Sotah 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

You have stated it:

the tanna'im disagreed in a case of this kind concerning shikheḥa, whether it is considered covered, as it was taught:

A sheaf that one had taken in order to bring it to the city, and placed it on top of another sheaf and then forgot it—the lower one is shikheḥa, whereas the upper one is not

shikheḥa. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Neither of them is shikheḥa—the lower one because it is covered, and the upper one because it is floating.

And the Gemara explains that the members of the academy who sought to resolve from this Mishna the question of an object covered by an object of its own kind

assumed that these tanna'im—

both the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon—

accepted the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: “In the field”—to exclude what is covered.

If so, the first tanna, who said that the lower one is shikheḥa, did not disagree with Rabbi Shimon over whether an item covered is exempt from shikheḥa or not. Rather,

is it not that they disagree over this: One Master,

Rabbi Shimon,

holds that an object covered by an object of its own kind is considered covered, while the other Master,

the first tanna,

holds that an object covered by an object of its own kind is not considered covered,

and therefore the lower one is shikheḥa. Thus, the question raised by that amora is dependent on a dispute among the tanna'im.

And we reject this:

No,

there is no proof that they disagreed over whether an object of its own kind is considered covered. Rather, even

if

they all

accepted the view of Rabbi Yehuda,

that an item covered is exempt, it may be said that

everyone

would agree that

an object covered by an object of its own kind is considered covered; but here,

in the case of the sheaf placed on top of another sheaf,

they disagree over the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis,

whether an item covered is exempt from shikheḥa or not.

The Rabbis—

the first tanna—

hold in accordance with the Rabbis,

that an item covered is liable to be shikheḥa,

whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda

holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who exempts an item covered from shikheḥa. There is no connection between their dispute and the question concerning an object covered by an object of its own kind. Nor can one prove from the fact that they exempted the upper one that an object of its own kind is considered floating, since we concluded above that its exemption is because one had held it, and not because it was floating [Rashi]. The questions therefore remain unresolved.

We ask: If their dispute concerning the sheaf is whether an item covered is exempt or not,

why specifically

did the tanna add that the upper one had been placed

on top of the other,

when

even if

he had buried the lower one

in earth and stones as well,

they would disagree over whether it is exempt from shikheḥa? And we answer:

Indeed, that is so:

they disagree concerning an item covered in any manner,

and

it was necessary to teach us that it was covered by an object of its own kind only in order

to inform you of the force of Rabbi Yehuda’s position, who says that even an object covered by an object of its own kind is considered covered.

The Sages taught:

It is stated: “When a

slain person

is found”—that is, one killed by a sword or the like—and this implies an exclusion:

but not one strangled.

It further implies that only one found when he is already

a slain person, and not one still convulsing;

and from the wording

“on the ground”

it is inferred:

but not one buried under a mound.

And from the fact that it is written

“fallen,”

we exclude

one hanging from a tree.

And from the word

“in the field”

we derive:

but not one floating on the surface of the water. Rabbi Eliezer says: In all these cases—

one convulsing, floating, buried, or hanging—

if he was a slain person,

one killed by a sword and not one strangled,

the neck is broken.

It was taught: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda said: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: Do you not concede that if he was strangled and lying in a refuse heap

where he was neither floating nor hanging nor buried, and nevertheless it is certain

that the neck is not broken—this proves

that we derive

“a slain person,” but not one strangled;

if so,

here too

we should carefully derive the other exclusions indicated by this verse, such as

“on the ground,” but not buried under a mound; “fallen,” but not hanging from a tree; “in the field,” but not floating on the water.

And we answer:

But Rabbi Eliezer

holds that

“slain person” is written redundantly.

The word “slain person” is written several times in the passage, and is therefore expounded to teach that the neck is broken specifically over one killed by a sword, but not over one strangled. He did not make inferences from the other exclusions, since it is the normal usage of the verse to say “fallen in the field” and the like; only “slain person,” which is written several times, is expounded to exclude one strangled.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he was found near the frontier or near a city whose majority are idolaters, and so on.

And we explain why the neck is not broken over him:

For it is written: “When one is found,”

and we exclude

a place where he is commonly found.

The city or frontier of the gentiles is frequented constantly, [ Rashi; see the notes].

We learned in the Mishna:

Or near a city that has no court.

And we explain the reason that the neck is not broken over a slain person found near a city that has no court: It is because

I require

the fulfillment of “and the elders

of the city shall go out,” but this is impossible.

We learned in the Mishna:

The measurement is taken only toward a city, and so on,

that has a court.

And we ask:

Is this obvious? Since the tanna taught

that if he was found near

a city that has no court,

the measurement is not taken from it, it follows that

I know that the measurement is taken only toward a city that has a court.

And we answer:

This teaches us

that one should not say that when the slain person is found near a city that has no court, no measurement is taken at all. Rather, the measurement is always taken toward a city that has a court.

As it was taught: From where is it derived that if

he was found near a city that has no court, that city is set aside and the measurement is taken toward another city

that has a court?

The verse states: “And the elders of that city shall take,”

for, apparently, the words “that city” are superfluous. It would have been sufficient to write: “And it shall be, the city nearest the slain person, and its elders shall take.” The words “that city” were written only to teach that

in any event

the measurement is taken toward a city that has a court.

Mishna:

If

the slain person

is found exactly

in the precise midpoint of the distance

between two towns, both of them bring two

heifers,

that is, each city brings one heifer,

the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken,

as the Gemara derives from a verse.

If his head

of the slain person

was in one place and his body in another,

and the halakha is that a met mitzva acquires the place where it is to be buried, and they disagree where he should be buried: whether

the head is brought to the body, the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,

whereas

Rabbi Akiva says:

the

body is brought to the head,

and the reason for their dispute is explained in the Gemara.

They also disagree

from where,

from which place on the slain person’s body,

the measurement was taken

to determine the distance from the city:

Rabbi Eliezer says: from his navel;

Rabbi Akiva says

from his nose. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: from the place where he became a slain person,

that is,

from his neck,

and the reason for the dispute is explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We discuss this:

What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s

view, who said that if he is found exactly at the midpoint, each city brings a heifer? And we explain:

He holds that it is possible to determine precisely.

A person is capable of measuring with complete precision, and if the measurement shows that the slain person is exactly at the midpoint, the two cities are indeed equally close to him.

And we do not worry that one of these cities might be closer than the other by a distance imperceptible to a person. In such a case of doubt, the two towns bring one heifer jointly and stipulate: If our city is the nearer one, your share in the heifer will be acquired by us, and vice versa, but the measurement establishes that there is no doubt.

And

therefore the two cities bring a heifer, since Rabbi Eliezer also holds that the word

“nearest”

means

even

several cities that are

nearest.

We learned in the Mishna:

And Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken.

And we explain the reason:

The verse states:

“When a slain person is found on the land that the Lord your God gives you”

to inherit,

and we derive that the neck is broken over him only if he is found in a place apportioned for the inheritance of the tribes.

And he holds

that the tanna who said that Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken follows the opinion that

Jerusalem was not apportioned among the tribes.

We learned in the Mishna:

If his head was in one

place and his body in another,

and so on.

We discuss this:

Over what do they disagree?

With regard to what did Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree when they said that the head is brought to the place of the body, or vice versa?

If you say that they disagree with regard to the measurement,

whether the measurement is taken from the head or from the body, and each one holds that the other part is brought to the place of the part from which, according to his view, the measurement is taken, this cannot be said, because

from the fact that the latter clause teaches: “From where was the measurement taken,”

from the nose or from the navel,

it follows that the first clause is not discussing the measurement.