Temurah 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says

the offspring of a tereifa

may not be brought upon the altar, whereas the Sages say it may be brought.

The Gemara presents two approaches to explaining the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages [and in a beraita in tractate Chullin it is explicit that this is Rabbi Yehoshua].

The Sages disputed in tractate Chullin whether “a tereifa gives birth,” that is, whether it can conceive and give birth. According to the one who says, “A tereifa does not give birth,” it is impossible to explain our Mishna as referring to an animal that became a tereifa and then conceived, since it cannot conceive at all. It must therefore be referring to one that conceived and only afterward became a tereifa. They then dispute the law of “the fetus is the thigh of its mother,” as explained in the preceding sugya concerning an animal set aside for idolatry, worshipped, or used for bestiality.

But according to the one who says, “A tereifa gives birth,” their dispute can be explained as referring to an animal that became a tereifa and then conceived, and they dispute the principle of “two causes,” as explained.

According to the one who says

“a tereifa gives birth,”

it can be found, for example, where it became a tereifa and ultimately conceived

[that is, it conceived].

And in this they disagree,

they dispute this premise:

Rabbi Eliezer holds

“two causes”—

is prohibited,

whereas the Rabbis hold

“two causes”—

is permitted.

Their dispute cannot be explained as concerning whether the fetus is the thigh of its mother, because the fetus can be disqualified on the basis that “the fetus is the thigh of its mother” only when the animal became a tereifa while the offspring was in its body. At that time it is possible to say: Since the offspring is one of its limbs, the tereifa affected its entire body and all its limbs, including the offspring. But according to the one who says that the fetus is not the thigh of its mother, the tereifa affected only the mother and not the offspring. However, if the offspring was not in its mother’s womb when she became a tereifa, certainly the tereifa did not affect the offspring. At most, it could be rendered a tereifa on the grounds that it was created and brought about by its tereifa mother. Since it has another, permitted cause—namely, the male that mated with its mother—it is therefore a case of “two causes.” The Sages and Rabbi Eliezer dispute whether this is permitted or prohibited.

But

according to the one who says

“a tereifa does not give birth,”—

it can be found, for example, where it conceived and ultimately became a tereifa.

And in this they disagree: Rabbi Eliezer holds

“the fetus is the thigh of its mother,”

whereas the Rabbis hold

“the fetus is not the thigh of its mother.”

The Gemara now discusses a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa—for example, turtledoves or young pigeons that became tereifot and laid eggs. What is the status of the chicks emerging from those eggs? Are they fit to be offered, and is there a distinction between a chick and the offspring of an animal?

Rav Huna said: The Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a chick from the egg of a tereifa that it is prohibited!

What is the reason?

What is the rationale for distinguishing between a chick and the offspring of an animal?

The Rabbis disputed

the view of

Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the offspring of an animal,

and they hold that it is not the thigh of its mother, because

it grows from the air.

An offspring in an animal’s womb is not attached to its body; rather, it hangs in the air and creates and grows on its own.

But an egg of a tereifa,

as long as it has not fully developed, is attached to the cluster of eggs, and

it grows from the body of the hen.

It grows and reaches completion from the hen’s body; therefore,

even the Rabbis concede

that it is a limb of the mother, and when the mother became a tereifa, it too became a tereifa.

Another explanation: An animal grows from the air, since even after it is born it continues to grow, demonstrating that its primary growth does not come from its mother. An egg, however, does not grow after it leaves the hen, demonstrating that its primary growth comes from the hen.

According to this wording, on both explanations Rav Huna spoke according to the one who says, “A tereifa does not give birth,” and they dispute whether the fetus is the thigh of its mother, in a case where the animal conceived and afterward became a tereifa. Rav Huna teaches us that when a hen was carrying eggs and then became a tereifa, the Sages concede that the eggs became tereifot together with the hen. But according to the one who says, “A tereifa gives birth,” and they dispute the principle of “two causes,” in a case where the animal became a tereifa and then conceived, there is no difference between an egg and animal offspring. Just as the offspring of a tereifa is fit according to the Sages because “two causes are permitted,” so too is the chick.

The Gemara presents another formulation, according to which there is a distinction between an egg and animal offspring even when the animal became a tereifa and then conceived. The Sages, who hold that the offspring is fit because the father is a permitted cause, concede with regard to a chick’s egg. As will be explained:

Another formulation:

Rav Huna said: The Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa that it is prohibited!

What is the reason?

The Rabbis disputed Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the offspring of a tereifa animal.

If according to the first formulation,

according to the one who says, “A tereifa gives birth,” the Sages permit it

because

they hold

“two causes are permitted.”

And if according to the latter formulation,

according to the one who says, “A tereifa does not give birth,” the Sages permit the offspring

because

they hold that

“the fetus is not the thigh of its mother,”

and the offspring is permitted.

to be used.

But a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa,

the Sages concede that it is prohibited—

If according to the first formulation, there,

with regard to the offspring of an animal,

there is a permitted element within it;

there is a permitted cause in addition to the prohibited cause, and therefore they permitted it. But

a chick has no permitted element within it.

There is no permitted cause, because this refers

to “

the first cluster of eggs,”

the same cluster of eggs that was present when the hen became a tereifa, and which became tereifot together with it.

And

the Sages concede that it is

prohibited.

And if according to the latter formulation, there,

with regard to the offspring of an animal,

why do the Rabbis permit it,

because they hold

that “

the fetus is not the thigh of its mother”?

But an egg is the very body of its mother.

For it was taught:

And they agree with regard to the egg of a tereifa that it is prohibited, because it grew through a prohibition.

This concludes the alternative formulation.

Rava said to Rav Huna: A beraita was taught that supports you,

that the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to a chick born from the egg of a tereifa.

For it was taught: “

A full ladleful”

[a specific measure relevant to matters of ritual impurity] of

maggots

[a mass of flesh-eating worms that forms in flesh and is attached to it]

that comes from a living person: Rabbi Eliezer deems it impure, and the Sages deem it pure.

There are two explanations of this. The first explanation is that the worms emerged from a living person, who subsequently died, and they dispute whether the maggots convey corpse impurity.

The second explanation is that even while the person is alive, they dispute whether the maggots convey impurity as a limb severed from a living person, which conveys impurity through contact, carrying, and a tent, like a limb from a corpse.

According to both explanations, the rationale for their dispute is as follows: Rabbi Eliezer deems it impure because the maggots are considered part of the person’s body. The Sages deem it pure because it is not considered part of his body; rather, it is a new creature.

Abaye proves this:

The Rabbis disputed Rabbi Eliezer only

with regard to

maggots,

since

it is merely excrement,

like ordinary excrement; because it separated from the person during his lifetime, it is therefore something separate from him.

But with regard to a chick

that emerged from the egg of a tereifa, even the Rabbis concede that it is a fully-fledged offspring,

as is evident, because it grew within its mother’s body.

Abaye said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable! Rabbi Eliezer disputed the Rabbis only with regard to maggots,

because

a person is called “a maggot” during his lifetime;

a person is called a maggot while alive,

as it is written

[Job 25]: “

And the hope of man”—

a maggot, and the son of man—

a worm.”

But a chick,

when does it grow from the egg?

When does the chick emerge from the egg?

After it has become putrid,

after the egg has spoiled.

At that moment,

when the egg spoils, it is

mere dust

and

it becomes permitted,

so the chick that emerges from it is permitted.

And when is the egg prohibited,

and when does its prohibition apply?

It is prohibited only initially,

only before it spoiled,

when it was fit for food,

when it was suitable for eating. But

now,

after it has spoiled, it

is not prohibited.

Furthermore,

Abaye argues:

It was explicitly taught,

we learned an explicit beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

to the Sages

with regard to the chick of the egg of a tereifa that it

is

permitted. [An alternative version:

that it may be brought upon the altar].

What is the reason?

Let us say that it is because it fattens from it,

He said to him,

Rava said to Abaye:

If it was taught,—

it was taught!

If this is indeed what we learned, I retract my objection.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: An animal that suckled from a tereifa is disqualified from being offered upon the altar.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

If we say it is because

it is fattened by it,

because it becomes fat from the tereifa,

then from now on,

if that is your reasoning, if

it was fed vetches of idolatry,

then

would it also be prohibited?!

Did we not learn above [29a ] that when an animal is fed foods associated with the practices of idolatry, it becomes prohibited only if it was actually designated for idolatry, and even then it is prohibited under the category of an animal set aside for idolatry, not because it was fattened through a prohibited substance?

Why, then, should it become prohibited because it was fattened with prohibited food?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rabbi Hanina of Trita taught before Rabbi Yohanan:

Indeed, if it suckled from a tereifa only occasionally, it is not prohibited. Rather, our Mishna is speaking

of a case where it suckled hot milk every morning,

throughout its life, and

since it can subsist on it

on that nursing,

for a full twenty-four-hour period

without any other food until the next nursing of hot tereifa milk—even if it ate other things in the meantime, nevertheless its life can subsist on that nursing. It follows that throughout its life it was fattened and sustained by the tereifa, and it is therefore disqualified from being offered upon the altar. Likewise, if it was fattened throughout its life with vetches of idolatry, it is prohibited even if it was not designated for idolatry.

We learned in our Mishna:

With regard to all consecrated animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them, because consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs.

The Gemara cites a beraita that expounds a verse to establish that “consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs,” according to one tanna.

From where are these matters derived?

As the Sages taught:

The Torah says [Deuteronomy 12]: “Only according to the desire of your soul may you slaughter and eat meat, according to the blessing of the Lord your God that He has given you in all your gates. The impure and the pure may eat of it, as of the gazelle and the deer.” The Sages expounded [Sifrei, Re’eh 12:15] that the verse speaks of disqualified consecrated animals that were redeemed.

And we expound: “

You shall slaughter”—

but not shearing,

meaning that it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals even after their redemption. “

And you shall eat”—

but not to your dogs.” “

Meat”—

but not milk,

meaning that it is prohibited to derive benefit from their milk .

From here

we learn

that consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs;

rather, if they die, they must be buried.

The Gemara cites the view of another tanna, who holds that “consecrated animals may be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs,” and he expounds the verse differently.

There are those who say:

This is how we expound it: “

You shall slaughter, and you shall eat meat” —

you have no permitted use of them except from the time of slaughter onward,

but not shearing and milk, whose benefit is derived during the animal’s lifetime. There is no exposition here from which to derive a prohibition against redeeming them to feed dogs,

therefore,

this tanna holds

that

consecrated animals may be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs.

It is also possible to derive an explicit permission to feed them to dogs. This is how we expound it: All benefits derived during the animal’s lifetime, such as shearing and milk, may not be enjoyed; but benefits derived after its death, even when it was not slaughtered—namely, redeeming it and feeding it to dogs—are permitted.

to feed them to dogs. We expound it as follows: All benefits obtained during the animal’s lifetime, such as shearing and milk, may not be enjoyed. But benefits obtained after its death, even if it was not slaughtered—namely, redeeming it and feeding it to dogs—are permitted.

We have completed the chapter “All Those Prohibited.”

The first Mishna explains the laws and stringencies that apply to consecrated offerings of the altar but not to consecrated property for Temple maintenance, and those that apply to consecrated property for Temple maintenance but not to consecrated offerings of the altar.

Mishna:

There are laws applying to consecrated offerings of the altar

that do not apply to consecrated property for Temple maintenance.

And there are laws applying to consecrated property for Temple maintenance that do not apply to consecrated offerings of the altar.

There are laws applying to consecrated offerings of the altar but not to consecrated property for Temple maintenance—

a.

Consecrated offerings of the altar can generate a substitution,

whereas consecrated property for Temple maintenance cannot generate a substitution, as explained above [13a].

b.

And one is liable

for them,

for consecrated offerings of the altar,

for piggul

if, while performing one of the four blood rites of an offering, he intended to eat some of its meat or burn its sacrificial portions outside the allotted time, the offering is piggul, and one who eats from it is liable to karet. And

for notar,

if some of their meat remained after the time allotted for eating it and one ate it, he is liable to karet.

And

for

one who is impure,

as, if the person’s body became impure and he ate from them while impure, he is liable to karet. All three of these prohibitions are stated in the Torah with regard to peace-offerings, and the other consecrated offerings of the altar are derived from peace-offerings [7b]. But consecrated property for Temple maintenance cannot become subject to the disqualifications of piggul, notar, or impurity.