Temurah 18a — the Talmud in English

If

it is the substitute

of a guilt-offering,

this is difficult: is it not

known to us

as a halakha given to Moses at Sinai

that it proceeds to grazing, since

we hold as a halakha given to Moses at Sinai:

“Whatever in the sin-offering dies, in the guilt-offering grazes”?

Why was it necessary to exclude these from “only”?

If so, the offspring and substitute of which offering were excluded from being sacrificed?

And we answer:

Actually, it is the offspring

or the substitute of

a sin-offering.

And your difficulty—that we know from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai that they die—is not a difficulty! For

the halakha was learned, that they are for death. And

if

the verse

“Only your consecrated animals” came

to exclude them from being sacrificed,

so that they should not sacrifice them.

The Gemara is astonished at this answer:

But

behold,

these two matters

depend on one another!

That is,

since they proceed to death,

they are automatically not sacrificed!

And the difficulty returns: why was “only” necessary to exclude them from being sacrificed? They go to death, and it is obvious that they are not sacrificed.

And we answer: Indeed, the offspring of a sin-offering and the substitute of a sin-offering did not require Scripture to exclude them.

Rather, the halakha is for a sin-offering,

and they are not sacrificed since they go to death.

And

if

the verse came to exclude

the substitute

of a guilt-offering,

and to teach us that it is not sacrificed.

And we object:

But

the substitute of a guilt-offering

also—the halakha was learned! Since

behold,

we said

[we said]:

“Whatever in the sin-offering dies—

in the guilt-offering grazes,”

and one of them is the substitute of a sin-offering; and since it grazes, it certainly is not sacrificed. Why was it necessary to exclude it from “only”?

And we conclude:

Rather,

from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai we know that the offspring of a sin-offering and the substitute of a sin-offering are not sacrificed but die, and likewise that the substitute of a guilt-offering grazes. But

the verse is needed

to teach us

that if he transgresses and sacrifices

for the sake of a guilt-offering or for the sake of a sin-offering,

he stands under

a positive commandment,

he has transgressed a positive commandment, and it is “a prohibition derived from a positive commandment.”

And this is the exposition: “And you shall make your burnt-offerings”—this is the burnt-offering. And “the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out, and you shall eat the flesh”—this is the peace-offering. In both of these, their offspring and their substitutes were included, and one is obligated to bring them and sacrifice them. One who sacrifices them fulfills a positive commandment. And the exclusion “only” comes to exclude the other offerings, namely, the sin-offering and the guilt-offering, so that one who sacrifices their offspring or substitutes transgresses the prohibition of a “positive commandment.”

And the Gemara continues to explain the beraita.

Rabbi Akiva says: It is not necessary.

Behold, it says

“It is a guilt-offering”—

it is sacrificed, but its substitute is not sacrificed.

And we object:

Why do I need a verse

to exclude the substitute of a guilt-offering?

But the halakha was learned

that it grazes, and consequently it is not sacrificed? And we answer:

Indeed so.

A verse is not needed to say that its substitute is not sacrificed.

Rather, why do I need the verse?—

It is needed to

derive from it

as Rav Huna [taught].

For Rav Huna said: A guilt-offering that

was disqualified from being sacrificed because its owner achieved atonement through another offering, or because of other matters that disqualify it,

and was detached,

and its owners detached themselves from it and cast it

to grazing,

until a blemish occurs in it,

and slaughtered it

in the Temple before a blemish occurred in it, not for the sake of a guilt-offering, but

without specification—

it is valid as a burnt-offering .

The explanation is that, even though the halakha given to Moses at Sinai is that whatever in the sin-offering dies, in the guilt-offering grazes, the halakha came only to say that he should detach it and hand it over for grazing. But once he detached it for grazing, since in any event its value will go toward an olah, it is again valid—even it itself—as an olah, because once it has been detached, it no longer bears the designation of a guilt-offering.

And let us infer:

“Detached”—

yes,

it is valid as an olah; but

“not detached”—

no.

And even though it is no longer needed as a guilt-offering, since its owner has already achieved atonement through another guilt-offering, and in any event its value will ultimately go toward an olah, nevertheless, since he did not detach it, it is not valid as an olah, and if he slaughtered it without specification, it is entirely invalid.

What is the reason?

Because it is stated

“it,”

and we derive:

“It shall remain as it is,”

and it is still a guilt-offering; and a guilt-offering that is unfit to be sacrificed is therefore invalid, itself.

Thus, two beraitot disagree, using two expositions, concerning the teaching that the offspring of a peace-offering is sacrificed as a peace-offering. One derives it from “whether male or female,” and the other from “You shall carry and come.” And the Gemara discusses why each tanna did not expound the other exposition.

And according to this tanna,

of the second beraita,

who derives it from these verses

from “You shall carry and come,” there is a difficulty:

let it emerge for him —

behold, he can derive it

from

“male and female”?

And we answer:

That verse

is needed

to derive another exposition from it,

for the offspring of blemished animals and for the substitute of blemished animals

of peace-offerings, and to teach us that they are sacrificed as peace-offerings, as explained.

And we object:

Let all of them emerge from this verse.

Behold, it is possible to derive from “male and female” both the offspring and substitute of peace-offerings, which are sacrificed as peace-offerings, and the offspring and substitutes of blemished animals from “whether,” as the tanna of that other beraita indeed expounded?

And we answer: The exposition from

“whether”

does not suggest itself to him,

and it is not superfluous for an exposition, since this is simply the language of the Torah. But the other tanna holds that “whether” is superfluous for an exposition.

And now the Gemara discusses that tanna, who derives it from “whether”: why does he not derive it from “You shall carry and come”?

And according to this tanna, who derives it

who teaches that the offspring and substitute of a peace-offering are sacrificed as peace-offerings

from

“male”

and

“female,”

this statement that the Torah said

“You shall carry and come,”

what does he do with them,

for which exposition does he expound them?

And we answer: he does not expound it concerning offspring and substitutes, but concerning the consecrated animals themselves: the Torah warned one to “carry and bring them”

even from their grazing,

even if they are grazing in pasture. If the time has come to make the pilgrimage, he should not say, “I do not wish to trouble myself to search for them in the meadow and lead them; I will wait and bring them another time.” Rather, “You shall carry and come” immediately when you go up for the pilgrimage.

Another wording: even from their threshing-floor.

[A threshing implement, a large board perforated with holes and with pegs fixed in it, which they place on the grain, and the animal steps on it and threshes with it.] That is, even if the animal that you wish to consecrate is threshing the grain, if you are prepared to go up for the pilgrimage, do not say, “Since it is threshing, I will wait until afterward.” Rather, “You shall carry and come” to the place that the Lord will choose.

Mishna:

We learned in the previous Mishna that the offspring of a peace-offering is sacrificed as a peace-offering. In our Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that it is not sacrificed; rather, he confines it in an enclosure, and it dies.

And although according to the Torah it is sacrificed, and no halakha given to Moses at Sinai concerning confining it in an enclosure was transmitted except in the case of a sin-offering, nevertheless, the Sages decreed death for it; and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of a peace-offering shall not be sacrificed as a peace-offering.

And the Sages say: It shall be sacrificed.

Rabbi Shimon said: They did not disagree

the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer

concerning the offspring of the offspring of a peace-offering and concerning the offspring of the substitute

that they should not be sacrificed.

And this will be explained in the Gemara.

Over what did they disagree?

Over the first offspring,

for Rabbi

Eliezer says it shall not be sacrificed, and the Sages say it shall be sacrificed.

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappais testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering

that they had thus received from their teachers,

that it should be sacrificed as a peace-offering,

not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

Rabbi Pappais said:

It is not only that I received this from my teachers, but

I testify

in actual practice

that we had a cow of peace-offering sacrifices, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the festival.

Gemara:

The Gemara clarifies the reason of Rabbi Eliezer. At first, the Gemara considers that according to Torah law it is not offered, and brings a scriptural exposition for this.

Rabbi Ami said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer that

the offspring of a peace-offering is not offered as a peace-offering?

The verse says

in the section of peace-offerings [Leviticus 3]:

“And if his sacrifice is a peace-offering”,

and we expound:

“If”

[with a tsere ]—

but not the offspring.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami:

But if that is so,

if we expound in this way, then what the Torah said in the section of the thanksgiving-offering [there, chapter 7],

“If he offers it for a thanksgiving-offering,”

would it also be so that

we expound

that

“if”

[with a tsere]—

but not the offspring?!

And if you would say,

and if you would say:

It is also so!

Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer also disputes the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering, and holds that according to Torah law it is not offered!

