Temurah 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

B. Animals disqualified for sacrifice that became mixed with fit animals—even if one disqualified animal became mixed with one thousand fit animals—all the animals in the mixture are disqualified from being sacrificed on the altar. For an animal is an “important item,” either because an animal is “an item that is counted,” meaning that when people sell their animals they are particular to count each animal individually, and even when a person sells his herd, he does not sell the animals together as one unit called a “herd”; rather, he counts each of the animals in the herd individually and sells them according to their number; or because it is a “living creature,” and every living creature is an important item.

C. Among those disqualified listed in our Mishna, some are explicitly stated in the Torah to be disqualified with regard to the altar, while others are derived from expositions of the verses. And some are disqualified even for ordinary use, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Mishna:

All those prohibited with regard to the altar,

all animals that are disqualified for sacrifice,

prohibit the entire mixture, regardless of the proportion,

if they became mixed and are not recognizable—even if one became mixed with one thousand—all of them are prohibited for the altar, as explained.

And these are they:

the one that engaged in bestiality,

an animal that engaged in intercourse with a person;

and the animal with which bestiality was performed,

an animal with which a person engaged in intercourse;

and the designated animal,

whose owner set it apart to sacrifice it for idolatry, but it has not yet been sacrificed, as will be explained later in the Mishna;

and the worshipped animal,

which its owner made into an object of idolatry, as will be explained later in the Mishna;

and the fee,

which its owner gave to a prostitute in payment for prostitution, as will be explained in the following Mishna;

and the exchange

for a dog, which was exchanged for a dog, as will be explained later in the chapter;

and the crossbred animal,

which was born from a prohibited crossbreeding, for example, its father was a goat and its mother a ewe;

and the animal with a fatal defect,

which possesses one of the signs of a tereifa that prohibit it from being eaten even by an ordinary person;

and the one born by caesarean section,

which was born by means of an incision in its mother’s flank, through which the fetus was removed, rather than emerging on its own through the womb.

The Mishna explains:

What is the designated animal?

The animal designated for the worship of stars and constellations, whose owner set it apart for idolatry. And its law is as follows:

it is prohibited

to be sacrificed on the altar,

but what is upon it

its ornaments or the equipment used for the animal,

is permitted.

That is, it is permitted to use the money from the sale of its ornaments to bring sacrifices on the altar, since no prohibited act of idolatry has yet been performed with the ornaments.

And what is the worshipped animal?

Any animal that people worship.

And its law is that

it and what is upon it are prohibited

for the altar [and what is upon it is prohibited for benefit even to an ordinary person].

Both this one and that one,

the designated animal and the worshipped animal,

are permitted to be eaten

by an ordinary person [after non-sacred slaughter], because living animals were not prohibited for ordinary use.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses several mishnayot in which we learned that prohibited items are not nullified because of their importance, and why the Mishna repeated this law several times.

The Master said,

we learned in our Mishna:

They prohibit the entire mixture, regardless of the proportion.

And we raise an objection:

What

does it teach us—that they are not nullified by a majority?!

Is this not

already taught

in tractate Zevachim [70b]?

The Gemara cites the Mishna there, as well as the give-and-take of the Gemara there, in order to clarify the objection.

We learned in tractate Zevachim, in the chapter dealing with mixtures:

All the sacrifices

that became mixed with animals designated for death, [as explained above, in the chapter “The Offspring of a Sin Offering,”]

as explained above, in the chapter “The Offspring of a Sin-Offering,”

or with an ox sentenced to be stoned,

an animal that killed a person, whose law is execution by stoning,

even

if they became mixed

one among ten thousand [one among ten thousand]—

—

they shall all die.

The Gemara assumed that the wording of the Mishna indicates that it is discussing one fit sacrifice that became mixed with many disqualified sacrifices.

And it is difficult for us,

there they raise the following objection:

What

is the meaning of “even”

that it states?

Is it not obvious that if one permitted animal became mixed with many prohibited ones, everything is prohibited, since the majority consists of prohibited animals?

