Temurah 30b (ל:) — the Talmud in English

From where is this matter:

from where do we learn

that the Sages said: “

There is no sexual immorality with regard to an animal”?

This is the ruling taught in our Mishna, that the payment given for a dog, given in exchange for intercourse with a dog or another animal, is permitted.

Rav Ashi said to him:

Since it is written: “

As it is written: “

You shall not bring the payment of a zonah or the price of a dog.”

And if there were a law of “sexual immorality” with regard to an animal,

the verse would not have omitted—

the verse would not have refrained from

writing: “

the payment of a zonah and a dog,”

in order to prohibit the payments for both; and since it did not say this, it is proven that “there is no sexual immorality with regard to an animal.”

It was taught likewise:

and so we learned in a

beraita:

According to the Tzon Kodashim and the Shitta Mekubbetzet [letter gimmel]. The explanation is that the beraita explicitly says that the payment given for a dog is “permitted” [although their words are not entirely clear: does the Mishna not say “permitted”?]. Birkat HaZevaḥ and the Shitta Mekubbetzet [letter yod-zayin] read in Rashi that Rashi himself was uncertain about bringing from the beraita something explicit in the Mishna, and deleted from the reading of the Gemara the proof from the beraita. See Tosafot:

And the beraita adds:

And if you say

that they are prohibited, and that the Torah prohibited specifically only the payment of a zonah and the price of a dog, but also intended

to place the one in the category of the other, and the other in the category of the one,

thereby prohibiting both the payment for a dog and the price of a zonah:

The verse states: “

For both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God,”

to teach us:

two, and not four.

Thus it is proven that there is no sexual immorality with regard to an animal.

We learned in our Mishna:

And their offspring are permitted, as it is stated: “They,” and not their offspring.

The Gemara discusses the offspring of the other animals disqualified for sacrifice—such as an animal with which a person had intercourse, an ox that gored, an animal designated for idolatrous use, or an animal worshipped—that were in their mother’s womb when she committed the transgression of the prohibition.

Rava said: The offspring of an animal with which a person had intercourse—

is prohibited

for sacrifice, because

she and her offspring were involved in the intercourse.

is forbidden,

The offspring

of an ox that gored,

a cow that gored an Israelite while she was pregnant and killed him, and the offspring was subsequently born,

is prohibited,

because

she and her offspring gored.

However,

the offspring of an animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped—

is permitted.

What is the reason?

He designated the mother for idolatrous use; only the mother was designated for idolatry, and likewise,

only the mother did he worship,

only the mother was worshipped as an idol, and not the offspring.

Some say—

there are those who transmitted this teaching in the name of Rava:

Even

the offspring of an animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped is also prohibited! What is the reason?

Although the offspring itself was neither designated nor worshipped, this is because

he is pleased with its increase in size and fattening.

Since the fetus causes the mother to become larger and fatter, thereby making her more valuable for idolatrous use, the offspring too is considered part of the animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped.

And is this like that which Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said in the name of Rav: One who betroths

a woman

with the dung

[droppings]

of an ox sentenced to stoning,

and the dung is worth a peruta—

she is betrothed,

even though the ox itself is prohibited to derive benefit from. But one who betroths a woman

with the dung of calves used for idolatry—

she is not betrothed.

If you wish, say that the distinction is derived from a verse,

What is the reason—

what is the reason for distinguishing between an ox sentenced to stoning and idolatry, since both are prohibited to derive benefit from?

If you wish, say it is derived from a verse,

if you wish, the distinction can be found in the interpretation of the verse;

and if you wish, say it is based on reasoning,

if you wish, we can distinguish between them on logical grounds:

And he explains:

If you wish, say it is based on reasoning: With regard to

idolatry, one is pleased with its increase in size,

that it should appear fat; therefore, the prohibition of idolatry takes effect even on the dung. Whereas

with regard to an ox sentenced to stoning—

If you wish, say that it is derived from a verse: With regard to idolatry, it is written [Deuteronomy 7]: “ And you shall be an object of destruction like it,”

one is not pleased with its increase in size,

since it is destined to die. Therefore, the dung is not considered significant enough for the prohibition to take effect upon it.

If you wish, say it is derived from a verse: With regard to idolatry it is written [Deuteronomy 7]: “

Anything that comes into being from it is like it.

And you shall be an anathema like it,”

and we derive:

Anything that you cause to come from it is like it.

Therefore, dung produced from it is prohibited; whereas

with regard to an ox sentenced to stoning it is written [Exodus 21]: “

is prohibited; its dung—

Its flesh shall not be eaten,”

and we infer:

Its flesh—

is prohibited; its dung—

is permitted.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the laws of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog.

If he gave her money —

these are permitted

to purchase a sacrifice with them. The reason will be explained in the Gemara.

If he gave her

wine, oil, or fine flour, or anything similar that is offered upon the altar—

it is prohibited.

If he gave her consecrated animals,

animals consecrated as sacrifices—

these are permitted,

and the prohibition of a payment for prostitution does not take effect upon them; the reason will be explained in the Gemara. It will also be explained how he could give them to her, since they did not belong to him.

If he gave her

birds,

turtledoves or young doves, non-sacred birds —

these are prohibited

for sacrifice.

It is necessary for the Mishna to teach this, because

it could have been reasoned that they should be permitted, by means of a

kal va-chomer:

If, with regard to consecrated animals, which are disqualified by a blemish, the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog do not take effect upon them; with regard to birds, which are not disqualified by a blemish,

is it not logical that the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog should not take effect upon them?!

Therefore,

the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a zonah or the price of a dog

But with regard to eating non-sacred food, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it is permitted.

for any vow into the House of the Lord your God,” and we derive from the additional expression “for any vow,”

And the Sages say: It shall be sacrificed.

to include birds,

which too can be brought as a vow, and they are prohibited.

We learned in the previous Mishna that the offspring of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog are permitted, even offspring that were in the mother’s womb when the payment was given. Our Mishna discusses animals prohibited for sacrifice, such as an animal with which a person had intercourse, an animal designated for idolatrous use, an animal worshipped, or an ox that gored, that became pregnant and gave birth after being disqualified because of the transgression: what is the status of those offspring?

All those disqualified with regard to the altar—

their offspring are permitted.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring

of

a tereifa may not be offered upon the altar.

But Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it is permitted for consumption by a non-sacred person.

And the Sages say: It may be offered.

The reason for their dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: A fit animal that nursed from a tereifa—

is disqualified from being offered upon the altar.

The Mishna continues concerning a tereifa.

All consecrated animals that became tereifa—

may not be redeemed,

because after they are redeemed they can be eaten only by dogs, and the law is

that “one may not redeem consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs,”

the reason for which will be explained in the Gemara. Rather, they should die on their own and be buried.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: If he gave her money, these are permitted.

The Gemara brings a

beraita that derives this ruling from an exposition of the verse.

The Sages taught:

If he gave her money

as her payment,

and she purchased an animal with it—

it is permitted,

the animal may be offered as a sacrifice.

What is the reason? “

Payment”

is written—

that is, the Torah prohibited the payment itself—

but it did not write “

with the payment,”

which would imply an object purchased with the payment.

Furthermore,

if we say that whatever she purchased with the payment is also prohibited,

that would be its exchange; and its exchange would be

its offspring. And we learned,

for we learned:

Their offspring are permitted.

olives, and she made them into oil, or grapes, and she made them into wine— one baraitha teaches— as one baraitha states— they are prohibited,

We learned in our Mishna: Wine, oil, fine flour, and anything similar that is offered upon the altar are prohibited.

The Gemara brings a

beraita discussing changes: if the payment has changed from what it was at the time it was given, may it be brought as a sacrifice? The Sages taught: If he gave her wheat, and she made it into fine flour,

or he gave her

olives, and she made them into oil,

or

grapes, and she made them into wine—

one [beraita] teaches,

one beraita teaches:

they are prohibited,

the fine flour, oil, and wine may not be brought as sacrifices.

And another [beraita] teaches,

while another beraita teaches that they are

permitted.

Rav Yosef said: Gurion of Asporak taught [from a place called this] that

the House of Shammai hold: “

Beit Shammai prohibit, and Beit Hillel permit.

And he explains:

Beit Hillel hold that what the Torah wrote, “they” [“both of them”], teaches us to exclude both offspring and changes, and thus we expound: “

and the Torah expanded the prohibition to include changes.

They”—

only the payment and the price themselves are prohibited,

but not their offspring. “

They,” and not their changes.

Whereas

Beit Shammai hold: “

They,” and not their offspring; and the phrase “For both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” is expounded:

And we raise an objection:

“also”

to include their changes,

and the Torah expanded the prohibition to include changes.

And we object:

But according to Beit Hillel, it is written “

also”—

and what does it come to include?

And we conclude: Indeed,

“also”

is difficult for Beit Hillel!

The Gemara cites a

beraita concerning a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog. The Sages taught:

The Torah states: “You shall not bring the payment of a zonah or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God,” and we expound: “

the House of the Lord your God”—

the prohibition of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog applies only to that which is brought into the House of the Lord;

to exclude a red heifer,

red,

which does not come into the House,

since it is slaughtered on the Mount of Olives, as it is stated [Numbers 19]: “And he shall take it outside the camp” . If he gave her a red heifer, it is permitted—

the words of Rabbi Elazar.

The verse therefore states: “ For any vow,”

The beraita continues:

And the Sages say:

The word “House” comes

to include the gold plating;

if he gave her gold, it is prohibited to make it into plating for the altar. The Gemara explains:

Who are the Sages—who are these Sages?

Now that birds are disqualified because of the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog, it should be possible to prohibit consecrated animals given as such a payment, because

Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

as it was taught: If he gave her gold—

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not make from it

gold plating, even behind the Chamber,

in those eleven cubits behind the Holy of Holies: if there is a structure there and he gave her stones as her payment, one may not build with them, even though the sanctity of that place is less stringent. We learned in our Mishna:

If he gave her consecrated animals, these are permitted.

Birds—these are prohibited.

For it could have been reasoned: If, with regard to consecrated animals, which are disqualified by a blemish, the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog do not take effect upon them, with regard to birds, which are not disqualified by a blemish, is it not logical that the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog should not take effect upon them? The verse therefore states: “

for any vow,”

to include birds.

This implies: Had the verse not excluded them, if the Torah had not excluded them, we would have said: When he gives her consecrated animals, the payment for intercourse with a prostitute and the price of a dog takes effect upon them! But how could this be possible, when

Now that birds are disqualified on account of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog, one must reason that consecrated animals given as a payment for prostitution should be prohibited, by means of a

kal va-chomer of consecrated animals!

If birds, which are not disqualified by a blemish,

nevertheless

have the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog take effect upon them; consecrated animals, which are disqualified by a blemish—

is it not the case that

the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog should take effect upon them?!

The verse therefore states: “

for any vow,”

teaching that the verse prohibits vowing these animals and bringing them,

to exclude an animal already vowed,

upon which the prohibition of a payment for prostitution and the price of a dog does not take effect.

The Gemara discusses this:

The reason—

the entire reason that the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog does not take effect upon consecrated animals is

because the verse excluded them.

And one should infer:

Had the verse not excluded them,

if the Torah had not excluded them,

we would have said: When he gives her consecrated animals—

the payment for prostitution and the price of a dog takes effect upon them!

But how could this be possible?

For

a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him!