Temurah 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

The wording of taking effect -

as it is written in the passage concerning afflictions

in the passage concerning afflictions [Leviticus 23] “

And if the bright spot remains in its place,”

it remains in its place [“beneath it”], similar to the taking effect of temura, whereby the sanctity of a consecrated animal remains in its place.

And one can find the wording

of profanation, as it is written [Isaiah 60] concerning the future redemption of Israel: “

[Isaiah 60] concerning Israel’s future redemption: “

In place of copper,”

which the nations took from you, “

I will bring gold

in its place.”

And since this is so -

the verse entrusted this matter only to the Sages,

and they know how to say when “in place of” expresses taking effect and when it expresses profanation.

Therefore,

if one places a non-sacred animal

beside offerings designated for the altar, with regard to which temura is performed,

and says, “This is in place of that,” the Sages established that

this is wording of taking effect,

and this is what our Mishna is discussing. But when he places it

beside consecrated property designated for Temple maintenance, with regard to which temura is not performed,

the Sages established that

this is wording of profanation,

and this is what the beraita is discussing.

Rava said: Even with regard to offerings designated for the altar, sometimes

there are cases

where one finds wording of profanation,

where “in place of” expresses profanation,

for example, when the consecrated animal was

a sacrificial offering

with a blemish

that is awaiting redemption, and he placed a non-sacred animal before it and said, “This is in place of that.” In that case, it is certainly wording of profanation, and his words take effect .

Rav Ashi said:

Rava’s words are not absolute. Rather,

even with regard to

a consecrated animal

with a blemish as well, sometimes

one finds wording of profanation,

and his words take effect: its sanctity is transferred, and it applies to the non-sacred animal;

and sometimes one finds wording of taking effect,

and it takes effect with the sanctity of temura, while the consecrated animal with a blemish is not profaned [as is the law with regard to temura, which takes effect even from a consecrated animal with a blemish, as explained above in the Mishna, 9a]!

Rav Ashi explains his statement: If he placed

his hand on the consecrated animal [on a consecrated animal with a blemish] and said, “This is in place of that,” then certainly, by placing his hand on the consecrated animal, his intention is that the sanctity of this animal, on which he placed his hand, should be transferred to the non-sacred animal. Therefore, its sanctity is transferred, and

[on a consecrated animal with a disqualifying defect] and said, “This is in place of that,” his intention in placing his hand on the consecrated animal is certainly that the sanctity of the animal on which he placed his hand should be transferred to the unconsecrated animal. Therefore, it is profaned, and

it becomes non-sacred.

But if he placed

his hand on the non-sacred animal

[on the non-sacred animal] and said, “This is in place of that,” then certainly his intention is that this animal—the non-sacred animal on which he placed his hand—should take on the sanctity of the consecrated animal. This is wording of taking effect through temura, because if he had wanted to profane the consecrated animal, he should have placed his hand on the consecrated animal. Therefore,

it becomes consecrated,

and its sanctity is not transferred and does not depart from it, while the non-sacred animal takes on the sanctity of temura.

After Abaye’s conclusion that the expression “in place of” has two meanings—sometimes it means taking effect and sometimes profanation—Abaye raises several questions concerning one who says, “In place of.”

Abaye asked:

There were before him two consecrated animals with blemishes and two unblemished non-sacred animals,

and he placed his hand on neither these nor those,

and said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is

the status of those animals and of that person?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say that

he intends to make them take effect,

and both of them take on temura,

and he is liable to lashes,

and he receives two sets of lashes for the prohibition against temura?

Or he intends to profane them,

to profane the animals with blemishes, and he is not liable to lashes.

The reason for the uncertainty is that he placed his hand on neither these nor those.

The same question could have been raised if there had been before him one consecrated animal with a blemish and one non-sacred animal. However, since later he raises other questions involving two animals, Abaye also formulated this question with two animals.

b.

And

Abaye continues to ask:

If you are to say,

if we resolve the previous question by saying that his intention is profanation, because

wherever there is a permitted option,

that is, a permitted act is available to him,

a person does not abandon the permitted option

and perform a prohibited act,

he does not forgo the permitted option in order to perform a prohibition,”

it is profanation,

and his intention is certainly profanation and not causing an animal to take on sanctity, which is prohibited—there is another question to be raised:

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them blemished, and two non-sacred animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them blemished, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is

the status of those animals and of that person? With regard to the unblemished consecrated animal, he certainly causes one of the non-sacred animals to take effect in its place, whether the unblemished one or the blemished one, since we concluded above that “in place of” with regard to an unblemished consecrated animal means taking effect. In any event, he violated the prohibition against temura, and one of them takes on temura, since a blemished animal also takes on temura, as explained above [9a], that one exchanges good for bad and bad for good—that is, a blemished animal for an unblemished one, and an unblemished animal for a blemished one -

Rather, the question is whether he may have violated two prohibitions, becoming liable to two sets of lashes, with both animals taking on temura, as will be explained:

The side for saying that there is only one act of causing temura to take effect is:

Do we say

that this man’s intention is:

“An unblemished animal in place of an unblemished animal,” to cause it to take effect

through temura. For this act of taking effect, he indeed transgresses, and the unblemished animal takes effect in place of the unblemished one;

and “a blemished animal in place of a blemished animal,” for profanation,

since “taking effect” has no significance when a blemished animal is exchanged for a blemished animal. The Torah stated only the exchange of bad for good and good for bad, but the Torah did not state that “bad for bad” creates temura. Thus, the meaning of his words is “a blemished animal in place of a blemished animal” for mere profanation, and not for taking effect. It follows that he performed one act of taking effect and one act of profanation -

The side for saying that there are two acts of causing temura to take effect is:

Or perhaps,

it may be said that his intention is:

“The unblemished non-sacred animal in place of the blemished consecrated animal,”

and an unblemished animal may be exchanged for a blemished one, so there is one act of causing temura to take effect. And

“the blemished non-sacred animal in place of the unblemished consecrated animal,”

and a blemished animal may be exchanged for an unblemished one, so there is a second act of causing temura to take effect.

And he is liable to lashes for both,

receiving two sets of lashes, with both animals taking on temura and neither one being profaned.

In this question, it is not as apt to say, “A person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,” since in any event he violated one prohibition. One may say that just as he does not care about violating one prohibition, he likewise does not care about violating two prohibitions.

c.

And

Abaye continues to ask:

If you are to say,

if we resolve the previous question by saying that nevertheless it is applicable to say

“wherever there is a permitted option -

he does not perform a prohibited act,”

and it is for profanation, and he is not liable to two sets of lashes

but to only one -

there is another question:

There were before him three consecrated animals,

two of them unblemished

and one of them blemished, and three non-sacred animals,

all of them

unblemished, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is

the status of those animals and of that person who consecrated them? With regard to the two unblemished animals, he certainly caused temura to take effect and is liable to two sets of lashes. The question concerns the third one -

The side for saying that he is also liable for the third one is:

Do we say that since these two

unblemished animals were caused to take effect -

that unblemished animal,

the third one,

also, in place of

a consecrated

blemished animal, was caused to take effect,

and he is liable for it as well, and it takes on temura? Although we already resolved that “a person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,” one may still say that since he violated a prohibition with regard to two of the three, which are the majority, his intention with regard to the third was likewise to cause it to take effect -

The side for saying that with regard to the third his intention was to profane it is:

Or perhaps,

it may nevertheless be said that

here too, “

wherever there is a permitted option, he does not perform a prohibited act.”

And that last one,

the last non-sacred animal -

is for profanation,

and he does not violate a prohibition with regard to it.

d.

And

Rav Ashi continues to ask:

If you are to say,

if we resolve the previous question by saying that

here too, since the man has not yet been established as one who commits prohibitions,

that person who consecrated them has not yet committed three prohibitions and has not been established as a transgressor, it is therefore applicable to say of him, “

He does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,”

and he caused two to take effect while profaning the third -

Therefore,

Rav Ashi asked:

In a case in which he certainly violated three prohibitions and has an established status as a transgressor, does he also establish this status with regard to the fourth, intending to violate a prohibition and cause it to take effect, or not? And what are the circumstances?

There were before him four consecrated animals, one of them blemished, and four unblemished non-sacred animals ,

and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is

the status of that person who consecrated them and of those animals? Did three of them take on temura, while the fourth was profaned in place of the blemished animal, or did all four take on temura?

The side for saying that all four took on temura is:

Here, certainly, since the man has been established as one who commits prohibitions,

and he has already violated three prohibitions -

he is liable to four

sets of lashes -

The side for saying that only three took on temura and the fourth was profaned is:

Or perhaps,

it may be said that

even though the man has been established

as one who commits prohibitions,

nevertheless, “

a person does not abandon the permitted option and perform a prohibited act,”

and this last one,

the fourth, the last one,

is for profanation,

his intention being to profane it.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

The questions remain unresolved.

Another wording

Abaye asked

a.

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them blemished, and two unblemished non-sacred animals, and he said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is:

did he violate two acts of causing temura to take effect, or one act of taking effect, while the other is an act of profanation?

