Temurah 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

And

this is

what Rabbi Yirmeya said: with regard to unconsecrated real estate, and Rabbi Yona said: with regard to consecrated property; both of them said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: “

There is no exploitation for them, but they do have cancellation of the sale.”

Explanation: Concerning the Mishna there, “These are the matters for which there is no exploitation ... real estate ... and consecrated property,” Rabbi Yohanan said: “There is no exploitation for them; they do have cancellation of the sale.” That is, although the laws of exploitation at the rate of one-sixth do not apply to them, nevertheless, the sale is canceled when the exploitation is greater than one-sixth. Rabbi Yohanan’s students disagreed with regard to which law in the Mishna Rabbi Yohanan said entails cancellation of the sale. Rabbi Yirmeya said: He was referring to real estate. Although real estate was excluded from the laws of exploitation by a scriptural derivation, as explained there, nevertheless, the sale is canceled, since when the exploitation is greater than one-sixth it is a mistaken transaction, and it is not included in the laws of exploitation and was not excluded from cancellation on account of exploitation. But with regard to consecrated property, Rabbi Yohanan did not say that there is cancellation of the sale, since there is no mistake with regard to Heaven, and one cannot say that had the seller known, he would not have sold it. And Rabbi Yona said: Rabbi Yohanan said this even with regard to consecrated property: If consecrated property was exploited by more than one-sixth, the sale is entirely void.

As explained, “cancellation of the sale” is not included in the laws of exploitation, and consecrated property was excluded from “exploitation” alone by a scriptural derivation, but not from “cancellation of the sale.” All the more so this applies to real estate, for the same reason: “cancellation of the sale” is not included in the laws of exploitation, and if it was exploited by more than one-sixth, the sale is void. For if even with regard to consecrated property, where one might ostensibly say that “there is no mistake with regard to Heaven,” Rabbi Yohanan nevertheless holds that the sale is void, all the more so this is the case with regard to unconsecrated real estate.

In brief: According to Rabbi Yirmeya, Rabbi Yohanan holds that with regard to consecrated property there is no cancellation of the sale when the exploitation is greater than one-sixth; according to Rabbi Yona, he holds that there is cancellation of the sale.

Now, if we say that our Mishna is speaking of cancellation of the sale, and that this is the subject of Rabbi Yohanan’s statement in our passage—that only by rabbinic ordinance must one establish its value, whereas by Torah law the sale remains valid—this is difficult: This works out well according to Rabbi Yirmeya, as Rabbi Yohanan properly holds that there is no cancellation of the sale by Torah law. But according to Rabbi Yona, there is a contradiction between Rabbi Yohanan’s statements?

And we answer:

Actually,

the true version is that Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish were speaking

about cancellation of the sale, and reverse them—

reverse their attributions!

Rabbi Yohanan’s

statement should be attributed to Reish Lakish, and Reish Lakish’s statement to Rabbi Yohanan; and Rabbi Yohanan said: By Torah law one must establish its value, since there is cancellation of the sale for them, whereas Reish Lakish said that this is only by rabbinic ordinance.

And we challenge this:

Can you actually say: Reverse them?!

This works out well,

this solution—to reverse the statements and say that Rabbi Yohanan holds that by Torah law one must establish its value—works out well

according to the one who says,

namely, Rabbi Yona,

that it applies to consecrated property, and all the more so to real estate,

as explained.

But according to the one who says,

namely, Rabbi Yirmeya,

that it applies to real estate,

Rabbi Yohanan said that there is cancellation of the sale for them,

but there is no cancellation of the sale for consecrated property,

and the sale remains valid even when the exploitation is greater than one-sixth, this is difficult:

How can you reverse this?

For if you reverse the statements, and Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says, “By Torah law one must establish its value,” and the sale is void, Rabbi Yohanan’s words will contradict his statement that Rabbi Yirmeya transmitted in his name: “There is no cancellation of the sale for them,” and the sale remains valid?

And we answer:

He can say to you,

Rabbi Yirmeya: Do not reverse them!

Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says: “By rabbinic ordinance one must establish its value”!

The Gemara explains the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yona [whose view, when the statements are not reversed, is that of Reish Lakish], who holds that there is cancellation of the sale with regard to consecrated property, and Rabbi Yirmeya [whose view, when the statements are not reversed, is that of Rabbi Yohanan], who holds that there is no cancellation of the sale with regard to consecrated property.

Shall we say,

is this the issue

in

the words of

Shmuel that they disagree? —

As Shmuel said: If consecrated property worth one hundred dinars was redeemed with an item worth one peruta,

which is much more than one-sixth—

it is redeemed,

since there is no exploitation with regard to consecrated property, and there is also no cancellation of the sale; and it is not applicable to say that consecrated property was mistaken, since there is no mistake with regard to Heaven.

And let us say that

Rabbi Yona does not accept Shmuel’s ruling,

as explained, because an error of more than one-sixth is not a normal form of sale, and since with regard to a sale it is entirely invalid and is a mistaken transaction, it is likewise entirely invalid with regard to redemption.

And Rabbi Yirmeya accepts Shmuel’s ruling,

and when consecrated property was excluded from the laws of exploitation, it was excluded entirely; there is no distinction between more than one-sixth and one-sixth. Only with regard to an ordinary person can one say that the party who was exploited made a mistake; with regard to consecrated property, however, one cannot say this.

Shall we say that they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s ruling?

And we conclude:

No! Both this one and that one accept Shmuel’s ruling;

Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yirmeya indeed accept Shmuel’s ruling.

And if

he intends to effect the redemption,

and intends to redeem and exploit the consecrated property even by more than one-sixth,

, it is certainly redeemed,

as Shmuel said. But

here, because he does not intend to effect the redemption,

he does not wish to redeem it for less than its value; rather, he erred and thought that this was its value. Therefore, Rabbi Yona [and likewise Reish Lakish, who says, “By Torah law one must establish its value”] says that the redemption is void, since he made a mistake—and in his view, Shmuel also holds this. But Rabbi Yirmeya [and likewise Rabbi Yohanan, who says, “By rabbinic ordinance one must establish its value”] holds that nevertheless it is redeemed by Torah law.

Alternatively, actually do not reverse them,

even according to Rabbi Yona; and our Mishna is not speaking at all about cancellation of the sale, but about exploitation! That is: He exploited consecrated property by an amount of one-sixth, and even by less than one-sixth. Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan said that one must establish its value only by rabbinic ordinance, since consecrated property was excluded from the laws of exploitation by a scriptural derivation, as explained.

And

what

is difficult for you

concerning Reish Lakish, who holds that “by Torah law one must establish its value,”

from the Mishna “

These are the matters

for which there is no exploitation ...

consecrated property”?

We can answer: Reish Lakish interprets that Mishna

as

it was

so

interpreted by

Rav Hisda.

For Rav Hisda said: What

does the Mishna mean by

“There is no exploitation for them”?

They are not subject to the laws of exploitation,

as they apply when an ordinary person exploits another ordinary person: at one-sixth the sale remains valid and he returns the amount of the exploitation, while at less than one-sixth he waives the exploitation. Rather,

even

when one exploits consecrated property by

less than the rate of exploitation,

less than one-sixth,

he must retract!

And this is the scriptural derivation according to Rav Hisda from the verse, “Do not exploit one another”: The law that at one-sixth the sale remains valid and the amount of the exploitation must be returned, while at less than one-sixth nothing need be returned, was stated only with regard to “one another,” ordinary people. By contrast, with regard to consecrated property, even at less than one-sixth, he must retract. Therefore, Reish Lakish said: “By Torah law one establishes its value,” and by Torah law he returns even less than one-sixth to the consecrated property.

We learned in our Mishna: “And one must establish its value.”

Ulla said: We said this only

this matter—that he returns the amount of the exploitation to the consecrated property—does not apply

when it was valued by two,

when two people initially valued the consecrated property, and it was subsequently established by three others that the first valuers had erred, and the latter valued it at more than the first valuers.

But when it was valued by three,

if three people initially valued it,

even if a hundred come,

if one hundred people come and value it at more than the first three, saying that the first three erred,

he does not retract;

he does not retract from the first valuation, and he need not supplement the amount of the exploitation for the consecrated property.

And we challenge this:

Is that so?

Is this not incorrect?

And

this

is what Rav Safra said: Where do we say

that

a hundred

are

like two,

like two, and

two are like a hundred—

only

with regard to testimony,

when two witnesses contradict one hundred witnesses: the one hundred have no superiority, and the status of this testimony is like a contradiction between two witnesses and two witnesses.

But with regard to an assessment,

an matter requiring valuation and estimation,

everyone agrees

that we follow the majority of opinions, and the valuation of the majority is accepted. How, then, did Ulla say that if the consecrated property was valued by three, he need not return the money according to the valuation of one hundred people?

Furthermore,

another difficulty: It is not specifically when one hundred came; rather,

even

three and three,

when three initially valued it and three others came and gave a different valuation, higher than that of the first three—

do we not follow the latter

and accept the valuation of the latter? And although there is no majority of opinions here, and it is an evenly balanced uncertainty, nevertheless,

the

consecrated property is given the advantage, so should the later valuation, which benefits the consecrated property, not be accepted? And we answer:

Ulla holds

that what the Mishna said, “

One must establish its value,”

is

by rabbinic ordinance,

only by rabbinic law.

