Temurah 28a — the Talmud in English

B. Animals disqualified for sacrifice that became mixed with fit animals—even if one disqualified animal became mixed with a thousand fit animals—all the animals in the mixture are disqualified from being sacrificed upon the altar. For an animal is an “important matter,” whether because an animal is a “matter counted,” that is, people are particular, when they sell their animals, to count each animal separately; and even when a person sells his herd, he does not sell the animals together as a single unit called a “herd,” but counts each and every one of the animals in the herd separately, and sells them according to their number. Or because it is a “living creature,” and every living creature is an important matter.

C. Among the disqualified ones in our Mishna—some are explicitly stated in the Torah to be disqualified with regard to the altar, and some are derived through expositions of the verses. And some are disqualified even for an ordinary person, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Mishna:

All the prohibited ones with regard to the altar,

all animals that are disqualified for sacrifice,

prohibit in any quantity,

if they became mixed and are not discernible—even if one became mixed with a thousand—all of them are prohibited for the altar, as explained.

And these are they:

the one that copulated,

which caused a human to copulate with it,

and the one with which a human copulated,

with which a human copulated,

and the designated one,

whose owner designated it to be sacrificed to idolatry, but it has not yet been sacrificed, as will be explained later in the Mishna,

and the one worshipped,

whose owner made it an object of idolatry, as will be explained later in the Mishna,

and the payment,

which its owner gave to a prostitute in exchange for prostitution, as will be explained in the following Mishna,

and the exchange

for a dog, which they exchanged for a dog, as will be explained later in the chapter,

and the mixed-species animal,

which was born from a prohibited crossbreeding, for example, its father was a goat and its mother a ewe,

and the animal with a fatal condition,

which has one of the signs of fatal conditions that prohibit it for consumption even for an ordinary person,

and the one born by caesarean section,

which was born by cutting the wall of its mother, where they removed the fetus through the wall and it did not emerge by itself through the womb.

And the Mishna explains:

What is the designated one?

The one designated for idolatry, whose owners designated it for idolatry. And its law is:

it is prohibited

for sacrifice upon the altar,

but that which is upon it

its ornaments or the equipment of the animal,

is permitted.

That is, it is permitted to bring sacrifices to the altar from the money received for its ornaments, since no prohibited act of idolatry was yet performed with the ornaments.

And what is the one worshipped?

Any one that they worship.

And its law is:

it and that which is upon it are prohibited

for the altar [and that which is upon it is prohibited for benefit even to an ordinary person].

Both this and that,

the designated one and the one worshipped,

are permitted for consumption

by an ordinary person [for non-sacred slaughter], because living creatures were not prohibited to an ordinary person.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses several Mishnayot in which we learned that prohibitions are not nullified on account of their importance, and why the Mishna repeated and taught this law several times.

The master said,

we learned in our Mishna:

they prohibit in any quantity.

And we raise an objection:

What

does it teach us—that they are not nullified by a majority?!

Is it not the case that

we learned

this already in tractate Zevachim [70b]?

And the Gemara cites the Mishna there, and the back-and-forth discussion of the Gemara there, in order to clarify the objection.

We learned in tractate Zevachim, in the chapter “The Mixture”:

All the sacrifices

that became mixed with animals designated to die,

[as explained above, chapter “The Offspring of a Sin-Offering”],

or with an ox sentenced to be stoned,

an animal that killed a person, whose law is stoning,

even

if they became mixed

one in ten thousand

[ten thousand]—

they shall die.

And the Gemara assumed that from the wording of the Mishna it follows that it is speaking of one fit sacrifice that became mixed with many disqualified sacrifices.

And it is difficult for us,

there they raise an objection:

What “

even”

does it say?

Is it not obvious that if one permitted item became mixed with many prohibited items, everything is prohibited, since the majority is prohibited?

