Temurah 30a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar

is the one,

for Rabbi Elazar said:

Rabbi Elazar:

An unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage—

has made her a harlot

through this intercourse, and she is disqualified from the priesthood. That is, from now on she is a “harlot” forbidden to a priest, since every intercourse that is not permitted through a huppa and betrothal is called harlotry. Therefore, the beraita maintains that her payment is forbidden.

And Abaye holds in accordance with the Sages. Indeed, according to the Sages it is not a payment for harlotry, and the Torah forbade only the payment for intercourse with a forbidden relation with whom betrothal does not take effect.

And we raise an objection:

If

the beraita holds like

Rabbi Elazar, why specifically

when it wished to give an example of forbidden intercourse did it say

a widow

to a High Priest, and a divorcee or a halutza to an ordinary priest, who are subject to prohibitions stated in negative commandments?

Let it teach

it should have said, even

an unmarried woman,

whose intercourse with an Israelite does not involve those subject to negative commandments, and nevertheless her payment is forbidden [according to Abaye’s establishment of the beraita in accordance with Rabbi Elazar]?

And we answer: On the contrary! If the beraita had not said in the latter clause “a widow to a High Priest,” I would have said the opposite! Only in the case of an unmarried woman is her payment forbidden, and she is the harlot about whom the Torah spoke when it said “the payment of a harlot” [according to Rabbi Elazar], but concerning the payment of those subject to negative commandments I would have said that it is not forbidden. Therefore, the beraita informs us that even the payment given by a High Priest to a widow, which involves those subject to negative commandments, is forbidden.

The widow was needed

to inform us that her payment is forbidden. For if it had not informed us,

it might enter your mind, since

an unmarried man and an unmarried woman

are an “ancestral principle”

that is,

to teach that the payment is forbidden only in the case of an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, whereas other persons subject to negative commandments

would not be forbidden,

therefore

it informs us

the beraita informs us that even the payment of those subject to negative commandments, such as a widow to a High Priest or a divorcee and halutza to an ordinary priest, is forbidden.

Another version:

It was objected: Both a gentile harlot and an Israelite harlot—

their payment is forbidden.

A refutation of Abaye!

And we answer:

Abaye could say to you:

Indeed, the payment of an unmarried woman is permitted, even though she is promiscuous or previously had intercourse with persons forbidden by karet. And

when

this was taught,

in what case did this beraita forbid it? In the case of

forbidden relations with whom betrothal does not take effect,

and concerning the payment for this intercourse the beraita said that it is forbidden.

And we raise an objection:

But does not the latter clause teach

of the beraita:

“Such as a widow to a High Priest, and a divorcee or a halutza to an ordinary priest.”

But betrothal does take effect with these persons subject to negative commandments, and nevertheless the beraita said that she is a harlot and her payment is forbidden. This is difficult for Abaye, who says that every woman with whom betrothal takes effect is not a harlot, and her payment is permitted?

And we answer:

Who is the author of this

who taught this beraita that concluded by saying “such as a widow to a High Priest and a divorcee or a halutza to an ordinary priest”?

It is Rabbi Akiva, who said: Betrothal does not take effect with those subject to negative commandments,

for those subject to negative commandments have the status of forbidden relations subject to karet, with whom betrothal does not take effect, and therefore their payment is forbidden. But Abaye spoke neither of those subject to karet nor of those subject to negative commandments, but only of an unmarried woman, and concerning her payment he said that it is permitted.

And seemingly this requires explanation, why did the beraita need to say “such as a widow to a High Priest,” and according to Rabbi Akiva, it should have said only “both an Israelite harlot,” and it would be self-evident that every payment, and the payment of every forbidden relation, whoever is defined as a harlot, is forbidden?

And Abaye explains: If it had informed us with the wording “harlot,” it would have been possible to err and say that even concerning a harlot with whom betrothal takes effect, such as a “promiscuous harlot” or a “harlot from intercourse with persons subject to karet in an earlier intercourse,” who has now had intercourse with one who is subject neither to an obligation of karet nor to an obligation from a negative commandment, the payment of this woman too would be forbidden,

and it informs us that every harlot

literally,

with whom betrothal does not take effect

through this intercourse for which she received the payment, and not only those subject to karet, but even

similar to a widow

to a High Priest

with whom betrothal does not take effect,

according to Rabbi Akiva, her payment is forbidden. But not in the case of a harlot who is not among those subject to negative commandments, with whom betrothal takes effect, as Abaye said.

And now the objection from this beraita turns against Rava. For Rava holds that even in the case of an unmarried woman she is a harlot and her payment is forbidden, and if so, why did the beraita say in the latter clause “such as a widow to a High Priest”?

And according to Rava, what is different that it teaches

“such as a widow to a High Priest”?