And every

matter that is

rabbinic—

the Sages were lenient with it. Therefore, he holds that if three initially valued it, their valuation is accepted, and even if it becomes clear that they undervalued it, he need not supplement the amount of the exploitation.

Mishna:

We learned in the preceding Mishna several formulations that are effective with regard to temura. Our Mishna continues its discussion of formulations of temura and of consecration at the outset of sanctity.

If he said, “

This is in place of an olah,” or if he said, “This is

in place of

a sin-offering,” but did not say, “This is an olah,” or “This is this sin-offering,”

he has said nothing.

But if he said, “This is

in place of

this sin-offering,”

or “

in place of this olah,” and the sin-offering or olah is standing before him; or if he said, “

In place of the sin-offering

that I have at home”

or “

in place of the olah that I have at home,”

and indeed

he had one—

his words take effect.

This is because it is stated in the passage concerning temura [Leviticus 27], “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it,” and we derive: This applies only when the consecrated animal for which he made the substitution is known and specifically identified.

If he said concerning a non-kosher animal or a blemished animal, “

These are an olah”—

he has said nothing.

It does not even acquire sanctity of value, since he did not consecrate it for its monetary value, while it is unfit for the altar.

But if he said, “ These are

for an olah”—

—

they are sold, and with their proceeds he brings an olah.

Since he said “for an olah,” this implies an object that leads to an olah, meaning that he consecrated it for the monetary value of an olah. For if he had wanted to offer the animals themselves, he should have said, “These are an olah.”

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Our Mishna,

which states that if one said “in place of a sin-offering” or “in place of an olah,” and likewise in its latter clause, that if one consecrated a non-kosher animal or a blemished animal he has said nothing and his words are void,

is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir!

For if it is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, this—

for Rabbi Meir holds that

a person does not utter his words in vain.

And so we learned [Arakhin 5]: With regard to one who assesses a person who is less than one month old [and there is no law of assessment except for one who is at least one month old], Rabbi Meir says: He gives his value, the amount for which he would be sold in the market as a slave. And the Sages say: He has said nothing. The Gemara explains there that the reason for Rabbi Meir’s ruling is that “a person does not utter his words in vain”: He knows that there are no assessments for one less than one month old, and he completed his statement with the intention of assigning monetary value. Accordingly, according to Rabbi Meir, the same applies in the case of our Mishna: he does not utter his words in vain, and his intention is toward a sin-offering or olah that he has at home. And likewise, in the latter clause of the Mishna, Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that the one who consecrated the animal intends to consecrate the non-kosher animal with sanctity of value.

We learned in our Mishna:

“These are for an olah; they are sold, and with their proceeds he brings an olah.”

And the Gemara infers:

The reason

that it is sold without waiting for a blemish is because

they are a non-kosher animal and a blemished animal,

,

which are unfit,

as they themselves are unfit to be offered, and therefore they

do not require a blemish,

and need not graze until they develop a blemish.

But if he sets aside a female animal for a guilt-offering or for an olah, it requires a blemish,

and may not be sold without a blemish. Although they are not fit for the sanctity for which they were consecrated, nevertheless, they would have been fit for another sanctity, had he consecrated them as peace-offerings.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon!

As we learned [above 19b]: With regard to one who sets aside a female animal for a guilt-offering,

Rabbi Shimon says: It is sold without a blemish.

Rabbi Shimon says: It is sold without a blemish.

Our Mishna, from which it is inferred that it may not be sold until it develops a blemish, is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but with the Sages, who hold that it must graze until it becomes blemished. The basis of their dispute is explained there.

Alternatively,

the reason he said, “This is for an olah,”

“concerning a non-kosher animal and a blemished animal,”

which are entirely unfit for offering.

Had he said concerning a female animal, “This is a sin-offering” or “This is an olah,”

since, because it is sanctified with bodily sanctity for peace-offerings, its body too is sanctified,

which is fit for peace-offerings,

it would acquire intrinsic sanctity, meaning that it may not be sold without a blemish.

Since it acquires intrinsic sanctity for peace-offerings, it also acquires intrinsic sanctity,

and must graze until it becomes blemished—

Who is the tanna

who holds this?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda.

As it was taught [

above 20b],

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Even

one who designates a female

for his burnt offering

does not effect a temura,

because it does not possess sanctity of bodily status and may be sold without a blemish. And our Mishna, from which it is precisely inferred that it may not be sold without a blemish, is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, but according to another view in accordance with Rabbi Shimon [and all the more so according to the Sages], which holds that it grazes until it develops a blemish, as explained there.

We have returned to you, chapter How Do They Employ Stratagems

A. A mixture in which a minority consists of a prohibited substance with a majority of a permitted substance, and the prohibited minority is not recognizable, renders the entire mixture permitted. However, the Sages said that “an important item is not nullified by a majority,” and they prohibited several things that are not nullified because of their importance.