Temurah 27a — the Talmud in English

The wording of designation -

as it is written in the section of negaim [Leviticus 23] “

[Leviticus 23] “

And if the bright spot stands in its place,”

it remained in its place [“under it”], analogous to the designation of an exchange, where the sanctity of a consecrated animal remains in its place.

And you find the wording

of profanation, as it is written [Isaiah 60], concerning Israel’s future redemption: “

[Isaiah 60] concerning Israel’s future redemption: “

In place of copper,”

which the nations took from you, “

I shall bring gold”

in its place.”

And since this is so -

the verse entrusted it only to the Sages,

and they know to say when “in place of” is an expression of designation and when it is an expression of profanation.

Therefore,

if he places an unconsecrated animal

beside offerings designated for the altar, with which an exchange is performed,

and says, “This in place of this,” the Sages established that

it is the wording of designation,

and this is what our Mishna is speaking about. But when he places it

beside offerings designated for the maintenance of the Temple, with which an exchange is not performed,

the Sages established that

it is the wording of profanation,

and this is what the beraita is speaking about.

Rava said: Even with offerings designated for the altar, sometimes

there are occasions when

you find the wording of profanation,

that “in place of” is an expression of profanation,

for example, when the consecrated property was

a sacrifice

with a blemish

that was awaiting redemption, and he placed an unconsecrated animal before it and said, “This in place of this.” Then it is certainly an expression of profanation, and his words take effect .

Rav Ashi said:

Rava’s words are not absolute. Rather,

even with

a consecrated animal

with a blemish as well, sometimes

you find the wording of profanation,

and his words take effect, and its sanctity was transferred and rose onto the unconsecrated animal,

and sometimes you find the wording of designation,

and it is seized with the sanctity of an exchange, while the consecrated animal with a blemish was not profaned [as is the law of an exchange, which is seized even from a consecrated animal with a blemish, as explained above in the Mishna, 9a]!

And Rav Ashi explains his words: If he placed

his hand on the consecrated animal

[on a consecrated animal with a blemish], and said, “This in place of this,” then certainly, by placing his hand on the consecrated animal, his intention was that the sanctity of this animal on which he placed his hand should be profaned onto the unconsecrated animal. Therefore it was profaned, and

it is unconsecrated.

But if he placed

his hand on the unconsecrated animal

[on an unconsecrated animal] and said, “This in place of this,” then certainly his intention was that this unconsecrated animal, on which he placed his hand, should be seized with the sanctity of the consecrated animal, and this is an expression of designation through an exchange, for if he had wished to profane the consecrated animal, he should have placed his hand on the consecrated animal. Therefore,

it is consecrated,

and its sanctity was not profaned and did not descend from it, and the unconsecrated animal was seized with the sanctity of an exchange.

And after Abaye’s conclusion that the expression “in place of” divides into two meanings—sometimes its meaning is designation and sometimes profanation—Abaye raises several questions concerning one who says, “In place of.”

Abaye asks:

There were before him two consecrated animals with blemishes, and two unblemished unconsecrated animals,

and he did not place his hand either on these or on those,

and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law?

What is the status of those animals and of that person?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say that he

intends designation,

and both are seized through an exchange,

and he is lashed,

and he receives two sets of lashes for the prohibition of exchange?

Or he intends profanation,

to profane the animals that have blemishes, and he is not lashed.

And the reason for the uncertainty is that he did not place his hand either on these or on those.

And it would be possible to raise that question if there were before him one consecrated animal with a blemish and one unconsecrated animal. Rather, because later he raises other questions concerning two animals, Abaye also formulated this question concerning two animals.

b.

And

Abaye continues to ask:

If you should say,

if we resolve the preceding question by saying that his intention is profanation, because

wherever there is a permitted option,

there is a permitted act before him,

a person does not abandon the permitted option

and perform a prohibited act,

he does not leave a permitted option in order to perform a prohibition,”

and it is for profanation,

and certainly his intention is profanation and not to designate through sanctity, which is prohibited—there is another question to raise:

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished,

and one of them with a blemish. And two unconsecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them with a blemish, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law?

