Sukkah 41b (מא:) — the Talmud in English

And bread, roasted grain, and fresh grain you shall not eat

until the very essence of this day,"

and we expound: "Until the very essence of this day

—until the middle of the day itself! And he holds that ‘until’ includes the stated time"—

that is, wherever they said “until” a particular time, that time itself is included in the matter. Therefore, when the Torah says, “until the very essence of this day,” it means that even that day is prohibited. It follows that the entire sixteenth day is prohibited by Torah law! However, when the Temple was standing, the offering of the omer permitted the new grain from the time of the offering onward. Rav Naḥman held that this was also the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, and that this was not a novel enactment that he instituted as a commemoration of the Temple.

And the Gemara challenges:

Did Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai indeed hold that

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai

agreed with Rabbi Yehuda, that the entire sixteenth day is prohibited by Torah law?

But

he

indeed

strongly disagreed with him!

As we learned in the Mishna: After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the entire day of the waving should be prohibited.

Rabbi Yehuda said to him

—the Gemara does not mean that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehuda debated with each other, since Rabbi Yoḥanan preceded Rabbi Yehuda by several generations. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda, in his own time, was referring in his statement to the position of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai:

Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan need to “institute” this enactment,

when it is prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until the very essence of this day”—

until the middle of the day itself!

And it is evident from his challenge that, in the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, by Torah law the new grain was permitted from sunrise, and the Torah did not prohibit the sixteenth day?!

The Gemara answers:

It was Rabbi Yehuda who erred

in understanding Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s statement.

He thought

that Rabbi Yoḥanan

was speaking of a rabbinic prohibition, but that is not so;

rather, he was speaking of a prohibition

by Torah law.

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how can you say that Rabbi Yoḥanan was speaking of a Torah prohibition,

when he said “instituted”?

The Gemara answers:

What

is the meaning of the expression

“instituted”

that is stated in the Mishna?

He expounded and instituted.

That is, since, when the Temple was standing, people ate from the new grain from midday onward, they thought that the sixteenth day was permitted for eating, except that, during the time of the Temple, one had to wait for the offering to be brought. Rabbi Yoḥanan then expounded that the entire sixteenth day is prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until the very essence of this day,” and “until” includes the stated time. Through this exposition he “instituted” the matter and restored the halakha to its proper status.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the procedure for taking the lulav in those times, when it was taken even on Shabbat during the festival.

On the first Festival day

of Sukkot

that occurred on Shabbat, everyone would bring

before Shabbat

his lulav to the synagogue,

because it is prohibited to carry it four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat.

The next day,

on Shabbat morning, they would

rise early and come; each person recognized his own and took it.

The reason they had to ensure that each person took specifically his own

was that the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first Festival day

of the festival

with another person’s lulav,

as it is stated: “And you shall take for yourselves,” excluding one that was borrowed, as explained above, at the beginning of this chapter, and below in the Gemara.

But

on

the other days of the festival,

when the law of “for yourselves” was not stated,

a person fulfills his obligation with another person’s lulav.

The Mishna cites another halakha:

Rabbi Yosei says: If the first Festival day of the festival occurred on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the lulav into the public domain, he is exempt, because he carried it for the sake of a mitzva.

That is, Rabbi Yosei held that one who errs while engaged in a mitzva, and inadvertently performs an act for which one who performed it intentionally would be liable to karet, is exempt from a sin-offering, because he was preoccupied with a mitzva and hastening to perform it, and as a result he erred and forgot.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains:

From where are these words

that a person does not fulfill his obligation on the first Festival day of the festival with another person’s lulav?

As the Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 23:40]:

“And you shall take,” meaning that the taking must be performed by each and every individual,

and they cannot all fulfill their obligations through one person’s taking.

“For yourselves”—from your own property, excluding

the lulav

that was borrowed or stolen.

That is, the Torah insisted that the lulav belong specifically to him.

From here the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first Festival day of the festival with another person’s lulav, unless he gave it to him as a gift.

And there was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were traveling on a ship, and there was only one lulav, belonging to Rabban Gamliel, who had purchased it for one thousand zuz.

Rabban Gamliel took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, and gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift.

And the Gemara discusses: Why do I need it to say "and returned it" to Rabban Gamaliel? What concern is it to us what Rabbi Akiva did with it after they had all fulfilled their obligations? And we explain: It teaches us something incidentally: that Rabban Gamaliel gave them the lulav as a gift on condition of return, and not forever; and it teaches us that this suffices for the lulav to be considered theirs with regard to the law of "for yourselves," except that they are obligated to fulfill the condition and return it ultimately to Rabban Gamaliel. And it teaches us that

Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, and gave it as a gift to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation

with it and returned it to Rabban Gamliel.

And the Gemara discusses:

The Gemara asks:

Why do I need it to say “and returned it”

to Rabban Gamliel? What concern is it to us what Rabbi Akiva did with it after they had all fulfilled their obligations?

And we explain:

It teaches us something incidentally.

Rabban Gamliel gave them the lulav as a gift on condition that it be returned, and not as an unconditional gift. It teaches us that this suffices for the lulav to be considered theirs with regard to the requirement of “for yourselves,” although they were obligated to fulfill the condition and ultimately return it to Rabban Gamliel. It also teaches us that

a gift given on condition that it be returned

is considered a gift.

As in the statement of Rava: “Here is this etrog for you on condition that you return it to me”; he took it and fulfilled his obligation with it.

Then, if he

returned it—

he fulfilled his obligation. But

if he

did not return it,

because the condition was not fulfilled—

he did not fulfill his obligation.

It is thus explained that a gift given on condition that it be returned is considered a gift with regard to “for yourselves.”

The Gemara further discusses:

Why do I need it to say that

Rabban Gamliel

had purchased it for one thousand zuz?

And we answer:

To inform you how beloved mitzvot were to them!

Mar bar Amemar said to Rav Ashi: My father

held the mitzva of lulav in extremely high regard, so that even while praying

he would pray while holding it—

he would pray with the lulav in his hand.

Meytivi

—the Gemara challenges him from what we learned in a beraita:

A person may not hold tefillin in his hand or a Torah scroll in his lap and pray,

because he is preoccupied with the thought that they might fall from his hand and be disgraced, and he cannot concentrate properly in his prayer.

Nor may he urinate while holding them,

out of respect.

Nor may he sleep while holding them, neither a permanent sleep nor a temporary sleep,

lest they fall from his hand while he sleeps.

And

regarding this

Shmuel said: A knife

which he fears might fall from his hand and injure him,

or a bowl

full of food, which he fears might spill,

or a loaf

which he fears might fall from his hand and become soiled,

or coins,

which he fears might scatter,

are all comparable to them.

He should not pray while holding them in his hand, lest they disturb his concentration.

If so, this is difficult: How did Amemar pray while holding the lulav? He certainly took care that it should not fall and become unfit, so how did its status differ from that of a knife and similar objects, which one does not hold in one’s hand during prayer lest one’s concentration be disturbed?!

The Gemara answers:

There,

with regard to a knife and similar objects,

they are not mitzvot,

since there is no mitzva in holding them—and even with regard to tefillin, there is no mitzva when one holds them in his hand, since the discussion is about holding them rather than wearing them properly.

And

therefore

he is preoccupied with them,

for safeguarding them is a burden and a strain for him, and he wants to be free of holding them.

But

here,

with regard to the lulav,

it is a mitzva,

and he is happy to exert himself in safeguarding it,

and he is not preoccupied with it.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: This was the practice of the people of Jerusalem: A person would leave his house with his lulav in his hand, go to the synagogue with his lulav in his hand, recite the Shema

and pray with his lulav in his hand.

But when he

read from the

Torah

scroll,

which he needed to roll and open,

and

when a kohen

raised his hands,

as he could not hold the lulav in his hand at that time,

he would place it on the ground,

and afterward take it up again.

When he

went to visit the sick or comfort mourners, he held his lulav in his hand.

But when he

entered the bet midrash,

where he could not hold the lulav in his hand, lest holding it distract him from his study, he would

send his lulav

home

in the hands of his son, in the hands of his servant, or in the hands of his agent.

What does this teach us

through this account?

To inform you how diligent they were in the mitzvot.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: If the first Festival day

of the festival occurred on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the lulav into the public domain, he is exempt because he carried it for the sake of a mitzva.

Abaye said: