the priest sells its flesh, it is not sold in a butcher’s shop and is not weighed by the litra [as explained above, 5b].

And the Gemara discusses whether the firstborn is the priest’s “property.”

Gemara:

We learned there,

we learned in a Mishna in tractate Second Tithe [chapter 1]:

A firstborn

the priests

sell it,

when it is

unblemished, and it is

and

alive. And

when it is

blemished,

the priests sell it whether

alive and

whether

slaughtered. And they betroth a woman with it.

Because it is their property.

And it plainly implies that this law applies both when the Temple is standing and in the present time.

Therefore, when the Temple is standing, the priest who received it sells it to another priest, and that priest offers it. When does this apply? When it is alive; but when it is slaughtered, the priest does not sell it, since this is a degradation of sacred offerings, for it is not proper conduct to trade in offerings.

And in the present time, the priest sells it to another priest [or to an Israelite, and on the next folio the Gemara discusses this]. And the purchaser leaves it until a blemish befalls it. But the owner does not sell it, for he would be robbing the priest. When does this apply? When it is alive; but in the present time there is no possibility of an “unblemished slaughtered” animal, since it is forbidden to slaughter it, and if he slaughtered it, its law is that it must be buried and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

And we raised the question:

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: They taught this only

that when the firstborn is alive and unblemished, it is the priest’s property, and he is permitted to sell it and betroth a woman with it,

in the present time,

when it is unfit for offering.

Since the priest has ownership in them,

and he acquired them.

But when the Temple is standing, since an unblemished one stands for offering,

it stands for offering,

they do not sell it unblemished and alive,

and the priests have no ownership in it during its lifetime; rather, after the burning of its sacrificial portions, the priest acquires its flesh. And the Gemara brings Mishnayot and beraitot to challenge what Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha. The first challenge is from the precise inference of this very Mishna:

Rava challenged Rav Nahman:

The Mishna said:

They sell it unblemished and alive.

And let us infer: When it is

alive—

no, indeed they sell it, whereas when it is

slaughtered—

slaughtered—

no,

they do not sell it.

When

which time was the Mishna speaking about?

If you say,

if you say

the present time, is there an unblemished slaughtered animal?!

Surely it is forbidden to slaughter it, since it is sacred with the sanctity of an offering, and it is forbidden to slaughter sacred offerings outside the Temple; and if he slaughtered it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it?

Rather, obviously,

the Mishna is speaking

when the Temple is standing.

And

concerning this

it teaches

they sell it unblemished and alive,

so how did you say that they do not sell it unblemished and alive?

And we answer:

No! Always,

we will establish the Mishna

in the present time,

because

does it teach,

does the Mishna say,

they sell it unblemished and alive—

no, slaughtered—

no,

so that we should infer from it that it is speaking about the time of the Temple? Rather, the Mishna is speaking about the present time, and therefore it said nothing concerning slaughtered. Since such a situation as an unblemished slaughtered animal does not exist in the present time. And the Mishna did not write “unblemished and alive” so that we should infer from it. Rather,

this itself comes to teach us,

this matter itself is a novelty,

that a firstborn is sold unblemished and alive,

so that you should not say that the priests have no ownership in a firstborn until a blemish befalls it .