What is the status of those animals and of that person? And concerning the unblemished consecrated animal, he certainly designates one of the unconsecrated animals, whether the unblemished one or the one with a blemish, for we concluded above that the expression “in place of” concerning an unblemished consecrated animal is designation. In any event, he violated the prohibition of exchange, and one of them was seized through an exchange, for an animal with a blemish is also seized through an exchange, as explained above [9a], that one exchanges good for bad and bad for good—that is, an animal with a blemish for an unblemished one, and an unblemished one for an animal with a blemish -

Rather, the question is whether he may have violated two prohibitions, and become liable for two sets of lashes, with both being seized through an exchange, as will be explained:

The side for saying that there is one designation through an exchange is:

Do we say that this man’s intention is:

that this man’s intention is:

“An unblemished one in place of an unblemished one,” for designation

through an exchange. Concerning this designation, he indeed transgresses, and the unblemished one is seized in exchange for the unblemished one, while

“an animal with a blemish in place of an animal with a blemish,” for profanation,

for there is no significance of “designation” with an animal with a blemish in exchange for an animal with a blemish, since the Torah stated only an exchange of bad for good and good for bad, but “bad for bad” the Torah did not write as effecting an exchange. And if so, the meaning of his words is “an animal with a blemish in place of an animal with a blemish” for mere profanation, and not for designation. It follows that he performed one designation and one profanation -

And the side for saying that there are two designations is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that his intention is:

“An unblemished unconsecrated animal in place of a blemished consecrated animal”,

and one exchanges an unblemished animal for an animal with a blemish, and here there is one designation through an exchange. And

“a blemished unconsecrated animal in place of an unblemished consecrated animal”,

and one exchanges an animal with a blemish for an unblemished one, and here there is a second designation.

And in both cases he is lashed,

he receives two sets of lashes, and both are seized through an exchange, and neither one is profaned.

And concerning this question, it is not so possible to say, “A person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,” for in any event he violated one prohibition. One may say: Just as he does not care about violating one prohibition, so he does not care about violating two prohibitions.

c.

And

Abaye continues to ask:

If you should say,

if we resolve the preceding question, that nevertheless it is appropriate to say, “

Wherever there is a permitted option -

he does not perform a prohibited act,”

and it is for profanation, and he is not lashed

for two, but for one -

there is another question:

There were before him three consecrated animals,

two of them unblemished

and one of them with a blemish, and three unconsecrated animals,

all

unblemished, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law?

What is the law concerning those animals and that consecrator? The two unblemished ones he certainly designated, and he is liable for two sets of lashes. The question concerns the third one -

And the side for saying that he is also liable concerning the third is:

Do we say, since these

two unblemished ones are for designation -

that unblemished animal,

the third one,

also “in place of”

a consecrated

animal with a blemish is for designation,

and he is liable concerning it as well, and it is seized through an exchange. Even though we already resolved that “a person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,” one may still say that since concerning two out of the three, which are the majority, he violated a prohibition, it follows that concerning the third as well his intention is designation -

And the side for saying that concerning the third his intention is to profane is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that nevertheless

here too, “

wherever there is a permitted option, he does not perform a prohibited act.”

And that last one,

the last unconsecrated animal -

it is for profanation,

and he does not transgress concerning it.

d.

And

Rav Ashi continues to ask:

If you should say,

if we resolve the preceding question, that

here too, since the man has not yet been established as one who commits prohibitions,

that consecrator has not yet committed three prohibitions and has not been established as a transgressor, therefore it is appropriate to say concerning him, “

A person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,” and he designated two and profaned the third -

and he designated two animals and profaned the third—

Therefore,

Rav Ashi asks:

In a case where he certainly violated three prohibitions and has an established status as a transgressor, whether he has also become established concerning the fourth—that his intention is to violate a prohibition and designate—or not. And what are the circumstances?

There were before him four consecrated animals, one of which had a blemish, and four unblemished unconsecrated animals ,

and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law?

What is the law concerning that consecrator and those animals: were three of them seized through an exchange and the fourth profaned onto the animal with a blemish, or were all four of them seized through an exchange?

The side for saying that all four were seized through an exchange is:

Here, certainly, since the man has been established as one who commits prohibitions,

and he has already violated three prohibitions -

he is lashed four

sets of lashes -

And the side for saying that only three were seized through an exchange and the fourth was profaned is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

even though the man has been established

as one who commits a prohibition,

nevertheless, “

a person does not abandon a permitted option and perform a prohibited act,”

and this last one,

that is, the fourth and last one,

is for profanation,

his intention is to profane it.

And we conclude:

teyku!

And the questions were not resolved.

Another wording

Abaye asks

a.

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them with a blemish, and two unblemished unconsecrated animals, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law,

did he violate concerning two designations, or concerning one, while the second is for profanation?