The side for saying that he violated two acts of causing temura to take effect is:

Do we say that since “an unblemished animal in place of an unblemished animal”,

his intention

is to cause to take effect -

an unblemished animal

of consecrated property

in place of a blemished animal also is to cause to take effect -

The side for saying that he violated only one act of causing temura to take effect is:

Or perhaps, indeed,

indeed,

“an unblemished animal in place of an unblemished animal”

is his intention

to cause to take effect,

because

it is fit,

the unblemished consecrated animal being fit for sacrifice, as explained above, that this certainly expresses taking effect.

But an unblemished animal

of non-sacred property

in place of a blemished animal

of consecrated property—his intention

is to profane,

because

a blemished animal is not fit

for sacrifice, and profanation applies to it.

b. And Abaye continues to ask:

If you are to say,

if we resolve the previous question by saying that both are intended to take effect, because

here, since

if he indeed wanted to cause one to take effect and profane the other,

he would have had to say,

he should have stated explicitly, “

One is to take effect and one is for profanation,”

but he did not say so; therefore:

both take effect,

both take on temura,

since both are alike,

and they are both equal, since he did not specify with his mouth. Moreover, his placing his hands on both non-sacred animals also proves that his intention was to cause both to take effect,

for if,

if his intention was

to profane - -

he should have placed his hand on that blemished animal

of consecrated property. Both from the consecration expressed by his mouth and from the placing of his hands, it can be demonstrated that his intention was to cause both to take effect -

Rather,

there is another question to be raised:

There were before him two consecrated animals,

one of them unblemished

and one of them blemished, and three unblemished non-sacred animals,

and he placed his hand on one of the non-sacred animals,

and said, “

Behold, these are in place of those” -

what is

the status of those three animals, and how many prohibitions did he violate? Now, with regard to two of them, he certainly causes them to take effect in place of the one unblemished consecrated animal , and the question concerns the third: was his intention to cause it to take effect or to profane it?

The consideration for saying that he also intended to consecrate the third animal through the blemished consecrated animal is:

Do we say that, since these two animals serve to effect consecration,

just as with the first two his intention is to effect consecration through

that unblemished non-sacred animal,

so too with the third,

through the blemished consecrated animal, he likewise intends to effect consecration,

and therefore he placed his hand on the unconsecrated animals —

The consideration for saying that he intends to desacralize the third animal is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

that blemished consecrated animal

is the one he intends

to desacralize.

And if we say this, the following difficulty arises: Why, then, did he place his hand on the unconsecrated animals? We can answer:

And the fact that he did not place his hand on it,

on the unblemished consecrated animal

that was alongside the blemished animal,

standing together with the blemished consecrated animal—and certainly he should have placed his hand on the blemished animal itself [rather, at the very least he should have placed his hand on the unblemished consecrated animal, and this would have been effective as though he had placed his hand on the blemished animal itself]—why, then, did he place his hand on the unconsecrated animals? We can answer:

Because he maintains

that this person maintains that

the majority is preferable: It is preferable to place his hand on the three unconsecrated animals, which are the majority, rather than on the two; nevertheless, his intention is to desacralize the third animal.

: It is preferable to place his hand on the three unconsecrated animals, which are the majority, rather than on the two. Nevertheless, his intention is to render the consecrated animal unconsecrated.

c.

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If you say

that we resolve the previous dilemma in accordance with the first side, namely, that

since he needed to place his hand on an unblemished consecrated animal,

if his intention had been to desacralize the animal, he should have placed his hand on the blemished consecrated animal, or at least on the unblemished consecrated animal, and from the fact that he placed his hand on the unconsecrated animals it is evident that he

intends to effect consecration—

another dilemma must be raised, as follows:

He arranged them [

in order]

one opposite the other.

Another version: He arranged them one opposite the other.

For example: There were before him three consecrated animals, two of them unblemished and one blemished, and three unblemished unconsecrated animals. He arranged them in two rows, with the consecrated animals in one row and the unconsecrated animals in the other, each animal opposite another, and he placed his hand on the unconsecrated animals and said, “These in place of these.” The dilemma concerns the third unconsecrated animal, which stood opposite the blemished consecrated animal: Is his intention to effect consecration through it, or to desacralize it?

The consideration for saying that his intention is to desacralize it is:

Do we say

that although he placed his hand on the unconsecrated animals [and if you say that the previous dilemma was resolved, namely, that placing one’s hands determines definitively that his intention is to effect consecration], nevertheless,

since he arranged one opposite the other,

he deliberately arranged them one opposite the other, and his actions demonstrate that his intention is

to effect consecration through an unblemished animal in place of an unblemished animal, and to desacralize a blemished animal opposite an unblemished animal—

and the consideration for saying that he also intends to effect consecration through the third animal is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that there is no proof from the manner in which he arranged them; rather,

we follow his statement,

as the matter depends primarily on his speech and on his placing his hand, and since he placed his hand on the unconsecrated animals and said “in place of,” his intention is to effect consecration through all of them.

