Temurah 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught [in other books: Rav Ḥananya]: he taught a beraita

in order to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi

.

The Torah says in the passage concerning shelamim offerings [Leviticus 3]: “If it is a sheep, he shall bring it.” And we derive that what is stated

“if it is a sheep”

whose meaning is “offspring,” teaches us:

the first offspring is sacrificed, but the second offspring is not sacrificed,

as will be explained. And what is stated, “he shall bring it,” teaches us:

it is sacrificed, but the offspring of all other consecrated animals is not sacrificed,

as will be explained.

The first part of the beraita is merely an asmakhta, since we concluded that even according to Rabbi Eliezer it is only a rabbinic decree. Now, who is of the opinion, according to everyone, that the first offspring of a shelamim offering is sacrificed? It is certainly the Sages, and not Rabbi Eliezer. Nevertheless, they maintain that the second offspring is not sacrificed. This proves Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s statement.

We learned in the latter part of the beraita: “It is sacrificed, but the offspring of all other consecrated animals is not sacrificed.”

And the Gemara discusses this:

The offspring of what

—of which offering—is the beraita excluding from sacrifice?

If it is the offspring of an olah or an asham

—it is obvious!

They are males and cannot have offspring,

since they do not give birth?

If it is the offspring of a ḥatat

—there is likewise no need to exclude it, since

it is a received halakhic tradition that it goes to death,

and is it not obvious that it is not sacrificed? The Gemara answers:

Ravina said: To include

—that is, to bring it under the exclusion of the Torah—

the offspring of an animal counted as the tithe

: an offspring of an animal tithe offering. If the tenth animal that emerged was female, became consecrated with the sanctity of animal tithe, and gave birth, that offspring is not sacrificed. Rather, it must wait until it develops a blemish, and its owners eat it according to the law of an animal tithe that is eaten by its owners when blemished [this will be explained below, 21a, in the Mishna]. This is the case referred to by the beraita when it says: “The offspring of all other consecrated animals is not sacrificed.”

The Gemara asks:

Why do I need a verse for the offspring of an animal tithe?

Is it not derived by the repetition of the word

“transfer”

“transfer”

from the firstborn?

As explained above [5b], animal tithe and firstborn are derived from one another by a gezera shava. With regard to a firstborn, its offspring is not sacrificed, since it is male and has no offspring. Why, then, is the verse “it” needed to exclude the offspring of an animal tithe?

The Gemara concludes:

It was necessary

to teach this from a verse, for if it were derived from the firstborn,

it might enter your mind

that the offspring of an animal tithe is sacrificed, since in this matter it cannot be compared to a firstborn, because

one does not derive a possible case from an impossible case

. A firstborn cannot have offspring, since it is only male; therefore it is impossible to derive from it the law of animal tithe, which “can” have offspring. Therefore,

it teaches us

that there is a special exclusion concerning the offspring of an animal tithe, teaching us that it is not sacrificed.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappayas testified concerning the offspring of a shelamim offering that it is sacrificed as a shelamim. Rabbi Pappayas said: I testify that we had a cow belonging to a shelamim offering, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as a shelamim on the festival.

The Gemara assumes that “the festival” mentioned in the Mishna is Sukkot, which is called simply “the festival” in the language of the Mishna. Therefore it asks: Why did they not sacrifice it on Atzeret, meaning Shavuot? According to Rava, is there not a positive mitzva to bring all vowed offerings on the first pilgrimage festival after their consecration, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “And you shall come there, and you shall bring there”?

And according to Rava, who said

[Rosh HaShana 6a]:

With regard to consecrated offerings, once one pilgrimage festival has passed over them,

each and every day one violates a positive mitzva,

the question is difficult:

He should have eaten it beginning on Shavuot!

He should have brought it and eaten it on the festival of Shavuot, since surely he would not yet have violated the positive mitzva!

Granted, there is a possible explanation as to why they did not sacrifice it during Passover itself: the offspring may not have been eight days old until after Passover, and it was therefore “lacking time.” But on Shavuot, why did they not sacrifice it? Does this testimony not contradict Rava? The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Zevid said in the name of Rava

: They did not bring it on Shavuot because it was not fit for sacrifice,

for example, it was

the offspring

ill on Shavuot

, and an ill animal is unfit for sacrifice, as explained below [28b]. On Sukkot it was fit, because it had recovered from its illness.

Rav Ashi said: What festival, too, is the one taught

—on which festival did they sacrifice it, according to Rabbi Pappayas’s testimony?

The festival of Shavuot,

which immediately follows Passover.

The Gemara explains:

And the other one

—Rav Zevid did not wish to interpret the Mishna in this way, because

whenever “Passover” is taught, “Atzeret” is taught

: It is the tanna’s practice in the Mishna to call the festival of Shavuot “Atzeret” whenever it is mentioned together with “Passover” [as opposed to when it is mentioned together with “the festival of matzot,” in which case it is called “the festival”]. Since in our Mishna it is mentioned together with “Passover,” the tanna should have called it “Atzeret.” When he called it “the festival,” he certainly meant the festival of Sukkot.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

whether they did not bring it on Shavuot because it was ill, as Rav Zevid said, or whether they brought it on Shavuot, as Rav Ashi said,

what is his testimony?

What is Rabbi Pappayas’s testimony? Granted, if they brought it on Sukkot and it was not ill, Rabbi Pappayas came to teach the novel point that one does not violate the positive mitzva during the first pilgrimage festival, contrary to Rava’s opinion. But if he did not come to teach that one does not violate the positive mitzva during the first pilgrimage festival, what is his testimony?

The Gemara answers: They actually sacrificed it on Sukkot because it had been ill on Shavuot, in accordance with Rava’s opinion. The essential novel point of his testimony is

to exclude the

opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The offspring of a shelamim offering may not be sacrificed as a shelamim,

and concerning this

he testifies

—Rabbi Pappayas testified

that it is sacrificed.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the law of the offspring and substitute of a thanksgiving offering.

The offspring of a thanksgiving offering and its substitute, its offspring

and the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the world—

these have the status of a thanksgiving offering,

and are sacrificed according to the law of a thanksgiving offering and eaten for one day and one night like it,

except that they do not require bread,

the loaves of the thanksgiving offering. The reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters

—from where do we know that the offspring and substitute of a thanksgiving offering do not require the loaves of a thanksgiving offering?

As the Sages taught

: The Torah says in the passage concerning a thanksgiving offering [Leviticus 7]: “If he sacrifices it for a thanksgiving offering, he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering unleavened loaves…” What does the phrase

“If he sacrifices it for a thanksgiving offering”

add, since it has already stated, “He shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering”?

And we expound:

From where do we know that one who consecrated

a thanksgiving offering, and it was lost, and he consecrated another in its place, and then the first was found, so that both stand ready for sacrifice,

to sacrifice—

from where do we know that whichever one he wishes he may sacrifice, with its loaves?

The verse says, “He shall sacrifice a thanksgiving offering” [meaning: even if it had not said yakrivennu—“he shall sacrifice it”—but only yakriv—“he shall sacrifice”], indicating that he may choose whichever thanksgiving offering he wishes, since both were consecrated as thanksgiving offerings. A thanksgiving offering is a voluntary offering.

The beraita continues:

Could it be that the second one

requires loaves?

The verse therefore says

“he shall sacrifice it”

[with the vav and nun suffix], and we expound:

one

brings loaves with it,

but not two

[the version of the Gemara there:

after the verse included

it for sacrifice, it

excluded

it from requiring loaves].

The beraita now expounds the inclusion of both animals for sacrifice—that is, that he is obligated to sacrifice both.

From where do we know to include offspring, substitutes, and replacements,

for example, the thanksgiving offering was lost, another was consecrated in its place, and the first was then found, so that both stand before him?

The verse says

“if it is for a thanksgiving offering,”

and from the word “if” we include both for sacrifice.

Could it be that all of them

require loaves?

The verse therefore says

“with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering,”

and we expound:

A thanksgiving offering requires loaves, but its offspring, its substitute, and its replacement do not require loaves,

that is: if one has already been sacrificed, the second does not require loaves.

Mishna:

The substitute of an olah

, for example, one exchanged a male animal for an olah;

the offspring of its substitute—

for example, one exchanged a female animal for an olah and the substitute gave birth to a male;

and the offspring of the offspring of its substitute

of the substitute,

until the end of the world—

these have the status of an olah, and require flaying and dissection, and are entirely burned upon the altar,

like an olah in all its laws.

One who consecrates a female animal as an olah

, although an olah may only be male,

and it gives birth to a male—

that offspring may not be sacrificed as an olah. Rather,

it grazes until it develops a blemish, it is sold, and with its proceeds he brings an olah.

Rabbi Elazar says: It itself is sacrificed as an olah

, as will be explained in the Gemara.

The Gemara discusses whether the Sages [the first tanna] disagree with Rabbi Elazar also in the first clause, concerning the offspring of the substitute of an olah. Seemingly, there is no difference between the first and latter clauses, since in the first clause as well, the offspring is the offspring of a female that is unfit to be an olah, and there is no logical basis for distinguishing between them. Yet the plain meaning of the Mishna indicates that in the first clause the Sages agree that the offspring itself is sacrificed.

Gemara:

What is different in the first clause,

concerning the offspring of the substitute of an olah,

that the Sages do not disagree,

and what is different in the latter clause, that they do disagree?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said

: Indeed, the first clause, which states that the offspring of a substitute is itself sacrificed as an olah,

is stated as a dispute

: It is Rabbi Elazar’s opinion, while the Sages disagree and maintain that it grazes until it develops a blemish. There is no reason to distinguish between the first and latter clauses.

And Rava said: You may even say

that the first clause was taught according to the opinion of

the Sages,

and there is a distinction between the offspring of the substitute of an olah and one who consecrates a female animal and it gives birth:

The Sages disagree

with Rabbi Elazar

only with regard to one who consecrates a female as an olah, since its mother is not fit to be sacrificed

and grazes until it develops a blemish; therefore its offspring is also not sacrificed and grazes until it develops a blemish.

But with regard to a substitute, its mother too is fit to be sacrificed,

meaning that the original consecrated animal from which the substitutes and offspring derive was male, and it itself is sacrificed. Therefore,

even the Sages agree

that the offspring itself is sacrificed.

The Gemara asks:

But did Rabbi Elazar say

“It itself is sacrificed as an olah”—

And we raise a contradiction

: This matter is contradicted by the following Mishna:

The substitute of an asham, the offspring of substitutes,

and their offspring, the offspring of their offspring, until the end of the world—

they graze until they develop blemishes, are sold, and their proceeds go toward a freewill offering,

to the collection boxes [resembling chests] that were in the Temple for this purpose. With the money placed in them, communal freewill olot were brought. This is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai: “Whatever in the case of a ḥatat is put to death—in the case of an asham, it grazes.” A substitute for a ḥatat is put to death. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Eliezer

says: They must be put to death.

This is the law of a substitute for a ḥatat and the offspring of a ḥatat, because he holds that the law of an asham is identical to that of a ḥatat in every respect.

Rabbi Elazar

said: He should bring a burnt offering with their value

the animal that was substituted and the offspring themselves, and their value should not go into the collection boxes for the communal donation, because he holds that the surplus of an asham goes to the donation of an individual. [The distinction between a communal burnt offering and an individual burnt offering will be explained there].

His wording is precise:

“with their value”—

not

indeed, he sells them and purchases a burnt offering with the proceeds, whereas

“itself”,

the offspring of the substitute—

does not

serve as a burnt offering—

It follows that Rabbi Elazar holds that, since its mother is not fit to be offered as a burnt offering , since no female animal is offered as a burnt offering, the offspring likewise is not offered as a burnt offering. Furthermore, even without the reason that its mother is female and therefore unfit for a burnt offering, in any event she is unfit to be offered because she is a substitute for an asham, which goes to pasture; therefore, her offspring likewise is not offered—

If so, it is difficult: Why does he hold that the offspring of a female burnt offering is itself offered as a burnt offering, when its mother is unfit for a burnt offering?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda said:

That is indeed so. Rabbi Elazar, according to his own position, also holds that the offspring of a substitute for an asham is itself offered as a burnt offering, just as he holds with regard to one who designates a female animal as a burnt offering. However,

Rabbi Elazar stated this in accordance with the position of the Rabbis,

arguing there with the Sages, who hold that the surplus of an asham goes to the communal donation. This is what he said:

As for me, I hold

I, according to my position, hold

that even the offspring

of a substitute for an asham

is likewise offered as a burnt offering,

even though its mother is unfit; but

as for you,

according to your position, since you disagree with me,

you say

and hold

“they shall not be offered”

the offspring themselves as burnt offerings, but their value goes toward a burnt offering—

at least concede to me

agree with me at least

that the surplus

of an asham

goes to the donation of an individual

and not to the communal donation.

And

regarding this claim,

the Sages said to him:

the Sages:

the surplus

of an asham

goes to the communal donation.

Rava said:

The truth is that Rabbi Elazar holds that the offspring of a substitute for an asham is not itself offered, but is sold and its value goes toward an individual’s burnt offering. Nevertheless, this ruling does not contradict his position that when one designates a female animal as a burnt offering and it gives birth, the offspring itself is offered as a burnt offering, since there is a distinction between the cases:

Rabbi Elazar said “itself is offered as a burnt offering” only

with regard to one who designates a female animal as a burnt offering, since

at any rate—

there is

a “designation of a burnt offering”

upon its mother.

For he consecrated her as a burnt offering, and although she is female and unfit for a burnt offering, nevertheless, we do find a “designation of a burnt offering” upon a female animal in the case of a bird burnt offering [as explained above, 17b, that the requirements of unblemished status and male sex do not apply to birds]. Therefore, her rejection is not so absolute, and sanctity of the body took effect upon her .

For he designated her as an olah offering, and although she is female and unfit to be an olah offering, nevertheless, we find the designation “olah offering” applied to a female in the case of a bird olah offering [as explained above, on 17b, that the requirements of an unblemished animal and a male do not apply to bird offerings]. Therefore, she is not rejected to such a great extent, and intrinsic sanctity takes effect upon her .

Furthermore, she is destined to be sold, and when she is sold, her value will go toward a burnt offering; it follows that she bears a “designation of a burnt offering” .