Sukkah 41b — the Talmud in English

And bread, and parched grain, and fresh grain you shall not eat

until the very essence of this day,"

and we expound: "Until the very essence of this day"

— until the day itself! And he holds: ‘until,’ and including the endpoint—

that is, wherever they said "until" a particular time, that time too is included in the matter. Therefore, when the Torah said, "until the very essence of this day," it means that that day too is forbidden. It follows that the entire sixteenth day is forbidden by Torah law! Rather, when the Beit HaMikdash was standing, the offering of the Omer permitted it from the time of the offering onward. And Rav Naḥman held that this was also the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, and it was not a new enactment that he instituted as a commemoration of the Beit HaMikdash.

And we raise an objection:

Did

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai

hold like

Rabbi Yehuda, that the entire sixteenth day is forbidden by Torah law?

But [the meaning is:

and yet]

did he not explicitly disagree with him?

For we learned: After the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the entire day of the waving should be forbidden.

Rabbi Yehuda said to him [the Gemara does not mean that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehuda debated with one another, since Rabbi Yoḥanan preceded Rabbi Yehuda by several generations. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda in his time referred in his words to the position of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai]:

Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan need to "institute" this enactment?

Is it not forbidden by Torah law, as it is written: ‘Until the very essence of this day’—

until the day itself!

And it is proven from his objection that, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, by Torah law the new grain is permitted from when the eastern horizon was illuminated, and the Torah did not forbid the sixteenth day?!

The Gemara answers:

It is Rabbi Yehuda who erred

in understanding the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.

He thought

that Rabbi Yoḥanan

was saying

that it was rabbinic, but it is not so;

rather, the prohibition

he was stating was by Torah law.

The Gemara objects: Ultimately, how can you say that Rabbi Yoḥanan was speaking of a Torah prohibition,

when he said ‘instituted’?

The Gemara answers:

What

is the meaning of the expression

“instituted”

that is stated in the Mishna?

, He expounded and instituted.

That is, because when the Beit HaMikdash was standing people would eat from the new grain from midday onward, they thought that the sixteenth day was permitted for eating, except that during the time of the Beit HaMikdash one had to wait for the offering of the sacrifice. Rabbi Yoḥanan came and expounded that the entire sixteenth day is forbidden by Torah law, as it is written: "Until the very essence of this day"; and "until" includes the endpoint. Through this exposition he "instituted" and restored the law to its proper standing.

Mishna: Our Mishna explains how the taking of the lulav was performed in their time, when they would take it even on the Shabbat of the festival.

The first festival day of the festival

of Sukkot

that occurred on Shabbat, all the people would bring

from before Shabbat

their lulavim to the synagogue,

since it is forbidden to carry it four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat.

On the following day

, on the morning of Shabbat, they would

rise early and come; each and every one recognized his own and took it.

would rise early and come; each person recognized his own lulav and took it.

And the reason they had to be careful that each person take specifically his own

was because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first festival day

of the festival

with his fellow’s lulav,

as it is stated, "And you shall take for yourselves," excluding one that was borrowed, as explained above at the beginning of our chapter and below in the Gemara.

And

in

the other days of the festival,

when the law of "for yourselves" was not stated,

a person fulfills his obligation with his fellow’s lulav.

The Mishna brings an additional law:

Rabbi Yosei says: The first festival day of the festival that occurred on Shabbat, and one forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt, because he took it out with permission.

That is, Rabbi Yosei held that one who errs concerning a mitzva, and through inadvertence does something for which, had he done it intentionally, he would be liable to karet, is exempt from a sin-offering, since he was occupied with a mitzva and hastening to perform it, and as a result he erred and forgot. Gemara: And the Gemara explains:

From where are these words

that a person does not fulfill his obligation on the first festival day of the festival with his fellow’s lulav?

For the Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 23:40]:

"And you shall take," meaning that the taking shall be in the hand of each and every person,

and everyone cannot fulfill the obligation through the taking of one person.

"For yourselves," from your own property, excluding the

lulav

that was borrowed or stolen.

That is, the Torah was particular that the lulav be specifically his own.

From here the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first festival day of the festival with his fellow’s lulav, unless he gave it to him as a gift.

And there was an incident involving Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were traveling on a ship, and there was only one lulav, belonging to Rabban Gamaliel, which he had purchased for one thousand zuz.

Rabban Gamaliel took it and fulfilled the obligation with it, and gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift.

Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled the obligation with it, and gave it as a gift to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled the obligation with it, and gave it as a gift to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled the obligation with it

and returned it to Rabban Gamaliel.

And the Gemara discusses: Why do I need it to say "and returned it" to Rabban Gamaliel? What concern is it to us what Rabbi Akiva did with it after they had all fulfilled their obligations? And we explain: It teaches us something incidentally: that Rabban Gamaliel gave them the lulav as a gift on condition of return, and not forever; and it teaches us that this suffices for the lulav to be considered theirs with regard to the law of "for yourselves," except that they are obligated to fulfill the condition and return it ultimately to Rabban Gamaliel. And it teaches us that

Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, and gave it as a gift to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation

with it, and returned it to Rabban Gamaliel.

And the Gemara discusses:

a gift on condition of return—

is called a gift.

As in what Rava said: Here is this etrog for you on condition that you return it to me; he took it and fulfilled the obligation with it,

then, if he

returned it—

he fulfilled the obligation. But

if he

did not return it,

since the condition was not fulfilled—

he did not fulfill the obligation.

And it is explained that a gift on condition of return is called a gift with regard to "for yourselves."

The Gemara further discusses:

Why do I need it to say that Rabban Gamaliel

had purchased it

for one thousand zuz?

And we answer:

To inform you how beloved the mitzvot were to them!

Mar bar Amemar said to Rav Ashi: My father held the mitzva of lulav extremely dear, so that even during prayer

he would pray with it—

he would pray while holding the lulav.

purchased it for one thousand dinars?

The Gemara answers:

To show you how dear the commandments were to them!

Mar bar Amemar said to Rav Ashi: My father

held the commandment of the lulav in extremely high regard, so that even during prayer

he would pray while holding it—

The Gemara raises an objection [the Gemara objects to this from what we learned in a beraita]:

A person may not hold tefillin in his hand or a Torah scroll in his lap and pray, since he is preoccupied by the thought that perhaps they will fall from his hand and suffer disgrace, and he cannot concentrate properly in his prayer. Nor may he urinate with them, because of their honor. Nor may he sleep with them, neither a fixed sleep nor a temporary sleep, lest they fall from his hand during his sleep. And concerning this

Shmuel said: A knife

which he fears may fall from his hand and injure him,

and a bowl

full of cooked food, which he fears may spill,

and a loaf

which he fears may fall from his hand and become repulsive,

and coins

which he fears may scatter,

these are all like them.

He should not pray while holding them in his hand, so that his concentration will not be disturbed.

And if so, it is difficult: How did Amemar pray while the lulav was in his hand? Surely he was concerned that it might fall and become invalid, and in what way did his law differ from that of a knife and the like, which one does not hold in his hand during prayer lest his concentration be disturbed?

and a bowl

full of cooked food, because he is concerned that it might spill,

The Gemara answers:

There,

concerning a knife and the like,

they are not mitzvot,

for there is no mitzva in holding them [and even with tefillin there is no mitzva, since it is speaking of when he holds them in his hand and not when they are placed properly],

and

therefore

he is preoccupied with them, because guarding them is a burden and a load upon him, and he wishes to be rid of holding them. But here,

concerning the lulav,

they are a mitzva,

and he is glad to trouble himself with guarding it,

and he is not preoccupied with them.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: This was the custom of the people of Jerusalem: A person would leave his house with his lulav in his hand, go to the synagogue with his lulav in his hand, recite the Shema and pray with his lulav in his hand. But when he would read from the Torah scroll that he needed to roll it and open it, and likewise a kohen when he would raise his hands,

therefore he is

preoccupied with them,

because guarding them is a burden and an inconvenience, and he wants to be free of holding them.

But

here,

in the case of the lulav,

it is an object involved in a commandment,

and he is happy to take the trouble to guard it,

so he is not preoccupied with it.

since he could not hold the lulav in his hand at that time,

he would place it on the ground,

and afterward take it again.

read from the

Torah

scroll,

He would

go to visit the sick and console mourners, with his lulav in his hand.

But when he would

enter the beit midrash

—since he could not hold the lulav in his hand, lest his learning be disturbed because of holding it—he would

send his lulav

to his house

in the hand of his son, in the hand of his slave, or in the hand of his agent. What does it teach us through this account? To inform you how zealous they were in mitzvot. We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: The first festival day

of the festival that occurred on Shabbat, and one forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain, is exempt because he took it out with permission.

Abaye said:

where he could not hold the lulav in his hand lest holding it distract him from his learning, he would

send his lulav

to his house

with his son, his servant, or his agent.

What does this teach us

through this account?

To show you how diligent they were in performing the commandments.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: If the first Festival day

of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the lulav into the public domain, he is exempt because he carried it with permission.

Abaye said: