Temurah 28b (כח:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

said

Rav Ashi:

The tanna of the beraita disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and holds that this is not a valid inference,

because one can say: the refutation lies at the very foundation of the argument.

The kal va-chomer from an animal with a physical defect is fundamentally refuted. For

what can be said about an animal with a physical defect,

which is therefore disqualified with regard to the altar,

as its defect is visible.

Can you say the same concerning an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, whose defect is not visible,

that it too should be disqualified for the altar?!

Now,

since its defect is not visible,

I might have thought:

it should be fit for the altar.

Therefore the beraita concludes:

the verse states

“from the animal,”

to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated.

The Gemara cites the continuation of the beraita:

It is further stated there:

“from the cattle,”

and we expound: but not all cattle,

to exclude an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering,

which is not fit for the altar.

The beraita asks: Why is a verse needed to teach that it is disqualified?

Is it not a matter of logical inference?

It is possible to derive through a kal va-chomer that it is disqualified:

As for the payment to a prostitute

a prostitute receives

and the exchange-price

of a dog,

whose coverings are permitted,

for if the prostitute covered the payment with a piece of jewelry or an animal utensil after it had been given to her as her payment, or after the animal had been exchanged for a dog, that covering is permitted to be brought into the House of the Lord and made into plates for the altar. This is because the Torah states in the passage concerning the payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price of a dog (Deuteronomy 23): “For both of them are an abomination of the Lord your God,” and we expound: the payment and the exchange-price of a dog themselves are an abomination, but not their coverings. Nevertheless,

they

themselves

are forbidden

for sacrificial use.

An animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering, whose covering is forbidden,

as it is stated (Deuteronomy 7): “You shall not covet the silver or gold upon them,” referring to idols, and it is forbidden even to a non-Jew,

is it not logically inferred that it is forbidden

for sacrificial use?! Although an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering is not forbidden to a non-Jew, as explained, since animals do not become prohibited, nevertheless, because an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering is more stringent in that its covering is forbidden even to a non-Jew, all the more so its body should be forbidden for sacrificial use! And if so, why do I need to derive this from the exposition of the verse? It can be derived through a kal va-chomer.

The beraita discusses rejecting the kal va-chomer and argues the opposite. That is, if we had not expounded “from the cattle” to forbid an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering for sacrificial use, and had said that it is permitted for sacrificial use, we could have derived through a kal va-chomer that the coverings of such an animal are permitted.

Or the reverse!

It is possible to derive the opposite: that the coverings of an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering are permitted through a kal va-chomer.

As for the payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price of a dog,

which are more stringent in that

they are forbidden

for sacrificial use, nevertheless

their coverings are permitted. An animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering, which is permitted

for sacrificial use [that is, if we do not expound “from the cattle” to prohibit it],

is it not logically inferred

that its covering should be permitted

to a non-Jew?!

The beraita rejects this, saying that under no circumstances can one derive that the coverings of an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering are permitted, for

if so, you would nullify

what the Torah states (Deuteronomy 7):

“You shall not covet the silver or gold upon them, and take it for yourself”!

It is clear that the covering of an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering is forbidden. Thus, the kal va-chomer returns to prohibiting the animal itself for the altar. Why, then, was it necessary to teach this from “from the cattle”?

The beraita rejects the claim, “If so, you would nullify ‘You shall not covet the silver or gold upon them,’” and says:

I will uphold it!

It is possible to say that the covering of an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering is permitted, and nevertheless to uphold what the Torah states: “You shall not covet the silver or gold upon them.”

For when the Torah states

“You shall not covet the silver or gold,”

it is speaking

of

silver and gold found upon idols that are

inanimate objects,

and since the idols themselves are forbidden, the Torah also forbade their coverings.

But with

coverings found upon

an object that possesses the breath of life,

it may still be said:

since it is

permitted,

as explained, that animals do not become forbidden even for sacrificial use unless we derive their prohibition from “from the cattle,”

might its covering be permitted?

We now have two possible kal va-chomer inferences: one, to prohibit an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering for sacrificial use through a kal va-chomer from the coverings of the payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price of a dog; and the other, to permit the coverings of an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering through a kal va-chomer from the coverings of the payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price of a dog—and all the more so, the worshipped animal itself would be permitted for sacrificial use.

Therefore, the beraita concludes:

the verse states

“from the cattle,”

to exclude an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering,

and to disqualify it for sacrificial use. Once we expound that it is disqualified for sacrificial use, the kal va-chomer permitting its coverings to a non-Jew is also nullified, for animals are likewise forbidden for sacrificial use, and concerning the coverings of animals as well the Torah states: “You shall not covet the silver or gold upon them.”

Before the Gemara cites the continuation of the beraita, it asks:

Rav Hanania challenged it: The reason

the covering is forbidden is solely

because the verse excluded it; but if the verse had not excluded it,

if the Torah had not excluded it, I would have said that

the covering is permitted,

but how is it possible to say this,

as

it is

written (Deuteronomy 12):

“And you shall obliterate their name,”

the meaning of which is:

everything made for their name!

