Shevuot 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi says: It is not necessary

to expound the two occurrences of “and it is hidden,” as it would suffice for us to derive this from a single occurrence of “and it is hidden,”

for it says

“and it is hidden.” From this

you learn

that he knew

of the impurity beforehand. For if he had no knowledge of it at all, this could not be called that it was “hidden” from him. And since the verse continued and said

“and he knew,” it follows that

there were written

here two acts of knowledge—

one before the lapse of awareness and one afterward!

Rabbi continues and expounds:

If so, what is the meaning of

the two occurrences of

“and it is hidden,” “and it is hidden”?

To obligate

both

for lack of awareness of the impurity and

both

for lack of awareness of the Temple.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael, and not with Rabbi Akiva, who said that one is liable only for lack of awareness of the impurity, but not for lack of awareness of the Temple]!

We have found with regard to acts of knowledge

of the impurity

that

Rabbi has

his own rationale

for holding in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael.

With regard to

an oath of utterance,

since

Rabbi does not have

his own rationale, from where do we know

that Rabbi holds like Rabbi Akiva, who says that one is liable for an oath of utterance even with regard to the past?

The Gemara explains:

It is a logical inference! For what reason does Rabbi Akiva obligate

a person to bring an offering even for an oath

regarding the past? Because he expounds inclusions and exclusions [and does not expound according to the method of generalization and specification], and therefore he included from the verse “when a person takes an oath” all oaths, both those concerning the future and those concerning the past. If so,

and does not expound them according to the method of generalization and specification]. Therefore, from the verse “When a person takes an oath,” he includes all oaths, both those concerning the future and those concerning the past. If so,

Rabbi likewise expounds inclusions and exclusions

and does not expound according to the method of generalization and specification. Therefore, he too expounds the inclusion of Rabbi Akiva to obligate one for an oath concerning the past.

The difference between the method of inclusions and exclusions and that of generalizations and specifications is that with inclusions and exclusions, the inclusion includes everything, while the exclusion excludes only one thing. In contrast, with generalizations and specifications, we expound that the generalization includes only something similar to the specification. For example, in the passage concerning an oath of utterance: On the one hand, the verse says, “when a person takes an oath,” implying every type of oath. On the other hand, the verse limits it to “to do harm or to do good.” If we expound it by the method of generalization and specification, the specification teaches about the generalization that one is liable only for oaths concerning the future, which resemble the specification “to do harm or to do good,” whereas oaths concerning the past are not included in this category. But if we expound it by the method of inclusions and exclusions, the inclusion of “when a person takes an oath” includes all oaths, both those concerning the future and those concerning the past, while the exclusion “to do harm or to do good” excludes only one thing: one who takes an oath to nullify a mitzva].

And the proof that Rabbi expounds inclusions and exclusions and not generalizations and specifications is from the following:

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: With anything

worth five selaim

one may redeem a firstborn human son, except for documents

alone.

And the Rabbis say: With anything one may redeem a firstborn human son, except for slaves, documents, and land.

What is the reason for Rabbi’s opinion? He expounds inclusions and exclusions: “And his redemption from one month old”—

it includes

everything as an object of redemption;

“according to your valuation, five silver shekels”—

it excludes,

as it indicates that the redemption is only with money.

“You shall redeem”—

it again includes

redemption with anything. And we say:

An inclusion, an exclusion, and an inclusion—

it includes everything

and excludes one thing.

What does it include?

Everything,

every object as an item of redemption.

And what does it exclude?

It excludes documents,

as their physical substance does not itself have monetary value.

And the Rabbis expound generalizations and specifications: “And his redemption from one month old” -

a generalization; “according to your valuation, five silver shekels”—

a specification; “you shall redeem”—

it returns and generalizes. A generalization, specification, and generalization: You may derive only something similar to the specification

as the specification comes to explain the generalization]:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something that is movable and whose substance has monetary value, so too, anything that is movable and whose substance has monetary value

may be used for its redemption;

land is excluded, as it is not movable; slaves are excluded, as they are compared to land,

as it is written, “and you shall take them as an inheritance” (Rashi);

documents are excluded, for although they are movable, their physical substance does not itself have monetary value!

Ravina said to Ameimar:

But is it so that

Rabbi expounds inclusions and exclusions? Yet Rabbi expounds generalizations and specifications!

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the passage of Re’eh [Deuteronomy 15:17] that if a Hebrew slave does not wish to leave his master after six years, “you shall take the awl, place it through his ear and through the door, and he shall be your slave forever.” And we expound:

“The awl”—I have derived only an awl. From where is it derived to include a pointed stake

a sharpened piece of wood]

and a thorn

a spike],

a needle, a drill, and an engraving tool

a stylus]?

The verse states: “You shall take”—anything that can be taken in the hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi says: “The awl”—

just as an awl is specifically made of metal, so too, anything made of metal.

The verse teaches that one may not pierce him with a sharpened piece of wood or with a thorn.

And we say: With regard to what do

Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

differ? Rabbi expounds generalizations and specifications:

“You shall take” is a generalization, “the awl” is a specification, and “place it through his ear” returns and generalizes (Rashi). Therefore, the awl must be made only of metal, because in the case of a generalization and a specification, one may derive only something similar to the specification.