Shevuot 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, expounds

according to the principle of inclusions and exclusions,

and therefore he includes every item, and excludes only piercing with a chemical agent.

And on the basis of this explicit proof from the beraita, the Gemara retracts the explanation that Rabbi expounds according to inclusions and exclusions, and says:

No,

indeed,

in general, Rabbi expounds according to generalization and specification,

and not according to inclusions and exclusions.

But here,

in the redemption of the firstborn,

this is the reason

that Rabbi expounds according to inclusions and exclusions: Here, it is impossible to derive the law through generalization and specification, since the specification is not written between two generalizations. Rather, the generalizations are written first, and only afterward the specifications. In such a case, Rabbi holds

in accordance with the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

that one derives through generalization and specification only when the form is inclusion and exclusion.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

In the passage concerning sheratzim in Leviticus 11, it is stated: “This you may eat from all that is

in the water:

all that has fins and scales

in the water,

in the seas and in the streams, those you may eat.”

It appears twice.

And from the fact that “in the water” is written twice, and only afterward “in the seas and in the streams” is stated, it is evident that

this is not a generalization and specification, but an inclusion and an exclusion.

This is because two generalizations followed by a specification are interpreted as generalization and specification only in the form of inclusion and exclusion. We say: Place the exclusion of “in the seas and in the streams” between the two inclusions of “in the water.” [But in the case of generalization and specification, we do not say to place a specification that follows the generalizations between them.]

And we raise an objection:

But the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi concerning the redemption of the firstborn and derive the law through generalization and specification—how did they derive it in this manner? After all, the two generalizations precede the specification?

Ravina said:

The Rabbis hold

in accordance with what they say in the West: Wherever you find two generalizations adjacent to one another

and the specification follows them,

place the specification between them and interpret them as a generalization and specification

[and generalization].

The Gemara concludes its explanation of Rabbi’s method in our Mishna:

Now that you have said that Rabbi—

expounds generalizations and specifications, you are necessarily faced with the difficulty concerning oaths!

For if one derives through generalization and specification, and not through inclusions and exclusions, he is liable only for the two oaths concerning the future, analogous to the specification [“to do harm or to do good”]. Why, then, did Rabbi write in the Mishna: “Oaths are two, which are four”?

Rather,

it must be that

with regard to oaths, he took

the statement “two, which are four”

according to Rabbi Akiva,

[who expounds inclusions and exclusions].

But he himself does not hold this view,

for he himself expounds generalizations and specifications!

The text itself: From where is it derived that he is liable

for an ascending-and-descending offering for the ritual impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things

only for

impurity

in which there was awareness at the beginning, awareness at the end, and obliviousness in between?—

The verse states

[Leviticus 5]:

“And it was hidden” and “and it was hidden,” twice; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi says: It is not necessary! For it says, “And it was hidden,” indicating that he knew initially,

and it is also written,

“and he knew”; here, then, are two instances of awareness.

One at the beginning and one at the end.

If so, what does the verse teach by saying “and it was hidden” and “and it was hidden”?—

To make him liable

also

for obliviousness concerning the impurity,

and also

for obliviousness concerning the Sanctuary.

The Master said: “And it was hidden”—

indicating that he knew.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

What indication is there?

From where do we know this? Perhaps the meaning of “and it was hidden” is that he never knew at all?

Rava said: Because it is not written, “and it was concealed from him,”

for such wording would indicate complete obliviousness, including at the beginning.

Abaye said

to Rava:

If so, with regard to a woman suspected of adultery, concerning whom it is written

[Numbers 5],

“and it was hidden from the eyes of her husband,”

we should also say:

It indicates that he knew initially,

that the husband initially knew that she had secluded herself or committed adultery, but afterward this knowledge was hidden from him. Yet this cannot be so, for

if he knew, who would have the waters test her? For it was taught in a beraita: “The man shall be clear of iniquity

and that woman shall bear her iniquity”—when the man is clear of iniquity, the waters test his wife; when the man is not clear of iniquity—

the waters do not test his wife.

For if he forgot that she had secluded herself or committed adultery, presumably he would have relations with her, and it would turn out that he was not clear of iniquity, since after she secluded herself or committed adultery she is forbidden to him.

Furthermore, with regard to the Torah, concerning which it is written

[in the Book of Job 28],

“It is hidden from the eyes of every living thing, and concealed from the birds of the sky,”

according to your reasoning, one should say:

It indicates that there was someone who knew it. But it is written—

“No man knows its value”!

Rather, Abaye said: Rabbi holds that knowledge acquired in one’s teacher’s school is considered knowledge.

That is, there is no person who did not read this verse in his teacher’s school and know that one who touches an impure object becomes impure; he simply now fails to remember that he is impure, because he did not pay attention to the fact that this contact renders him impure. According to Rabbi, knowledge acquired in one’s teacher’s school is considered awareness at the beginning, followed by obliviousness.

Rav Pappa said

to Abaye:

But with regard to that which is taught

in the Mishna,

“There was no awareness at the beginning, but there was awareness at the end—

the goat that was sacrificed outside and Yom Kippur atones for it”—

is there anyone who lacks knowledge acquired in his teacher’s school?

If so, for whom does this offering come to atone?

He said to him,

Abaye:

Yes! It can be found in the case of a child who was captured among gentiles,

who does not even have knowledge acquired in his teacher’s school. It is for him that the external goat, together with Yom Kippur, provides atonement.

We learned in the Mishna:

The acts of transferring objects on Shabbat are two, which are four.

We learned there,

at the beginning of tractate Shabbat:

The acts of transferring objects on Shabbat are two, which are four inside, and two, which are four outside!

And we considered this:

What is different here, where it teaches “two, which are four,” and no more; and what is different there, where it teaches “two, which are four inside, and two, which are four outside”?

And we answer:

There, since it is the primary subject of Shabbat, it teaches the primary categories

[which are the acts of transferring, performed by the poor person and the homeowner, since the prohibition of transferring is explicit in the Torah]

and the derivatives

[which are the acts of bringing in, which are not explicit in the Torah]. But

here, since it is not the primary subject of Shabbat, it teaches the primary categories, but does not teach the derivatives.

But the Gemara rejects this answer, since it is impossible to say that only the primary categories are taught here, for

what are the primary categories?—

The acts of transferring.

But

the acts of transferring are two!

One concerns someone standing inside, and the other someone standing outside. How, then, did we learn that there are four for which one is liable?

And if you would say

that not all four entail liability, but rather

some entail liability and some do not entail liability

[for example, when he merely uprooted the object but did not place it down, or placed it down but did not uproot it],

but it is taught in a manner analogous to the appearance of plagues: Just as there, all of them entail liability, so too here, all of them entail liability!?

Rather, Rav Pappa said: There, since it is the primary subject of Shabbat, it teaches cases of liability and cases of exemption. Here, it teaches cases of liability, but does not teach cases of exemption.

But his answer is still not clear:

What are the cases of liability?—

The acts of transferring. And the acts of transferring are only two!?

The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa means to say that the four cases of liability in the Mishna that are mandated by Torah law are

two acts of transferring out and two acts of bringing in.

However, there is still a difficulty with Rav Pappa’s answer:

But it teaches “the acts of transferring,”

whereas Rav Pappa is also counting two acts of bringing in!?

Rav Ashi said,

to explain Rav Pappa’s answer:

The tanna—

he also calls bringing in “transferring”!