Another version:

The consideration for saying that he also intends to effect consecration through the third animal is:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

we follow the majority,

and since he certainly intends to effect consecration through two of them, he also intends to effect consecration through the third [and, furthermore, he did place his hand on the unconsecrated animals].

And we conclude:

Let them remain unresolved!

The dilemmas were not resolved.

We learned in our Mishna:

And if the consecrated animal was blemished, it becomes non-sacred, and one must establish its monetary value for it.

Meaning: The unconsecrated animal must be worth as much as the consecrated animal in whose place it is being used for desacralization, so that the consecrated property will not be wronged.

The Gemara discusses the case in which it is not of equal value: Must he return to the consecrated property the amount of the “overcharge,” and does the consecrated property have the status of a voided sale? This will be explained below. This discussion does not apply specifically to a consecrated animal, but to every desacralization of consecrated property.

Three measures were stated with regard to overcharging . a. If the overcharge was “less than one-sixth,” by any amount—for example, if he sold an item worth sixty dinars for fifty dinars and one peruta—he is not required to return anything, because it is customary for everyone to waive any amount less than one-sixth. b. If the overcharge was “more than one-sixth,” by any amount—for example, if he sold an item worth fifty dinars for sixty dinars and one peruta—the sale is void, and he returns the item to him, while the seller returns the money to him. c. If the overcharge was exactly one-sixth, neither less nor more—the sale stands, and the one who overcharged must return the amount of the overcharge [“the one-sixth”] to the one who was overcharged.

We learned in the Mishna [Bava Metzia 56a]: “These are matters to which the laws of overcharging do not apply … and consecrated property.” That is, if a treasurer sells consecrated property, or sells his offering that became blemished, and overcharges the purchaser by one-sixth of its value, the purchaser cannot demand the return of the amount of the overcharge. Likewise, one who overcharges consecrated property—for example, if he redeems something from consecrated property for a price differing by one-sixth—does not return the overcharge to the consecrated property [the view of Rav Ḥisda will be explained below]. And the Sages derived this [there, 56b] from what the Torah says in the passage concerning overcharging [Leviticus 25]: “Do not wrong one another,” and we expound: “one another,” but not consecrated property.

The Gemara discusses whether, even if the laws of overcharging do not apply to consecrated property, the law of a voided sale nevertheless applies when one overcharges consecrated property by more than one-sixth .

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

What the Mishna says,

“it becomes non-sacred,”

even if it is not equal in value to the consecrated property—is

by Torah law,

as is the law concerning consecrated animals that become non-sacred through redemption . Whereas what the Mishna says,

“and one must establish its monetary value for it,”

to return to the consecrated property the amount by which the consecrated property is worth more than ordinary property—is

by rabbinic law,

and by Torah law he need not return it.

And Reish Lakish said: Even

what the Mishna says,

“one must establish its monetary value for it,”

is

by Torah law.

The statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish do not explicitly indicate whether they disagree concerning an overcharge of exactly one-sixth or concerning the voiding of a sale involving more than one-sixth. The Gemara therefore discusses this:

With regard to what are we dealing?

If you say that it concerns overcharging [an overcharge], and that they disagree over whether by Torah law one must return to the consecrated property the one-sixth constituting the overcharge—this is difficult to say: Would

Reish Lakish say in this case,

“Even one must establish its monetary value for it by Torah law”?

But we learned

is it not explicitly taught in a Mishna [there]:

“These are matters to which the laws of overcharging do not apply: slaves, documents, and land” [

as is explained there],

“and consecrated property.”

As explained, consecrated property is excluded by Torah law from the laws of overcharging. Would Reish Lakish disagree with the Mishna?

Rather, it is the voiding [

concerning voiding]

of a sale

involving more than one-sixth that the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish concern—

That is, if we interpret our Mishna as referring to the voiding of a sale, it can be explained as follows: If he redeems consecrated property by more than one-sixth—for example, an animal worth sixty dinars and one peruta for fifty—one must establish its monetary value for it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree about this. Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that this requirement is rabbinic, because he holds that “voiding a sale” is included in the laws of overcharging; and just as the laws of overcharging do not apply to consecrated property by Torah law, so too the voiding of a sale does not apply. Reish Lakish, however, maintains that it is not included in the laws of overcharging, but is instead a “mistaken transaction”; and just as it is not the normal manner of a sale, so too it is not a valid desacralization, and by Torah law the property did not become desacralized —

If we explain it in this manner, there is a difficulty: Would

Rabbi Yoḥanan say in this case,

“one must establish its monetary value for it—

by rabbinic law”?