Temurah 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

The beraita speaks of a case

in which she preceded him and offered it

before the lamb he had given her, even before he had intercourse with her.

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Elazar’s answer:

What are the circumstances—

in what manner is this referring?

If you say,

if we say

that

at the time he gave it to her he

transferred ownership of it to her

immediately,

he gave her the lamb at once and said to her, “Acquire it from now,” then

it is obvious that it is permitted! For until

the time of the offering,

he had not had intercourse with her.

But rather,

perhaps you will say that it is referring to a case

where he said to her, “

You will not acquire it until the time of intercourse,”

and the acquisition took place only at the time of intercourse. She preceded him and offered it before he had intercourse with her, while it had not yet acquired the status of such a payment,

but it is impossible to establish the case in this manner, because of the following difficulty:

Could she offer it?

Could she be permitted to offer it even if it did not have the status of such a payment? After all, this lamb still did not belong to her, and a person cannot consecrate and offer an item that does not belong to him, as

the Merciful One states, “When a person consecrates his house as holy to the Lord,”

the Merciful One said

[Leviticus 27], and we derive:

Just as his house is in his possession, so

everything must be in his possession!

The answer is:

It is necessary;

the case is one

where he said to her: “You will not acquire it

until the time of intercourse. And if you need it

if you need it,

you will acquire it from now!”

Therefore, the lamb is in her possession, and she may offer it, since he authorized her to take it for herself.

The novelty of the beraita is that since he told her that the acquisition would take effect at the time of intercourse, it might have been thought that it immediately became a prohibited payment to a prostitute. Therefore, the beraita teaches us that if she preceded him and offered it, it is permitted, since he authorized her to take it for herself beforehand, at the time of need, and it is considered an unconditional gift. But if she did not precede him and offer it, it is such a payment.

Rav Oshaya raised a dilemma:

If she did not offer it, but

preceded him and consecrated it, what is the law?

May she offer it? The two sides of the dilemma will be explained below.

The question is raised:

Let him resolve it from Rabbi Elazar, for Rabbi Elazar said, “

She preceded him and offered it.”

One should infer from his statement:

It is specifically when she offered it that it is

permitted, since it is no longer present

in the world

at the time of intercourse. But when she consecrated it, it is present

in its entirety,

meaning that the payment is before us, and it is

prohibited.

What, then, is Rav Oshaya’s dilemma?

The answer is: It is impossible to infer this from Rabbi Elazar’s statement, because

Rabbi Elazar himself was the subject of Rav Oshaya’s dilemma.

Rav Oshaya was uncertain about the meaning of Rabbi Elazar’s own words: When he said, “She offered it,” did he mean specifically that she offered it, or even that she consecrated it?

The dilemma is as follows: Perhaps only

“she offered it,” since it is not present at the time of intercourse, is permitted. But “she consecrated it,” since it is present at the time of intercourse, is prohibited,

as explained.

Or perhaps,

it may be said:

Since we learned

[Kiddushin 28b]:

A person’s declaration concerning the Most High,

when he consecrates an item to the Most High, is

like his transfer of it to an ordinary person,

and he can no longer retract, as though he had performed an act of acquisition, therefore, even if she

consecrated it, it is

permitted.

After all, he authorized her to use it when necessary.

And all the more so if she

she

offered it.

Rav Oshaya’s dilemma, then, is whether it was clear to Rabbi Elazar that consecrating it is prohibited, and therefore he said, “She offered it”; or perhaps Rabbi Elazar was uncertain about consecrating it, and therefore, because he could not decide the matter, he said, “She offered it” .

The conclusion is:

Teiku,

the dilemma remains unresolved!

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita.

The Master said:

If he had intercourse with her and afterward gave it to her, his payment is permitted.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from another beraita:

And

this

was taught:

If he had intercourse with her and afterward

gave it to her, even up to twelve months later, his payment is prohibited.

Yet the beraita before us states that it is permitted?

The answer is:

Rav Hanan bar Rav Hisda said: It is not difficult! This

beraita, which says that it is prohibited, is referring to a case

where he said to her, “

Have intercourse with me for this lamb,”

meaning that he designated a specific lamb for her before intercourse, and it would be her payment after intercourse. Since he designated it at the time of intercourse, the prohibition of such a payment takes effect whenever he gives it to her, even though the giving took place much later [as will be explained below].

Whereas this

beraita, which says that it is permitted, is referring to a case

where he said to her, “

Have intercourse with me for a lamb without specification,”

and he did not undertake to give her a particular lamb, nor did she acquire one. Therefore, the lamb that he sent her later is an ordinary gift and not “such a payment.”

The question is raised:

And

even

when he

said to her: “Have intercourse with me for this lamb!”—

is it prohibited!?

Does it become prohibited as such a payment,

when the acquisition through pulling is still lacking

and she performed no effective act of acquisition with it? How, then, did she acquire it at the time of intercourse?

