Shevuot 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And from where

that bringing in is also called taking out? ")

as we learned

in tractate Shabbat, in the chapter Kelal Gadol [73a], in the Mishna explaining the thirty-nine labors:

“One who takes out from one domain to another is liable!”

Are we not dealing with a case where he brings in

from the public domain into the private domain, which is likewise a transfer from one domain to another,

and it calls it taking out?

The Gemara attempts to reject the proof:

Perhaps

the tanna is speaking only when

he takes out from the private domain into the public domain

and that is why he says

“One who takes out”

from one domain to another?

The Gemara rejects this rejection:

If so,

if the tanna is speaking specifically about one who takes out from the private domain into the public domain,

let him teach: “One who takes out from the private domain into the public domain.” What

is the reason that the tanna used the expression

“from one domain to another”?

If it is not to teach you

that even when one brings in from the public domain into the private domain, it calls it taking out.

The Gemara explains:

And the reason

for calling bringing in by the expression taking out

what

is it? —

The tanna calls any uprooting of an object from its place

taking out.

The expression “taking out” refers to taking the object out of the place where it is resting. Thus, even when it is uprooted from the public domain, it is taken out of its place there.

Ravina said: The Mishna

at the beginning of tractate Shabbat

also indicates this,

as the tanna calls bringing in by the expression taking out.

For it teaches: “The acts of taking out on Shabbat are two that are four

for the householder standing

inside, and two that are four

for the poor person standing

outside,” and it explains

which acts of taking out these are; and at the very beginning of its words, the tanna explains how the

bringing in

of the poor person from the public domain into the private domain is performed.

Learn from this

that bringing in is also an expression of taking out.

Rava said: It teaches “domains”

in the Mishna, and not “acts of taking out.” Therefore, there is no difficulty as to why it calls bringing in taking out. And this is what the tanna of the Mishna is saying:

The domains of Shabbat

are

two,

namely, the private domain and the public domain. By means of them, there are two prohibitions for one standing inside, and two prohibitions for one standing outside.

We learned in the Mishna:

The appearances of afflictions—

two

principal categories,

which are four

together with their two derivatives.

The two principal categories and the two derivatives of the appearances of afflictions are derived from the verse: “When a person has on the skin of his flesh a se’et, or a sappahat, or a baheret, and it becomes on the skin of his flesh an affliction of tzara’at.” And we expound that the baheret and the se’et are principal categories of afflictions, whereas sappahat is not an affliction in its own right. Rather, it is a designation for the two derivatives of the two principal categories, which are “attached” in the appearance of their whiteness, each derivative to its principal category.

And these are the appearances of whiteness of the principal categories and the derivatives:

The baheret

has the brightest appearance of whiteness, and appears like the whiteness of snow.

The se’et

is the second degree of whiteness, and appears like the clean wool of a yearling lamb.

The derivative of the baheret

is the third degree of whiteness, and appears like the white lime with which they would plaster the Sanctuary.

The derivative of the se’et

is the fourth degree of whiteness, and appears like the white of an eggshell.

We learned there,

at the beginning of tractate Nega’im:

“The appearances of afflictions are two”

principal categories,

“which are four”

together with the two derivatives of the principal categories.

And these are the principal categories and the derivatives:

The baheret

is the first principal category, and its whiteness

is strong like snow.

This is the first degree of whiteness!

The second to it,

its derivative, has whiteness

like the lime of the Sanctuary,

which is the third degree of whiteness!

The se’et

is the second principal category, and its whiteness is

like white wool,

which is the second degree of whiteness!

The second to it,

its derivative, has whiteness

like an eggshell,

which is the fourth degree of whiteness!

This concludes the wording of the Mishna in tractate Nega’im.

The practical difference resulting from dividing the four afflictions into two principal categories and their two derivatives is that each principal category combines with its derivative to complete the measure of a gris, which is the measure that renders an affliction impure!

Rabbi Ḥanina said: Who is the tanna

who taught the Mishna that

the appearances of afflictions

are divided into two principal categories and two derivatives—

not Rabbi Akiva!

For if

our Mishna holds

like Rabbi Akiva, since he said

that the Sages taught the four appearances according to the order of their degrees of whiteness,

“one above another, and this one above that one,”

so that we would know which appearance of an affliction combines with another to complete the measure of a gris [which is the smallest measure of an affliction that renders one impure with the impurity of afflictions]; for only two appearances adjacent to one another in their degrees of whiteness combine—if we divide the four appearances into two principal categories and their two derivatives, and they combine only as a principal category with its derivative, as we learned in the Mishna in tractate Nega’im,

then you have rendered pure

the appearance of

the lime of the Sanctuary from combining

half a gris measure of it with half the measure of any other affliction! For

with which one could it combine?

With which appearance of an affliction can the lime of the Sanctuary combine according to Rabbi Akiva?

Let it combine with the baheret,

which is its principal category—but this is impossible according to Rabbi Akiva, who said that only two afflictions adjacent to one another in their degree of whiteness combine. According to him, it is impossible to combine the appearance of white lime, which is the third degree of whiteness, with the baheret, which is the first degree. For between the baheret and the lime of the Sanctuary

there is the se’et,

which is the second degree of whiteness,

which is superior to it,

as it is more suitable than the baheret for combining with the lime of the Sanctuary: the se’et is the second degree, adjacent to the third, whereas the baheret is the first, two degrees of whiteness distant from the white lime.

And if you say

let it combine

with the lime of the Sanctuary

with the se’et

that is adjacent to it, then according to the tanna of our Mishna, who divides the four afflictions into two principal categories and two derivatives, it is impossible to combine the lime of the Sanctuary with the se’et, since the lime of the Sanctuary

is not its derivative

—it is not its derivative! Therefore, it is impossible to establish our Mishna as following Rabbi Akiva, because according to him there is necessarily no division into principal categories and derivatives. Rather, according to him, the Mishna of the four appearances of afflictions must be arranged according to their order of whiteness: the baheret, strong like snow; the se’et, like white wool; and the second to it, the lime of the Sanctuary and the eggshell. The reason that the appearances are taught as one above another is to teach that they combine only when they are two adjacent appearances. According to Rabbi Akiva, the baheret combines with the se’et adjacent to it, and the se’et with the lime of the Sanctuary adjacent to it. Likewise, the lime of the Sanctuary, which is third, can combine both with the se’et, which is second, and with the eggshell, which is fourth.

Therefore it is impossible to establish our Mishna as being in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, because according to him there must be no division into primary categories and derivatives. Rather, according to him the Mishna of the four appearances of afflictions must be taught according to the order of their whiteness: The bright spot is strong as snow, the swelling is like white wool, and the second to it are the plaster of the Sanctuary and the eggshell. And the fact that the appearances are taught one above the other teaches us that their combination is only between two adjacent appearances. According to Rabbi Akiva, the bright spot combines with the swelling adjacent to it, and the swelling with the plaster of the Sanctuary adjacent to it. Likewise, the plaster of the Sanctuary, which is third, can combine both with the swelling, which is second, and with the eggshell, which is fourth.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if you inferred that our Mishna is not like Rabbi Akiva because the baheret cannot combine with the lime of the Sanctuary, since they are two degrees apart, and according to Rabbi Akiva a distance of two degrees between appearances prevents their combination,

the eggshell also

presents you with a difficulty, since it is impossible to establish the Mishna as following Rabbi Akiva because

with which could it combine?

If you say

let it combine

the eggshell

with the se’et,

its principal category, this cannot be said according to Rabbi Akiva, since

there is lime

of the Sanctuary between the se’et, which is second, and the eggshell, which is fourth,

which is superior to it

than the se’et. For the lime of the Sanctuary is adjacent in its third degree to the eggshell, which is fourth, and according to Rabbi Akiva only adjacent appearances combine!

And if you say

let the eggshell combine with the lime

of the Sanctuary, which is adjacent to it—

it is not of its kind!

For the eggshell is a derivative of the se’et, whereas the lime of the Sanctuary is a derivative of the baheret.

And since it is impossible to establish the Mishna as following Rabbi Akiva even with regard to the eggshell, why did you not infer from it that the tanna of the Mishna of the appearances of afflictions is not Rabbi Akiva?