Temurah 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar

is the one

who said

Rabbi Elazar:

An unmarried man who has relations with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage—

he has rendered her a zona

through this act of intercourse, and she is disqualified from marrying a kohen. That is, from now on she is a “zona” forbidden to a kohen, since any intercourse that is not permitted through huppa and kiddushin is called prostitution. Therefore, the beraita holds that her payment is forbidden.

And Abaye follows the opinion of the Rabbis. Indeed, according to the Rabbis it is not payment to a zona, and the Torah prohibited only payment for intercourse with a forbidden relation with whom kiddushin does not take effect.

And we challenge this:

If

the beraita follows

Rabbi Elazar, why specifically

when it wished to provide an example of forbidden intercourse did it say

a widow

with a High Priest, or a divorcee or a halutza with an ordinary kohen, which are relationships punishable by a prohibition?

Let it teach

it should have said, even

an unmarried woman,

whose intercourse with an Israelite does not involve a prohibition, and nevertheless her payment is forbidden [according to Abaye’s establishment of the beraita in accordance with Rabbi Elazar]?

And we answer: On the contrary! If the beraita had not stated in its latter clause “a widow with a High Priest,” we would have said the opposite: Only the payment of an unmarried woman is forbidden, and she is the zona of whom the Torah spoke when it referred to the payment of a “zona” [according to Rabbi Elazar]. But we would have said that the payment of those subject to prohibitions is not forbidden. Therefore the beraita informs us that even the payment given by a High Priest to a widow, which involves a prohibition, is forbidden.

A widow was necessary

to inform us that her payment is forbidden. For if it had not informed us,

it might have entered your mind: Since

an unmarried man and an unmarried woman

are an archetypal derivation

that serves

to teach that payment is forbidden only in the case of an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, whereas other relationships involving prohibitions

should not be prohibited,

therefore

it informs us

the beraita informs us that payment for those subject to prohibitions as well—for example, a widow with a High Priest, or a divorcee or halutza with an ordinary kohen—is forbidden.

Another version:

The Gemara raises an objection: Both a gentile zona and a Jewish zona—

their payments are forbidden.

This is a refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

Abaye could say to you:

Indeed, the payment of an unmarried woman is permitted, even if she is promiscuous or had previously engaged in intercourse with forbidden relations. And

when

this is taught,

the matter concerning which this beraita prohibited is

forbidden relations with whom kiddushin does not take effect,

and it was regarding payment for this intercourse that the beraita said that it is forbidden.

And we challenge this:

But the latter clause teaches

of the beraita:

“For example, a widow with a High Priest, or a divorcee or halutza with an ordinary kohen.”

Yet kiddushin does take effect in these relationships involving prohibitions, and nevertheless the beraita says that she is a zona and that her payment is forbidden. This is difficult for Abaye, who says that every woman with whom kiddushin takes effect is not a zona and her payment is permitted?

And we answer:

Who is the author of this

who taught this beraita, which concluded by saying “for example, a widow with a High Priest, or a divorcee or halutza with an ordinary kohen”?

It is Rabbi Akiva, who said: Kiddushin does not take effect in relationships involving prohibitions,

for he holds that relationships involving prohibitions have the same status as forbidden relations punishable by karet, in which kiddushin does not take effect; consequently, their payment is forbidden. Abaye, however, was speaking neither of relationships punishable by karet nor of relationships involving prohibitions, but only of an unmarried woman, whose payment he says is permitted.

And apparently this requires explanation, why did the beraita need to say “for example, a widow with a High Priest,” in accordance with Rabbi Akiva? It could simply have said, “Both a Jewish zona,” and it would be self-evident that every payment given for any forbidden relation—whoever is defined as a zona—is forbidden?

Abaye explains: If the beraita had informed us only through the expression “zona,” one might mistakenly think that even the payment of a zona with whom kiddushin takes effect—for example, a “promiscuous zona” or a “zona who had previously engaged in intercourse with one subject to karet”—who now has intercourse with someone with whom she is subject neither to karet nor to a prohibition, would also be forbidden.

