Temurah 18b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Hiyya taught [other books: Rav Hanania],

a beraita,

to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

The Torah said in the section of peace-offerings [Leviticus 3]: “If it is a sheep, he brings it.” And we expound: What is stated

“if it is a sheep” —

whose meaning is “offspring” — teaches us:

the first offspring is sacrificed, but the second offspring is not sacrificed,

as will be explained. And what is stated, “he brings it,” comes to teach us:

it is sacrificed, but the offspring of all the sacred animals is not sacrificed,

as will be explained.

And the first clause of the beraita is merely an asmachta, for we concluded that even according to Rabbi Eliezer it is only a rabbinic decree. Now, who is the one who holds, according to everyone, that the first offspring of a peace-offering is sacrificed? Certainly it is the Sages, and not Rabbi Eliezer. Nevertheless, they hold that the second offspring is not sacrificed. And this proves Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s statement.

We learned in the latter clause of the beraita: It is sacrificed, but the offspring of all the sacred animals is not sacrificed.

And the Gemara discusses:

the offspring of what

sacrifice does the beraita exclude as not being sacrificed?

If it is the offspring of a burnt-offering or a guilt-offering—

it is obvious! Are they not

males, and not creatures capable of producing offspring,

since they do not give birth?

If it is the offspring of a sin-offering—

there is likewise no need to exclude it, for

it is an established halakha received by tradition that it goes to death,

and is it not obvious that it is not sacrificed? And we answer:

Ravina said: To include

[that is, to bring it to the point that the Torah excludes it]

the offspring of the tithed animal,

of an animal-tithe offering: If a female emerged as the tenth and was sanctified with the sanctity of an animal tithe, and it gave birth—the offspring itself is not sacrificed. Rather, it waits until it develops a blemish, and its owners eat it according to the law of an animal tithe that is eaten by its owners when blemished [as will be explained below, 21a, in the Mishna]. And it is concerning this that the beraita stated: “But the offspring of all the sacred animals is not sacrificed.”

And we raise a difficulty:

The offspring of the tithed animal—why do I need a verse!?

Does not the expression

“passing”

“passing”

derive it from the firstborn,

as explained [above, 5b], that the animal tithe and the firstborn are learned from one another by a gezerah shavah? And regarding a firstborn, its offspring is not sacrificed, since it is a male and has no offspring; why, then, is a verse, “it,” needed to exclude the offspring of an animal tithe?

And we conclude:

It is necessary

to teach it from a verse, for if it were only because of the derivation from the firstborn,

it might enter your mind

that the offspring of an animal tithe is indeed sacrificed, since with regard to this law it cannot be compared to a firstborn, because

one does not derive what is possible from what is impossible.

For it is impossible for a firstborn to have offspring, since it is only a male, and therefore it is not possible to learn from it concerning an animal tithe, for which it is “possible” to have offspring. Therefore,

it teaches us

a special exclusion concerning the offspring of an animal tithe, teaching us that it is not sacrificed.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papaiys testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it is sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papaiys said: I testify that we had a cow of peace-offerings, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as peace-offerings on the festival.

And the Gemara assumes that the “festival” mentioned in the Mishna is the festival of Sukkot, which is called simply “the festival” in the language of the Mishna. Therefore we ask: Why did they not sacrifice it on Shavuot, which is the Festival of Weeks? After all, according to Rava, there is a positive mitzva to bring all vows on the first pilgrimage festival after its sanctification, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “And you shall come there, and you shall bring there” .

And according to Rava, who said

[Rosh Hashana 6a]:

Sacred offerings, once one pilgrimage festival has passed over them—

each and every day he violates a positive commandment,

the difficulty is:

He had to eat it from Shavuot!

He should have brought it and eaten it on the Festival of Weeks, since certainly he had not violated the positive commandment!

And granted that they did not sacrifice it on Passover itself, it is possible that the offspring had not reached eight days of age until after the Passover festival, and it was “lacking time.” But on Shavuot, why did they not sacrifice it? Is this testimony a difficulty against Rava? And we answer:

Rabbi Zevid said in the name of Rava:

They did not bring it on Shavuot because it was not fit for sacrifice,

for example, it was

the offspring

ill on Shavuot,

and an ill animal is unfit for sacrifice, as explained below [28b], while on Sukkot it was fit, having recovered from its illness.

Rav Ashi said: What is “the festival” as it is also taught,

on which festival did they sacrifice it according to Rabbi Papaiys’s testimony?

The Festival of Weeks,

which is adjacent to Passover.

And the Gemara explains:

But the other one,

whereas Rav Zevid did not wish to interpret it this way, because

wherever “Passover” is taught, “Shavuot” is taught,

for the tanna’s practice in the Mishna is to call the Festival of Weeks “Shavuot” wherever it is mentioned together with “Passover” [to exclude a place where it is mentioned together with “the festival of unleavened bread”—there it is called “the festival”]. And since in our Mishna it is mentioned together with “Passover,” the tanna should have called it “Shavuot”; and when he called it “the festival,” certainly his intention was the festival of Sukkot.

And we ask:

If so,

if they did not bring it on Shavuot because it was ill, according to Rav Zevid, or if they brought it on Shavuot, according to Rav Ashi,

what is his testimony,

what is Rabbi Papaiys’s testimony? Granted, if they brought it on the festival of Sukkot and it was not ill, Rabbi Papaiys came to teach us a novelty: that one does not violate the positive commandment on the first pilgrimage festival, contrary to Rava’s view. But if he did not come to innovate that one does not violate the “positive commandment” on the first pilgrimage festival, what is his testimony?

And we answer: In fact, they sacrificed it on the festival of Sukkot because it had been ill on Shavuot, and this is according to Rava; and the principal novelty of his statement is:

to exclude from

the words of

Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The offspring of a peace-offering shall not be sacrificed as a peace-offering,

and concerning this

he testifies,

Rabbi Papaiys testified

that it is sacrificed.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the law of the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering and its substitution.

The offspring of a thanksgiving-offering and its substitution, its offspring

the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the entire world —

these are like a thanksgiving-offering,

and they are sacrificed according to the law of a thanksgiving-offering, and eaten for one day and one night like it,

provided that they do not require bread,

the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering. The reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses:

From where are these matters,

from where is it known that the offspring and the substitution of a thanksgiving-offering do not require the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering?

For the Sages taught:

The Torah said in the section of the thanksgiving-offering [Leviticus 7]: “If he brings it for a thanksgiving-offering, he shall bring with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering loaves of unleavened bread...” What does

“if he brings it for a thanksgiving-offering” say,

when it already says, “he shall bring with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering” ?

And we expound:

From where do we know that one who set aside

a thanksgiving-offering, and it was lost, and he set aside another in its place, and the first was found, and both of them are standing

for sacrifice—

from where do we know that whichever one he wishes he may sacrifice, together with its bread?

The verse states: “He shall bring a thanksgiving-offering” [that is, even if it had been written not “he shall bring it” but “he shall bring”], implying any thanksgiving-offering that he wishes, and both of them were sanctified as thanksgiving-offerings. And a thanksgiving-offering is a voluntary offering.

And the beraita continues:

Could it be that the second one

requires bread?

The verse states

“he shall bring it”

[with the vav-nun pronominal suffix], and we expound:

one

brings bread with it,

but not two

[the reading of the Gemara there:

after Scripture included

it for sacrifice, it

excluded

it from requiring bread].

Now the beraita expounds that both of them are included for sacrifice, meaning that he is obligated to sacrifice both of them.

From where do we include the offspring of substitutions and replacements,

for example: the thanksgiving-offering was lost, another was set aside in its place, and the first was found, and both of them stand before him?

The verse states

“if he brings it for a thanksgiving-offering,”

and from “if” we include both of them for sacrifice.

Could it be that all of them

require bread?

The verse states

“with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering,”

and we expound:

A thanksgiving-offering requires bread, but its offspring, its substitution, and its replacement do not require bread,

that is

Mishna:

The substitution of a burnt-offering,

for example, he substituted a male for a burnt-offering;

the offspring of its substitution ,

for example, he substituted a female for a burnt-offering and the substituted animal gave birth to a male;

the offspring of the offspring of its substitution

of the substituted animal,

until the end of the entire world —

these are like a burnt-offering and require flaying and dismemberment, and are entirely burned on the altar-fire,

like a burnt-offering in all its laws .

One who sets aside a female for a burnt-offering,

and a burnt-offering is only a male ,

and it gives birth to a male—

that offspring shall not be sacrificed as a burnt-offering. Rather,

it grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and he brings a burnt-offering with its value.

Rabbi Elazar says: It itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering,

as will be explained in the Gemara.

The Gemara discusses whether the Sages [the first tanna] disagree with Rabbi Elazar also in the first clause, concerning the offspring of the substitution of a burnt-offering. Seemingly, there is no difference between the first clause and the latter clause, since in the first clause as well, the offspring is the offspring of a female that is not fit for a burnt-offering, and logically there is no basis for distinguishing between them. Yet from the plain meaning of the Mishna it appears that in the first clause the Sages agree that it itself is sacrificed.

Gemara:

What is different in the first clause,

concerning the offspring of the substitution of a burnt-offering,

that the Sages do not disagree,

and what is different in the latter clause, that they disagree?

Rabba bar bar Hana said:

Indeed! The first clause as well, which states that the offspring of a substitution is itself sacrificed as a burnt-offering,

is stated as a dispute,

and it is Rabbi Elazar’s statement, while the Sages disagree and hold that it grazes until it develops a blemish. There is no reason to distinguish between the first clause and the latter clause.

And Rava said: You may even say

that the first clause was taught even according to

the Sages,

and there is a distinction between the offspring of the substitution of a burnt-offering and one who sets aside a female and it gives birth:

The Sages disagree

with Rabbi Elazar

only concerning one who sets aside a female for a burnt-offering, for its mother is not sacrificed,

and it grazes until it develops a blemish; therefore the offspring likewise is not sacrificed and grazes until it develops a blemish.

But concerning a substitution, its mother too is sacrificed,

that is, the original consecrated animal from whose power the substitutions and offspring come is a male, and it itself is sacrificed; therefore

even the Sages agree

that the offspring itself is sacrificed .

And we ask:

Did Rabbi Elazar say

“It itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering” —

And we juxtapose,

this is contradicted by the following Mishna:

The substitution of a guilt-offering, the offspring of substitutions ,

and the offspring of their offspring until the end of the entire world—

they graze until they develop blemishes, and they are sold, and their values fall to the communal voluntary offering ,

to the collection boxes [similar to containers] that were in the Temple and designated for this purpose; with the money placed in them, communal voluntary burnt-offerings are sacrificed. And it is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai: “Whatever in the case of a sin-offering dies—in the case of a guilt-offering grazes.” And the substitution of a sin-offering dies. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Eliezer

says: They shall die.

This is according to the law of the substitution of a sin-offering and the offspring of a sin-offering, because he holds that the law of a guilt-offering is like the law of a sin-offering in every respect .

Rabbi Elazar

said: He shall bring an olah with their value

the owner of the temura and the offspring itself, and their value shall not fall into the collection boxes for the public donation, because he holds that the surplus of an asham goes to the individual donation. [And there the difference between a public olah and an individual olah will be explained].

And his words are precise:

“With their value”—

no;

indeed, he shall sell them and purchase an olah with their proceeds, whereas

“itself”,

the offspring of the temura—

not

shall it be brought as an olah—

It is proven that Rabbi Elazar holds that since its mother is not fit to be brought as an olah , since a female is not brought as an olah, the offspring also is not brought as an olah. And furthermore, even without the reason that its mother is a female and is not fit for an olah, in any event it is not fit for offering, since it is the temura of an asham, which goes to pasture—therefore, its offspring also is not brought—

If so, it is difficult: Why does he hold that the offspring of a female olah is itself brought as an olah, since its mother is not fit for an olah?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda said:

It is indeed so. Rabbi Elazar, according to his own position, holds also concerning the offspring of the temura of an asham that it itself shall be brought as an olah, just as he holds concerning one who designates a female for an olah; rather,

Rabbi Elazar said this to them according to the position of the Sages,

arguing there with the Sages who hold that the surplus of an asham goes to the public donation. And these are his words:

As for me, I hold

I, according to my position, hold

that even the offspring

of the temura of an asham

also is brought as an olah,

even though its mother is not fit; but

as for you,

according to your position, since you disagree with me,

that you say

and hold

“they shall not be brought”

the offspring themselves as an olah, but their value shall fall to an olah—

at least concede to me

at least agree with me

that the surplus

of an asham

goes to an individual donation

and not to a public donation.

And

concerning this argument of his,

they said to him

the Sages:

The surplus

of an asham

goes to a public donation.

Rava said:

The truth is that Rabbi Elazar holds that the offspring of the temura of an asham is not itself brought, and it shall be sold, and its proceeds shall fall to an individual olah. Nevertheless, this law does not contradict what he holds—that one who designates a female for an olah and it gives birth, the offspring itself shall be brought as an olah—since there is a distinction between the cases under discussion:

Rabbi Elazar said “itself shall be brought as an olah” only this far

“itself shall be brought as an olah”

only concerning one who designates a female for an olah, for

in any event—

there is

“the designation of an olah”

upon its mother.

For he consecrated it for the designation of an olah, and even though it is a female and is not fit for an olah, nevertheless, we do find “the designation of an olah” upon a female in the bird olah [as explained above, 17b, that there is no requirement of being unblemished and male in birds]; therefore, its rejection is not such a great rejection, and kedushat ha-guf descended upon it .

And furthermore, it is destined for sale, and when it is sold, its proceeds will fall to an olah; it follows that it has upon it “the designation of an olah” .