Sukkah 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

It is only when it was taught

that he is exempt,

but

if he carried it out at a time

when

he had

not yet fulfilled the mitzva with it,

for then he should be exempt, since his preoccupation with a mitzva caused him to err and forget.

But

if he carried it out after he had already

fulfilled the mitzva with it—

he is liable

to bring a sin-offering, because he was no longer preoccupied with a mitzva.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How is it possible for him to carry it into the public domain while he had not yet fulfilled his obligation with it?

But

after all,

from the

time

he lifted it

the lulav in the private domain in order to take it and go with it into the public domain, he had already

fulfilled the mitzva with it!

For the mitzva is fulfilled through the very act of lifting the lulav from its place?!

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: It is referring to a case

such as when

he inverted

the lulav when he took it, so that he does not fulfill the mitzva with it until he takes it in the manner in which it grows, as explained above.

Rava said: Even if you say that he did not invert it, here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he carried it out

the lulav while it was placed

in a vessel,

and consequently he did not fulfill his obligation with it, because the vessel intervenes between his hand and the lulav.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How could Rava establish the case in this manner?

But Rava

himself

said: “Taking through another object is considered taking,”

and it is not necessary for him to hold the lulav directly in his hand?!

The Gemara answers:

This applies

when he fulfills the mitzva by taking it through another object, when he takes it in this manner

in a dignified way,

such as when he wraps a cloth around his hand for the beautification of the mitzva. But if he takes it through another object

in a degrading manner,

such as when he takes it while it is placed in a bowl, rather than in the customary manner of taking it,

he does not

fulfill the mitzva with it.

Rav Huna said: Rabbi Yosei was of the opinion

that one who, while preoccupied with a mitzva, mistakenly violated a prohibition is exempt from bringing a sin-offering:

a bird burnt-offering

whose entire body is to be burned upon the altar,

that was found among the wings,

among birds whose pinions had been nipped as those of sin-offerings, and for that reason he erred

and thought

that

the bird sin-offering was

the one eaten by the priests,

and he ate it—

he is exempt

from bringing a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, since eating the bird sin-offering is a mitzva, and one who errs while engaged in a mitzva is exempt from bringing an offering.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

What is Rav Huna teaching us

through this statement,

that one who errs while engaged in a mitzva is exempt

from bringing an offering according to Rabbi Yosei?

But

this is the same matter

stated in our Mishna: If one forgot and carried the lulav on Shabbat into the public domain, he is exempt from bringing an offering?!

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say: There,

in our Mishna,

it is where one who errs while engaged in a mitzva is exempt—

that is where he performed a mitzva,

for in the end he fulfilled the mitzva of lulav by taking it, and it follows that the mitzva was accomplished through this act of carrying it out.

But here,

in the case of the bird burnt-offering, which he thought was a sin-offering and ate,

he erred while engaged in a mitzva but did not perform a mitzva,

since eating it was prohibited.

You might say that he does not

become exempt from bringing an offering.

Therefore,

he teaches us

Rav Huna that even in this case Rabbi Yosei exempted him from bringing an offering, since ultimately this mishap occurred because his preoccupation with a mitzva led to it.

The objection is raised

against Rav Huna from what we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei says: One who slaughters

by mistake

the

daily offering

on Shabbat without having inspected it in accordance with halakha

to determine whether it has a defect or the like, [since this requirement of inspecting for defects is indispensable for establishing the offering’s fitness],

on Shabbat,

because he mistakenly thought that it had been inspected,

, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Since it was not accepted as an offering, it follows that he violated the prohibition against taking a life on Shabbat.

And he must

bring

another daily offering

that has been inspected for defects.

It is thus clear that although he erred while engaged in a mitzva, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Apparently, the reason is that the mitzva was not fulfilled; and it is proven that Rabbi Yosei said that one who errs while engaged in a mitzva is exempt only where the mitzva was ultimately performed, but not in the case of the burnt-offering that was found among the wings, contrary to Rav Huna?!

Rav Huna said to him:

My statement applies

except for that case.

That is, apart from this case.

And the reason is that

it was stated concerning it: Rav Shmuel bar Ḥatai said that Rav Hamnuna the Elder said that Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said that Rav Huna said that Rav

was speaking of a case

such as where they brought

a daily offering that had not been inspected

from the chamber

of lambs

that had not been inspected.

Consequently, he is not considered coerced because he was preoccupied with a mitzva, since this error is close to intentional negligence: He should have paid attention to which chamber he was bringing the offering from.

Mishna:

The lulav is not considered muktzeh on Shabbat that occurs during the festival, even though it is not a utensil and is not fit for any use, and it is permitted to move it even after its mitzva has been fulfilled [before the enactment of the Sages not to take it on Shabbat ].

Therefore,

a woman may receive

the lulav

from her son and from her husband,

after they have fulfilled their obligation with it,

and return it to the water on Shabbat,

so that it will not dry out.

The Mishna teaches another halakha:

Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat, one returns

the lulav to the place from which it was taken, but one may not add water, because it is prohibited to trouble oneself with the “repair of a utensil.”

Whereas

on a Festival, one may add

water, but one may not replace it with other water that is colder.

And during

the intermediate days of

the Festival,

one may also

replace

the water.

They further said:

A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav

by virtue of the mitzva of education.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A woman receives the lulav from her son or from her husband and returns it to the water on Shabbat.

And we raise a difficulty:

Isn’t it obvious

that she is permitted to take it from them? Since the lulav is taken on Shabbat, it is certainly not muktzeh?!

The Gemara explains:

Lest you say: Since a woman is not subject to the obligation

of the mitzva of lulav, as it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, the lulav becomes muktzeh with regard to her, because it is not fit for any use by her; therefore

you might say that she may not receive

the lulav from her husband.

It teaches us

our Mishna that since men are commanded to take it, it has the status of a utensil also with regard to women, and it is not muktzeh at all.

We learned in the Mishna:

A minor who knows how to wave the lulav

is obligated in the mitzva of lulav.

The Sages taught: A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav

by rabbinic law, by virtue of the mitzva of education.

A minor who knows how

to wrap himself

in a garment

, is obligated in tzitzit.

A minor who knows how

to safeguard tefillin

from treating them disrespectfully and from entering a lavatory with them—

his father buys him tefillin.

A minor who

knows how to speak: His father teaches him Torah and the recitation of the Shema.

The Torah

that his father first teaches him—

what is it?

Rav Hamnuna said:

He first teaches him the verse [Deuteronomy 33]:

“Moses commanded us the Torah, the inheritance of the congregation of Jacob.”

The recitation of the Shema

that his father first teaches him—

what

is it? The first verse

of the recitation of the Shema.

A minor

who knows how to safeguard his body

from ritual impurity:

pure food may be eaten on account of his body.

That is, one may eat the pure food that this minor touched with his body. But one may not eat pure food that he touched with his hands. For not every minor who knows how to safeguard his body from impurity knows how to safeguard the purity of his hands, since they do not know that the Sages decreed ordinary hands impure until they are washed. This means that the law of hands is more stringent than that of the rest of the body: with regard to hands, even if he does not know that he touched something impure, the Sages decreed them impure unless he knows with certainty that he safeguarded them. But with regard to the rest of his body, as long as it is not known that he touched something impure, there is no concern. Therefore, although a minor knows to take care not to touch pure food after touching impurity, he nevertheless does not know to take care not to touch it with hands that have not been explicitly safeguarded.

And if the minor also knows how

to safeguard

his

hands,

and washes his ordinary hands before touching pure food [even though he does not remember having touched anything impure],

pure food may be eaten on account of his hands.

A minor

who knows how to answer questions,

that is, who knows how to answer the question of whether he touched something impure: If there was a case of uncertain impurity

in the private domain,

and they asked the minor whether he had touched it and he answered, “I do not know,”

his uncertain status is impure.

But if the uncertainty was

in the public domain,

and they asked him whether he had touched it but he did not know how to answer,

his uncertain status is pure.

This halakha—that uncertain impurity in the private domain renders the person impure—is derived by means of a kal va-chomer from the sota, as explained in tractate Sota 28a. Since the sota’s location is the private domain, we learn that in every case of uncertain impurity, stringency applies only in the private domain.

A minor kohen

who knows how to spread his hands,

everyone knows that he has already matured and grown two pubic hairs, since a minor does not spread his hands in the Priestly Benediction; therefore

they apportion teruma to him

at the threshing floor.

Before this stage, they do not apportion teruma to him at the threshing floor, even if the person distributing it knows that this minor knows how to safeguard it. The reason is that not everyone recognizes him well enough to know that he safeguards the teruma. If they see that it is being given to him, this would be a degradation of the teruma, as they would assume that he does not safeguard it.