Sukkah 19b — the Talmud in English

He said

he explains]:

Yes,

indeed, there is such a case !

Loosened mud

earth mixed with water, so soft that it can be poured from one vessel into another

proves

that it

combines to make up forty se'a,

to complete the measure of a ritual bath,

and

if

one who immerses in it

in a ritual bath made entirely of loosened mud

has not achieved immersion,

because it is not considered actual water.

Mishna:

One who makes his sukka in the form of a hut

a sukka used by hunters who lie in wait for birds, made in the sloping form of a beehive, with its roof and walls forming one unit—that is, he placed two walls of a material fit for roofing opposite one another, slanting diagonally and attached to one another at their tops, so that this sukka has no separate roof apart from its walls; rather, everything is one.

Or one who leaned it

the wall of his sukka

against a wall,

slanting the tops of the reeds diagonally, with their bases distant from the wall and their tops resting at an angle against the wall.

Rabbi Eliezer deems

this sukka

invalid because it has no roof,

as it is not discernible which part is its roof and which parts are its walls. Rabbi Eliezer held in accordance with the opinion that “the sloping sides of tents are not considered tents.” That is, the law of a tent applies only when it has a roof at least one handbreadth wide, and not when its top is sloped.

But the Sages deem it valid.

Their rationale will be explained below in the Gemara.

Gemara:

A tanna taught,

we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer,

who deems invalid in our Mishna a sukka that has no roof, concedes

that if one raised it

his sukka made in the form of a hut, placing it above on stakes

one handbreadth above the ground,

that it is valid, even though he did not close that handbreadth with a partition.

The reason is that we apply the principle of lavud from beneath the reeds to the ground in a straight line. Consequently, it is found that on the ground, before the slope begins, there is a wall one handbreadth high; therefore, the sloping partition is considered a roof and has the status of a tent, since it is discernible in the sukka which part is the roof and which parts are the walls. [The requirement that the wall be specifically one handbreadth high is because this is the measure of a tent everywhere.]

Or if he extended it

[удалил] стену своей сукки

one handbreadth away from the wall,

supporting the tops of the reeds on stakes, so that there is a handbreadth of air between the tops of the reeds and the wall,

even in this case Rabbi Eliezer concedes

that it is valid,

because we apply lavud from the tops of the reeds to the wall, and that air is rendered the roof of the sukka, while the rest of the hut is treated as a wall. It is therefore considered a tent and is valid.

The Gemara explains:

What is the rationale of the Sages

who deemed this sukka valid even though its roof is not discernible?

Because they hold that

the sloping sides of

tents are like

the roofs of tents.

That is, it is not necessary for the roof alone and the wall alone to be discernible; even when they are all one, it is considered a tent.

Abaye found

[нашел]

Rav Yosef sleeping

during the Festival of Sukkot

in

a bed over which there was spread

a bridal canopy,

which does not have a roof a handbreadth wide, but is made with a slope like a hut,

in a sukka.

Rav Yosef held that the canopy is not considered a tent to interpose between him and the sukka, since it does not have a roof a handbreadth wide.

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rav Yosef:

In accordance with whom

are you acting this way? Are you acting

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer

in our Mishna, who deems a sukka made in the form of a hut invalid because the sloping sides of tents are not considered tents, and likewise the canopy does not interpose between him and the sukka? If so, this is difficult for you: Have you

abandoned the Sages and acted in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer?

Do you abandon the words of the Sages, who hold that the sloping sides of tents are considered tents, and act according to Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion?!

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Indeed, our Mishna is as you say. But in the

beraita it is taught oppositely

[that is, the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer is stated in reverse], and it reads as follows:

Rabbi Eliezer deems it valid, and the Sages deem it invalid,

since they hold that the sloping sides of tents are not considered tents; and therefore I acted by sleeping beneath the canopy, in accordance with the words of the Sages. Abaye replied to him: Even if the beraita is as you say, have you

abandoned our Mishna

нашу

and acted in accordance with the beraita?

Do you abandon our Mishna, which states that according to the Sages the sloping sides of tents are considered tents, and act in accordance with the beraita?!

He said to him,

Rav Yosef

Our Mishna is the opinion of an individual

[it is one tanna who taught it that way]. But the Sages of his generation disagreed with him and taught: Rabbi Eliezer deems it valid, and the Sages deem it invalid, as we learned in the beraita.

And

as it was taught: One who makes his sukka in the form of a hut, or leans it against a wall, Rabbi Natan says: Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid

this sukka

because it has no roof

and the sloping sides of tents are not considered tents.

But the Sages deem it valid.

Mishna:

It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 16:13]: “You shall make the Festival of Sukkot for yourself for seven days, when you gather from your threshing floor and your winepress.” The Sages expounded: The verse is speaking of the refuse of the threshing floor and the winepress. That is, the verse teaches that the roofing of the sukka must be made only from materials resembling the “refuse of the threshing floor and the winepress,” which have two characteristics: first, they grow from the ground; and second, they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, vessels that are susceptible to ritual impurity are invalid for roofing.

And not only is a vessel made to contain food or drink invalid for roofing; a bed, which is used for lying, is also called a vessel with regard to susceptibility to ritual impurity.

A large mat of reeds,

although it is stiff and not particularly comfortable for lying, if

he made it

so that it would serve

for lying

on it, it is considered a vessel, since he explicitly designated it for that purpose, and it

is susceptible to ritual impurity, and

therefore

one may not use it for roofing.

But if he made it

for roofing,

it is not considered a “vessel,” and therefore

one may use it for roofing, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

The Gemara will explain the law of a mat that he made without specifying and did not explicitly designate for lying or roofing.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Both

a mat

small

and a large one

have the same law: If

he made it for lying,

it

is susceptible to ritual impurity, and one may not use it for roofing.

But if he made it

for roofing, one may use it for roofing, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

The Gemara below will explain the subject of their dispute, since the Sages certainly agree with Rabbi Eliezer that if he explicitly made it for lying, whether small or large, it is invalid. And if he designated it for roofing, even a small one is valid.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A large mat of reeds—if he made it for lying, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not use it for roofing; if he made it for roofing, one may use it for roofing and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity:

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

This itself is difficult

[the words of the Mishna contradict one another internally].

For

you said

at the beginning of the Mishna:

If he made it for lying, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not use it for roofing.

And it implies:

The reason is that he made it for lying;

therefore it is considered a vessel and is susceptible to ritual impurity.

But

if he made it

without specification,

it is as though he made it

for roofing

explicitly, and one may use it for roofing.

But then it teaches

at the end of the Mishna: If he made it

for roofing, one may use it for roofing, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

And it implies:

The reason is that he made it

explicitly

for

that purpose,

for roofing; but

if he made it

without specification,

it is as though he made it

for lying?!

The Gemara explains:

This is not difficult:

Here,

the first clause is speaking

of a

mat

large,

whose unspecified purpose is roofing. Therefore, it is specifically when he designated it for lying that it becomes a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity.

But

here,

the latter clause is speaking

of a

mat

small,

whose unspecified purpose is lying and which is fit to become susceptible to ritual impurity, and therefore it is specifically when he explicitly designated it for roofing that the status of a vessel is removed from it and it becomes valid for roofing.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Granted, according to the Sages, this is not difficult

the first and latter clauses, as we explained.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer,

it is still

difficult

to reconcile the first clause with the latter clause?!

As we learned,

for we learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Both

a mat

small and a large one—

if

he made it for lying, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not use it for roofing.

And it implies:

The reason is that he made it for lying

explicitly;

but

if he made it

without specification, it is intended for roofing

and is not considered a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity.

But

say the latter clause: If he made it for roofing, one may use it for roofing and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

And it implies:

The reason is that he made it

explicitly

for roofing; but

if he made it

without specification, it is intended for lying

and is invalid for roofing. And according to his opinion, it is impossible to resolve the matter as we resolved it according to the Sages—here referring to a large mat and here to a small one—for regarding Rabbi Eliezer we learned, “Both a small one and a large one,” making clear that both the first and latter clauses were stated with regard both to a small mat and to a large one.

Rather, Rava said,

the contradiction between the first and latter clauses of the Mishna, both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi Eliezer, must be resolved in a different manner: What we learned in the Mishna, both in the words of the Sages and in the words of Rabbi Eliezer, “for roofing,” does not mean that he explicitly designated it for roofing; rather, it means that he made it without specification.

The explanation of their dispute is as follows:

With regard to a

mat

large, everyone agrees that an unspecified one is for roofing.

For the first tanna, who speaks of a large mat, deems it invalid for roofing only if he explicitly made it for lying; but when made without specification, it is valid. And Rabbi Eliezer also said only that if he explicitly made it for lying, it is invalid.

When they disagree—

with regard to a

mat

small:

The first tanna,

who distinguished in the case of a large mat between one made for lying and one made without specification,

holds

that this distinction applies specifically to a large mat, but with regard to a small one,

an unspecified

mat

small is intended for lying

and is invalid for roofing.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who distinguished even in the case of a small mat between one made for lying and one made without specification,

holds that an unspecified small one is also intended for roofing

and is therefore fit for that purpose.