The side for saying that he violated concerning two designations is:

Do we say, since “an unblemished one in place of an unblemished one”,

his intention

is to designate

the unblemished one

of the consecrated animals

in place of an animal with a blemish as well, for designation -

And the side for saying that he violated concerning only one designation is:

Or perhaps,

indeed

“an unblemished one in place of an unblemished one”

his intention

is to designate,

because

it is fit,

an unblemished consecrated animal is fit for sacrifice, and as explained above, this is certainly an expression of designation.

But an unblemished one

of the unconsecrated animals

in place of an animal with a blemish

of the consecrated animals—his intention

is to profane,

because

an animal with a blemish is not fit

for sacrifice, and profanation applies to it.

b. And Abaye continues to ask:

If you should say,

if we resolve the preceding question that both are for designation, because

here, since

if he indeed wished to designate one and profane one,

he would have needed to say,

he should have said explicitly, “

one for designation and one for profanation,”

and he did not say so; therefore:

both are seized,

both were seized through an exchange,

for both are alike,

and both are equal, since he did not specify with his mouth. And from his placing his hands on the two unconsecrated animals as well, there is proof that his intention is designation,

for if,

if his intention were

to profane - -

he should have placed his hand on that animal with a blemish

of the consecrated animals. Both from the consecration of his mouth and from the placing of his hands, it is possible to prove that his intention is to designate both of them -

Rather,

there is another question to raise:

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them with a blemish, and three unblemished unconsecrated animals,

and he placed his hand on one of the unconsecrated animals,

and said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is the law?

What is the law concerning those three animals, and how many prohibitions did he violate? Now, two of them certainly designate against the one unblemished consecrated animal , and the question concerns the third: Is his intention to designate or to profane?

The side for saying that the third one, too, he designates through an animal possessing a blemish of consecrated property is:

Do we say, since these two animals serve for designation,

just as with the first two his intention is designation—

that non-consecrated, unblemished animal,

so with the third one,

also his intention is designation in place of an animal of consecrated property possessing a blemish,

and therefore he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals—

And the side for saying that he wishes to desacralize the third one is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

that animal of consecrated property possessing a blemish

is his intention

to desacralize.

And if we say so, it is difficult: Why did he place his hand upon the non-consecrated animals? We shall answer:

And this—that he did not place his hand upon it,

upon the unblemished animal of consecrated property

that was together with the blemished one,

which was standing with the blemished animal of consecrated property, and all the more so he should have placed his hand upon the blemished one itself [rather, at the very least he should have placed his hand upon the unblemished animal of consecrated property, and this would have been effective as though he had placed his hand upon the blemished one!]—and why did he place his hand upon the non-consecrated animals? We shall answer:

Because he held,

this man holds that

the majority is preferable,

it is preferable to place it upon three non-consecrated animals, which are the majority, and not upon two; but, nevertheless, his intention is to desacralize.

g.

Rav Ashi raised a question: If you should reach the conclusion,

if we resolve the preceding question according to the first side, that

since he wished to place his hand upon an unblemished animal of consecrated property,

if his intention were to desacralize, he should have placed his hand upon a blemished animal of consecrated property, and at the very least upon an unblemished animal of consecrated property; and from the fact that he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals it is proved that

he intends designation—

There is another question to be raised, namely:

He arranged them in rows [

arranged them in order ]

one opposite the other.

Another version: He arranged them in rows opposite one another.

For example: Three animals of consecrated property were before him, two of them unblemished and one possessing a blemish, and three unblemished non-consecrated animals. And he set them up in two rows, a row of consecrated animals separately and a row of non-consecrated animals separately, one animal opposite the other, and he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals and said, “These in place of these.” And the question is concerning the third non-consecrated animal, which stands opposite the blemished animal of consecrated property: Is his intention to designate it, or to desacralize it?—

And the side for saying that his intention is to desacralize it is:

Do we say,

even though he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals [and if you should reach the conclusion that the preceding question was resolved, that the placing of hands decisively establishes that his intention is designation], nevertheless,

since he arranged one opposite the other,

he deliberately arranged them one opposite the other—his actions prove that his intention is

for an unblemished one in place of an unblemished one, for designation, and a blemished one opposite an unblemished one, for desacralization—

And the side for saying that he also wishes to designate the third one is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that there is no proof from the order in which he set them up, but

we follow his statement,

the essential matter depends upon his statement and the placing of his hand; and since he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals and said “in place of”—his intention is to designate all of them.