And Rava answers and innovates: What he holds—that the payment of an unmarried woman is forbidden—applies only to forbidden intercourse. He knows that it is forbidden intercourse, such as with those subject to negative commandments, or he knows that she is a “promiscuous harlot,” or a “harlot who has already had intercourse with those subject to karet,” in which case her payment is forbidden even though this intercourse, for which he gave the payment, is not even intercourse with one subject to a negative commandment. But an ordinary unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman and gives her a gift—it is not a payment for harlotry until he says to her explicitly, “Here is your payment.” This is the intent of the beraita, as will be explained.

And we answer: Therefore the beraita taught “a widow to a High Priest,” to teach us

similar to a widow

to a High Priest:

Just as in the case of a widow, he is not flogged until they warn her,

and she and he know that this intercourse is forbidden,

so too a harlot,

an ordinary unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman—her payment is not forbidden

until he says

“Here is this lamb.”

For only then is it harlotry, since he expresses himself in the language of payment for harlotry. If he did not say to her, “Here is this lamb as your payment,” she is not thereby called a “harlot.”

And the innovation of the beraita is:

to exclude Rabbi Elazar’s view! For Rabbi Elazar said: An unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage—

has made her a harlot

through this one intercourse. And all this concerns an unmarried woman who had intercourse with an unmarried man for the first time.

But where she was a harlot from the outset,

such as a “promiscuous harlot” or a “harlot who had already had intercourse with those subject to karet,”

even ordinarily,

without his saying to her, “Here is this lamb as payment,”

it is likewise forbidden.

And she is the “harlot” concerning whom Rava said that her payment is forbidden even when she is an unmarried woman.

We learned in our Mishna:

“One who says to his fellow: Here is this lamb, and have your maidservant lie with my slave!”

Rabbi says: It is not a payment for harlotry. And the Sages say: It is a payment for harlotry.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the words of the Sages:

But a maidservant

a Canaanite

to a slave

a Canaanite

is permitted!

She is permitted to him, so why did the Sages forbid the payment that he gives him? For we have not found anyone who forbids a payment given to a woman for intercourse that is permitted to him [apart from Rabbi Elazar, who holds that an unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage has made her a harlot]?

And we answer:

Rav Huna said: He meant, “with him.”

The Israelite wants the maidservant for himself, and indeed she is forbidden to him, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 23], “There shall not be a sacred prostitute,” and the payment is forbidden.

And that which it teaches

“slave,”

and why did it use the wording “with my slave”?

It uses an improved expression

it says this because he does not wish to say explicitly, “and have her lie with me.”

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if he gives the payment for his own intercourse,

what is the reason of Rabbi

who disagrees in our Mishna and holds that it is not a payment for harlotry? Surely, if he gives her the payment for the fee of his intercourse, why is it not a payment for harlotry?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said:

“Slave” means literally “my slave,”

not himself,

and when it teaches,

and in what case was the Mishna taught?

With regard to a Hebrew slave,

and therefore Rabbi said that it is not a payment for harlotry, since her intercourse is permitted.

And we raise an objection:

If so, what is the reason of the Sages?

For

a maidservant

a Canaanite

to a Hebrew slave is permitted!

She is permitted to him.

And we conclude: In the case of an ordinary Hebrew slave, indeed, the Sages hold that she is permitted to him and her payment is permitted. And in what case did they say that her payment is forbidden?

Here we are dealing with a case such as where he has neither a wife nor children,

the Hebrew slave does not have a wife and children of his own—

And Rabbi and the Sages in our Mishna disagree in the dispute of tannaim concerning a Hebrew slave who has no wife and children, whether his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant. According to the Sages, his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant, and it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant. And if he has intercourse with her and gives her a payment, it is forbidden. Whereas Rabbi holds that his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant, and she is permitted to him; therefore her payment is not forbidden.

For it was taught: If he has no wife and children, his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant,

as it is stated in the section concerning a Hebrew slave sold by the court [Exodus 21], “If he enters alone, he shall leave alone.”

If he has a wife and children—

his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant,

against his will, as it is stated there, “If he is a married man … if his master gives him a woman.” And Rabbi disagrees and holds that even if he has no wife and children, his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the law of “the price of a dog,” which is forbidden to be offered.

And what is the price of a dog? One who says to his fellow

“Take” [

this is for you]

“this lamb in exchange for this dog,”

and he exchanges a lamb for a dog—that lamb is forbidden to bring as an offering in the House of the Lord.

And likewise, two partners who divided

their property:

one took ten

lambs,

and the other

took

nine

lambs

and a dog,

the ten lambs

that correspond to the dog,

meaning, which the first partner took,

are forbidden

to be offered, since all of them are the price of a dog.

And

those nine lambs

that are with the dog,

which the second partner took,

are permitted,

and are not the price of a dog. And it will be explained in the Gemara.

