Temurah 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

If

it is the substitute

of an asham,

this too is difficult. Is it not

known to us

by a halakha given to Moses at Sinai

that it goes to grazing,

as we maintain, by a halakha given to Moses at Sinai: “

Whatever in the case of a sin offering dies, in the case of an asham grazes”?

Why, then, was it necessary to exclude these from “only”?

If so, the offspring and substitute of which offering were excluded from being sacrificed?

And we answer:

Actually, it is the offspring

or the substitute of

a sin offering.

As for your objection—that we know from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai that they die—this is not a difficulty, because

the halakha was transmitted as a law that they must die. And

if

the verse

“Only your sacred offerings” had come

to exclude them from being sacrificed,

it would teach that they must not sacrifice them.

The Gemara is astonished at this answer:

But

is it not that

one depends on the other

!

That is,

since they go to die,

they are automatically not sacrificed!

The question therefore returns: Why was “only” needed to exclude them from being sacrificed? They go to die, and it is obvious that they are not sacrificed.

And we answer: Indeed, the offspring of a sin offering and the substitute of a sin offering do not require the verse to exclude them.

Rather, the halakha concerning a sin offering

establishes that they are not sacrificed, since they go to die.

And

if

the verse had come to exclude

the substitute

of an asham,

and teach us that it is not sacrificed—

We challenge this:

But

the substitute of an asham

also has a halakhic ruling transmitted!

For

we said [

we stated ] “

Whatever in the case of a sin offering dies—

in the case of an asham it grazes,” and one of these is the substitute of a sin offering. Since it grazes, it certainly is not sacrificed; why, then, was it necessary to exclude it by means of “only”?

and one of them is the substitute of a sin-offering; and since it grazes, it certainly is not sacrificed. Why was it necessary to exclude it from “only”?

And we conclude:

Rather, we know from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai that the offspring of a sin offering and the substitute of a sin offering are not sacrificed but die, and that the substitute of an asham grazes.

But

the verse is needed

to teach us

that if one transgresses and sacrifices

as an asham or as a sin offering,

he fulfills “

a positive commandment”: he has transgressed a positive commandment, and this is a “negative commandment derived from a positive commandment.”

a positive commandment”: he has transgressed a positive commandment, which is a prohibition expressed through the terms of a positive commandment.

And this is the exposition: “And you shall perform your burnt offerings”—this refers to a burnt offering. And “You shall pour out the blood of your sacrifices, and you shall eat the meat”—this refers to a peace offering. In both of these, their offspring and substitutes are included, and one is obligated to bring them and sacrifice them. One who sacrifices them fulfills a positive commandment. The exclusion “only” comes to exclude the other offerings, namely a sin offering and an asham, so that one who sacrifices their offspring or substitutes transgresses the prohibition of a positive commandment.

And the Gemara continues to explain the baraita.

Rabbi Akiva says: There is no need.

It says

“It is an asham”—

it is sacrificed, but its substitute is not sacrificed.

We challenge this:

Why do I need a verse

to exclude the substitute of an asham?

But it is known by halakha

that it grazes, and consequently it is not sacrificed? We answer:

Indeed, it is so.

There is no need for a verse to state that its substitute is not sacrificed.

Rather, what do I need the verse for?

It is needed to

derive from it

the teaching of Rav Huna.

For Rav Huna said: An asham that

became disqualified for sacrifice because its owner obtained atonement through another offering, or because of other factors that disqualify it,

and was transferred,

and its owner detached it from its former status and cast it

to grazing,

until it develops a blemish,

and they slaughtered it

in the Temple before it developed a blemish, not for the purpose of an asham, but

without specifying—

it is valid as a burnt offering.

Explanation: Although the halakha given to Moses at Sinai states that whatever in the case of a sin offering dies, in the case of an asham grazes, the halakha only requires that it be detached from its former status and handed over for grazing. Once it has been transferred to grazing, since in any event its monetary value will go toward a burnt offering, the animal itself is again valid as a burnt offering, because once it has been transferred, it no longer bears the designation of an asham.

And we infer:

If it was transferred—

yes,

it is valid as a burnt offering; but

if it was not transferred—

no. Although there is no longer any need for it as an asham, since its owner has already achieved atonement through another asham, and in any event its monetary value will ultimately go toward a burnt offering, nevertheless, because it was not transferred, it is not valid as a burnt offering; and if one slaughtered it without specifying, it is entirely invalid.