And we answer,

and there we answered:

This is what it teaches:

this is how the Mishna should be understood:

All the sacrifices that became mixed

among them

was one animal designated for death or an ox sentenced to be stoned,

that is, one disqualified animal among many fit ones,

even one

prohibited animal

among ten thousand

permitted animals—

they shall all die,

and it is not nullified by a majority.

If so, it is difficult: We already learned there that disqualified animals are not nullified by a majority, but prohibit the entire mixture, regardless of the proportion. Why, then, did we need to repeat this law here?

We answer:

It was necessary!

It was necessary to teach us here something that could not be learned from that Mishna. For if the tanna had taught only that Mishna,

it might have entered your mind to say

that only

there,

in tractate Zevachim, with regard to animals designated for death and an ox sentenced to be stoned that became mixed with fit animals,

is it

that the prohibited animal is not nullified by a majority, because

they are prohibited for benefit

and therefore important, and are not nullified by a majority.

But here,

with regard to the disqualified animals listed in our Mishna,

they are not prohibited for benefit

—

say

that it is possible to say:

they should be nullified by a majority.

Therefore

it teaches us

our Mishna that even these are not nullified, and prohibit the entire mixture, regardless of the proportion .

We raise an objection:

An animal that engaged in bestiality and an animal with which bestiality was performed,

and the other disqualified animals listed in our Mishna,

is this not also already taught

that they are not nullified, despite the fact that they are not prohibited for benefit?

For we learned [there]:

If

the fit sacrifices

became mixed with an animal that engaged in bestiality or an animal with which bestiality was performed

of non-sacred status,

with a designated animal, a worshipped animal, a fee, or an exchange for a dog—and because of the sacrifice mixed among them all of them became prohibited for ordinary use, and if he sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard he is liable for karet. It is impossible to redeem the sacrifice mixed among them with money, since it is unblemished, and it is certainly prohibited to sacrifice them. Therefore,

they must graze until they develop blemishes

all of them,

and they are sold,

and become permitted for ordinary use,

and with the money received for the finest

among them

he shall bring a sacrifice

of the same type

as the fit sacrifice.

That is, since one sacrifice is mixed among them, he should choose the finest animal from among all of them, perhaps it is the sacrifice, and “the hand of consecration is uppermost”; he should take money equal to the value of the finest animal from the redemption money and say: “Wherever the sacrifice is, it is desacralized onto this money.” With this money he shall bring a sacrifice “of the same type,” whether a peace offering or another sacrifice, according to the status to which the animal had been consecrated. Once he does this, all of them become permitted for ordinary use. If so, it is difficult: Even with regard to disqualified animals that are not prohibited for benefit, the Mishna in tractate Zevachim already taught us that they are not nullified. Why, then, did the Mishna here need to teach this?

We answer:

Rav Kahana said: I presented this teaching,

I raised this objection,

before

Rav Shimi bar Ashi.

He said to me: One

Mishna—our Mishna—speaks of a case in which the disqualified animals became mixed

with

ordinary

animals,

and afterward the animals were consecrated; and it teaches us that the entire mixture is prohibited for the altar.

And one

the other Mishna—speaks

of consecrated animals,

in which consecrated animals that had already been consecrated became mixed with disqualified animals, as is explicitly stated there: “All the sacrifices that became mixed—”

And both are necessary,

both mishnayot were necessary, and if only one of them had been taught, we would not have learned the other from it.

For if it had taught us only with regard to consecrated animals,

we would have said that the Sages stated that they are not nullified

because

at the time they became mixed they were

loathsome.

That is, it is loathsome to sacrifice these disqualified animals to the Most High.

But with regard to ordinary animals,

which at the time they became mixed had not been consecrated to the Most High,

say

we would have said:

let them be nullified

now; once they have been nullified, he may subsequently consecrate and sacrifice them. Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless it is prohibited to sacrifice them.

The Gemara there continues: Indeed, if we had taught only our Mishna, which states that they are prohibited to be sacrificed even if they became mixed with ordinary animals, we would have learned that all the more so they are prohibited to be sacrificed if they became mixed with consecrated animals. However, our Mishna here does not state what remedy there is for them or what should be done with them. Therefore, that Mishna taught their remedy: “They must graze until they develop blemishes, and they are sold, and with the money received for the finest among them he shall bring a sacrifice of the same type.”

We raise an objection:

And with regard to ordinary animals, is this not also already taught?

When a prohibited item became mixed with a majority of ordinary permitted items, we already learned in another Mishna that they prohibit the entire mixture, regardless of the proportion, and are not nullified. Moreover, there we learned that the item is not nullified even when the prohibited item itself is of ordinary status! All this is because the prohibited item is an important item that is customarily counted, or because it is a living creature, as explained; by rabbinic law, a prohibited item is not nullified when it is an important item—

For we learned in tractate Avoda Zara [74a]:

And these are prohibited, and prohibit

their mixtures

regardless of the proportion:

wine used for libations, idolatry, leper’s birds, and

heart-pierced hides,

the hides of animals that were pierced opposite the heart, and through that opening their sacrificial portions were removed and offered to idolatry; the hides themselves are also considered an offering to idolatry;

and the hair of a nazirite,

which must be burned beneath the pot and is prohibited for benefit;

and the firstborn donkey, and meat cooked with milk,

a piece of meat that was cooked in milk and became mixed with one thousand permitted pieces;

and an ox sentenced to be stoned, a calf whose neck is broken, and non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, [

and the scapegoat ]—

these are prohibited, and prohibit

their mixtures

regardless of the proportion—

If so, it is difficult: Another Mishna has already taught us that an important item is not nullified even in ordinary, non-consecrated mixtures.

We answer:

Both are necessary!

Both mishnayot were necessary, and each teaches us something that the other did not teach:

For if it had taught us only there,

that Mishna concerning wine used for libations and idolatry, we would have said that only

there, because

all the prohibitions mentioned there are

prohibitions involving benefit,

is it

that they are not nullified. But here,

the disqualified animals of our Mishna, such as an animal that engaged in bestiality, an animal with which bestiality was performed, and all the others, which are not prohibited for benefit,

let them be nullified.

Therefore the Mishna teaches us that they are not nullified.

And if it had taught us only here,

we would have said that they are not nullified since

with regard to the Most High,

because one wishes to sacrifice them,

it is loathsome

to bring a sacrifice from these disqualified animals.

But

if one wants them

for

ordinary use,

say,

there is room to say

even

though they are

prohibitions involving benefit, let them be nullified by a majority.

Therefore

it teaches us

that the other Mishna teaches us that even ordinary animals are not nullified.

And now the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the difference between the Mishna in tractate Zevachim and the Mishna in tractate Avoda Zara. In tractate Zevachim, prohibitions that involve deriving benefit and prohibitions that do not involve deriving benefit were taught together, whereas in tractate Avoda Zara, prohibitions that involve deriving benefit were taught separately [29b], and afterward, in another Mishna [35b], prohibitions that do not involve deriving benefit were taught?

And what is different with regard to the mixture of sacrificial animals,

i.e., prohibitions that became mixed with sacrificial animals,

that it taught prohibitions involving deriving benefit and prohibitions involving eating

such as a tereifa,

together, whereas

in the case of

a mixture of non-sacred animals,

i.e., prohibitions that became mixed with non-sacred animals,

it separated them and taught prohibitions involving deriving benefit and the prohibition involving eating separately?

And we answer: In tractate Avoda Zara, the Mishna primarily wished to state the basic law of wine used for idolatrous libation, that it prohibits even in the smallest amount and is not nullified. Therefore, incidentally, the Mishna taught there all the matters similar to it, which involve deriving benefit, and afterward, by way of “an incidental matter within an incidental matter,” the Mishna also taught prohibitions that do not involve deriving benefit. But in tractate Zevachim, the Mishna taught all the animals disqualified with regard to the altar that are not nullified, and with regard to their disqualification for the altar there is no difference at all whether they are prohibited to a non-priest from deriving benefit or are prohibited only from eating.

