Sotah 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

And the priests say: “Atone for Your people Israel, whom You redeemed, O Lord, and do not place innocent blood in the midst of Your people Israel,”

and at the conclusion of this verse it says: “And the blood shall be atoned for them.” The Mishna explains that

the priests did not

the priests

need to say

also the words

“And the blood shall be atoned for them”; rather,

the meaning of the verse is that

Divine inspiration renders them fit

for the people of Israel through Moses our teacher for all generations:

Whenever you perform this in this manner, the blood shall be atoned for them.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning what we learned: “A blemish does not disqualify it,”

and let a blemish disqualify the heifer by means of a kal va-chomer: Just as the red heifer

red

whose age does not disqualify it,

for it may be made at any age, and nevertheless

a blemish disqualifies it,

then let us derive from it with regard to

the heifer, whose age does disqualify it,

as an ordinary “heifer” is one year old, and once its first year has passed it is disqualified from having its neck broken;

is it not then logical that a blemish should disqualify it?

And we answer:

There

with regard to the red heifer,

the verse says: “In which there is no blemish,”

and we expound only

“in which”

with regard to the red heifer:

a blemish disqualifies it, but a blemish does not disqualify the heifer whose neck is broken.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so,

since we do not derive by means of a kal va-chomer where the word “in which” is written, then even with regard to the red heifer

other forms of labor should not disqualify it.

For the Torah does not explicitly state that labor disqualifies the red heifer; it mentions only a yoke. The other forms of labor, however, are derived by means of a kal va-chomer from the heifer whose neck is broken, concerning which it is stated: “And they shall take a heifer of cattle that has not been worked with.” This implies every form of labor. And if labor disqualifies the heifer, even though a blemish does not disqualify it, all the more so should every form of labor disqualify the red heifer, where even a blemish disqualifies it.

But if there is a rule that when the Torah states “in which” concerning one mitzva, we do not derive from it with regard to another mitzva, then there is no source for disqualifying a red heifer through every form of labor performed with it. This would contradict the following:

For why, then, did Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rav: If one placed upon it

upon a red heifer

while it was still

a bundle

of sacks, it is disqualified,

even though this is not a yoke?

And

if

with regard to the heifer

it is not disqualified from having its neck broken

until it pulls

and shakes the load placed upon it, as it is stated with regard to it: “that has not pulled with a yoke,” implying that the red heifer is disqualified by any labor. Necessarily, then, we derive this from the heifer even though “in which” is written with regard to it. [The Gemara will explain below why the red heifer need not pull in order to become disqualified.]

And we answer:

The red heifer is different,

for it is not excluded by the word “in which” written with regard to the heifer, since we do not derive this through a kal va-chomer from the heifer, but rather

we derive it

by means of a gezera shava,

“yoke,” “yoke,” from the heifer.

Since it is derived by means of a gezera shava, the law is considered as though it were written in the passage concerning the red heifer itself, while the exclusion expressed by “in which” with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is expounded elsewhere.

And we raise a difficulty: If so, let us derive the disqualification of

a heifer

with a blemish from that same gezera shava of

“yoke,” “yoke,” from the red heifer.

And we answer that it is impossible to derive this from the red heifer, for

the Merciful One excluded

and wrote with regard to the red heifer

“in which,”

so that we do not derive from it.

And we express surprise: If so, what have you accomplished by deriving through a gezera shava from the heifer that labor disqualifies the red heifer? After all,

“in which” is also written with regard to the heifer,

so how can we derive from it with regard to the red heifer? And we answer:

That

“in which” written with regard to the heifer

is needed

for another exposition, namely

to exclude sacrificial animals, with regard to which labor does not disqualify them,

and they remain fit for sacrifice. Since one matter is excluded by means of “in which,” it is possible to derive the red heifer from the heifer through a gezera shava, and “in which” does not exclude the red heifer.

And we explain why it is necessary to exclude the possibility that labor disqualifies sacrificial animals. Why would we have disqualified the animal from sacrifice, seeing that the Torah merely states that an animal that has not been worked with must be taken as a sacrifice? Rather,

it might enter your mind to say that all sacrificial animals should be brought

by means of a

kal va-chomer from the heifer: Just as a heifer, with regard to which a blemish does not disqualify it,

nevertheless

labor disqualifies it, and

we would derive from it with regard to all

sacrificial animals, with regard to which a blemish does disqualify them,

that

is it not then logical that labor should disqualify them as well?

Therefore it is necessary for the Torah to write “in which” with regard to the heifer, teaching that labor disqualifies only it.