Even though it is no longer needed as a guilt-offering, since its owner has already achieved atonement through another guilt-offering, and in either case its proceeds will ultimately be used for a burnt-offering, nevertheless, because it was not detached, it is not valid as a burnt-offering. If it was slaughtered without a specific intention, it is entirely invalid.

What is the reason?

Because it is stated

“it,”

and we expound:

It shall remain as it is.

It is still an asham, and an asham that is not fit for sacrifice; therefore, it is invalid as it stands.

Thus, two baraitot disagree, employing two different expositions to teach that the offspring of a peace offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. One derives this from “whether male or female,” and the other from “You shall carry them and come.” The Gemara discusses why each tanna did not expound the other teaching.

And according to this tanna,

of the second baraita,

who derives it from these verses,

from “You shall carry them and come,” there is a difficulty:

let him derive it

for he could teach it

from “

male and female”?

We answer:

That verse

is needed

to derive another teaching from it, namely

for the offspring of blemished animals and for the substitutes of blemished animals

of peace offerings, and to teach us that they are sacrificed as peace offerings, as explained.

We challenge this:

Let him derive all of them from this verse. For it is possible to derive both that the offspring and substitute of a peace offering are sacrificed as peace offerings from “male and female,” and that the offspring and substitutes of blemished animals are included by “if,” just as the tanna of the other baraita expounded it?

It is possible to derive both that the offspring and substitution of peace-offerings are offered as peace-offerings from “male and female,” and that the offspring and substitutions of animals with physical defects are included from “whether,” as the tan­ny of the other beraita in fact expounds it.

We answer: The exposition from

“if”

does not appear to him,

and “if” is not superfluous for an exposition, since this is simply the Torah’s wording. The other tanna, however, holds that “if” is superfluous and is available for an exposition.

The Gemara now discusses that other tanna, who expounds “if”: Why does he not expound “You shall carry them and come”?

And according to this tanna, who derives it

that the offspring and substitute of a peace offering are sacrificed as peace offerings

from “

male”

and “

female,” what does he do with

what the Torah stated, “

You shall carry them and come”?

What does he do with them,

and for which exposition does he expound them?

We answer: He does not expound it with regard to offspring and substitutes, but with regard to the sacred offerings themselves. The Torah warned one to “carry and bring them” from

even their grazing places.

Even if they are grazing in pasture, when the time comes to make the pilgrimage, one may not say, “I do not want to trouble myself to search for them in the meadow and lead them along; I will wait and bring them another time.” Rather, “You shall carry them and come”—immediately, when you go up for the pilgrimage.

Another version: Even from their threshing,

[a threshing implement: a large perforated board with pegs fixed in it, which is placed on the grain, while the animal walks over it and threshes with it]. That is, even if the animal that you wish to consecrate is threshing the grain, when you are prepared to go up for the pilgrimage, do not say, “Since it is threshing, I will wait until afterward”; rather, “You shall carry it and come” to the place that the Lord will choose.

Mishna:

We learned in the previous Mishna that the offspring of a peace offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. In our Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that it is not sacrificed; rather, it is placed in an enclosure and dies.

Although by Torah law it is sacrificed, and the halakha given to Moses at Sinai concerning confinement in an enclosure was transmitted only with regard to a sin offering, nevertheless, the Sages decreed that it should die; the Gemara will explain the reason.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of a peace offering shall not be sacrificed as a peace offering.

And the Sages say: It shall be sacrificed.

Rabbi Shimon said: The Sages and Rabbi Eliezer did not disagree

about

the offspring of the offspring of a peace offering, or about the offspring of the offspring of a substitute

that they are not to be sacrificed.

This will be explained in the Gemara.

Over what did they disagree?

Over the first offspring,

as Rabbi

Eliezer says that it shall not be sacrificed, while the Sages say that it shall be sacrificed.

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappai testified concerning the offspring of a peace offering,

that this is what they had received from their teachers:

that it is sacrificed as a peace offering,

contrary to the view of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Pappai said:

It is not merely that I received this from my teachers, but

I testify

as a practical halakhic ruling

that we had a cow belonging to a peace offering, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as a peace offering on Sukkot.

Gemara:

The Gemara clarifies the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer. Initially, the Gemara reasons that according to Torah law it may not be sacrificed, and it cites a scriptural exposition to that effect.

Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer,

that the offspring of a shelamim offering may not be sacrificed as a shelamim offering?

The verse states

in the passage concerning shelamim offerings [Leviticus 3]: “

And if his sacrifice is a sacrifice of peace-offerings,”

and we expound:

“And if”

[with a tzeirei ]—

but not its offspring.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: If that is so,

if we expound in this manner the verse that the Torah states in the passage concerning the thanksgiving-offering [Leviticus 7]: “

If he offers it for a thanksgiving-offering,”

so too

let us expound

that “

if”

[with a tzeirei] means

but not its offspring?!

And if you would say,

that you would say:

So too!

Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer also disagrees with regard to the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering, and holds that according to Torah law it may not be sacrificed!

It is not possible to say this, because

it was taught in a beraita,

as we learned in a beraita with regard to a thanksgiving-offering:

Its offspring, its substitute, and its replacement,

for example, if the thanksgiving-offering was lost and another animal was consecrated in its place, and the first one was then found, so that both are standing ready to be sacrificed—how do we know that they are sacrificed under the status of a thanksgiving-offering?

The verse states, “

If he offers it for a thanksgiving-offering,”

and we expound “if”:

in any event;

all forms of a thanksgiving-offering may be sacrificed.

And Rabbi Eliezer did not disagree with regard to a thanksgiving-offering , even though “if” is also written with regard to it.

And we conclude:

Rather, Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer: It is a rabbinic decree .

If the offspring of a shelamim offering were permitted a remedy by being sacrificed, the Sages were concerned

lest

he delay the mother until she gives birth and

raise from them

from the offspring

flocks upon flocks,

and come to violate the prohibition against shearing and working them .

Therefore, the Sages enacted that he place them in an enclosure and deprive them of water and food. But with regard to a thanksgiving-offering they did not decree this, because it is not as common as a shelamim offering.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon said: They did not disagree with regard to the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim offering or with regard to the offspring of the offspring of a substitute, that they may not be sacrificed. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the offspring.

Rabbi Shimon said: They did not disagree concerning the offspring of the offspring of peace-offerings or concerning the offspring of the offspring of a substitute, that they may not be sacrificed. Concerning what did they disagree? Concerning the offspring.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s statement. His words may be interpreted in two ways, as will be explained.

They raised a dilemma before them,

they were uncertain in the beit-midrash:

How did he teach it,

how did Rabbi Shimon phrase his statement?

Does he mean:

They did not disagree

with regard to the offspring of the offspring

that they may not be sacrificed; rather,

even Rabbi Eliezer concedes to the Sages, since they

may be sacrificed,

because

the generations have become forgotten

from them,

the fact that the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim offering had shelamim offerings as their maternal ancestors has already been forgotten. Therefore, there is no reason to issue a decree lest others see them being sacrificed as shelamim offerings and learn from this to raise flocks upon flocks for the sake of their offspring:

Or perhaps

this is how Rabbi Shimon’s statement is to be understood:

They did not disagree

with regard to the offspring of the offspring, the Sages with Rabbi Eliezer,

that they may be sacrificed; rather,

they agree with Rabbi Eliezer that they

may not be sacrificed,

since he raises a second generation from them, and his actions reveal that he delayed the mother in order to raise flocks upon flocks from her. According to this interpretation, when he said “that they may not be sacrificed,” this is the conclusion of his statement; that is, they certainly may not be sacrificed.

And we resolve the dilemma:

Rabba said: It is reasonable,

that the first interpretation is correct, that

they did not disagree that they may not be sacrificed; rather,

so

they may be sacrificed.

What is the reason?

Until this point, Rabbi Eliezer disagreed with them ,

the Sages, only with regard to the offspring; but the offspring of the offspring is merely an incidental occurrence

[a happenstance]

in general,

and it is not common to delay it for so long. And consequently , the matter will be forgotten, and the Sages did not issue a decree, as explained.

And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

The second interpretation is correct:

They did not disagree that they may be sacrificed—

rather, they may not be sacrificed.

What is the reason?

The Sages disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the offspring; but with regard to the offspring of the offspring—

from his actions ,

which show that he delayed the mother until a second generation,

his intention is evident, that he seeks to raise

offspring

from her.

Therefore, the offspring of the offspring may not be sacrificed even according to the Sages, and he places them in an enclosure to die, lest he come to violate the prohibition against shearing and working them, as explained.