Another version:

The side for saying that he also wishes to designate the third one is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

we follow the majority,

we follow the majority, and since two of them certainly serve for designation, his intention is to designate the third one as well [and, furthermore, since he placed his hand upon the non-consecrated animals].

And we conclude:

Let it be a question!

The questions were not resolved.

We learned in our Mishna:

And if the consecrated animal possessed a blemish, it goes out to non-consecrated status, and one must establish its value.

The explanation: The non-consecrated animal should be worth as much as that consecrated animal in whose place he desacralizes it, so that the consecrated property should not suffer a loss.

The Gemara discusses whether, if it is not of equal value, he must return to the consecrated property the amount of the “overcharge,” and whether consecrated property has the law of “rescission of the sale,” as will be explained. This discussion is not specifically concerning a consecrated animal, but concerning every desacralization of consecrated property.

Three measures were stated concerning overcharge . a. If the overcharge was “less than a sixth” by any amount, for example, he sold something worth sixty dinars for fifty dinars and a peruta, he is not obligated to return anything, because anything less than a sixth is ordinarily relinquished by everyone. b. If the overcharge was “more than a sixth” by any amount, for example, he sold something worth fifty dinars for sixty dinars and a peruta, the sale is void, and he returns the item to him, while the seller returns the money to him. c. If the overcharge was exactly a sixth, neither less nor more, the sale is acquired, and the one who overcharged is obligated to return the amount of the overcharge [“the sixth”] to the one who was overcharged.

We learned in a Mishna [Bava Metzia 56a]: These are matters concerning which there is no overcharge ... and consecrated property. That is: A treasurer who sells consecrated property, or one who sells his sacrifice in which a blemish occurred, and overcharged the purchaser by the value of a sixth, the purchaser cannot demand the return of the overcharge. And likewise, one who overcharges consecrated property, for example, he redeemed from consecrated property at a sixth above its value, does not return the overcharge to the consecrated property [the opinion of Rav Hisda will be explained below]. And the Sages expounded this [there, on 56b] from what the Torah said in the section of overcharge [Leviticus 25], “You shall not wrong one another,” and we expound: “one another,” but not consecrated property.

The Gemara discusses whether consecrated property also does not have the law of rescission of the sale when one overcharges consecrated property by more than a sixth .

Rabbi Yohanan said:

What the Mishna said, “

It went out to non-consecrated status,”

even if it is not worth as much as the consecrated property, is

a matter of Torah law,

like the law of consecrated items that go out to non-consecrated status through redemption ; whereas what the Mishna said, “

And one must establish its value,”

to return to the consecrated property the amount by which the consecrated property is worth more than ordinary property, is

from their words,

only rabbinic, and by Torah law he does not return it.

And Reish Lakish said: Even

what the Mishna said, “

One must establish its value,”

is

a matter of Torah law.

The words of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish do not explicitly state whether they disagree concerning overcharge of a sixth or concerning rescission of the sale when it is more than a sixth, and concerning this the Gemara discusses:

With what are we dealing?

If you say, concerning overcharge [concerning an overcharge], if we say that they disagree over whether by Torah law one must return the sixth of the overcharge to the consecrated property—this is astonishing to say: For would

Reish Lakish say in this matter “

Even one must establish its value by Torah law”?

And we learned,

did we not learn an explicit Mishna [there]:

These are matters concerning which there is no overcharge: slaves, documents, and land [

and it is explained there ]

and consecrated property.

As explained, consecrated property was excluded by Torah law from the law of overcharge; would Reish Lakish disagree with the Mishna?

Rather, rescission [

concerning rescission ]

of the sale,

the words of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish were stated concerning more than a sixth—

That is, if we interpret our Mishna as concerning rescission of the sale, it will be explained as follows: If he redeemed from consecrated property by more than a sixth, for example, an animal worth sixty and a peruta for fifty, one must establish its value. And Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree concerning this. Rabbi Yohanan holds that it is rabbinic, because he holds that “rescission of the sale” is included within overcharge, and just as there is no overcharge concerning consecrated property by Torah law, so there is no rescission of the sale. Whereas Reish Lakish holds that it is not included within overcharge, but rather is a “mistaken transaction,” and just as it is not the ordinary manner of a sale, so it is not a desacralization, and by Torah law it was not desacralized—

If we explain it so, it is difficult: Would

Rabbi Yohanan say in this matter “

One must establish its value—

from their words?!