And we raise a difficulty:

There is grounds to refute

the kal va-chomer from the heifer to sacrificial animals, for

what is unique about the heifer

is that it is more stringent than sacrificial animals in an additional respect,

as age disqualifies it.

Therefore labor also disqualifies it, but it is impossible to derive a kal va-chomer with regard to sacrificial animals, which are less stringent in that age does not disqualify them. And we reject this refutation:

Is it so? Are there not sacrificial animals with regard to which age does disqualify them?

After all, a Paschal offering and a sin-offering are fit only when they are in their first year. If so, we can say that

the verse is needed

to write “in which” in order to exclude

those sacrificial animals with regard to which age does disqualify them.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

is it true

that the fact that labor does not disqualify sacrificial animals is derived from here,

from the exclusion of “in which” with regard to the heifer,

and follows from it?

But

it follows from there,

as it is written:

“Blind, or broken, or maimed, or having a wart, or scurvy, or scabbed, you shall not offer these to the Lord,”

and we expound:

“These you may not offer, but you may offer sacrificial animals with which labor has been performed.”

These you may not offer, but you may offer sacrificial animals with which labor has been performed,

so why do we need to exclude them through “in which” written with regard to the heifer?

And we answer:

It is necessary,

for if only “you shall not offer these to the Lord” had been written, and we had expounded it to permit sacrificial animals with which labor had been performed,

it might enter your mind to say that this applies

only to animals fit for sacrifice

where one performed permitted labor with them, but

if one performed with them

forbidden labor,

such as plowing with them on Shabbat or driving them together in a prohibited mixture of an ox and a donkey,

say that they should be forbidden

and disqualified for sacrifice. Therefore

it is necessary

to have the “in which” written with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, to exclude disqualification through labor and establish that such animals remain fit among sacrificial animals.

And we raise a difficulty:

But

the fact that sacrificial animals with which forbidden labor was performed remain fit

also follows from here,

as it is written:

“And from the hand of a foreigner you shall not offer the bread of your God from any of these,”

and we expound:

These you may not offer, but you may offer sacrificial animals with which labor has been performed.

Since there are two exclusions concerning sacrificial animals with which labor has been performed, we can assign the second exclusion to forbidden labor, teaching that even it does not disqualify them. Why, then, do we need an exclusion from the heifer?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to have two exclusions concerning sacrificial animals with which permitted labor was performed, for if there were only one exclusion,

it might enter your mind to say that this applies

only in a case

where one worked with them when they were non-sacred, but

if one

worked with them when they were sacrificial animals, say that they should be forbidden

and disqualified for sacrifice. Therefore

it is necessary

to have an additional exclusion, “from any of these.” The disqualification resulting from forbidden labor has still not been excluded, and therefore it is necessary to exclude it through “in which” with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: If one placed upon it

upon a red heifer

while it was still a bundle of sacks, it is disqualified; but with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken

it is not disqualified

until it pulls.

The Gemara raises an objection:

With regard to a red heifer it is written: “upon which no

yoke has come; I have only

a basis for knowing that it disqualifies

only a yoke; from where

do we know that other forms of labor also disqualify it?

You say by means of a kal va-chomer: Just as the heifer,

even

though a blemish does not disqualify it,

nevertheless

other forms of labor disqualify it,

and we derive from it by means of a kal va-chomer with regard to

the red heifer, with regard to which a blemish does disqualify it,

that

is it not then logical that other forms of labor

should also

disqualify it? And if you wish to say

that there is some reason not to derive this kal va-chomer, as will be explained below, there is nevertheless a source for disqualifying it through every form of labor by means of a gezera shava:

It is stated here

with regard to the red heifer

“yoke,” and it is stated elsewhere

with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken

“yoke.”

With regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, this word is superfluous, since it is disqualified by every form of labor, and therefore it is available to teach us:

Just as there, other forms of labor disqualify it,

as it is stated: “that has not been worked with,” which implies every form of labor,

so here, other forms of labor disqualify it.

And we explain:

What is the meaning of “And if you wish to say”?

Its meaning is:

And if you would say that there is grounds to refute

the kal va-chomer from the heifer, with regard to which a blemish does not disqualify it, for one could say:

What is unique about the heifer

is that it has a more stringent aspect than the red heifer,

as age disqualifies it,

and therefore only it is disqualified by every form of labor, but not the red heifer;

alternatively,

one could say that

sacrificial animals prove the contrary, for a blemish disqualifies them, but

nevertheless

labor does not disqualify them.

Even if you say this, there is still a source for disqualifying the red heifer through every form of labor by means of a gezera shava from the heifer:

It is stated here “yoke,” and it is stated there “yoke”; just as there

with regard to the heifer

other forms of labor

disqualify it,

so here, with regard to

the red heifer,

other forms of labor

disqualify it.

Here the Gemara concludes its objection to Rav Yehuda, who said that a red heifer becomes disqualified merely when sacks are placed upon it, even if it does not pull them. We have seen that the entire source for disqualifying a red heifer through every form of labor is the gezera shava from the heifer whose neck is broken. If so, how can the red heifer become disqualified through carrying a load, while the other heifer is not disqualified until it pulls? One should argue:

And from the very source from which you have come,

you have a basis for deriving

that just as there,

with regard to the heifer, it is not disqualified

until it pulls

and shakes the load placed upon it,

so here too,

the red heifer should not become disqualified

until it pulls.

And we answer:

It is the subject of a tannaitic dispute, for there is one who derives it

that other forms of labor disqualify the red heifer

from the heifer,

and according to his view the red heifer does not become disqualified through carrying a load alone until it pulls.

And there is one who derives it from the body of the passage concerning the red heifer itself, as it is taught:

With regard to the verse concerning the red heifer,

“yoke,” I have only

that it becomes disqualified through

a yoke; from where do we know this concerning other forms of labor? The verse states: “upon which no yoke has come”—in any event.

We derive from the fact that the verse does not say “upon which no yoke has come” that its intention is to refer to anything that has not come upon it.

And we explain:

If so, what is the verse teaching by stating “yoke”? A yoke disqualifies whether during the performance of labor or not during the performance of labor,

for example, if one placed it upon the heifer temporarily merely to lighten his load, and not in order that it pull the yoke, whereas

other forms of labor disqualify only during the performance of labor,

when one places a load upon it for an actual purpose. But if one places the load upon it temporarily, without intending that it carry the load for his needs, this does not disqualify it.

And we raise a difficulty:

But say: “upon which no labor has been performed” is a general statement, while “yoke” is a specific statement;

and let us expound:

A generalization followed by a specification includes only what is specified in the specification.

Thus we should derive that only

a yoke, and nothing else,

disqualifies it, whereas

anything else,

other forms of labor,

do not

disqualify the red heifer. And we answer:

“Which” is an inclusion, and

it includes the fact that other forms of labor also disqualify the red heifer.

And a beraita was likewise taught with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken in this manner:

For it is written with regard to it:

“Yoke”; I have only

that it becomes disqualified

only

through

a yoke; from where do we know that other forms of labor also disqualify it? The verse states: “that has not been worked with,”

which implies labor

in any event. If so, what does the verse teach by stating

again: “that has not pulled with a

yoke,”

to teach us:

A yoke disqualifies whether during the performance of labor or not during the performance of labor; other forms of labor disqualify only during the performance of labor.

And we raise a difficulty:

But say: “that has not been worked with” is a general statement, while “yoke” is a specific statement; a generalization followed by a specification includes only what is specified in the specification, and

we should derive that only

a yoke

disqualifies it, whereas

nothing else does.

And we answer:

“Which” is an inclusion,

to include that other forms of labor also disqualify it.

Rabbi Abbahu said: I asked Rabbi Yohanan: The pulling of a yoke

that disqualifies the heifer whose neck is broken

to what

measure is it defined?

He said to me: The measure of a full yoke.

It was asked:

Does “the full measure of the yoke” mean

along its length or across its width? One of the Sages, whose name was Rabbi Yaakov, said to them: For me, Rabbi Yohanan explained the matter: The pulling of the yoke

is measured

across its width,

and how much is that?

One handbreadth.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Let him say simply: “One handbreadth.”

Why did he need to say that it is the width of a yoke? And we explain:

This teaches us that the measure of a yoke is a handbreadth. What practical difference does this make? For buying and selling,

for buying and selling,

so that if one bought a yoke and discovered that its width was less than a handbreadth, he could return it and claim that he had been misled in the purchase.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Shaul said: Why did the Torah say to bring a heifer to a rugged valley? The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Let something that produced no fruit—the heifer—come and have its neck broken in a place that produces no fruit,

which is the valley, whose soil is hard and cannot be cultivated,

and let it atone for the one whom they did not allow to produce fruit

through having murdered him. And we inquire into this:

What fruit

did they not allow him to produce?

If you say that it means procreation, then from now on

with regard to a murdered person who was

old or castrated, would we also not break the heifer’s neck? Rather,

the intention is that they did not allow him to perform

mitzvot.

it means that they did not allow him to perform

mitzvot.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And they bring it down to a rugged valley”; “rugged” means literally hard.

The Sages taught: From where do we know that “rugged”

means

that it is hard?