And we answer: That verse

that

came

to give them a name

of disgrace

is what it came for. It is interpreted as follows: Obliterate the “name” of the idols and give them a name of disgrace. For example, an idol whose name is

Beit Galyah,

meaning “lofty house,”

we call it

Beit Kalyah,

“house of destruction” [another version: we call it

Beit Kariya,

“house of the pit,” meaning a lavatory]. An idol whose name is

Face of Molekh,

we call it

Face of a Dog.

An idol whose name is

Eye of All,

we call it

Eye of a Thorn.

We have learned that from “from the animal” we expound to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, whereas from “from the cattle” we expound to exclude an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering.

And we ask:

Why should I not reverse them?!

Why should we not expound the opposite:

“From the animal”—

to exclude an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering.

“From the cattle”—

to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated?

And we answer:

There, it is based on the subject matter of the verse, and here

it is based on the subject matter of the verse.

The term “animal” serves to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, because the Torah uses this term for this prohibition elsewhere, whereas “cattle” refers to idolatry, as the Torah calls it.

Regarding an animal, it is written

[Leviticus 20]:

“And a man who lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.”

Whereas

regarding cattle, it is written

[Psalms 106], concerning the sin of the Golden Calf:

“They exchanged their glory for the likeness of an ox that eats grass.”

The beraita continues: It is further stated there (Leviticus 1), “And from the flock.” And we expound:

“From the flock,”

but not all the flock,

to exclude an animal set aside for idolatry.

From the Torah’s addition of the letter vav, writing

“and from the flock,”

we expound

to exclude an ox that gored,

an ox that gored a person and killed him, for which it is liable to be stoned if witnesses had testified against it previously. If two witnesses did not testify against it, but only one witness testified or the owners confessed, it is not stoned, but it is disqualified for sacrificial use.

Rabbi Shimon said: If an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated is stated, why is an ox that gored stated? And if an ox that gored is stated, why is an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated stated?

Are they not both forbidden as offerings, and are they not both alike in that if two witnesses testified against them, they are stoned?

The reason is:

because there is

a stringency

with regard to an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated that does not apply to an ox that gored, and there is a stringency with regard to an ox that gored that does not apply to an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated,

and if the Torah had excluded one of them from being offered, we would not have excluded the other.

There is

a stringency

with regard to an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, for

it is so that

the one with which a person copulated is treated alike whether the act was under duress or willingly,

for the animal is liable to be stoned even if it was compelled.

This does not apply to an ox that gored,

for if the ox gored not willingly but was forced to gore, such as when it was trained to gore, it is not liable to be stoned, as we learned (Bava Kamma 39a): An arena ox is not liable to be stoned, as it is stated (Exodus 21), “When an ox gores a man”—when it gores on its own, and not when others caused it to gore. Therefore, if the Torah had excluded an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, we would not have derived an ox that gored from it.

And

there is

a stringency

with regard to an ox that gored, for the owner of the ox that gored

its owner

pays the ransom,

even though the ox is stoned.

This does not apply to an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated,

and it cannot be derived from an ox that gored.

And because there is a feature in an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated that does not apply to an ox that gored, and a feature in an ox that gored that does not apply to an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated—

it was necessary to state the case of an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, and it was necessary to state the case of an ox that gored.

After the beraita was cited that excludes an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering, and an animal set aside for idolatry, based on the verse “When a person brings an offering from among you to the Lord, from the animals, from the cattle, and from the flock,” thereby prohibiting them as offerings, the Gemara cites another beraita that excludes them from being offered through a different exposition, from a verse written in the passage concerning defects. This beraita defines these disqualifications as analogous to physical defects.

But this tanna,

of the following beraita,

derives it from here,

deriving them from another verse—

As it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

An animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated,

an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering, and an animal set aside for idolatry are like consecrated animals that acquired a temporary defect before their consecration, and they require a permanent defect in order to redeem them,

that is, they are unfit to be offered, as though they had a physical defect; nevertheless, they may not be redeemed without another defect.

As it is stated

in the passage concerning defects (Leviticus 22):

“For their corruption is in them; there is a defect in them;

they shall not be acceptable for you.”

The Gemara discusses this:

What is the textual basis

for expounding this way? This verse was stated concerning physical defects, and concerning crushed and mutilated organs.

And we answer:

The text is incomplete,

the beraita is missing a clause,

and this is what it teaches,

and this is how it should be recited:

From where is it derived that they are forbidden to be offered

like an animal with a physical defect?

The verse states

“For their corruption is in them; there is a defect in them.”

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Everywhere that it is stated

in the Torah,

“corruption,”

it refers only to sexual transgression or idolatry!

