Temurah 31a — the Talmud in English

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says

the offspring of a tereifa

may not be brought upon the altar, and the Sages say it may be brought.

And the Gemara brings two ways to explain the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages [and in a beraita in tractate Hullin it is explicit that this is Rabbi Yehoshua].

The Sages disputed in tractate Hullin whether “a tereifa gives birth”—that is, whether it conceives and gives birth. According to the one who says, “a tereifa does not give birth,” it is impossible to explain our Mishna as referring to an animal that became a tereifa and afterward conceived, since it does not conceive at all. Necessarily, it conceived and afterward became a tereifa. And they dispute the law of “the fetus is the thigh of its mother,” as explained in the preceding sugya concerning an animal designated for idolatry, worshipped, or used for bestiality.

But according to the one who says, “a tereifa gives birth,” it is possible to explain their dispute as referring to an animal that became a tereifa and afterward conceived, and they dispute the principle of “this and that cause,” as explained.

According to the one who says “

a tereifa gives birth,”

it can be found, for example, where it became a tereifa and only afterward conceived

—it conceived.

And in this they dispute,

they dispute over this reasoning:

for Rabbi Eliezer holds “

this and that cause—

forbidden,”

whereas the Rabbis hold “

this and that cause—

permitted.”

And one cannot explain their dispute as concerning whether the fetus is the thigh of its mother, because it is possible to invalidate it on account of “the fetus is the thigh of its mother” only when she became a tereifa while the offspring was in her body. For then it is possible to say: since the offspring is an organ of her organs, the tereifa occurred in her body, in all her organs, including the offspring. But according to the one who says that the fetus is not the thigh of its mother, the tereifa occurred not in the offspring but only in the mother. However, if the offspring was not in its mother’s womb when she became a tereifa, certainly the tereifa did not affect the offspring, and at most it can be rendered a tereifa on account of its having been formed and caused by its mother, the tereifa. And since it has another, permitted cause—namely, the male that mated with its mother—it is “this and that cause.” And the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer dispute whether it is permitted or forbidden.

But

according to the one who says “

a tereifa does not give birth”—

it can be found, for example, where it conceived and only afterward became a tereifa.

And in this they dispute, for Rabbi Eliezer holds “

the fetus is the thigh of its mother,”

whereas the Rabbis hold “

the fetus is not the thigh of its mother.”

And now the Gemara discusses a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa—for example, turtledoves and young pigeons that became tereifot and laid eggs. What is the status of the chicks emerging from those eggs? Are they fit to be brought as offerings, and is a distinction to be made between a chick and the offspring of an animal?

Rav Huna said: The Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a chick of the egg of a tereifa that it is forbidden!

What is the reason?

What is the reasoning for distinguishing between a chick and the offspring?

The Sages disputed

him,

Rabbi Eliezer, only concerning the offspring of an animal,

and they hold that it is not the thigh of its mother, because

it grows from the air,

the offspring in the animal’s womb is not attached to its body, but hangs in the air and forms and grows by itself.

But the egg of a tereifa,

as long as it is not complete, is attached to the cluster of eggs, and

it grows from the body of the hen,

and grows and is completed from the body of the hen. Therefore,

even the Rabbis concede

that it is an organ of the mother, and when the mother became a tereifa, it too became a tereifa.

Another explanation: The animal grows from the air, for even after it is born it continues to grow, which proves that the principal of its growth is not from the mother. But an egg does not grow after it leaves the hen, which proves that the principal of its growth is from the hen.

And according to this wording, according to both explanations, Rav Huna spoke according to the one who says, “a tereifa does not give birth,” and they dispute whether “the fetus is the thigh of its mother,” and the case is where she conceived and afterward became a tereifa. Rav Huna teaches us that when a hen was carrying eggs and afterward became a tereifa, the Sages concede that the eggs became tereifot together with the hen. But according to the one who says, “a tereifa gives birth,” and they dispute “this and that cause,” in the case where she became a tereifa and afterward conceived, there is no difference between an egg and offspring. Just as the offspring of a tereifa is fit according to the Sages because “this and that cause is permitted,” so too is the chick.

And the Gemara brings another version, according to which a distinction is made between an egg and offspring even when she became a tereifa and afterward conceived. The Sages, who hold concerning offspring that it is fit because the father is a permitted cause, concede concerning the egg of a chick, as will be explained.

Another version:

Rav Huna said: The Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa that it is forbidden!

What is the reason?

The Rabbis disputed Rabbi Eliezer only concerning the offspring of an animal

that was a tereifa, for if according to the first version,

according to the one who says, “a tereifa gives birth,” the Sages permit it

because

they hold

“this and that cause is permitted.”

And if according to the latter version,

according to the one who says, “a tereifa does not give birth,” the Sages permit it

because

they hold that

“the fetus is not the thigh of its mother,”

and the

offspring

is permitted.

But a chick that emerged from the egg of a tereifa,

if according to the first version, there,

in the case of animal offspring,

there is a permitted factor within it—

there is a permitted cause in addition to the forbidden cause, and therefore they permitted it. But

in the case of a chick there is no permitted factor within it,

there is no permitted cause, because the case is one of

the “

first cluster,”

the same string of eggs that was in her when she became a tereifa, and they became tereifot with her.

And

the Sages concede that it is

forbidden.

And if according to the latter version, there, in the case of animal offspring, why did the Rabbis permit, because they hold that “

the fetus is not the thigh of its mother.”

But an egg is the very body of its mother.

For it was taught:

and they agree concerning the egg of a tereifa that it is forbidden, because it grew through a forbidden process.

Thus far the other version.

But an egg is the very body of its mother.

For it was taught:

Rava said to Rav Huna: There is a beraita that supports you,

that the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a chick born from the egg of a tereifa.

For it was taught: “ A full ladleful” —a certain measure that determines matters of ritual impurity—of maggots

—a group of flesh-worms formed in flesh and attached to it—

that comes from a living person: Rabbi Eliezer declares it impure, and the Sages declare it pure.

And there are two explanations of this: The first explanation is that the worms emerged from a living person and afterward he died, and they dispute whether the maggots impart corpse-impurity.

The second explanation: Even while he was alive, they dispute whether the maggots impart impurity on account of the impurity of an organ separated from a living person, which imparts impurity through contact, carrying, and a tent, like an organ from a corpse.

And according to both explanations, the reasoning of their dispute is: Rabbi Eliezer declares it impure because the maggots are considered part of the person’s body. And the Sages declare it pure because it is not considered part of his body, but is a new creature.

And Abaye proves:

The Sages disputed him,

Rabbi Eliezer,

only concerning maggots,

because

it is merely excrement, like ordinary excrement, since it separated from the person during his lifetime, and therefore it is something separate from him.

But concerning a chick

that emerged from the egg of a tereifa, even the Sages concede that it is a proper offspring,

as explained, because it grew in the womb of its mother.

since

they are merely excrement,

like ordinary excrement: because they separated from the person during his lifetime, they are a separate entity from him.

But regarding a chick

Abaye said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable! Rabbi Eliezer disputed the Rabbis only concerning maggots,

because

a person is called “maggot” while alive— a person during his lifetime is called a maggot— as it is written [Job 25], “ And the hope of man”— a maggot, and the son of man—

a worm.”

But a chick

when does it grow from an egg—

when does the chick emerge from the egg?

After it has putrefied,

after the egg has putrefied.

At that time,

when the egg putrefies,

it is mere dust,

it is,

and it becomes permitted to him,

and the chick emerging from it is permitted.

And when is the egg forbidden,

and when is it forbidden?

It is forbidden initially,

only before it putrefied,

for it was fit for food,

when it was fit for eating. But

now,

now, after it putrefied,

it is not forbidden.

It is prohibited only initially,

before it has spoiled,

when it is food,

when it is fit to eat. But

Furthermore,

Abaye argues:

It was taught explicitly,

we learned an explicit beraita: Rabbi Eliezer concedes to the Sages concerning a chick of the egg of a tereifa that it is permitted. [Another version: that it may be brought upon the altar.]

He said to him,

Rava to Abaye:

If it was taught,

it was taught!

If indeed we learned this, I retract.

regarding a chick from the egg of a tereifa, that it

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonos says: A female animal that suckled from a tereifa is disqualified from [being brought] upon the altar.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason?

Let us say that it is because it fattens from it,

that it becomes fat from the tereifa.

But if that is so,

if it is as you say, if

one fed it the vetch of idolatry,

would it indeed also be

forbidden?! Did we not learn above [29a] that through feeding an animal foods characteristic of the practices of idolatry, it becomes forbidden if it was indeed designated for idolatry, and even then it becomes forbidden under the category of an animal designated for idolatry, and not because it was fattened through a forbidden substance?

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: An animal that suckled from a tereifa is unfit to be placed upon the altar.

And why should it become forbidden on account of being fattened with forbidden foods?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rabbi Hanina of Tritah taught before Rabbi Yohanan:

Indeed, if it suckled intermittently from a tereifa, it is not forbidden. Rather, our Mishna speaks of

a case where it suckled boiling milk from morning to morning,

all its days, and

since it can subsist on it,

on that suckling,

for a twenty-four-hour period,

without any other eating until the next suckling of boiling tereifa milk—and even if it ate other things in the meantime, nevertheless its life can subsist on the suckling. It follows that all its days it was fattened and its life was sustained by the tereifa, and therefore it is disqualified from [being brought] upon the altar. And likewise, if it was fattened all its days with the vetch of idolatry, it is forbidden even without having been designated.

We learned in our Mishna: All consecrated animals that became tereifot are not redeemed, for one does not redeem consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs. The Gemara brings a beraita that expounds from Scripture that “one does not redeem consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs,” according to one tan###. From where are these words? For the Sages taught: The Torah said [Deuteronomy 12], “Only according to all the desire of your soul may you slaughter and eat meat, according to the blessing of the Lord your God that He has given you, in all your gates. The impure and the pure may eat it, as the gazelle and as the deer,” and the Sages expounded [Sifrei, Re’eh 12:15] that the verse speaks of consecrated animals disqualified from the altar that were redeemed.

And we expound: “

You shall slaughter”—

but not shearing,

for it is forbidden to shear consecrated animals disqualified from the altar even after their redemption. “

And you shall eat”—

but not for your dogs. “

Meat”—

but not milk,

for it is forbidden to derive benefit from their milk .

without eating anything else until the next nursing of hot milk from the tereifa, even if it ate other things in the meantime, its life could nevertheless be sustained by that nursing. Thus, throughout its life it was fattened and sustained by the tereifa, and it is therefore unfit to be placed upon the altar. Similarly, if it was fattened throughout its life with carobs of idolatry, it is prohibited even if it was not designated for idolatry.

We learned in the Mishna:

With regard to all sacrificial animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them, because consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs.

The Gemara brings a beraita that derives from a verse that “consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs,” according to one tanaitic authority.

From where are these matters derived?

For the Sages taught:

From here

we learn

that one does not redeem consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs;

rather, if they die, they are buried.

And the Gemara brings the view of another tan###, who holds, “One redeems consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs,” and he expounds the verse with a different exposition.

Some say,

this is how we expound it: “

You shall slaughter, and you shall eat meat” —

you have no permission concerning them except from the time of slaughter onward,

but not shearing and milk, whose benefit is during the animal’s lifetime. And there is no exposition from which to learn that it is forbidden to redeem them for the purpose of feeding dogs,

Therefore, he holds— this tan###— that one redeems consecrated animals in order to feed them to dogs. And it is also possible to expound an explicit permission to feed them to dogs. This is how we expound it: All benefits during the animal’s lifetime, such as shearing and milk, may not be enjoyed; but benefits after its death, even when it was not slaughtered—namely, redeeming it and feeding it to dogs—are permitted. We shall return to you, chapter “All the Forbidden Ones.”

we learn

that consecrated animals may not be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs;

rather, if they die, they must be buried.

The Gemara brings the view of another tanaitic authority, who holds that “consecrated animals may be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs,” and who expounds the verse differently.

Some say

that we expound it as follows: “

You shall slaughter and eat meat” —

you have no permitted use of them except from the time of slaughter onward.

This excludes shearing and milk, whose benefit is obtained during the animal’s lifetime. No derivation prohibiting redemption in order to feed dogs can be learned from this verse.

Therefore,

this authority holds

that

consecrated animals may be redeemed in order to feed them to dogs.

It is also possible to derive an explicit permission

to feed them to dogs. We expound it as follows: All benefits obtained during the animal’s lifetime, such as shearing and milk, may not be enjoyed. But benefits obtained after its death, even if it was not slaughtered—namely, redeeming it and feeding it to dogs—are permitted.

We have completed the chapter “All Those That Are Prohibited.”

The first Mishna explains the laws and stringencies that apply to the consecrated things of the altar but do not apply to the consecrated things for the repair of the House, and that apply to the consecrated things for the repair of the House but do not apply to the consecrated things of the altar.

Mishna:

There is in the consecrated things of the altar that

is not in the consecrated things for the repair of the House.

And there is in the consecrated things for the repair of the House that is not in the consecrated things of the altar.

There is in the consecrated things of the altar that is not in the consecrated things for the repair of the House —

A.

For the consecrated things of the altar effect temura,

whereas the consecrated things for the repair of the House do not effect temura, as explained above [13a].

B.

And they are liable

for them,

for the consecrated things of the altar,

because of piggul,

if, at the time of performing one of the four services of the blood of an offering, he had the intention of eating from its flesh or burning its portions outside their proper time, the offering is piggul, and one who eats from it is liable for karet. And because of

remaining,

if some of their flesh remained after the time allotted for eating it and they ate it, they are liable for karet.

And

because of

one who is impure.

For if the person’s body became impure and he ate from them while he was impure, he is liable for karet. All three of them are stated in the Torah with regard to peace-offerings, and the other consecrated things of the altar are derived from peace-offerings [7b]. But with regard to the consecrated things for the repair of the House, the disqualification of piggul, remaining, and impurity cannot apply to them.