And we answer,

and there we answered:

This is what it teaches,

the Mishna is to be understood as follows:

All the sacrifices that became mixed “

among which”

one of the animals designated to die or an ox sentenced to be stoned,

that is, one disqualified animal among many fit ones,

and even one

prohibited item

among ten thousand

permitted items,

all of them shall die,

and it is not nullified by a majority.

If so, it is difficult: we already learned there that disqualified animals are not nullified by a majority, but prohibit in any quantity; why do we need to repeat and teach this law here as well?

And we answer:

It was necessary!

It is necessary to teach us here what was not heard from that Mishna. For if the tanna had taught only that Mishna,

it might enter your mind to say,

it might have occurred to one to say that only

there,

in tractate Zevachim, with regard to the animals designated to die and the ox sentenced to be stoned that became mixed with fit animals,

it

is not nullified by a majority because

they are prohibitions deriving benefit,

and therefore they are important and are not nullified by a majority.

But here,

with regard to the disqualified ones listed in our Mishna,

which are not prohibitions deriving benefit,

say,

it is possible to say,

let it be nullified by a majority.

Therefore

it teaches us

our Mishna that even these are not nullified, and prohibit in any quantity .

And we raise an objection:

the one that copulated and the one with which a human copulated,

and the other disqualified ones listed in our Mishna,

we also learned

them, for did we not also learn there that they are not nullified, even though they are not prohibitions deriving benefit?

For we learned [there]:

became mixed

the fit sacrifices

with one that copulated and one with which a human copulated

of non-sacred property,

with the designated one and the one worshipped, with the payment and the exchange for a dog; and because of the sacrifice mixed among them, all of them became prohibited to an ordinary person, and if he slaughters them outside [the Temple courtyard] he is liable for excision. And it is impossible to redeem the sacrifice mixed among them onto money, since it is unblemished, and certainly it is prohibited to sacrifice them. Therefore,

they shall graze until they become blemished

all of them,

and they shall be sold,

and they are permitted to an ordinary person,

and he shall bring with the money for the finest

among them

a sacrifice

of the same type

as the fit sacrifice.

That is, since one sacrifice is mixed among them, he should choose the finest among all of them, perhaps it is the sacrifice, and “the hand of consecration is uppermost,” and he should take money equal to the value of the finest from the redemption money, and say: “Wherever the sacrifice is, it is redeemed onto this money.” And with this money he should bring a sacrifice “of the same type,” whether a peace-offering or another sacrifice, in accordance with what the sacrifice had been consecrated as. And when he does so, all of them become permitted to an ordinary person. If so, it is difficult: even with regard to disqualified animals that are not prohibitions deriving benefit, the Mishna in tractate Zevachim already taught us that they are not nullified; why was it necessary for the Mishna here to teach us this?

And we answer,

Rav Kahana said: I stated the matter,

I stated this objection

before

Rav Shimi bar Ashi.

He said to me: One

Mishna, namely, our Mishna, is speaking when the disqualified animals became mixed

with

animals

of non-sacred property,

and afterward he consecrated them, and the Mishna teaches us that the entire mixture is prohibited for the altar.

And one,

that other Mishna, is speaking

of consecrated property,

where animals of consecrated property that had already been consecrated became mixed with disqualified animals, as is explicit there: “All the sacrifices that became mixed”—

And they are necessary,

both Mishnayot were necessary, and if only one of them had been taught, we would not have learned the other from it.

For if it had taught us with regard to consecrated property,

we would have said that the Sages said that they are not nullified

because

at the time of the mixture they were

repulsive.

That is, it is repulsive to sacrifice these disqualified animals to the Most High.

But with regard to non-sacred property,

where at the time of the mixture they were not consecrated to the Most High,

say,

we would have said,

let them be nullified,

now they are nullified, and since they have already been nullified, he can again consecrate them and sacrifice them; therefore the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless it is prohibited to sacrifice them.

