Temurah 30b — the Talmud in English

From where is this matter

learned—from where is it derived

that the Sages said “

there is no sexual immorality with an animal”?

And this is what we learned in our Mishna: the payment for a dog, given for intercourse with a dog or other animals, is permitted.

He said to him

Rav Ashi:

as it is written “

You shall not bring the payment of a sexually immoral woman or the price of a dog”;

and if there were a law of “sexual immorality” with an animal,

the verse would not have omitted—

the verse would not have refrained from

writing “

the payment of a sexually immoral woman and a dog,”

to forbid their payments; and since it is not written so, it is proven that “there is no sexual immorality with an animal.”

It was also taught so

and likewise we learned in a beraita:

the payment for a dog and the price of a sexually immoral woman are permitted.

And the beraita adds: and if you should say

that they are forbidden, and the Torah did not forbid specifically the payment of a sexually immoral woman and the price of a dog, but also intended

to place the one of this into that and the one of that into this,

to forbid also the payment for a dog and the price of a sexually immoral woman.

The verse says “

for an abomination of Hashem your God are both of them,”

to teach us:

two, and not four.

And it is proven that there is no sexual immorality with an animal.

We learned in our Mishna:

and their offspring are permitted, as it is stated: “they,” and not their offspring.

And the Gemara discusses the offspring of the other disqualified animals, such as an animal with which intercourse was performed and an ox that gored, an animal designated and an animal worshiped, which were in their mothers’ wombs at the time when the transgression of the prohibition was performed with them.

Rava said: The offspring of an animal with which intercourse was performed— is forbidden for sacrifice, because she and her offspring were subjected to intercourse.

The Gemara discusses the offspring of the other animals disqualified for sacrifice—such as an animal that had intercourse with a person, an ox that gored, an animal designated for idolatrous use, or one worshipped as an idol—when they were in their mothers’ wombs at the time their mothers committed the prohibited transgression.

Rava said: The offspring of an animal that had intercourse with a person— is prohibited

The offspring

of an ox that gored,

a cow that gored an Israelite while she was pregnant and killed him, and the offspring was born—

is forbidden,

because

she and her offspring gored.

is prohibited,

because

But

the offspring of an animal designated and an animal worshiped—

is permitted. What is the reason? He designated its mother; only the mother did he designate for idolatry, and likewise only

for its mother did they worship it,

only the mother did they worship as idolatry, and not the offspring.

Some say

there is one who transmitted this report in Rava’s name:

even

the offspring of an animal designated and an animal worshiped is also forbidden! What is the reason?

After all, the offspring was neither designated nor worshiped? Because

he is pleased with its swelling and its fattening.

Since the fetus makes the mother swollen and fattened, and thus she is more valuable for idolatry, it too is considered part of the designated and worshiped animal.

he is pleased with its making the mother larger and fatter.

Since the fetus causes the mother to become larger and fatter, thereby making her more valuable for idolatrous worship, the offspring too is considered part of what was designated for idolatrous use or worshipped as an idol.

And is this like that which Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said in the name of Rav: One who betroths

the woman

with the dung [ droppings ]

of an ox sentenced to stoning,

and they have the value of a peruta—

she is betrothed,

even though the ox itself is forbidden for benefit.

But one who betroths

with the dung of calves of idolatry—

she is not betrothed.

What is the reason,

what is the reason for distinguishing between an ox sentenced to stoning and idolatry? Are they not both forbidden for benefit?

If you wish, say: Scripture,

if you wish, we find the distinction in the scriptural expositions,

and if you wish, say: reasoning,

and if you wish, we distinguish so from reasoning:

And he explains:

If you wish, say: reasoning: concerning

idolatry, he is pleased with its swelling,

that it should appear fat; therefore the name of the prohibition of idolatry takes effect also upon the dung.

But

concerning an ox sentenced to stoning—

he is not pleased with its swelling, for it is destined to die.

Therefore the dung is not considered significant for a prohibition to take effect upon it.

If you wish, say: Scripture: concerning idolatry it is written [Deuteronomy 7] “ and you shall be ḥerem like it,” and we derive: everything from which you derive benefit is like it.

one is not pleased with its increase in size,

since it is destined to die. Therefore, the dung is not considered significant enough for the prohibition to take effect upon it.

Therefore, dung that came from it is forbidden, whereas

concerning an ox sentenced to stoning it is written [Exodus 21] “

its flesh shall not be eaten,”

and we infer:

its flesh—

is forbidden; its dung—

is permitted.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the law of the payment and the price.

He gave her money —

these are permitted

to purchase a sacrifice with them. And the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

these are permitted

He gave her

wines, oils, and fine flour, and anything similar to them that is sacrificed upon the altar—

is forbidden.

