Shevuot 4b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi says: It is not necessary

to expound two instances of “and it was concealed”; it is sufficient for us to learn from one instance of “and it was concealed,”

for he says ![](pamud.bmp "

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“and it was concealed.” From this

you learn

that he knew

beforehand about the impurity. For if he had not known about it at all, it cannot be called that it was “concealed” from him. And since the verse continued and said

“and he knew,” it follows that

there were written

here two instances of “knowledge”—

one before the concealment and one after it!

And Rabbi continues and expounds:

If so, what does

the repetition

“and it was concealed,” “and it was concealed,”

come to obligate

both

for concealment of impurity and

both

for concealment of the Sanctuary.

And that is in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael, and not with Rabbi Akiva, who said that one is liable only for concealment of impurity, but not for concealment of the Sanctuary!

We have found this with regard to the knowledges

of impurity,

that

Rabbi

has his own reason

to hold in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael.

With regard to

an oath of utterance,

since

Rabbi

does not have his own reason, from where do we know

that Rabbi held in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, that one is liable for oaths of utterance even concerning the past?

And the Gemara explains:

It is a logical inference! For what is Rabbi Akiva’s reason that he obligates

a sacrifice also for an oath

concerning the past? Because he expounds inclusions and exclusions

and does not expound generalizations and particulars; therefore, from the verse “When a person swears” he included all oaths, both concerning the future and concerning the past. If so,

Rabbi also expounds inclusions and exclusions,

and does not expound generalizations and particulars. Therefore, he too expounds the inclusion of Rabbi Akiva to obligate one for an oath concerning the past.

The difference between inclusions and exclusions and generalizations and particulars is that with inclusions and exclusions, the inclusion includes everything, while the exclusion excludes only one thing, whereas with generalizations and particulars we expound that the generalization includes only something resembling the particular. For example, in the passage concerning an oath of utterance: on the one hand, the verse says, “When a person swears,” implying every type of oath. On the other hand, the verse limits it to “to do harm or to do good” alone. If we learn it as a generalization and a particular, then the particular teaches concerning the generalization that one is liable only for oaths concerning the future, which resemble the particular “to do harm or to do good,” whereas oaths concerning the past are not included in this. But if we learn it through inclusions and exclusions, then the inclusion of “When a person swears” includes all oaths, both concerning the future and concerning the past, while the exclusion “to do harm or to do good” excludes only one thing: one who swears to nullify a mitzva.

And the proof that Rabbi expounds inclusions and exclusions and not generalizations and particulars is from this:

as it was taught: Rabbi says: With anything

worth five selaim

one redeems a firstborn human being, except for documents

alone.

And the Sages say: With anything one redeems a firstborn human being, except for slaves, documents, and landed property.

What is Rabbi’s reason? He expounds inclusions and exclusions: “And its redemption from a month old”—

it included

every object for redemption;

“according to your valuation, five shekels of silver”—

it excluded,

that the redemption is only with money;

“you shall redeem”—

it again included

for redemption with every object. And we say:

It included, excluded, and included—

it included everything,

and excluded one thing.

What did it include?

All things,

every object for redemption.

And what did it exclude?

It excluded documents,

because their substance is not property.

And the Sages expound generalizations and particulars: “And its redemption from a month old” —

a generalization; “according to your valuation, five shekels of silver”—

a particular; “you shall redeem”—

it returned and generalized. A generalization, a particular, and a generalization—you may derive only something resembling the particular

because the particular comes to explain the generalization:

Just as the particular is explicitly something movable and its substance is property, so too every thing that is movable and whose substance is property

can be used to redeem it.

Excluded is landed property, which is not movable; excluded are slaves, who were compared to landed property,

as it is written, “and you shall hold them as an inheritance” (Rashi);

excluded are documents, which, although they are movable, their substance is not property!

Ravina said to Ameimar:

But is it so that

Rabbi expounds inclusions and exclusions? Yet Rabbi expounds generalizations and particulars!

As it was taught:

It is stated in the passage of Re’eh [Deuteronomy 15:17] that if a Hebrew slave does not wish to leave his masters after six years: “And you shall take the awl, and place it in his ear and in the door, and he shall be your slave forever.” And we expound:

“The awl”—I have only the awl; from where to include the pointed wooden piece

a sharpened piece of wood]

and the thorn,

a thorn],

the needle, the gimlet, and the stylus

;

the verse says, “And you shall take”: anything that is taken in the hand. These are the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi says: “The awl”—

just as the awl is specifically of metal, so too everything must be of metal.

The verse teaches that he cannot pierce with sharpened wood or with a thorn.

And we say: In what do

Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda

differ? Rabbi expounds generalizations and particulars;

“And you shall take”—a generalization; “the awl”—a particular; “and place it in his ear”—it returned and generalized (Rashi). Therefore, it must be that the awl is of metal alone, because with a generalization and a particular, you may derive only something resembling the particular.