And the Gemara there continues: Indeed, if we taught only our Mishna, that even if they became mixed with non-sacred property it is prohibited to sacrifice them, we would learn that all the more so, if they became mixed with consecrated property, it is prohibited to sacrifice them. However, here in our Mishna it was not stated what their remedy is or what should be done with them; therefore, that Mishna taught their remedy: “They shall graze until they become blemished, and they shall be sold, and he shall bring with the money for the finest among them a sacrifice of the same type.”

And we raise an objection:

With regard to non-sacred property too, we learned

it: when a prohibition became mixed with a majority of non-sacred permitted items, we already learned in another Mishna that they prohibit in any quantity and are not nullified. Moreover, there we learned that it is not nullified even when the prohibited item is non-sacred property! All this is because the prohibition is an important matter that is ordinarily counted, or because it is a living creature, as explained, for by rabbinic enactment a prohibition is not nullified when it is an important matter—

For we learned in tractate Avoda Zara [74a]:

And these are prohibited, and they prohibit

their mixtures

in any quantity:

wine

of libation, and idolatry, and birds of a leper, and heart-pierced hides,

hides of animals that they pierced opposite the heart, and through that puncture they removed their sacrificial parts and offered them to idolatry; the hides themselves are also considered an offering to idolatry,

and the hair of a nazirite,

which must be burned beneath the pot, and it is prohibited for benefit,

and the firstborn of a donkey, and meat cooked with milk,

a piece of meat that was cooked in milk, and the piece became mixed with a thousand permitted pieces,

and an ox sentenced to be stoned, and a heifer whose neck is broken, and non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, [

and the scapegoat ]—

these are prohibited, and they prohibit

their mixtures

in any quantity—

If so, it is difficult, for another Mishna already taught us that an important matter is not nullified even with regard to non-sacred property?

And we answer:

They are necessary!

The two Mishnayot were necessary, and each teaches us what the other did not teach:

For if it had taught us there,

that Mishna concerning wine of libation and idolatry, we would have said that only

there, since

all the prohibitions there are

prohibitions deriving benefit,

is it

that they are not nullified. But here,

the disqualified animals of our Mishna, such as the one that copulated and the one with which a human copulated and all of them, which are not prohibitions deriving benefit,

let them be nullified.

Therefore the Mishna teaches us that they are not nullified.

And if it had taught us here,

we would have said that they are not nullified since

with regard to the Most High,

because he wishes to sacrifice them as a sacrifice,

it is repulsive

to bring a sacrifice from these disqualified animals.

But

if he wants them

for

ordinary-personal use,

say,

there is room to say,

even

though they are

prohibitions deriving benefit, let them be nullified by a majority.

Therefore

it teaches us,

that other Mishna teaches us that even non-sacred property is not nullified.

And now the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the difference between the Mishna in tractate Zevahim and the Mishna in tractate Avoda Zara: in tractate Zevahim, prohibitions of benefit and prohibitions that are not prohibitions of benefit were taught together, whereas in tractate Avoda Zara, prohibitions of benefit were taught separately [29b], and afterward, in another Mishna [35b], prohibitions that are not prohibitions of benefit were taught

And what is different with regard to the mixture of consecrated offerings,

prohibitions that became mixed with consecrated offerings,

that he taught prohibitions of benefit and prohibitions of eating

such as an animal with a fatal defect,

together, and

whereas

a mixture of unconsecrated produce,

prohibitions that became mixed with unconsecrated produce,

was divided, and he taught prohibitions of benefit and the prohibition of eating separately?

And we answer: in tractate Avoda Zara, the Mishna wished to teach principally the law of wine used for idolatrous libation, which is prohibited even in the smallest amount and is not nullified; therefore, there the Mishna incidentally taught all the things similar to it, which are prohibitions of benefit, and afterward, by way of “an incidental matter upon an incidental matter,” the Mishna also taught prohibitions that are not of benefit. But in tractate Zevahim, the Mishna taught all the disqualified things with regard to the altar that are not nullified, and with regard to their disqualification with regard to the altar there is no difference at all whether they are forbidden to a layperson as a matter of benefit or only as a matter of eating.