When he stands,

when the tanna is dealing

with Avoda Zara, because he needs to set out the prohibitions involving wine used for idolatrous libation,

which is not nullified and whose prohibition is everlasting,

he also sets out all the prohibitions involving deriving benefit that are similar to it.

And afterward he teaches the other prohibitions separately. But

here, because he needs to set out an animal set aside, an animal used for idolatry, a harlot’s payment, and an exchange for a dog, he also sets out all the animals disqualified with regard to the altar that are similar to them.

We learned in our Mishna:

an animal that copulated with a person

and an animal with which a person copulated.

As explained, an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated, on the testimony of witnesses, are put to death and are prohibited even to a non-priest and even from deriving benefit. But such animals that are not put to death, for example, on the testimony of a single witness or on the admission of the owner, are not prohibited to a non-priest; they are prohibited only to the Most High.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where do we derive that they are prohibited to the Most High?

From where do we know that they are prohibited to the Most High?

And the Gemara cites a beraita in which it is expounded that an animal that copulated with a person, an animal with which a person copulated, an animal set aside, and an animal used for idolatry are prohibited for the altar .

The Sages taught:

The Torah says in the passage concerning offerings [Leviticus 1]: “When a person brings an offering from you to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, you shall bring your offering.” And we expound:

“from animals”

means some of the animals but not all of them,

to exclude an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated,

as it is prohibited to offer them.

And the beraita asks: Why is it necessary to exclude them through an exposition of the verses?

Is this not a logical inference,

as it is possible to exclude them by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if a blemished animal, with which no transgression was committed,

is nevertheless

disqualified with regard to the altar, then in the case of an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated, with which a transgression was committed,

is it

not certainly the case that they are prohibited with regard to the altar?!

A person who plows with an ox and a donkey will prove this, with which

the transgression was committed in the case of

the ox, and

nevertheless it is

permitted with regard to the altar!

What can you say concerning a person who plows with an ox and a donkey,

which is why it was not prohibited with regard to the altar? Because

the

animals

are not liable to receive the death penalty; can you say the same concerning an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated, for which

the animals

are liable to receive the death penalty?!

Therefore, they are disqualified with regard to the altar by a kal va-chomer from a blemished animal, even without the exposition of the verses!

The beraita rejects the refutation based on “a person who plows with an ox and a donkey will prove this,” and says: “

Take back what you have brought”!

Take back your refutation, since this is not a valid refutation.

For indeed,

if a transgression was committed with them

in the case of an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated

on the testimony of two witnesses,

when they are liable to receive the death penalty, it is obvious that they are disqualified for sacrifice by a kal va-chomer from a blemished animal, and you cannot refute this from a person who plows with an ox and a donkey, since an ox and a donkey are not liable to receive the death penalty, whereas an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated are liable to receive the death penalty.

But what we are discussing is

when a transgression was committed with them on the testimony of a single witness or by the admission of the owners,

who admitted in court that their animal copulated with a person or that a person copulated with it, in which case they are not liable to receive the death penalty.

From where

do you know that they are disqualified with regard to the altar, if not from the exposition of “from animals”?

Rabbi Shimon said:

I will reason it out!

I will derive it by means of a kal va-chomer, and there is no need to learn from the exposition of the verse that it is disqualified with regard to the altar:

And if a blemished animal, for which the testimony of

two witnesses does not disqualify it from eating,

by a non-priest,

the testimony of a single witness

when a Sage determines that it has a permanent blemish,

disqualifies it from being offered,

all the more so

in the case of an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated, for which the testimony of two witnesses disqualifies it

even

from eating,

as its law is execution by stoning, is it

not certainly the case that the testimony of a single witness disqualifies it from being offered?!

And the beraita concludes:

The verse states

“from animals,”

and we expound:

to exclude an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated.

And we wonder:

But it follows,

for Rabbi Shimon learned it by means of a kal va-chomer; why does the beraita conclude by deriving it from a verse?