That is, granted that “money effects acquisition”—that is, the benefit of intercourse itself, which has monetary value—then she would properly acquire it as such a payment through monetary acquisition, even without acquisition through pulling. But “money does not effect acquisition”; only pulling effects acquisition. Therefore the difficulty is: She did not perform an act of pulling at the time of intercourse, so through what was it acquired by her, and how can it acquire the status of such a payment? How does this differ from “a lamb without specification”?

The answer is: This beraita is speaking

of a gentile prostitute,

a non-Jewish woman,

who does not acquire

through

pulling,

but only through money; thus the benefit of intercourse serves as monetary acquisition. Therefore, the beraita states that it is prohibited because of “such a payment.”

And if you wish, say that even

if it is referring

to a Jewish prostitute,

she likewise acquired it through the acquisition of chatzer, and the case is

where it was standing in her courtyard,

the lamb was located in her courtyard, as will be explained.

The question is raised: If the lamb was in her courtyard before the intercourse,

he had already given it to her

from the outset!

It was already in her possession, and at the time of intercourse she acquired it through chatzer. Why, then, does the beraita call it “and afterward” he gave it to her?

Furthermore,

if so,

it is obvious that it is prohibited,

since it is such a payment at the very time of intercourse. What novelty did the beraita teach?

The conclusion is: The case is indeed one in which the lamb is standing in her courtyard; however, he did not undertake to give her the lamb. Rather, he undertook to give her money, and the case is

where he made the lamb an apotiki,

he gave her the lamb as an apotiki—a pledge involving a specific item—

and said to her: “If by a certain day I give you money—

good; but if not, take it

the lamb

as your payment!”

Therefore, when that day arrived and he had not given her the money, it became apparent retroactively that the lamb had been hers from the time of intercourse, since it was in her courtyard. Thus the beraita calls it “afterward,” since it was not hers until then. This is the novelty of the beraita.

The Gemara discusses which prostitute is included in the Torah’s prohibition of such a payment.

Rav said: Both

[whether]

the payment to a male prostitute,

when he had intercourse with a male and gave him such a payment,

and the payment for any

the

forbidden sexual relations,

as stated in the Torah—

are prohibited.

Except for the payment to a menstruating wife.

What is the reason?

“Prostitute”

is written

in the Torah in the passage concerning such a payment [Deuteronomy 23],

and

a menstruating woman

is not a prostitute,

but rather intercourse that is prohibited.

And Levi said: Even the payment to one’s menstruating wife

is prohibited.

What is the reason?

“Abomination”

is written

[there]: “For it is an abomination of the Lord your God; both of them.”

And

one’s menstruating wife

is an abomination,

since the prohibition against intercourse with her is stated in the passage of forbidden sexual relations [Leviticus 18], and concerning all forbidden sexual relations it is written [there]: “All these abominations.”

The Gemara clarifies why Rav does not expound as Levi does, and why Levi does not expound as Rav does.

The Gemara asks:

And Levi! Also, and

this

is written,

“prostitute,”

and a menstruating wife is not a prostitute?

The answer is:

Levi could have said

to you:

That

which the Torah wrote “prostitute” comes to teach a different exposition:

“Prostitute”

[with a kamatz]

and not “prostitute”

[with a segol]. If she gave him such a payment for his intercourse with her, it is not prohibited for offering.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav! That

“prostitute and not prostitute”—

from where does he derive it,

from where does he know that if she gave him such a payment, it is not prohibited?

The answer is:

He derives it

from

the

exposition

that

was expounded by

Rabbi.

As it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi says: Such a payment is prohibited only when it is payment for any of the forbidden sexual relations that are performed in transgression,

with no aspect of permissibility,

but the payment to one’s menstruating wife,

who is prohibited to him only until she purifies herself, after which she will be permitted to him,

or when he gave her payment for her loss of work,

payment for refraining from her work at the time of intercourse, and not payment for intercourse,

or when she gave him payment as his payment—

all of these are permitted.

The payment to his menstruating wife is permitted because there is an aspect of permissibility; payment for loss of work is permitted because it is not payment for intercourse; and the case where she gave him payment will be explained below.

Although

from the following exposition

there is no proof of the matter,

a conclusive proof that when she gave it to him it is not included among such payments, nevertheless there is

a supporting indication:

an example resembling proof can be found in this verse. The prophet Ezekiel [16], in his rebuke of the people of Israel, likened them to a woman who had strayed from her husband, and said there: “And it came to pass with you the contrary of women in your harlotries …

and when you gave payment, and no payment was given to you, you became contrary.”

Thus, if she gives him such a payment, it is merely “contrary”—a reversal of the ordinary way of the world—and is not called such a payment. From this exposition Rav derives “prostitute and not prostitute.”

The Gemara asks:

And Rav, what does he do with this

statement of the Torah,

“abomination,”

from which Levi derives that the payment to one’s menstruating wife is prohibited?

What does he do with it?

The answer is:

He needs it

to expound

as

in

the

exposition of

Abaye.

For Abaye said: A.

a.

The payment to a gentile prostitute—

her payment is prohibited.

What is the reason?