When he stands

when the tanna stands

in Avoda Zara, because he needs to separate the prohibitions of wine used for idolatrous libation,

which is not nullified and whose prohibition is an everlasting prohibition,

he also separates all the prohibitions of benefit that resemble it.

And afterward he teaches the other prohibitions separately. But

here, because he needs to explain an animal set aside, an animal worshipped, the payment of a prostitute, and the price of a dog, he also explains all the things disqualified with regard to the altar that resemble it.

We learned in our Mishna:

the one that copulated

and the one with which copulation was performed.

As explained, an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed, according to witnesses, are killed, and are forbidden even to a layperson and even as a matter of benefit. Whereas an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed that are not killed, such as according to one witness or according to the owners, are not forbidden to a layperson, but only to the Most High.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where do we know that they are forbidden to the Most High?

From where do we know that they are forbidden to the Most High?

And the Gemara brings a beraita in which it is expounded that an animal that copulated, an animal with which copulation was performed, an animal set aside, and an animal worshipped are forbidden for the altar .

For the Sages taught:

The Torah said in the section of the offerings [Leviticus 1]: “When a person brings an offering from among you to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, you shall bring your offering.” And we expound: “

from animals” —

some of the animals, but not all of them,

to exclude an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed,

which it is forbidden to offer.

And the beraita discusses: Why is it necessary to exclude them through an exposition of the verses,

when it is an inference

and it is possible to exclude them by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if a blemished animal, with which no transgression was performed,

is

disqualified with regard to the altar, then an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed, with which a transgression was performed,

is it not

certain that they are forbidden with regard to the altar?!

An animal plowing with an ox and a donkey will prove it: with which a transgression was performed,

with the ox,

and

nevertheless it is

permitted with regard to the altar!

What can be said concerning an animal plowing with an ox and a donkey,

which for that reason was not forbidden with regard to the altar, because

the

animals

are not liable to death; can you say this concerning an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed, for the

animals

are liable to death?!

Therefore, they are disqualified with regard to the altar by a kal va-chomer from a blemished animal, even without the exposition of the verses!

And the beraita rejects the refutation concerning “an animal plowing with an ox and a donkey will prove it,” and says: “

Take for yourself what you brought”!

Take the refutation for yourself, for this is not a refutation.

For indeed,

if a transgression was performed with them

in the case of an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed,

with two witnesses,

when they are liable to death, it is obvious that they are disqualified for offering by a kal va-chomer from a blemished animal, and you cannot refute from an animal plowing with an ox and a donkey, since an ox and a donkey are not liable to death, whereas an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed are liable to death.

But what we are discussing is

when a transgression was performed with them according to one witness or according to the owners,

who admitted in court that their animal copulated or that copulation was performed with it, in which case they are not liable to death;

from where

do you know that they are disqualified with regard to the altar, if not from the exposition “from among the animals”?

Rabbi Shimon said:

I shall reason it out!

I shall reason it out by means of a kal va-chomer, and it is not necessary to learn from the exposition of the verse to disqualify it with regard to the altar:

And if a blemished animal, for which the testimony of

two witnesses does not disqualify it from eating,

for a layperson,

the testimony of one witness,

when a sage establishes its blemish,

disqualifies it from offering.

All the more so

in the case of an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed, for which the testimony of two witnesses disqualifies it

even

from eating,

for its law is stoning, and is it not

certain that the testimony of one witness disqualifies it from offering?!

And the beraita concludes:

The verse states “

from animals,”

and we expound:

to exclude an animal that copulated and an animal with which copulation was performed.

And we wonder:

But it follows,

for Rabbi Shimon learned it by means of a kal va-chomer; why does the beraita conclude by teaching it from a verse?