The payment of a dog,

one who says to his fellow, “Take this lamb as payment for your allowing your female dog to lie with me,”

and the price of a harlot,

one who purchases a harlot to be his maidservant and gives a lamb as her price—

these

lambs

are permitted.

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 23], “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination of the Lord your God.” And we expound: only

“both”

the Torah forbade, and they are “the payment of a harlot” and “the price of a dog,”

“but not four,”

for “the payment of a dog” and “the price of a harlot” are not forbidden.

Their offspring,

of the payment of a harlot and the price of a dog,

are permitted,

as it is stated “both,” and we expound: “the two themselves”; only

they

are forbidden,

but not their offspring.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: “The price of a dog”—

this is an exchange for a dog,

as explained in the Mishna.

And thus it says [

Psalms 44], “

You sell Your people for no wealth, and have not set a high price on their prices,”

so it is evident that “price” means money given for a sale.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Perhaps it means an actual payment?

So that both the payment of a harlot and the payment of a dog [as explained in the Mishna], as well as an exchange for a dog, would be forbidden.

And it answers:

If so,

as you say,

there would be three,

there would be three forbidden things here in the Torah, and it is impossible to say so, because

“both of them”

is written, and not three.

The one who raised the objection explains his words:

Are we saying

“the payment and the price”

of a dog

?!

We are saying a payment and not a price!

We said that the payment of a harlot and the payment of a dog should be forbidden, and not the price of a dog; and now there are only two?

And we answer:

If so,

as you say,

let the verse say

“You shall not bring the payment of a harlot and a dog.”

Since it is written,

from the fact that it says

“the payment of a harlot and the price of a dog,”

learn from it

that

it is the price of a dog that the Merciful One forbade, and not the payment of

a dog.

Learn from it!

Another version:

And we raise a difficulty:

Perhaps what is

“the price of a dog”

the payment of a dog?

And the payment of a harlot and the payment of a dog would be forbidden.

And we answer:

If so,

as you say,

let the verse write

“the payment of a harlot and a dog.”

And we raise a difficulty:

Perhaps,

let us say that what the Torah wrote,

“the payment of a harlot and the price of a dog,”

the vav that was stated in “price” means a vav that adds to the first matter,

and read it thus,

and it is interpreted as follows:

“the payment and the price of a dog.”

And the payment of a harlot, the payment of a dog, and the price of a dog would be forbidden?

And we answer: "

“The abomination of the Lord is also both of them”

is written—two, but not three.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And likewise, two partners who divided [their property]: one took ten [lambs], and one took nine and a dog. Those corresponding to the dog are forbidden, and those with the dog are permitted.”

And the Gemara left it [as follows]: since they divided equally, as is the way of partners, each lamb is worth the same as a lamb of the other partner, while the tenth, the dog, is worth the same as one of the lambs. And therefore the Gemara asks: why are all ten lambs forbidden?

Let one go out corresponding to the dog,

let him select one lamb from among the ten corresponding to the dog, and it will be forbidden because it is the “price of a dog,”

and the others all,

the remaining nine lambs,

should be permitted,

should they be permitted? And we answer: indeed, if the value of all of them were equal, this is what he would do, and he would permit nine lambs. However,

with what are we dealing here? With a case where it is more [

worth more]

the value of the dog than that of one of them,

than that of each and every lamb among the ten lambs. For example, each of the lambs belonging to the owner of the ten is worth one dinar, and together they are worth ten dinars, whereas the nine lambs with the dog are each worth one dinar less a ma'a, and the dog is worth one dinar and nine ma'ot [and in the total sum these are equal to one another, for they divided equally, except that in the individual sum the dog is worth more than each and every lamb].

And

therefore,

this excess

of the dog,

what the dog is worth somewhat more than the lambs—

cast it among all of them,

a share of the dog is present in each and every one of the nine, in addition to what is present in the tenth.

Another wording

And we object:

Why are those corresponding to the dog forbidden,

all ten?

One that is with the dog—

let it be forbidden, and the other nine—

let them be permitted?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: [this is] a case where all of them, each and every one, are worth four zuz and half a fifth [

a tenth of a zuz], and together the ten lambs are worth forty-one zuz, while the nine lambs are each worth only four zuz, and together they are worth thirty-six zuz,

and a dog worth five zuz,

and together they are worth forty-one zuz. It follows that

an extra zuz,

which the dog is worth more than the others,

is drawn through all of them,

the extra zuz is found in each and every lamb among the ten, in a share of a tenth of a zuz, with one lamb corresponding to it. And therefore all of them are forbidden .

We learned in our Mishna:

“The payment for a dog and the price of a prostitute are permitted, as it is stated,”

“both of them,”

but not four.

Rava of Parzika said to Rav Ashi: