Temurah 9a — the Talmud in English

for a person is not accustomed to calculate in this manner, because

people say,

it is the way of people to say:

A small gourd is better than a large gourd.

This is a proverb: a small gourd of the present is better than a large gourd of the future. That is to say, it is preferable that I sell it now at its value, for perhaps even if I lower the price for him now, this will not benefit me at all in the future, since he will not give me his firstborn animals another time.

Mishna:

The Mishna explains what type of animal the animal from which he makes a substitution causes a substitution.

They make a substitution from sheep

of consecrated property

for cattle,

of non-sacred property.

And from cattle,

of consecrated property,

for sheep,

of non-sacred property.

And

likewise,

from lambs for goats, and from goats for lambs; from males for females, and from females for males.

And the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

From the unblemished animals,

of consecrated property,

of non-sacred property,

and from

of consecrated property,

for the unblemished animals,

of non-sacred property. And from where [do we know] that they make a substitution from the unblemished animals for בעלי מומין and from בעלי מומין for the unblemished animals?

As it is stated [Leviticus 27]

“

He shall not exchange it and shall not substitute it, good for bad or bad for good.” “Good” means the unblemished animals, and “bad” means בעלי מומין.

And we expound: “good,” an unblemished animal of non-sacred property, may not be designated “for bad,” for a בעל מום of consecrated property. “And if he shall substitute a substitution, then it and its substitute shall be holy.” From here we learn that בעלי מומין of consecrated property effect a substitution for unblemished animals of non-sacred property. And from what is stated, “or bad for good,” we expound that he may not substitute “bad,” namely, a בעל מום of non-sacred property, for “good,” for an unblemished animal of consecrated property. “And if he shall substitute a substitution, then it and its substitute shall be holy.” From here we learn that an unblemished animal of consecrated property effects a substitution for a בעל מום of non-sacred property.

And the Mishna explains: what we expounded from “good for bad,” that “bad” of consecrated property effects a substitution, does not apply to every בעל מום of consecrated property, but:

And what is “good for bad,”

that is, which “bad” effects a substitution?

of consecrated property,

whose consecration preceded

their consecration

their defect,

for when they were consecrated they were unblemished and afterward a defect occurred in them; but if their defect preceded their consecration, it does not effect a substitution. And the Gemara will explain this from the exposition of Scripture .

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses:

From where are these matters

that all the substitutions taught by the Mishna are learned?

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah [there]: “He shall not exchange it, and he shall not substitute it, good for bad or bad for good. And if he shall substitute an animal for an animal, then it and its substitute shall be holy.” And from what is stated

“an animal for an animal,”

from here

we learn

that they make a substitution from sheep for cattle, and from cattle for sheep; from lambs for goats, and from goats for lambs; from males for females, and from females for males; from בעלי מומין for the unblemished animals, and from the unblemished animals for בעלי מומין.

One might have thought even when a permanent defect preceded

their consecration

they make a substitution upon them?

Scripture says: “He shall not exchange it and shall not substitute it, good for bad or bad for good.” And what is “good for bad”? בעלי מומין whose consecration preceded their defect, and not

those whose permanent defect preceded their consecration.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is the textual teaching,

what is the teaching? That is, how is this expounded from Scripture?

Abaye said: Let us write,

the Torah could have written

“He shall not substitute it, good for bad,

or bad for it,”

which would then have implied: “He shall not substitute it,” and the prohibited substitution is good of non-sacred property for bad of consecrated property, or bad of non-sacred property he shall not substitute “for it,” for all consecrated property, whether good or bad [and below it will be explained how good of non-sacred property for good of consecrated property would be learned]—

And if so, this that the Torah wrote

“for good” the second time,

the second one,

why do I need it? Learn from it: good from the outset,

that only if, at the time it was consecrated, it was unblemished, and afterward a defect occurred in it, it

effects a substitution.

But

bad from the outset does not effect a substitution.

Rava said: Both instances of “good”

Rava said: Both “good,”

both the first and the second,

are superfluous,

they are superfluous for exposition. How so?

If so,

if indeed the Torah intended good for bad and bad for good,

let Scripture write,

the Torah could have written

“He shall not exchange it and shall not substitute it for bad or bad for it,”

and from what would have been said, “it for bad,” it would have been implied: “good for bad,” that is, “it,” which is the consecrated animal, for bad of non-sacred property. And from what is said, “or bad for it,” it would have been implied: bad of non-sacred property for good of consecrated property. And if so,

why do I need the writing of both “good”?

To tell you:

one good,

the first “good” that is superfluous comes to teach us that

even good for good

also—

he who makes a substitution is liable to lashes,

he is liable to lashes even when he substitutes good for good.

And the other,

the second “good,” comes to teach us:

good from the outset effects a substitution,

whereas

bad from the outset does not effect a substitution.

And the Gemara discusses:

And Abaye said:

There is no need for an exposition to learn “good for good,” because

it is a kal va-chomer: Just as good

of non-sacred property

for bad

of consecrated property,

which elevates it,

it elevates the consecrated property—

he is liable to lashes.

When he substitutes

good for good, for they are alike,

for they are both equal and both good—does it not

follow all the more so that he is liable to lashes?!

And Rava,

responding to Abaye’s words: indeed, it is possible to learn a prohibition or a halakha from a kal va-chomer, but a punishment of lashes may not be learned, because

punishments are not derived from logical inference.

Therefore a special exposition is required for the punishment of lashes for substituting good for good.

And Abaye can say to you: This

is not punishment derived from logical inference,

and it is not learned from a kal va-chomer,

but merely a revealing of the matter,

it is a simple proof that just as he is liable to lashes when he substitutes bad of consecrated property for good of non-sacred property, so too when he substitutes good for good, because

how is good inferior to bad,

that is, is good of consecrated property inferior to bad of consecrated property? Just as when he substitutes bad of consecrated property he is liable to lashes, so is the same הדין when he substitutes good of consecrated property. For the Torah’s principal concern is that he not substitute anything at all for consecrated property .

The following beraita explains the difference between “exchange” and “substitution.”

The Sages taught:

What the Torah said,

“He shall not exchange it,”

means

with that of others: he exchanges his animal for another person’s animal, as will be explained, and this is the meaning of “exchange,” that two people exchange between themselves. And what the Torah said,

He exchanges his animal for another person’s animal, as will be explained. This is the meaning of “exchange,” namely, that two people exchange objects between themselves. And concerning what the Torah says,

“and he shall not substitute it”

means

with that of himself: a non-sacred animal in place of a consecrated animal, and both belong to him.

He substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, and both belong to him.

And the Gemara discusses: why did the Torah write both of them?

Let it write,

it would have sufficed for the Torah to write

“He shall not exchange it,” and it need not

have written

“and he shall not substitute it,”

for why would we think that an animal belonging to him is forbidden, as is one belonging to others?

And we answer:

If it had written this,

if the Torah had written only “he shall not exchange it,”

we would have thought,

we would have said that only when he exchanges with that of others, and says

“Let this go out,

my consecrated animal shall leave its consecration,

and let this enter,

his fellow’s animal shall enter as a sacrifice in its place,” and he intends to give him his animal—

he is liable to lashes

because according to his mistaken understanding he intended to remove consecrated property into non-sacred status—

But

when he

makes a substitution, for he sanctifies both of them , and he does not intend to render the consecrated animal non-sacred—

and he does not intend to render the consecrated animal unconsecrated—

say

we might have thought to say that he

does not receive lashes—

It teaches us

that the Torah informs us, “He shall not substitute,” that even in this manner he transgressed the prohibition and receives lashes.

The Gemara clarifies:

this one concerning another’s property,

which we expounded from “He shall not exchange”—

what are the circumstances

how is this speaking?

If you say

that it is speaking of one who exchanges

his own consecrated animal,

his own,

and

the

non-sacred

animal

of another,

belonging to someone else, that cannot be said, because

can he sanctify

can he sanctify another’s animal?! For

“When a man sanctifies his house as holy to the Lord, said the Merciful One” [Leviticus 27],

and we expound:

just as his house is in his possession, so too every

thing that he sanctifies—he can sanctify it only when it is

in his possession .

Rather,

if it is speaking of

another’s consecrated animal,

belonging to someone else,

and

he makes a substitution for it with

his non-sacred animal,

his own, this too cannot be said, for

can he designate,

can he designate it in this manner?!

And it was taught ,

for we learned in a beraita:

A person cannot designate with something that is not his.

And it is difficult: what are the circumstances?

And we conclude:

in fact,

it is speaking of

another’s consecrated animal and his own non-sacred animal .

And it is speaking

for example, when the owner of the consecrated animal said,

the owner of the consecrated animal authorized one to make a substitution for his animal, and explicitly said:

“Anyone who wishes to make a substitution with my animal, let him come and make a substitution.”

And in this manner a substitution takes hold upon it , and this is the substitution that the Torah prohibited when it said, “He shall not exchange” .

Mishna:

They make substitutions,

one sacrificial animal

one

of non-sacred property

for two

of consecrated property, for if he said concerning a non-sacred animal, “This is in place of those,” its substitution is a valid substitution.

And

they likewise make a substitution of two non-sacred animals

for one

of consecrated property, and likewise

one for a hundred, and a hundred for one,

the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Shimon says: They make substitutions only one for one,

because

it is stated [Leviticus 27]:

Leviticus 27]:

“And it shall be, it and its substitution shall be holy.”

“It” signifies “the singular one,” which is only one. From here, they make substitutions only with one sacrificial animal.

And from where is it established that substitutions are made only with one non-sacred animal and no more? It is stated, “and its substitution,” and we expound: its substitution is analogous to it.

Just as “it,”

the sacrificial animal,

is singular,

so too its substitution

is singular.

Gemara:

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters

derived?

The Gemara brings a beraita in which the reason for the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages is explained.

For the Sages taught:

The Torah said [there]: “And if he shall make a substitution, he shall make a substitution

an animal for an animal”;

from here

we learn

that they make a substitution of one for two, and two for one; one for a hundred, and a hundred for one.

As will be explained, “animal” can be interpreted as “animals.”

Rabbi Shimon says: They make substitutions only one for one,

because

it is stated, “an animal for an animal,”

and we expound:

and not an animal for animals, and not animals for an animal.

And in his view, “animal” signifies only one.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Shimon:

We find

in the language of Scripture many

animals that are called “animal,”

for it is a collective name for the animal species, as

it is stated [Jonah 4]:

Jonah 4]:

“And much animal.”

And the Gemara explains:

And Rabbi Shimon

responds that there is no proof from there! Indeed, many animals

are called “much animal,”

but

“animal” without qualification

in the singular

is not called

that, for many animals are not called “animal.” And the Gemara wonders:

And

for

the reason of Rabbi Shimon is because of “animal,”

which signifies the singular?!

But the reason of Rabbi Shimon is because

it is stated

“it,”

and he expounded:

just as it is singular, so too its substitution

is singular, as explained in our Mishna.

And we answer [first formulation]:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon agrees that they make substitutions

one for one,

and then make substitutions again

with the same sacrificial animal for which a substitution had already been made once. That is, they do not make a substitution of two for one at once, but they make substitutions several times for the same sacrificial animal.

What is the reason?

The first sanctity

of the sacrificial animal for which they made the substitution—

where did it go?

For if they made a substitution for it once, did its sanctity go away, so that it is impossible to make another substitution for it?!

That is to say, indeed, Rabbi Shimon derives from “it and its substitution” that they make substitutions only one for one, as explained in the Mishna. But from this exposition by itself, it would have been possible to say that they do not make a substitution and then make another substitution, because the substitution too must be an act that is “singular,” performed only once. Therefore he needed an additional exposition, “an animal for an animal,” to say that they make a substitution and then make another substitution, since each time he makes a substitution with no more than one animal, and it is properly called “an animal for an animal.”

Another formulation: And we wonder:

“Is Rabbi Shimon’s reason because of ‘animal’?! But Rabbi Shimon’s reason is because of ‘it’: just as it is singular, so too is its substitution singular?”

And we answer:

Initially,

at first,

Rabbi Shimon said to them from “And it shall be, it and its substitution,”

as the Mishna said.

And when he saw

and deemed it appropriate,

that the Sages expounded from “an animal for an animal,” he said to them,

he responded to them:

from there,

from that same verse from which you bring proof for your position,

we can also derive the reason for mine,

I too can derive my position, as explained in the beraita, because it did not say “animals,” but rather “animal.”

The Gemara brings the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish according to Rabbi Shimon, whether they make a substitution and then make another substitution. However, according to the second formulation, this is a new dispute and is unrelated to the resolution of the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita. According to the first formulation, it continues what was said above [and we must read: “With regard to the matter itself”].

Resh Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon agrees that they make substitutions and then make substitutions again. What is the reason? The first sanctity

of the first consecrated animal

where did it go?!

As explained.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Just as

according to Rabbi Shimon

they do not make a substitution of two for one, so too they do not make a substitution and then make another substitution.

It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan,

for we learned in a beraita according to his words;

it was taught,

and we learned in another beraita

in accordance with Resh Lakish.

It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan: Just as they do not make a substitution of two for one,

so too they do not make a substitution and then make another substitution.

It was taught in accordance with Resh Lakish: Could it be that just as Rabbi Shimon said that they do not make a substitution of two for one, so too they do not make a substitution and then make another substitution? The verse states, “And it shall be, it and its substitution,”

even a hundred.

The discussion of two bodies and two sanctities.

The Gemara brings several uncertainties that Rabbi Avin considered according to Rabbi Shimon [according to Rabbi Yohanan], who holds that with regard to a sacrificial animal for which a substitution was made once, they do not make a substitution again.

The uncertainty concerns a case in which the sanctity was “transferred” to another animal, and they made a substitution with the other animal: is its substitution a valid substitution? The sides of the uncertainty will be explained in the Gemara.

There are several forms of “transfer of sanctity”: a. “Two bodies and one sanctity.” For example: he set aside a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, and made a substitution with it. With regard to it, he cannot make another substitution. Rather, it developed a blemish, and he transferred its sanctity to another animal. It is now found that the other animal is a guilt-offering, and has that same sanctity of a guilt-offering, but it is a different body.

b. “Two sanctities and one body.” For example: he set aside a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, and made a substitution with it, and with regard to it, as it is, he cannot make another substitution. Rather, it was lost, and he achieved atonement through another guilt-offering that he set aside from his herd and consecrated as a guilt-offering, and sacrificed it, and afterward the first one was found. Its law after it was found is that it is “transferred to a burnt-offering”: its sanctity was detached from the sanctity of a guilt-offering, and it is now a burnt-offering, as is the law of a guilt-offering for which its owner achieved atonement through another. It is found that this very animal does not possess that earlier sanctity of a guilt-offering [for that sanctity has already been “emptied” by the law of substitution, after a substitution had already been made for it], and it possesses another sanctity. c. “Two bodies and two sanctities.” Such as, he set aside a guilt-offering to atone through it, and made temura with it. It developed a blemish, and he transferred its sanctity onto another animal, and it too was a guilt-offering like it. Now that second guilt-offering was lost, and he atoned with another. Afterwards it was found, and it was set aside for a burnt-offering. It follows that that second sacrifice, which is now a burnt-offering, is a different body from the first guilt-offering, which developed a blemish [with which one does not perform temura, since he had already performed temura with it], and also a different sanctity, since the sanctity of a guilt-offering was transferred from it to the sanctity of a burnt-offering.

The Gemara discusses all of these. And concerning this matter there are two formulations in the Gemara, the formulation of the Babylonian [Talmud] and the formulation of the Jerusalem [Talmud]—what Rabbi Avin actually raised as a question.

Rabbi Avin asked: According to the one who says, “One does not perform temura and then perform temura again,”

what is the law if

he set aside a guilt-offering to atone through it, and made temura with it?

And with regard to it, he does not again perform temura.