It is written here, in the passage concerning such a payment,

“abomination,”

as it states: “For it is an abomination of the Lord your God.”

And it is written there,

in the passage of forbidden sexual relations [Leviticus 18],

“For whoever performs any of all these abominations.”

These two passages are linked by a gzera shava:

Just as there,

where the reference is to

forbidden sexual relations with which betrothal does not take effect,

since all the forbidden relations listed there entail karet, and everyone agrees that betrothal does not take effect in cases entailing karet,

so too here,

with regard to such a payment, it is prohibited only

in the case of a prostitute

with whom betrothal does not take effect. Since a gentile prostitute is one with whom betrothal does not take effect, her payment is prohibited.

b. Abaye also stated another halakhic ruling concerning a gentile prostitute:

b. Abaye also stated another halakha concerning a gentile prostitute:

and when a priest has intercourse with her—

he does not receive lashes for her on account of being a prostitute,

and he has not violated the prohibition [Leviticus 21]: “They shall not take a prostitute or a woman profaned.”

What is the reason?

Because

the verse says

[there]:

“And he shall not profane his offspring.”

And we expound: The prostitute with whom he is prohibited is one

whose offspring is considered genealogically related to him—

excluding a gentile woman, whose offspring is not considered genealogically related to him,

since the sons and daughters born to them are not called his sons and daughters, but rather her sons and daughters, as explained in Tractate Yevamot [23a].

c. Concerning a Jewish woman, Abaye says:

A Jewish prostitute,

an unmarried woman—

her payment is permitted.

What is the reason?

Since betrothal does take effect with her, and we derive from the word “abominations” that only in the case of forbidden sexual relations with which betrothal does not take effect is such a payment prohibited.

d.

And when a priest has intercourse with her,

with a Jewish prostitute,

he receives lashes on account of being a prostitute.

What is the reason?

Because her offspring is considered genealogically related to him.

And Rava said: In both this case and that case,

the payment is forbidden, and a kohen who has relations with her is flogged on account of a harlot.

What is the reason?

They derive the cases from one another: the gentile woman and the Jewish woman are learned from one another with regard to the kohen’s liability to lashes and with regard to the payment.

What

do we find with regard to a

Jewish harlot? A

kohen who has relations with her violates

a prohibition,

as it is stated: “And he shall not profane his offspring,” referring to one whose offspring is attributed to him.

So too, a gentile harlot is subject to a prohibition.

And just as the payment to a gentile harlot is forbidden, so too, the payment to a Jewish harlot is forbidden.

And Rav answers that for this exposition of Abaye [and also of Rava], the Torah stated “abomination.”

In summary: In the case of actual forbidden sexual relations, it is certainly the case that the payment is forbidden. Rav and Levi disagree: Rav holds that this applies to all forbidden sexual relations except intercourse with one’s menstruant wife. Levi holds that it applies to all forbidden sexual relations, including intercourse with one’s menstruant wife.

In the case of a gentile harlot, the payment is universally forbidden.

And in the case of an unmarried Jewish harlot, Abaye and Rava disagree. Abaye holds that her payment is permitted, while Rava holds that it is forbidden.

They also disagree with regard to a kohen: In the case of a Jewish harlot, everyone holds that he is flogged. In the case of a gentile harlot, Abaye holds that he is not flogged, while Rava holds that he is flogged.

It was raised as an objection

to Abaye, from what we learned in a beraita:

Both a gentile harlot and a Jewish harlot—

the payment is forbidden.

This is a refutation of Abaye!

Abaye could have said to you:

The beraita is not speaking of payment for intercourse for which one is not liable to karet, such as intercourse with an unmarried woman who is not forbidden to him as an erva [and who is called a “harlot” because she is promiscuous with everyone, or because she previously engaged in intercourse with one of those liable to karet]. Rather,

when

it teaches this,

with regard to what did the beraita say that the payment is forbidden, and in the case of which Jewish harlot did it say this?

In the case of those forbidden sexual relations with whom betrothal does not take effect,

in the case of actual forbidden sexual relations, for which one is liable to karet, if he gave her payment for this intercourse, that payment is indeed forbidden.

That is, when the beraita says “harlot,” it is not referring to a woman who bears the designation “harlot” with regard to the prohibition applying to a kohen. Rather, it refers to prostitution for which one is liable to karet, and the intercourse is called an abomination.

And we raise an objection:

But the latter clause teaches,

of the beraita:

For example,

a widow to a High Priest, or a divorcee or a halutza to an ordinary kohen—

the payment is forbidden.

But these,

these women disqualified from the priesthood,

are women with whom betrothal does take effect,

and the latter clause is explaining the first clause. It therefore proves that they too are defined as harlots and that their payments are forbidden, which is difficult for Abaye, who holds that whenever betrothal takes effect, the payment is permitted?

And we answer: This beraita indeed holds that even the payment to an unmarried woman is forbidden, and that the Torah forbade every payment that is not given to one’s fully wedded wife.

Who is the author of this

beraita, who taught it?