But this is what it informs us: Every zona

in the full sense,

with whom kiddushin does not take effect

through this intercourse for which she received the payment—not only one subject to karet, but even

analogous to a widow

with a High Priest,

with whom kiddushin does not take effect, according to Rabbi Akiva—her payment is forbidden. But this does not apply to a zona who is not subject to a prohibition, with whom kiddushin does take effect, as Abaye maintains.

Now the challenge from this beraita is reversed against Rava. For Rava holds that even an unmarried woman is a zona and her payment is forbidden. If so, why did the beraita say in its latter clause “for example, a widow with a High Priest”?

And according to Rava, what is different that it teaches

“for example, a widow with a High Priest”?

Rava answers and introduces a new explanation: His view that the payment of an unmarried woman is forbidden applies only when the intercourse is forbidden. He knows that it is forbidden intercourse—for example, with one subject to a prohibition—or he knows that she is a “promiscuous zona,” or a “zona who had already engaged in intercourse with one subject to karet.” In such a case her payment is forbidden even though this particular intercourse, for which he gave the payment, was not even intercourse with one subject to a prohibition. But when an ordinary unmarried man has relations with an unmarried woman and gives her a gift, it is not payment to a zona unless he explicitly says to her, “Here is your payment.” This is the intent of the beraita, as will be explained.

And we answer: The beraita therefore taught “a widow with a High Priest,” to teach us

analogous to a widow

with a High Priest:

Just as with a widow, he is not liable to lashes until he has been warned,

and both he and she know that this intercourse is forbidden,

so too a zona,

an ordinary unmarried man having relations with an unmarried woman: her payment is not forbidden

until he says

“Here is this lamb for you.”

For only then is it considered prostitution, since he expresses it in the language of payment to a zona. If he did not say to her, “Here is this lamb for you as your payment,” she is not thereby called a “zona.”

And the novelty of the beraita is:

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Elazar! For Rabbi Elazar said: An unmarried man who has relations with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage—

he has rendered her a zona

through this single act of intercourse. All this applies to an unmarried woman who has intercourse with an unmarried man for the first time.

But where she was already a zona from the outset,

for example, a “promiscuous zona” or a “zona who had already engaged in intercourse with one subject to karet,”

even without specification,

that he did not say to her, “Here is this lamb as payment,”

it is likewise forbidden.

She is the “zona” concerning whom Rava said that her payment is forbidden even when she is an unmarried woman.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who says to his fellow: “Here is this lamb for you, and let your maidservant spend the night with my slave!”

Rabbi says: It is not payment to a zona. And the Rabbis say: It is payment to a zona.

The Gemara challenges the statement of the Rabbis:

But a maidservant

a Canaanite

with a slave

a Canaanite

is permitted!

She is permitted to him, so why did the Rabbis prohibit the payment that he gives him? For we have not found anyone who prohibits payment given to a woman for intercourse that is permitted to him [other than Rabbi Elazar, who holds that an unmarried man who has relations with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage has rendered her a zona]?

And we answer: Rav Huna said: He meant with him. The Israelite wants the maidservant for himself, and she is indeed forbidden to him, as it is stated: “There shall not be a male prostitute” [Deuteronomy 23]; therefore her payment is forbidden. And that it teaches

“slave”—why did it phrase it as “with my slave”?

It used a refined expression

because he did not wish to say explicitly, “and spend the night with me.”

And we challenge this: If so, if he is giving the payment for his own intercourse, what is the reason of Rabbi who disagrees in our Mishna and holds that it is not payment to a zona? If he gives it to her as payment for his intercourse, why is it not payment to a zona? And we answer: Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: “My slave” means literally, and not himself. And when it teaches, what is the case taught by the Mishna? It is referring to a Hebrew slave, and therefore Rabbi says that it is not payment to a zona, since her intercourse is permitted.

slave,”

why does it use the wording “with my slave”?

It used a refined expression

because he did not want to say explicitly, “and let her spend the night with me.”

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if he gives the payment for his own intercourse,

what is the reason for Rabbi

who disagrees in our Mishna and holds that it is not payment given to a prostitute? If he gives her payment for the reward of his intercourse, why is it not considered such payment?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said:

And we challenge this:

If so, what is the reason of the Rabbis?

Surely

a maidservant

a Canaanite

with a Hebrew slave is permitted!

She is permitted to him. And we conclude: In the case of an ordinary Hebrew slave, the Rabbis indeed hold that she is permitted to him and her payment is permitted. But in what case did they say that her payment is forbidden?

Here we are dealing with a case where he has no wife or children,

meaning that the Hebrew slave has no wife and children of his own—

Rabbi and the Rabbis in our Mishna disagree in the tannaitic dispute regarding a Hebrew slave who has no wife or children: whether his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant. According to the Rabbis, his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant, and he is forbidden to have intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant.

If he has intercourse with her and gives her payment, it is forbidden. Rabbi, however, holds

that his master does give him a Canaanite maidservant; she is permitted to him, and therefore her payment is not forbidden.

As it is taught in a beraita: If he has no wife or children, his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant, as it is stated in the passage concerning a Hebrew slave sold by the court: “If he comes alone, he shall leave alone” [Exodus 21]. If he has a wife and children— his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant, against his will, as it is stated there: “If he is married…if his master gives him a woman.” Rabbi disagrees and holds that even if he has no wife or children, his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant. Mishna: Our Mishna explains the law of the “price of a dog,” which is forbidden to be offered as a sacrifice.

The Gemara concludes: In the case of an ordinary Hebrew slave, the Rabbis indeed hold that she is permitted to him and that the payment given to her is permitted. In what case did they say that the payment is forbidden?

Here, with what case are we dealing? For example, where he has neither a wife nor children,

where the Hebrew slave does not have a wife and children of his own—

Rabbi and the Rabbis in our Mishna disagree in the tannaitic dispute concerning a Hebrew slave who has neither a wife nor children: Does his master give him a Canaanite maidservant? According to the Rabbis, his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant, and it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant. If he has intercourse with her and gives her payment, it is forbidden. Rabbi, by contrast, holds that his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant, she is permitted to him, and therefore the payment given to her is not forbidden.

And what is the price of a dog? One who says to his fellow

“Here you have [that is, this is for you]

this lamb in exchange for this dog,”

and exchanges a lamb for a dog: that lamb is forbidden to bring as an offering in the Temple.

And likewise, two partners who divided their property: one took ten lambs, and the other took nine lambs and a dog: the ten lambs

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the law of the “price of a dog,” which is forbidden to be offered as a sacrifice.

corresponding to the dog,

that is, those taken by the first partner,

are forbidden

to be offered, since all of them are the price of a dog.

But the nine lambs

that were with the dog, taken by the second partner, are permitted, and they are not the price of a dog. This will be explained in the Gemara. Payment to a dog,

where one says to his fellow, “Here is this lamb as payment for allowing your female dog to spend the night with me,”

and the price of a zona,

where one purchases a zona to be his maidservant and gives a lamb as her price,

these are

the lambs

permitted.

As it is stated: “You shall not bring the payment of a zona or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination of the Lord your God.” And we expound: only

“both”

the Torah prohibited, namely, “the payment of a zona” and “the price of a dog,”

but not four

since “payment to a dog” and “the price of a zona” are not forbidden.

are forbidden

to be offered, because all of them are the price of a dog.

But

the nine lambs

that were taken together with the dog,

which were taken by the second partner,

are permitted,

Their offspring,

that of the payment to a zona and the price of a dog,

are permitted,

as it is stated “both,” and we expound: “They are two”—only

they

are forbidden

but not their offspring.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: The price of a dog—

this is an exchange for a dog,

as explained in the Mishna.

And so it says [Psalms 44],

“You sell Your people for no wealth, and You have not set a high price on their sale,”

demonstrating that “price” means money given in exchange for a sale. The Gemara challenges this: Perhaps it means actual payment? So that both payment to a zona and payment to a dog would be forbidden [as explained in the Mishna], as well as an exchange for a dog. And we answer: If so, as you say, there would be three:

there would be three forbidden things in the Torah. This cannot be said, because

“both of them”

is written, and not three.

The questioner clarifies his argument:

Are we saying

that

“payment and price

of a dog”?!

We are saying payment and not the price!

We said that payment to a zona and payment to a dog should be forbidden, but not the price of a dog. There would now be only two.

And we answer:

If so,

as you say,

let the verse say:

“You shall not bring the payment of a zona and a dog.”

Since it is written

“the payment of a zona and the price of a dog,”

infer from it that it is the price of a dog that the Merciful One prohibited, and not payment to a dog. Infer from it! Another version: And we challenge this: Perhaps what is

“the price of a dog”

is the payment for a dog?

Then payment to a zona and payment to a dog would be forbidden.

And we answer:

If so,

as you say,

let the verse write

“the payment of a zona and a dog.”

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

the Torah’s wording

“the payment of a zona and the price of a dog”

means that the vav in “price” adds to the preceding matter,

and it should be read in this way:

“the payment and the price of a dog.”

Then payment to a zona, payment to a dog, and the price of a dog would all be forbidden?

the verse should have said: “

You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute and a dog.”

From the fact that it is written,

as it is written,

“the payment of a prostitute and the price of a dog,”

learn from this

that

it is the price of a dog that the Merciful One forbade, and not the payment

for a dog.

Learn from this!

Another version:

The Gemara asks:

Could one say that “

the price of a dog”

means the payment given for a dog?

Then payment given to a prostitute and payment given for a dog would be forbidden.

The Gemara answers:

If so,

as you say,

the verse should have written: “

The payment of a prostitute and a dog.”

The Gemara asks:

Could one say,

perhaps what the Torah wrote,

“the payment of a prostitute and the price of a dog,”

the letter vav in “price” is a vav that adds a matter to the first one,

and it should be read this way

and understood as:

“the payment and the price of a dog.”

Then payment given to a prostitute, payment given for a dog, and the price of a dog would all be forbidden?

And we answer:

“The abomination of the Lord is also both of them”

is written, indicating two and not three.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And likewise, in the case of two partners who divided their property, one taking ten and the other taking nine sheep and a dog: those corresponding to the dog are forbidden, and those that were divided together with the dog are permitted.”

The Gemara assumes that since they divided the property equally, as partners generally do, each sheep is worth the same as a sheep belonging to the other partner, while the tenth animal, the dog, is worth the same as one of the sheep. And therefore the Gemara asks: Why are all ten sheep forbidden?

Let one be taken out together with the dog,

that is, let one sheep be selected from among the ten corresponding to the dog, and it will be forbidden because it is the “price of a dog,”

while all the others,

the other nine sheep,

should be permitted,

that is, they should be permitted? And we answer: Indeed, if the value of all of them were equal, this is what would be done, and the nine sheep would be permitted. However,

with what are we dealing here? With a case where the value of the dog is greater

than the value

of each one of them,

of each of the ten sheep. For example, each of the sheep belonging to the owner of the ten is worth one dinar, and together they are worth ten dinars, whereas each of the nine sheep divided together with the dog is worth slightly less than one dinar, and the dog is worth one dinar and nine ma’ot [so that their total values are equal, since they divided the property equally; however, in the individual valuation, the dog is worth more than each and every sheep].

And

therefore,

this excess value

of the dog,

the amount by which the dog is worth somewhat more than the sheep,

is distributed among all of them,

a portion of the dog’s value is present in each of the nine sheep, in addition to the portion present in the tenth sheep.

An alternative formulation

And we ask:

Why are those corresponding to the dog forbidden,

all ten of them?

The one that is together with the dog—

let it be forbidden, and the other nine—

let them be permitted?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: This is a case where all of them are worth four zuz and half of a fifth, each one

[one-tenth of a zuz], so that the ten sheep together are worth forty-one zuz, while the nine sheep are each worth only four zuz, and together they are worth thirty-six zuz,

and the dog is worth five zuz,

so that together they too are worth forty-one zuz. It follows

that the extra zuz,

the amount by which the dog is worth more than the others,

is distributed among all of them,

the remaining zuz is present in each and every one of the ten sheep, in a portion of one-tenth of a zuz, and one sheep corresponds to the dog. Therefore, all of them are forbidden.

We learned in our Mishna:

“The hire of a dog and the price of a prostitute are permitted, as it is stated

‘both of them,’

and not four.”

Rava of Parzika said to Rav Ashi: