Sukkah 20a — the Talmud in English

And this is what he is saying:

the first tanna:

a large reed mat, if he made it for lying upon—

it is susceptible to impurity, and one may not cover with it.

That is to say,

the reason is that he made it for lying upon; but

if he made it

without specification, it is considered as one whom he made it

explicitly

for covering, and

he

may cover with it.

And all this applies specifically to a large mat.

But

a small one, if he made it for covering, one may cover with it.

That is to say,

the reason is that he made it

explicitly

for covering; but

if he made it

without specification, it is considered as one whom he made it for lying upon.

For an ordinary small mat is intended for lying upon,

and one may not cover with it.

And Rabbi Eliezer came to say: both a small one and a large one,

if he made it

without specification, it is fit for covering.

Abaye said

to Rava:

If so,

since Rabbi Eliezer came to say that the same distinction stated with regard to a large mat was also stated with regard to a small one, how do we learn:

Rabbi Eliezer says: both a small one and a large one!?

For this implies that the large one also has the law of the small one; and therefore

he should have needed to say: a large one and a small one

for Rabbi Eliezer to say!? And this would be the opposite: that the small one also has the law of the large one?!

And furthermore,

on the contrary, it is proven that

when they differ, they differ with regard to the large one. And Rabbi Eliezer is stating a stringency,

and not as you said, that Rabbi Eliezer came to be lenient and say that even a small mat is not invalid unless he explicitly made it for lying upon.

And the proof for this is from that

as it was taught,

for we learned in a beraita:

a large reed mat

that he made without specification,

one may cover with it.

Rabbi Eliezer says: if it is not susceptible to impurity,

such as when he made it explicitly for the purpose of covering,

one may cover with it,

but when made without specification, one may not cover with it.

It follows that Rabbi Eliezer did not come to be lenient with regard to a small mat, but rather to be stringent with regard to a large one, for even if he made it without specification, it is invalid.

Rather, Rav Pappa said,

this is the explanation of their dispute:

With regard to a small one—

everyone agrees that an unspecified one is for lying upon,

and therefore, if he did not explicitly designate it for covering, it is invalid.

When they differ,

the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer,

it is with regard to a large one.

The first tanna holds: an unspecified

mat

large one is for covering,

and it is unnecessary to make it explicitly for covering. And the contradiction between his statements from the beginning to the end is to be explained as we initially explained it: the beginning is referring to a large mat whose ordinary status is fit, and therefore it is invalid specifically if he made it for lying upon; and the end is referring to a small one, which is invalid when made without specification and is fit only if he made it explicitly for covering.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds: an unspecified large one too is for lying upon

and is intended for that purpose; therefore, “both a small one and a large one” is not fit until he makes it explicitly for covering.

And what does Rabbi Eliezer say at the end: “

one small one and one large one,

if he made it

for lying upon,

it is susceptible to impurity and one may not cover with it,”

that he says

at the end, implying that only if he made it for lying upon may one not cover with it, but when made without specification it is not susceptible to impurity?

This is what he is saying:

one small one and one large one,

their ordinary making is also for lying upon,

and one may not cover with it

until he makes

the mat explicitly

for

the purpose of

covering.

And this is why Rabbi Eliezer concluded his words and said: “For covering, one may cover with it and it is not susceptible to impurity”—that is, if he made it explicitly for covering, one may cover with it.

The Sages taught: a mat of shifa and gomi

[types of soft grasses]:

a large one, one may cover with it,

since its ordinary purpose is covering. But

a small one, one may not cover with it

since its ordinary purpose is lying upon. And there is no distinction between whether it was made through weaving, in which case it is smooth and convenient for lying, or whether he made it through plaiting, in which case it is thick and not smooth; since it is soft and he made it according to the dimensions of a person’s place of lying, he presumably made it for lying upon.

But a mat of

reeds and ḥulita

[reed stalks], which are hard and are not convenient for lying, there is a distinction regarding how that small mat was made: if it was

large

[with a shuruk beneath the letter dalet], meaning that it was made through plaiting, even though it is a small mat, its ordinary purpose is not lying upon, and it is not susceptible to impurity; therefore

one may cover with it.

But if it was

woven,

it is susceptible to impurity, because they were accustomed to weaving it only for the purpose of lying upon, so that it would be smooth and convenient; therefore

one may not cover with it.

Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yosei says in the name of his father: This one

Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yosei says in the name of his father:

This one

[a plaited mat of reeds or ḥulita],

and this one

[a woven mat],

one may cover with it,

because they never make a mat of reeds and ḥulita for lying upon, since they are hard.

And Rabbi Dosa likewise used to say in accordance with his words.

Ritba’s introduction: It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 15:9]: “And every vehicle upon which the one with the discharge rides shall become impure.” That is, anything fit for a place of lying, if he designated it for this or if its ordinary making is for sitting, even though they are simple wooden vessels, which generally do not become susceptible to impurity, nevertheless they become impure with the impurity of a place of lying. [And since they become impure with the impurity of a place of lying, the Sages learned by a kal va-chomer that they likewise become impure through a corpse, as explained in Shabbat 84a .] And if they are not fit for a place of lying, or if he explicitly designated them for another purpose, they do not become impure with the impurity of a place of lying. [However, if they have an interior and are fit to receive things within them, they become impure with the impurity of vessels, but not with that of a place of lying.]

We learned there

[in tractate Eduyot]:

All the ḥutzalot

[what they are will be explained below]

become impure through a corpse.

That is, ordinarily they are vessels, and if they touched a corpse they became a primary source of impurity. But they do not impart the impurity of a place of lying, since they are not made for lying upon—

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

And the Sages say:

even the ḥutzalot become impure with the impurity of a

place of lying,

because they are made for lying upon.

And the Gemara was astonished: Did they intend to say that

a place of lying—

yes,

but

impurity through a corpse—

no?!

[That is, that it becomes impure with the impurity of a place of lying but not with impurity through a corpse?!]

But

yet

we learned: everything that imparts the impurity of a place of lying imparts impurity through a corpse?!

[And the reason is that since he made them for lying upon, their law is like that of a vessel susceptible to impurity, even though simple wooden vessels generally do not become susceptible to impurity.]

The Gemara explains: Rather,

say:

And the Sages say,

even

they become impure with the impurity of a

place of lying.

What are the ḥutzalot?

Rav Avdimi bar Hamduri said: marzovli.

What are marzovli? Rabbi Abba said: mazbali

[shepherds’ packs], which is the practice of shepherds to place them beneath their heads and lie down.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says:

the meaning of ḥutzalot is

actual mats.

And Resh Lakish proceeded

with these words

according to his position—

according to his view elsewhere.

For Resh Lakish said: “I am a ransom for

[the sufferings that come upon me; may they be for atonement for]

Rabbi Hiyya and his sons.”

“For at first, when Torah was forgotten from Israel,

Ezra came up from Babylonia and established it. It was again

forgotten, Hillel the Babylonian came up and established it. It was again forgotten, Rabbi Hiyya and his sons came up,

and established it.”

And likewise

And so

[and thus]