He gave her consecrated animals,

animals consecrated as sacrifices—

these are permitted, and the prohibition of the payment does not take effect upon them; the reason will be explained in the Gemara. It will also be explained how he gave them to her, since they do not belong to him.

He gave her

birds,

turtledoves and young pigeons, non-sacred —

these are forbidden

for sacrifice.

And it is necessary to inform us of this, because it might have been reasoned If, regarding consecrated animals, which a blemish disqualifies, the payment and the price do not take effect upon them; birds, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not an inference that the payment and the price should not take effect upon them?! Therefore, the verse says “You shall not bring the payment of a sexually immoral woman or the price of a dog for any vow into the House of Hashem your God,” and we derive from the inclusive expression “for any vow” to include the birds, which also come through a vow, and they are forbidden. We learned in the preceding Mishna that the offspring of the payment and the price are permitted, even offspring that were in the mother’s womb at the time the payment was given are permitted. Our Mishna discusses animals forbidden for sacrifice, such as an animal with which intercourse was performed, an animal designated and an animal worshiped, and an ox that gored, which conceived and gave birth after they were disqualified because of the transgression: what is the law of those offspring?

for sacrifice.

It was necessary to teach this ruling because it might have been logically possible to permit them by an a-fortiori inference: If, with regard to consecrated animals, which a blemish disqualifies, the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog do not take effect upon them, then with regard to birds, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more so that the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog should not take effect upon them?

turtledoves or young doves, non-sacred birds —

these are prohibited

for sacrifice.

Therefore,

the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog

All those disqualified with regard to the altar—

their offspring are permitted.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring

of

an animal with a fatal defect shall not be sacrificed upon the altar.

But with regard to eating non-sacred food, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it is permitted.

for any vow into the House of the Lord your God,” and we derive from the additional expression “for any vow,”

And the Sages say: It shall be sacrificed.

And the Gemara will explain the reason for their dispute.

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: A female animal that suckled from an animal with a fatal defect—

is disqualified from being upon the altar.

And the Mishna continues concerning an animal with a fatal defect.

All consecrated animals that developed a fatal defect—

are not redeemed,

because after they are redeemed they will be eaten only by dogs,

and the law is that

“consecrated animals are not redeemed in order to feed them to dogs,”

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara. Rather, they should die on their own and be buried. Gemara: We learned in our Mishna: He gave her money; these are permitted. And the Gemara brings a beraita that derives this from an exposition of the verse. The Sages taught: He gave her money as her payment, and she purchased an animal with it— it is permitted

is disqualified from being offered on the altar.

for the animal to be sacrificed.

What is the reason? “

Payment”

is written, meaning that the Torah forbade the payment itself,

but it is not written “

with the payment,”

which would mean something purchased with the payment.

Furthermore,

if we say that what she purchased with the payment is also forbidden,

that would be its substitutes. And what are its substitutes?

Its offspring. And we learned,

and we have learned:

The Sages taught:

their offspring are permitted.

which would indicate something purchased with the payment.

and she purchased an animal with it—

it is permitted,

Furthermore,

if we say that whatever she purchased with the payment is also prohibited,

We learned in our Mishna: Wines, oils, and fine flour, and anything similar to them that is sacrificed upon the altar, is forbidden.

And the Gemara brings a beraita discussing “changes”: if the payment changed from what it was at the time it was given, is it permitted to bring it as a sacrifice?

The Sages taught: He gave her wheat, and she made it fine flour,

or he gave her

olives, and she made them oil,

or

grapes, and she made them wine— one [teacher] taught, we learned in one beraita,

they are forbidden,

the fine flour, oil, and wine, to bring them as a sacrifice.

And another taught,

and in another beraita we learned that they are

permitted.

Rav Yosef said: Tani Guryon from Aspork [from a place called so]: The House of Shammai prohibit, and the House of Hillel permit. And he explains: The House of Hillel hold, that what the Torah wrote, “they” [“both of them”], teaches us to exclude both offspring and changes, and this is how we derive it: “

they,”

only the payment and the price themselves are forbidden,

and not their offspring. “

They”—and not their changes.”

But

the House of Shammai hold, “

they—and not their offspring,”

and what the Torah wrote, “for an abomination of Hashem your God are both of them,” is expounded: “

also”

to include their changes,

and the Torah included the changes as forbidden.

only the payment itself and the price themselves are prohibited,

but not their offspring. “

They, and not their changes.”

But

the House of Shammai hold: “

They, and not their offspring”; and what the Torah wrote, “For both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God,” is interpreted as follows:

“Also”

includes their changes,

and the Torah expanded the prohibition to include changes.

The Gemara asks: But according to the House of Hillel, is it not written “ also”? What does it come to include? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, “also,” according to the House of Hillel, is difficult! The Gemara brings a baraitha concerning the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog. The Sages taught: The Torah states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God.” We derive from the words “the House of the Lord your God” that only something brought into the House of the Lord is subject to the prohibition of such payment and the price of a dog. This excludes a red cow, which does not enter the House, as it is slaughtered on the Mount of Olives, as it is stated [Numbers 19]: “And he shall take it outside the camp.” If he gave her a red cow, it is permitted— the words of Rabbi Elazar.

only the payment and the price themselves are prohibited,

but not their offspring. “

They,” and not their changes.

Whereas

Beit Shammai hold: “

They,” and not their offspring; and the phrase “For both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” is expounded:

And we raise an objection:

But according to the House of Hillel, is it not written “

also,”

and what does it come to include?

And we conclude: Indeed, “ also” according to the House of Hillel is difficult! The Gemara brings a beraita concerning the payment and the price. The Sages taught: The Torah said, “You shall not bring the payment of a sexually immoral woman or the price of a dog into the House of Hashem your God,” and we derive: “ the House of Hashem your God”— to exclude a red heifer, a red heifer which does not come into the House, for it is slaughtered on the Mount of Olives, as it is stated [Numbers 19], “and he shall bring it outside the camp.” And if he gave her a red heifer, it is permitted, the words of Rabbi Elazar. And the beraita continues: And the Sages say: what is stated, “House,” comes to include the hammered plates; if he gave her gold, it is forbidden to make from it a plating for the altar. And the Gemara explains: Who are the Sages, who are those Sages? Rav Hisda said: It is Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught: He gave her gold— Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Yehuda says: They do not make from them hammered plates even behind the House of the Curtain, in those eleven cubits behind the House of the Holy of Holies; if there is a structure there and he gave her stones as her payment, they do not build from them, even though the sanctity of the place there is lesser. We learned in our Mishna: He gave her consecrated animals; these are permitted.

Birds; these are forbidden.

For it might have been reasoned: If, regarding consecrated animals, which a blemish disqualifies, the payment and the price do not take effect upon them, then birds, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not an inference that the payment and the price should not take effect upon them? The verse says “

for any vow,”

to include the birds.

The Gemara explains:

Who are the Sages—who are these Sages?

The Gemara cites a

beraita concerning a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog. The Sages taught:

Rav Hisda said: It is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

And now, since birds are disqualified with regard to the payment and the price, one may reason to forbid consecrated animals given as payment, because

a kal va-chomer regarding consecrated animals!

And if birds, which a blemish does not disqualify,

and nevertheless

the payment and the price take effect upon them; consecrated animals, which a blemish does disqualify,

is it possible that it is not an inference that the payment and the price take effect upon them?!

The verse says “

for any vow,” the verse teaches that it is forbidden to vow them and bring them,

to exclude that which was already vowed,

upon which the prohibition of the payment and the price does not take effect.

And the Gemara discusses:

The reason,

the entire reason that the payment and the price do not take effect upon consecrated animals is because the verse excluded them.

And one should infer:

Had the verse not excluded them,

if the Torah had not excluded them, we would have said: When he gives her consecrated animals— the payment and the price take effect upon them! And how is it possible to say so?

But

does a person impose a prohibition upon something that is not his?!

The verse therefore states: “

For any vow,” teaching that it is prohibited to vow to bring them,

to exclude an animal already vowed,

upon which the prohibition of the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog does not take effect.

The Gemara discusses this:

The reason—the entire reason that the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog does not take effect upon consecrated animals is

that the verse excluded them.

This implies: Had the verse not excluded them, if the Torah had not excluded them, we would have said: When he gives her consecrated animals, the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog takes effect upon them! But how could this be possible, when

a person cannot impose a prohibition upon an object that does not belong to him?

kal va-chomer of consecrated animals!

If birds, which are not disqualified by a blemish,

nevertheless

have the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog take effect upon them; consecrated animals, which are disqualified by a blemish—

is it not the case that

the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog should take effect upon them?!

The verse therefore states: “

for any vow,”

teaching that the verse prohibits vowing these animals and bringing them,

to exclude an animal already vowed,

upon which the prohibition of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog does not take effect.

The Gemara discusses this:

The reason—

the entire reason that the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog does not take effect upon consecrated animals is

because the verse excluded them.

And one should infer:

Had the verse not excluded them,

if the Torah had not excluded them,

we would have said: When he gives her consecrated animals—

the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog takes effect upon them!

But how could this be possible?

For

a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him!

And we answer,

Rav Hoshaya said:

Indeed, with ordinary dedicated offerings, a verse is not needed to exclude them from being offered, and a harlot's fee and a dog's price do not take effect upon them, because they do not belong to him. Rather, here we are dealing with one who

enlists

the prostitute

for his Passover offering,

as payment for intercourse, in accordance with the law concerning the Passover offering, which may be eaten only by those enrolled in it—

And

this beraita is in accordance with the method of

Rabbi,

who holds that a person may enroll others in his Passover offering in exchange for money, even if he needs this money for needs that are not for eating the Passover offering, and he holds that it is his property for all his needs.

For it was taught:

The Torah said in the passage concerning the Passover offering [Exodus 12], “

And if the household is too small for a lamb.”

And the Sages expounded, “ If the household is too small,” meaning that his household has become diminished, that is, he does not have enough to buy wood for roasting the Passover offering or a spice with which to season it, then the Torah permits, “for a lamb” [as though it were written, “from sustaining,” with a het],

sustain him with the lamb;

give him his needs from the lamb, for he may enroll others in his Passover offering, and with the money he will buy wood and a spice.

And the Sages hold: Only if he is short

of what is needed for eating

did the Torah permit it,

but not of what is needed for purchase.

For if he lacks money for the needs of a purchase, that is, ordinary merchandise, and his household has become diminished, he may not enroll others and conduct business with the money.

Rabbi says: Even

if his household is diminished

of what is needed for purchase,

it is permitted for him to enroll others and spend the money,

for if he does not have it,

he enrolls others with him in his Passover offering and in his festival offering, and his money is unconsecrated,

because

on this condition Israel dedicated their

Passover offerings.

And now, according to Rabbi, who says that the Passover offering remains his property even after it has been dedicated, the Mishna and likewise the beraita said that if he enrolled her in exchange for intercourse, the prohibition of a harlot's fee does not take effect upon the Passover offering. And likewise, if he needed a dog and gave its price by enrolling someone in the Passover offering, the prohibition of a dog's price does not take effect upon it.

We learned in our Mishna:

All those forbidden [for offering] upon the altar—their offspring are permitted.

Rav said:

What we learned in the Mishna, that

all those forbidden with regard to the altar—their offspring are permitted,

these are the words of the Sages.

And it was taught concerning it

—and we learned a beraita that adds to the Mishna:

And Rabbi Eliezer forbids.

Rav Huna bar Hinena said in the name of Rav Nahman: The dispute

—what did the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer dispute? It is, for example,

that they became pregnant, and afterward

before giving birth, while they were pregnant,

bestiality was committed with them [or they were designated, worshipped, or gored].

they were designated for idolatrous use, worshipped, or gored].

For Rabbi Eliezer holds: “

An embryo is the thigh of its mother,”

for it is considered an organ of its mother's body, and it follows that bestiality was committed with the offspring itself.

And

if

the Sages hold that an embryo

is

is not the thigh of its mother.

But

if

bestiality was committed with them and afterward they became pregnant, it is agreed by all,

even Rabbi Eliezer holds,

they are permitted.

Rava said: The dispute is when they were used for bestiality and afterward became pregnant.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds: “

When this and that cause it, it is forbidden,”

that is, since the offspring was formed from the forbidden mother and from the male that had intercourse with her, it was formed through the causation of prohibition and the causation of permission, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that “when this and that cause it, it is forbidden.”

And

if

the Sages hold: “

When this and that cause it”—

it is permitted.

But if they became pregnant and afterward were used for bestiality—

it is agreed by all that they are forbidden.

And the Gemara explains:

And Rava

said this

according to his reasoning,

according to his method.

For Rava said: The offspring

of

an animal used for bestiality is forbidden,

because

both it and its offspring were used for bestiality. The offspring of a goring animal is forbidden,

because

both it and its offspring gored,

because of the principle that an embryo is the thigh of its mother.

Others state it differently: Rav Huna bar Hinena said in the name of Rav Nahman: The dispute is

when they were used for bestiality while they were dedicated.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds: The matter is disgraced

as a matter,

it is a disgraceful matter to offer their offspring, since bestiality was committed with them while they were dedicated,

and the Sages hold: The matter is not disgraced.

But when bestiality was committed with them while they were unconsecrated, since they changed,

for he dedicated them,

it is agreed by all that they are permitted.

Rava said

in the name of

Rav Nahman: The dispute is when bestiality was committed with them while they were unconsecrated, for Rabbi Eliezer holds, the matter is disgraced.

And the Sages hold, since they changed, they are permitted—

But if bestiality was committed with them while they were dedicated—

it is agreed by all that they are forbidden,

since the matter is disgraced.