It is not possible to say so, because

and it was taught,

for we learned in a beraita concerning a thanksgiving-offering:

its offspring, its substitute, and its replacement,

for example, the thanksgiving-offering was lost and he designated another in its place, and the first was found, and both of them stand to be offered—from where is it known that they are offered according to the law of a thanksgiving-offering?

The verse says

“if for a thanksgiving-offering”,

and we expound: “if,”

in any event—

all forms of the thanksgiving-offering may be offered.

And Rabbi Eliezer did not dispute this regarding a thanksgiving-offering , even though “if” is also written concerning it. And we conclude: Rather, Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: This is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer: a decree ,

if the offspring of peace-offerings were to have a remedy by being offered, the Sages were concerned

lest

he come to leave the mother until she gives birth and

raise from them,

from the offspring,

flocks upon flocks,

and come to transgress the prohibition of shearing and labor .

Therefore, the Sages instituted that he place them in an enclosure and withhold water and food from them. But regarding a thanksgiving-offering they did not decree, because it is not as common as peace-offerings. We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: They did not dispute concerning the offspring of the offspring of peace-offerings and concerning the offspring of the offspring of a substitute, that they are not offered. Concerning what did they dispute? Concerning the offspring. The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s words. His words may be interpreted in two ways, as will be explained. It was raised as a question before them, they were uncertain in the beit-midrash: How did he teach it, how did Rabbi Shimon teach it?

, and thereby come to violate the prohibition against shearing them or using them for labor.

Therefore, the Sages instituted that he place them in an enclosure and withhold water and food from them. But in the case of a thanksgiving-offering, they did not issue such a decree, because it is not as common as a peace-offering.

Did he intend to say:

They did not dispute

Rabbi Shimon said: They did not disagree concerning the offspring of the offspring of peace-offerings or concerning the offspring of the offspring of a substitute, that they may not be sacrificed. Concerning what did they disagree? Concerning the offspring.

concerning the offspring of the offspring

that they are not offered, but rather,

even Rabbi Eliezer concedes to the Sages, since

they are offered,

because

the generations have become forgotten to them ,

the generations,

the matter has already been forgotten in the offspring of the offspring of peace-offerings, whose mothers’ mothers were peace-offerings; therefore, there is no reason to decree lest others see that they offer them as peace-offerings and learn from this to raise flocks upon flocks for the sake of the offspring:

that they may not be sacrificed; rather,

even Rabbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages, since they

Or perhaps

this is how Rabbi Shimon’s words are interpreted:

They did not dispute

the Sages with Rabbi Eliezer concerning the offspring of the offspring

that they are offered, but rather,

they concede to Rabbi Eliezer that they are not offered, since he raises from them a second generation, and his actions show that he leaves it until he can raise from it flocks upon flocks. According to this interpretation, what he said, “that they are not offered,” is the conclusion of his words; that is to say, certainly they are not offered. And we resolve it:

Rabba said: It is reasonable,

according to the first side, that

they did not dispute that they are not offered, but rather

they are indeed

offered.

What is the reason?

Up to here Rabbi Eliezer disputed with them,

the Rabbis, only concerning the offspring, but the offspring of the offspring is

merely an incidental occurrence

[a case]

in general,

and it is not common to leave it for so long. And automatically

the matter will be forgotten, and the Sages did not decree, as explained.

What is the reason?

Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with them, the Sages, only concerning the offspring; however, the offspring of the offspring is

an incidental occurrence

[a happenstance]

And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

according to the second side, they did not dispute that they are offered— but rather, they are not offered. What is the reason? Up to here the Sages disputed with Rabbi Eliezer only concerning the offspring, but the offspring of the offspring— from his actions ,

that he left it until the second generation,

his intention is recognizable, that he seeks to raise

offspring

for himself.

Therefore, the offspring of the offspring are not offered even according to the view of the Sages, and he places them in an enclosure to die, lest he come to transgress the prohibition of shearing and labor, as explained.

The Sages disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer only concerning the offspring; however, in the case of the offspring of the offspring,

from his actions

that he delayed the animal until the second generation,

his intention is evident, that he wants to raise

offspring

from it.

Therefore, the offspring of the offspring may not be sacrificed even according to the Sages, and he places them in an enclosure to die, lest he come to violate the prohibition against shearing them or using them for labor, as explained.