Sexual transgression, as it is written

in the passage concerning Noah (Genesis 6):

“For all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth,”

and there they sinned through sexual transgression, as it is stated there: “The sons of God saw the daughters of man,” and so forth.

Idolatry, as it is written

(Deuteronomy 4):

“Lest you corrupt yourselves, and make for yourselves a graven image, the likeness of any figure.”

And this comes to teach us:

Everything

that is disqualified by a physical defect —

sexual transgression,

such as an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated

, and idolatry,

such as an animal set aside for idolatry or an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering

, disqualify it.

From this exposition the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael learned to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated, and an animal set aside for idolatry or worshipped as an idolatrous offering.

The Gemara discusses this: And the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael—“

from the animals,” “

from the cattle,”

and “from the flock”—

what does he expound from them,

what exposition are these expressions intended to teach?

And we answer:

He needs it;

it is needed to exclude

a

sacrificial animal that is

ill, old,

or malodorous,

which emits a foul odor and stinks. The Torah excludes such animals from being offered through its statement “from the animals,” but not every animal, and “from the cattle” and “from the flock.”

The Gemara discusses this:

And the first tanna,

of the preceding beraita,

who derived these verses,

who expounded “from the animals, from the cattle, and from the flock”

for an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated,

an animal set aside for idolatry, and an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering—

from where does he derive an ill, old, or malodorous animal,

and from where does he derive their exclusion from being offered?

And we answer:

He derives it

from another verse. It is stated there (verse 10):

“And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep or from the goats, for a burnt-offering,”

and from the Torah’s repetition of “from” and “from,” we expound that an old, ill, or malodorous animal is excluded.

The Gemara discusses this:

And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

who excludes an old, ill, or malodorous animal from what is stated (verse 2), “from the animals, from the cattle, and from the flock,” why did the Torah write (verse 10), “from the flock, from the sheep, and from the goats”?

And we answer:

It is the way of the verse to speak in this manner; these expressions are not available for exposition, because it is the way of the Torah to speak this way. This differs from

what is stated (verse 2), “from the animals, from the cattle, and from the flock,” which is available for exposition, because that entire verse is superfluous and intended for exposition.

We learned in our Mishna:

What is muktzeh? An animal designated for idolatrous worship.

Reish Lakish said: muktzeh is not

forbidden unless it is designated for seven years.

Only if they designated it and set it aside for seven years, at the end of which they would offer it for idolatrous worship, is it forbidden as muktzeh.

Alternatively:

Reish Lakish said: muktzeh is forbidden only until seven years.

After seven years, if they had not offered it, it was no longer muktzeh, because thereafter they would not offer it.

As it is stated

in Judges 6, concerning Gideon:

“And it came to pass on that night, and the Lord said to him: Take the bull of your father, and the second bull, seven years old. And you shall demolish the altar of the Baal that belongs to your father, and cut down the Asherah that is beside it.”

“And you shall build an altar to the Lord your God on the top of this stronghold, in the prescribed manner. And you shall take the second bull, and offer it as a burnt offering with the wood of the Asherah that you shall cut down.”

And we interpret, “the second” as referring to fattening, as in I Samuel 15: “and the cattle, and the second-best.” This proves that they used to fatten an ox for seven years for the purpose of idolatrous worship.

And since we find that Gideon offered this bull that had been fattened, it follows that it was not muktzeh. Either because seven years had not yet elapsed—according to the first version [and the statement “and the second bull, seven years old” does not mean that it had already been fattened for seven years; rather, it is a descriptive designation, meaning: “the bull that is customarily designated and fattened, and ultimately offered”]—or because seven years had already elapsed and they had not worshipped it—according to the second version. Therefore, it was permitted to be offered .

And we raise an objection:

But

if

there,

“muktzeh”

alone [only]

was the case,

for was it not also

ne’evad

the case?!

And we answer:

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: It was designated for worship

but

they did not worship it!

Rava said: In fact, they worshipped it,

and it was forbidden also as a “worshipped object,”

and it is an exceptional case,

a matter for which we find no parallel: that something which is forbidden to be offered should nevertheless be permitted to be offered. And since it is an exceptional case, no proof may be derived from it.

That is, Rava completely disagrees with Reish Lakish and maintains that every muktzeh is forbidden, and not specifically one designated for seven years. And as for Reish Lakish’s proof that during the seven years it is not forbidden [according to the first version], or that after seven years it is not forbidden [according to the second version], based on the fact that the Lord commanded him to offer it as a burnt offering, this is no proof, because it is possible that he offered it while it was “muktzeh,” and it was explicitly permitted by the Lord,

as Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said.

For Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: Eight matters

of prohibition

the Holy One, blessed be He, permitted

to Gideon

on that night:

a.

Outside,

for he slaughtered it outside the Tabernacle, since that incident took place in Ofra.

b.

And at night,

as it is stated there, “and he acted at night,” whereas offerings may not be offered at night.

c.

And as a non-koen,

for Gideon belonged to the tribe of Manasseh and was not a koen.